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
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## CHAPTER ONE : MACRO ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT

### A. RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS

#### Economic trends pre-1991

With a current per capita income of just US\$120, Ethiopia is one of the lowest income countries and one of the least developed in the world. Crucially, the country's economic evolution has been closely tied to its political developments. Under the tutelage of the late Emperor Haile Selassie, which was characterised by a period of relative political stability and prudent macroeconomic policies, the country's overall economic development was quite impressive. Between 1965 and the overthrow of the Emperor by the 'Armed Forces Co-ordinating Committee', otherwise known as the 'Dergue' in 1973, the economy expanded at an annual average rate of over 4 per cent. The result of such sustained growth in output was an improved standard of living for most of the population.

The Dergue's pursuit of socialist economic transformation under the leadership of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, however, ushered in a period of economic stagnation, and indeed, regression. In 1975, two years after its accession to power, the Dergue undertook a comprehensive nationalisation of private assets, which saw the financial sector, major manufacturing enterprises, commercial farming, trade, transport and tourism sectors brought under state control. In addition, there was an outright transfer of ownership of rural land, mostly from feudal absentee landlords, to the peasantry.

Predictably, the economic dislocation which accompanied these radical measures were massive. Despite a period of rising international coffee prices which underpinned the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and modestly successful successive annual development campaigns, the country's overall economic performance was broadly unfavourable. Between 1974 and 1990, real GDP growth averaged just 1.9 per cent per annum, falling far short of the estimated annual population growth rate of 2.7 per cent. In fact, this figure belies the fact that for much of the second half of the 1980s, there was a systematic deterioration in most macroeconomic indicators. In fiscal year (FY) 1988/89, real GDP grew by a sluggish 0.2 per cent, undermined by a broad-based stagnation/contraction in sectoral economic activity; the agricultural sector expanded by a pitiful 0.5 per cent, while industry and distributive services actually contracted by 3.5 per cent and 6 per cent respectively.

Allied to the contraction in the real sector, the fiscal deficit steadily widened, with the government increasingly resorting to deficit-financing from the central bank. By 1990, aggregate fiscal expenditures had reached a monumental 46 per cent of GDP (20 per cent in 1974), while revenues were less than 25 per cent of GDP. The result was that the overall deficit, excluding grants, amounted to just over 20 per cent of GDP for that year. Moreover, in 1989/90, export receipts plummeted by some 17 per cent year-on-year, imports contracted by over 12 per cent on the same comparative basis. The external account balance, excluding public transfers, worsened to almost 5 per cent of GDP, and by the end of 1990, gross official reserves equated to a precarious 1.3 weeks of import cover.

Also telling was that in 1990, Ethiopia's aggregate foreign debt stood at US\$8.6 billion or US\$172 per capita (compared to a GDP per capita of US\$90), and the country, once applauded for its prompt discharge of debt service obligations was in arrears on its external debt by almost US\$100 million.

In summary, the general deterioration of the domestic economy witnessed during much of the 1980s can be explained by the combination of several factors, including:

- the implementation of misguided policies which had the effect of discouraging efficiency;
- centralisation of economic management and the suppression of market forces;
- the maintenance of an unrealistic exchange rate which had the effect of penalising exports, while inducing an influx of cheap imports for both consumption and industrial use; and,
- fixed and administered prices which distorted resource allocation.

In no small measure, the perverse effects of the above policies were exacerbated by recurrent drought and the disruption caused by the prolonged armed conflict.

Table 1.1

Annual GDP growth rates - 1988/89 - 1993/94 (at constant 1980/81 factor cost)						
	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94
<b>Agricultural sector</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>-2.0</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>-5.3</b>
Agriculture	0.3	5.8	2.6	-2.6	7.0	-5.9
Forestry	2.0	2.0	1.7	2.0	2.5	-1.7
Fishing	6.0	4.8	6.8	6.4	6.0	5.7
<b>Industry</b>	<b>-3.5</b>	<b>-4.3</b>	<b>-18.5</b>	<b>-7.6</b>	<b>27.1</b>	<b>7.6</b>
Mining & quarrying	3.0	-5.4	171.4	-25.1	46.4	-21.2
Manufacturing	-0.5	-3.9	-38.7	-9.6	51.9	13.2
Handicraft/small-scale	-10.0	10.5	-13.8	0.3	17.1	1.9
Building/Construction	4.1	2.4	3.0	3.9	5.8	5.6
Electricity/water	-7.8	-15.0	-9.2	-14.3	16.9	10.0
<b>Distributive services</b>	<b>-6.0</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>-23.0</b>	<b>-3.0</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>8.6</b>
Trade, hotels etc	-10.5	7.2	-31.2	-13.0	35.4	11.1
Transp/Communication	3.1	-1.3	-7.3	11.3	10.8	5.6
<b>Other Services</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>-5.1</b>	<b>-3.0</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>22.2</b>
Banking/Insurance	-7.9	-3.1	-10.4	4.2	-1.3	136.2
Real Estate etc.	4.1	4.2	3.7	3.2	3.9	4.1
Public admin/Defence	12.9	8.9	3.7	3.2	3.9	4.1
Education	6.4	2.4	9.0	2.7	-2.7	2.6
Health	4.2	2.5	-3.5	10.1	14.7	19.3
Domestic & other services	7.6	7.9	6.9	6.1	6.1	6.2
<b>GDP</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>-5.5</b>	<b>-2.9</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>4.9</b>

Source: Ministry of Planning and Economic Development

#### Economic trends post-1991

With the end of civil war in 1991 and takeover of power by the Ethiopian Peoples's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the main pre-occupations the Transitional Government were security concerns and the quest for relative political stability. A process of rehabilitating the economy was soon initiated. A US\$672 million donor-supported Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Project (ERRP) was designed explicitly to help kick-start the moribund economy by rejuvenating essential social and physical infrastructure. Essentially, the objective of the programme was to utilise emergency assistance to overcome the devastating effects of decades of war and to recommence economic activity.

Crucially, however, the government recognised the need for a more coherent economic strategy to correct entrenched macroeconomic imbalances. This culminated in the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was unveiled in late-1991. The NEP represented a radical departure from the past, in that the main thrust of economic policy became the transformation of the command economy inherited from the Mengistu regime into a functioning market-based economy. The emphasis was to dismantle the Byzantine labyrinth of perverse state intervention and to limit the role of the state in economic activity. The systematic reduction in the role of the public sector in productive activities was to be undertaken in favour of the expansion and deepening of the private sector.

In some respects, the NEP acted as a precursor for a three-year IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was implemented in 1992. Under the auspices of the SAP, a plethora of reforms have been implemented including a partial liberalisation of prices; the devaluation of the local current, the birr; the enactment of a new, more liberal investment regime; and the granting of autonomy to public enterprises. Moreover, sweeping reforms have seen the establishment of a more market-determined foreign exchange and interest rates, and the overhaul of hitherto restrictive labour legislations. Underpinning the SAP has been the pursuit of tight fiscal and monetary policies.

By every objective criteria, the comprehensive reform measures implemented, in combination with the restoration of relative stability, have yielded significant positive dividends. Although the economy continued to contract in 1991/92, this had to do more with the lingering effects of the war, and in some respects, the inevitable process of consolidation by the new government. The domestic economy began to pull out of its traumatic decline in FY 1992/93, bolstered by the substantial inflow of foreign capital, both from official and private sources. Overall, following a decline of 5.5 per cent registered in 1990/91 and a more modest 2.9 per cent contraction witnessed in 1991/92, the economy rebounded robustly in 1992/93, registering year-on-year growth in real GDP of some 12 per cent. The improved availability of foreign exchange facilitated the critical importation of essential raw materials, spare parts, replacement machinery, and fertilisers to underpin growth.

Moreover, further assisting the impressive growth out-turn witnessed in FY 1992/93, was the positive supply-response of the productive sectors to the more liberalised price regime. On a sectoral basis, the agricultural sector grew by 6.4 per cent in 1992/93, industrial growth amounted to an impressive 27 per cent, while the distributive services recorded an expansion of some 24 per cent year-on-year.

In contrast, undermined by a severe drought, which saw the largely rain-fed agricultural sector contract by over 5 per cent, economic growth in 1993/94 was rather subdued, at 4.3 per cent. However, estimates for 1994/95 suggest a return to accelerated growth, with real GDP estimated to record growth of some 6 per cent for the year.

The dramatic turnaround in Ethiopia's economic performance is perhaps no better demonstrated than in the restoration of price stability. Needless to say that historically, Ethiopia had been a low inflation economy, although this was largely the result of the restrictive price and income policies pursued by the Dergue. As such, price developments have generally been influenced by supply-side factors, such as external shocks, variability in agricultural production and the availability of foreign exchange.

Largely due to supply-side disruptions and excessive monetary liquidity at the tail-end of the war, price pressures surged sharply in the first half of 1991, to reach an annual rate in excess of 35 per cent. However, with improved supply conditions, inflationary pressures subsequently decelerated markedly, with the result that retail price inflation - measured by the Addis Ababa Retail Price Index - registered an annual 21 per cent for 1991/92 as a whole. In 1992/93, annual inflation registered 10 per cent, and this favourable performance was achieved in spite of the adverse effects on price levels induced by the sharp devaluation of the birr in October 1992. Inflationary pressures further decelerated, and annual inflation plummeted to an impressive 1.2 per cent in 1993/94. While price pressures increased in the first half of 1994, this proved to be an aberration, as inflationary pressures remained generally subdued as a result of tight fiscal and monetary policies pursued by the government.

Indeed, with regards to fiscal performance, the overall picture that emerges is one of a stabilisation in government finances, with the fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP remaining consistently in the single digit range. According to preliminary official estimates, in nominal terms, revenues excluding grants, amounted to some Br5.7 billion in 1994/95, representing an increase of 84 per cent over the level in 1989/90. Concurrently, aggregate expenditures rose by just 54 per cent to Br5.1 billion in 1994/95. Thus, from 9.7 per cent of GDP in 1989/90, the fiscal deficit fell to 7.2 per cent of GDP in 1992/93, and bolstered by a sharp rise in revenue amid a virtual stagnation in expenditure growth, the deficit is estimated to have fallen to a commendable 4.1 per cent of GDP in 1994/95.



Table 1.2

**Profile of fiscal developments - 1990/91 - 1994/95**  
(million birr)

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95*
Total revenue, incl. grants	3,169.6	2,751.0	4,158.7	5,048.2	6,817.7
Revenue	2,706.3	2,208.0	3,091.6	3,830.1	5,782.8
Grants	463.3	543.0	1,067.1	1,218.1	1,034.9
Expenditure	4,854.1	4,205.3	6,039.2	7,895.2	8,136.9
Current expenditure	3,540.1	3,253.5	3,866.9	4,474.3	5,075.0
Capital expenditure	1,214.0	951.8	2,172.3	3,420.9	3,061.9
Overall balance (cash)	-1,684.5	-1,454.3	-1,880.5	-2,847.0	-1,319.2
Excluding grants (cash)	-2,147.8	-1,997.3	-2,947.6	-4,065.1	-2,354.1
Overall balance (% of GDP)	-8.5	-7.2	-7.2	-10.2	-4.1
Excluding grants (% of GDP)	-10.8	-9.8	-11.4	-14.5	-7.2

\* preliminary estimates

Source: Ministry of Finance

It is important to note that, in addition to the reining-in of the budgetary deficit, radical changes in government priorities have led to significant structural changes in expenditure patterns. In particular, to support the government's stated policy of poverty alleviation, there has been a re-allocation of state resources in favour of rehabilitating productive assets, as well as improving social and economic services. The corollary of this has been that an increasing proportion of total budgeted expenditures is now in the form of capital expenditures. Capital expenditures climbed from just 8 per cent of GDP in 1989/90 to a high of over 12 per cent of GDP in 1993/94, although the ratio fell back to an estimated 9.4 per cent in 1994/95. Military expenditures have fallen from a massive 25 per cent of total government expenditures in FY 1989 to 8 per cent in 1993/94, while at the same time spending on infrastructure rose from some 7 per cent to 17 per cent of total expenditures.

In sharp contrast to price developments, an analysis of the performance of the external sector post-1991 shows rather mixed results. While Ethiopia has historically run current account deficits, towards the end of the 1980s, the country's external position became unsustainable. Political and economic instability resulting from the intensification of the civil war curtailed exports, while the level of imports, dominated by military goods, remained high, albeit growth in imports actually stagnated.

In 1991, merchandise exports fell by some 43 per cent to US\$168 million for the year, and at the same, a pervasive shortage of foreign exchange led to a sharp contraction in imports. A result of this forced curtailment in imports was that the trade balance improved markedly, with the deficit halving to just over US\$303 million in 1991. Notably, this improvement in the trade balance, coupled with the large net transfer surplus registered for the year, led to a current account surplus of some US\$174 million in 1991, the first such to be recorded for many years.

Table 1.3

**Balance of payments**  
(US\$ million)

	1990	1991	1992	1993
Merchandise exports	292.0	167.6	169.9	198.8
Merchandise imports	-912.1	-470.8	-992.7	-706.0
Trade balance	-620.1	-303.3	-822.8	-507.2

Services:credit	304.6	268.3	267.9	278.1
Services:debit	-358.8	-284.3	-368.3	-299.4
Income:credit	9.2	14.4	22.3	21.5
Income:debit	-77.0	-96.7	-104.1	-78.4
Private unrequited transfers	229.1	222.4	341.5	251.8
Official unrequited transfers	220.0	353.0	543.9	279.6
<b>Current account</b>	<b>-293.8</b>	<b>173.9</b>	<b>-119.8</b>	<b>-57.9</b>

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics

In 1992, there was a virtual stagnation in merchandise exports, whilst imports bounded back to pre-1991 levels, increasing by more than two-fold to register some US\$993 million, and producing a deficit on the trade account of almost US\$823 million. Yet, while the sharp deterioration in the trade deficit caused the current account to move back into deficit in 1992, of about US\$120 million, the overall balance of payments was broadly favourable, thanks to debt cancellation and rescheduling instigated by the Paris Club of official creditors.

Driven by the recovery in the economy in general, and buoyant agricultural exports in particular, IMF figures show merchandise exports increased by 15 per cent to US\$200 million in 1993. Also positive was the fact that, undermined by the currency devaluation initiated in October 1992, merchandise imports fell sharply in 1993, which in turn produced a significant contraction in the trade deficit. Moreover, as a result of increased debt relief and large official and private inflows, the current account deficit shrunk to just US\$60 million for the year.

Favourable international coffee prices provided a major boost to export revenue in 1994, which is estimated to have registered almost US\$350 million. However, the beneficial impact of the strong growth in exports on the external account was offset somewhat by robust import growth that year. Overall, the current account was virtually in balance in 1994. Most notably, following sustained capital inflows and the positive effects of lower debt servicing, gross official reserves, which amounted to below 5 weeks of import cover in 1990/91 had risen to over 24 weeks imports by end of FY 1993/94.

## B. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

### The physical environment

Located in what is popularly termed the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is bounded by Eritrea in the north, Djibouti and Somalia in the east, Kenya in the South and Sudan in the west. It is the tenth largest country in Africa, and covers a total land area of some 1.14 million square kilometres. Of this, almost three quarters or about 840,000 square kilometres is comprised of arable land. However, the land suitable for cultivation is limited. In fact, only about one-eighth of the land area of Ethiopia can be used for the production of crops<sup>1</sup>. Three-eighths is permanent pasture.

Primarily as a result of the topography of the land, and also the proximity to the Indian Ocean, the country is characterised by both tropical and temperate conditions. Specifically, while the lowland regions are generally hot and humid, temperate conditions predominate on the central plateau.

There are two rainy seasons; the main one lasts between mid-June and mid-September, while the minor season or the so-called 'little rains', which covers mainly the central plateau area, extends from February to April. In a normal year, most parts of the central highlands experience average rainfall of some 1,000 mm, while the lowlands typically get about 500 mm per year. Critically, however, large parts of the country are vulnerable to drought, as has been witnessed in recent years.

The country's physical features and geographical location have given it a rich and varied natural heritage of vegetation and wildlife. Moreover, extensive geological surveys conducted over the past two decades highlight that the country is blessed with significant deposits of base, rare earth, and precious metals. The

Rift Valley area, in particular, is known to be rich in industrial minerals such as potash, soda ash, diatomite and bentonite.

#### The demographic base

With an estimated population of some 55 million in 1994, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria. And according to World Bank estimates, the population grew at an average annual rate of about 3.0 per cent between 1985 and 1993. As with most other African countries, Ethiopia's population is predominantly rural: some 85 per cent of the people reside in rural areas, versus 15 per cent in urban centres.

Demographic statistics show that the country's population is almost equally split by sex, with the male population marginally exceeding that of females at 50.1 per cent. Worrying, however, is the picture presented by the distribution of the population by age group. Principally, as a result of the high population growth and short life expectancy - estimated at 49 years - almost two-thirds of the total population is under 20 years of age. In fact, about 20 per cent of the population is under 5 years old.

Table I.4

#### Population structure by age group - 1994

	Male	Female	Total	% of total
0-19	17.3	16.2	33.5	60.9
20-59	9.3	9.7	19.0	34.4
60 +	1.3	1.3	2.6	4.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>27.9</b>	<b>27.2</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Central Statistical Authority

An additional concern, which has direct implications for the provision of social services and indeed overall economic development, is the divergent trends in growth pattern between the rural and urban areas. Undermined by sharp rural-urban migration, in part induced by the 'bright light' effect of town/cities, but more fundamentally due to a lack of economic opportunities in rural areas, population growth in the urban areas is well above the national average. According to official projections, Ethiopia's population will expand rapidly over the next 25 years to reach over 130 million in the year 2020. Simultaneously, the proportion of urban dwellers will increase to over 20 per cent by the year 2010, rising further to a projected 30 per cent by the year 2020.

Table I.5

#### Population projection, by sex,- 1993 -2020 (million)

	1994	1995	2000	2010	2020
Male	27.6	28.4	33.5	47.3	66.0
Female	27.4	28.2	33.3	46.9	65.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>66.8</b>	<b>94.2</b>	<b>131.4</b>

Source: Central Statistical Authority

Ethiopia has a number of culturally distinct ethnic groups. The largest of these is the Amhara who inhabit the central highlands of the country. Other major ethnic groups include the Tigreans who are related to the Amhara, but speak a different, though related language, and reside in the northern portion of the country;

the Oromos, the agricultural-based people in the south; and the Somalis, who occupy the south-east Ogaden desert.

The majority of the population are Coptic Christians, although a growing number, estimated at about 40 per cent, are Muslim.

### Agriculture

Agriculture is the mainstay of the Ethiopian economy. Currently, it contributes over 45 per cent of GDP, accounts for some 80 per cent of aggregate merchandise exports, and employs an estimated 80 per cent of the labour force. The principal crops produced include cereals, oil seeds, pulses and sugar cane. The northern part of the country typically tends to farm grain, including sorghum, barley, and wheat, but partly due to decades of over-cultivation, the region is afflicted with the problems of soil degradation, erosion and salination of water resources.

Coffee, the major cash crop and the principal foreign exchange earner, is cultivated predominantly in the south-west, south and east of the country, and generates over 60 per cent of export revenue. Cotton production is also being encouraged, as is the development of tea plantations.

Ethiopia's agricultural development has not only been hampered by the recurrence of austere weather, but also by numerous infrastructural and institutional barriers to growth. Presently, the sector is having to rejuvenate itself from years of neglect under the system of state-owned farms imposed under the Mengistu regime, the inadequate supply of critical inputs such as fertilisers, and constraints imposed by the restrictive internal marketing system. Unsurprisingly, the difficulty of restructuring a centrally planned agricultural has placed significant constraints on production.

Since its accession to power in 1991, the EPRDF government has made agricultural development its prime priority, as evidenced in the increasing share of capital expenditures devoted to agriculture. But the sector is still confronted by immense problems. For example, in 1994, there were damaging floods in the northern Welo area, as well as an infestation by army worm in the Asosa region in the northwest, which destroyed an estimated 60 per cent of the area's potential maize and millet harvest. Against a backdrop of only 2 per cent of the total area under cultivation being irrigated, perhaps the biggest problem is the recurrence of drought.

Under the on-going five-year programme to rehabilitate and modernise the agricultural sector, the government is hoping to lessen the dependence on rain-fed production, by bringing some 2.4 million hectares of arable land under irrigation. Presently, less than 200,000 hectares of farmland are considered well irrigated. In addition, a number of bilateral technical assistance schemes are being implemented that aim at improving yields through improved hybridised seeds.

In the policy arena, the system of collective farms imposed under Mengistu has been largely dismantled, with the farms now being leased to the farmers as tenants. However, in the short-to-medium term, it is expected that the government will fully diversify from state farms by transferring the ownership of land to farmers. In line with the quest to develop a market-based economy, the requirement that farmers sell a share of their produce to the state procurement agency has been abolished, and the prices of agricultural goods have also been deregulated in tandem with the general liberalisation of prices in the economy. Moreover, it is expected that existing subsidies on fertiliser will soon be phased out, with prices eventually deregulated.

Following the stabilisation and recovery in the sector now being witnessed, the main tenet of agricultural strategy is expected to shift the adoption of improved technologies to underpin enhancements in output, diversification, and the broadening and deepening of the private sector's participation in both the production and marketing of agricultural goods. Overall, barring the recurrence of adverse weather, agricultural performance is set to improve in the medium-term as the benefits of on-going deregulatory measures become fully felt and the substantial investment in the transport infrastructure allows for the expanded dissemination of agricultural supplies. The sector's performance will also be assisted by the greater availability of foreign

exchange to allow for greater importation of vital inputs, such as tractors, pesticides and processing equipment.

### Fishing

In the early 1980s, the Red Sea provided Ethiopia with approximately 25,000 tonnes of fish annually. With the loss of the Eritrean province, however, the country has lost its coastline and thus a large part of its fishing industry.

Nevertheless, fishing has potential. In addition to the lakes in the Rift Valley portion of the country (Kora, Zwai, Longano, Abiata, Shala, Awash, Abaya and Chamo), there is Lake Tana in the northern part of the country. Tana is the country's largest lake with an area of 3,600 square miles. Together with the country's rivers, it is estimated that freshwater fishing has the potential of producing 30,000 tonnes of fish per year. Approximately 24,000 tonnes of that would be from the lake system. Currently only 5,000 tonnes of fish per year are harvested from these freshwater resources<sup>2</sup>.

Early in 1995, the European Union granted the country US\$3.2 million to develop the fishing sector. The funds are to be used to purchase modern equipment and influence the eating habits of the local citizenry which currently consumes very little fish<sup>3</sup>.

### Mining and energy

#### Mining

Despite the country's wealth of mineral resources, their exploitation and development have, in many respects, been rather rudimentary. But buoyed by the recent spate of foreign interest in the sector, the government is aiming to increase the mining sector's small contribution to overall output. In 1993/94, mining contributed just three per cent of industrial output. The World Bank has recently classified Ethiopia as a 'Group A country', thus including it in the category of countries which 'possess exploitable mineral potential over large geological areas, and which warrant the investment of US\$10-20 million annually'. Known reserves of metallic and industrial minerals include gold, phosphates, nickel, copper, zinc, platinum and soda ash.

Table I.6

#### Proven reserves of some minerals - 1994

<u>Type of mineral</u>	<u>Tonnes</u>	<u>Location</u>
Placer gold	3.8	Adola
Primary gold	62.0	Lege Dembi
Nickel	17,000,000.0	Adola
Quartz	300,000.0	Kenticha
Phosphate	4,000,000.0 (P205)	Bikilal
Potash	160,000,000.0	Dallol
Kaolin	500,000.0	Bwanbawawiha
Platinum	12.5	Yubdo
Soda ash	400,000,000	Lakes region
Diatomite	40,000,000.0	Lakes region

Source: Ethiopian Institute of Geological Surveys

Crucially, February 1995 marked the culmination of a three-month governmental initiative to attract foreign investment into the mining sector, with the Minister of Mining suggesting that the investment code might

be revised to improve upon the attractiveness of mining investment. Presently, the corporation tax is set at 45 per cent for large-scale enterprises and a more favourable 35 per cent for smaller ones.

Most recently, four gold prospecting and mining concessions were offered to tender, which attracted a total of 12 bids, although only three of the concessions were ultimately awarded. The winning bidders were the American Canyon Resources for the Megado-serdo area in the Adola gold belt, the Canadian Golden Star Resources in Dul in the west region, and a Swedish-Saudi consortium consisting of the Swedish company, Boliden, and the Saudi National Mining Corporation, was awarded the concession for the Dawi Digati region in the south of the country.

According to mining analysts, it is estimated that each of the above concessions will require an investment in the neighbourhood of US\$150 million before output can be brought on-stream. But there are strong signs that the projects will become operational, with the three sites cumulatively producing about 30 tonnes annually in five years time. If this materialises, the output will sharply dwarf the annual production of three tonnes generated at the country's only hardrock goldmine at Lega Dembi in the Adola belt.

### Energy

In terms of energy, currently, the country is very low consumer and the principal sources of energy remain wood and charcoal. Since 1990, the country's fuel import bill has risen sharply, however, in part reflecting the cessation of favourable pricing agreements with the former Soviet Union and partly due to supply difficulties at the Assab petroleum refinery in Eritrea.

In 1991/92, largely due to war-related disruptions to output and technical constraints exacerbated by shortages of spare parts, production at the Assab facility tumbled to 326,000 tonnes of refined petroleum, down from 708,000 tonnes in 1990. Although production recovered to some 550,000 tonnes in 1992/93 and rose further to 672,000 tonnes in 1993/94, the rise in output has failed to keep pace with demand growth.

As a consequence, the development of energy sources to meet growing demand, and more crucially, to minimise the dependence on import sources has now assumed greater significance. The most promising find thus far has been the 60 billion cubic metres of natural gas at Kalub, in the Ogaden district in the east of the country. Already a share company has been established to develop the deposits for direct use and as a feedstock for fertiliser production. The World Bank is poised to provide some US\$70 million in financial support for the project. Hopes are high that with the World Bank support, production could come on-stream by 1998. Estimates point to initial annual production of some 11,000 tonnes of benzene, 20,000 tonnes of butane, 13,000 tonnes of naphtha and 17,000 tonnes of kerosene. The net effect of these volumes materialising would be an estimated reduction in the country's petroleum imports of some 12-15 per cent.

Presently, oil exploration is being undertaken in the Gambella region in the western part of the country, and the US-owned Afar Exploration Company has taken over Agip's prospecting interest in the north Afar region. To date, there has been no significant oil finds.

Large coal and shale oil deposits, estimated at 41 million tonnes and 100 million tonnes respectively, were reported in the Delbi and Moye areas of the Ilibabor zone, which if exploited would complement energy output from the Gilgel Gibe hydro-electric plant. Most crucially, it would lessen the dependence on wood for fuel, which according to one estimate causes the deforestation of nearly 1,000 square kilometres per annum.

Much of Ethiopia's electricity is generated by hydro-electric plants which form the basis of the country's 1987-2002 Energy Development Programme. Contributions towards the estimated Br3.7 billion costs have been provided by international organisations and bilateral grants. Following a decline almost 10 per cent experienced in 1991, electricity output recovered by about five per cent in 1993. However, hydro-electric power generation remains vulnerable to the effects of inclement weather.

### Manufacturing

According to the latest statistics from Ethiopia's Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, the manufacturing sector, including handcraft and small-scale industries, accounted for just under seven per cent of GDP in FY 1993/94, and contributes some five per cent of total employment. Akin to other African economies, manufacturing production is dominated by public sector entities. The private sector comprises of small enterprises, which typically employ less than 100 people.

For the most part, manufacturing is dominated by light manufacturing and agro-industries - most notably, food processing and textiles and garments, although cement, metalwork, leather, and chemicals production are also important. Partly due to infrastructural and logistical bottlenecks, there is a large concentration of manufacturing activity in Addis Ababa, and also along the 100 kilometre stretch between Addis Ababa and Nazareth. Other important manufacturing location includes Bahr Dar in the north-west, Dire Dawa in the east, Dessie/Combolcha in the north and Awassa in the south.

As might be expected, the intensification in the war in the late-1980's and early 1990's exacerbated existing infrastructural difficulties and raw material shortages, with the result that aggregate manufacturing production declined by a massive 43 per cent between 1989 and 1992. Inauspiciously, the situation was made worse by the loss to Eritrea in 1993 of the heavy concentration of industry in that territory.

Although output has since recovered, it is estimated that capacity utilisation averaged just 70 per cent in 1994/95. Factories continue to suffer from the lack of critical raw materials, spare parts and endemic power cuts. In fact, despite recent improvements in the operating environment, manufacturing activity remains dogged by numerous problems, including antiquated machinery and the lack of skilled personnel. Although foreign exchange is now more readily available, the devaluation of the currency has sharply increased the costs of raw material imports, and at the same time, high domestic interest rates have deterred domestic borrowing to expand production. Moreover, the utilisation of property as collateral for loans has made entrepreneurs reluctant to borrow to make new capital investments since, as leaseholders, they do not have the security of ownership of the land.

Direct private investment flows into manufacturing all but dried up after the Mengistu regime's nationalisation of private assets. Even when the overall policy thrust changed in the late-1980s and foreign direct investment was welcomed, inflows remained hampered by compensation claims and US legislation which barred investment in Ethiopia. As a consequence, the only foreign-owned manufacturing establishments constructed under the Dergue consisted of Eastern-Bloc investments.

Presently, as the push towards the development of a functioning market economy gathers pace, both domestic and foreign private interest in manufacturing activity is rising sharply. The agro-processing sector is at the forefront, attracting the most investor interest. The US company, Servtech, is building a large factory with a capacity of 4,000 tonnes of sugar and 45,000 tonnes of ethanol; the project has been made possible through a US\$50 million of risk insurance provided by the American Overseas Private Investment Corporation. An US\$80 million ADB grant is also being used to finance the construction of another sugar factory at Fincha.

### **Transport and communication**

By every objective criteria, Ethiopia's transport and communication infrastructure can be described as rudimentary. Essentially, the transport infrastructure, consisting principally of roads, is inadequate. The country's main road is the Addis Ababa-Assab road, and only about 20 per cent of the entire road network is paved. There exists only limited interconnecting links between adjacent road, which combined with the inadequate feeder road network leaves large parts of the country isolated.

Aware of the crucial role played by an adequate transport infrastructure in the country's overall economic development, the government is giving priority to road construction, and in particular, the rehabilitation and maintenance of the existing road network. Moreover there has been a shift towards greater reliance on the private sector in the provision of road transport services. To this end, the government has abolished the hitherto centralised freight transport allocation of the Katana system and ended all freight

tariff regulation and control, including those related to petroleum freight. Additionally, there are plans to sell some of the trucking fleet of the parastatal enterprises to private sector operators.

### **Banking and finance**

In 1975, the socialist government nationalised all commercial banks, financial institutions and insurance companies. Thus, until recently, other than the National Bank of Ethiopia (the central bank) there were just three wholly state-owned banks: the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia; the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank; and the Housing and Savings Bank. A financial sector reform programme has been implemented recently, part of which has included the restructuring and transformation of the three state-owned banks from specialised banking institutions to universal banks. In accordance with this restructuring programme and the renewed emphasis of greater diversification, the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank has been renamed the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), and the Housing and Savings Bank is now called the Construction and Business Bank (CBB).

Moreover, the policy of financial deregulation has seen the establishment of the first private bank - Awash International Bank - since 1975. Two further private banks, the Bank of Abyssinia and the Dashen Bank are under formation, although these have yet to be licensed (at December 1995).

The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia is the country's largest bank, and had a capitalisation of US\$40 million in mid-1994. The CBE ranks 19th in Africa in terms of capitalisation, and an impressive ninth in terms of asset size, which amounted to US\$1.7 billion in 1994. The banks' share in total domestic lending is estimated at some 90 per cent, and its main sources of funds are demand deposits, savings deposits and time deposits.

The Development Bank of Ethiopia is involved primarily in the provision of medium-to-long term loans. These are mainly to the agricultural and industrial sectors, although more recently, the hotels and the construction sectors have become major clients of DBE as well.

With regards to non-bank financial activities, such as pension funds and insurance companies, these are rather rudimentary, although the past year has witnessed an expansion in the size and scope of insurance activities. The biggest pension fund, with assets estimated at some Br1 billion, is run by the government. Also, as with other developing countries, there exists significant financial activity in the informal sector, which is dominated by 'money lenders'.

### **Tourism**

Ethiopia's historical sites and wide diversity of landscape and wildlife makes the country an attractive tourist destination. Indeed, the country's unique combination of natural, historical, cultural, archaeological and anthropological attractions underpin its massive tourism potential. But the disruption caused by the war and the damage inflicted on the already underdeveloped infrastructure led to a sharp slump in tourist arrivals. By the late-1970s, the number of arrivals had fallen below 30,000, compared to a peak of almost 74,000 recorded in the early years of the decade. However, in the mid-1980s, there was a gradual recovery in the sector, and by 1987, the number of tourists exceeded 70,000.

In fact, since the mid-1980s there has been a steady annual growth in the sector. According to official figures, the cumulative arrivals over the period 1991-95 amounted to some 504,000 tourists, an increase of one-third over the total for 1985-89. Foreign exchange earnings from tourism, which reached US\$25 million in 1973 had slumped to US\$9 million by 1977, and remained stagnant at this level until the late-1980s. Again, according to government sources, tourism generated an estimated US\$40 million in 1993.

In a bid to capitalise on the foreign exchange potential from the sector, government economic policy now places considerable emphasis on tourism. A number of hotels within the private sector have been constructed in the past three years, and the government envisages that over 20 additional hotels will be completed by 1996, as well as the upgrading of existing ones. It is hoped that the planned sale of some government hotels



to private sector operators in the near future will bring an enhancement in standards. In the short-to-medium term, the tourism sector should also be a significant beneficiary of the planned extension and improvement of the road and air networks which should permit high volume tourism to historic sites. Currently, in accordance with the government's policy of regional devolution, a number of regional authorities have started to market their own tourist attractions.

#### **The demand structure of GDP**

On the demand side, the main dynamic of economic activity is private consumption. This has been in spite of the overwhelming dominance of the public sector during the years of socialist economic development. Private consumption accounted for some 72 per cent of aggregate economic activity in 1988. Following the slow, but steady, rationalisation of the public sector and the shift towards greater private sector participation in the economy, the dominance of private consumption in gross economic activity has become even greater. Since 1992, private consumption has accounted for some 86 per cent of GDP.

In parallel with the rising share of private consumption, there has been a concomitant decline in the share of government consumption in GDP. The contribution of government consumption to GDP rose to a recent high of over 18 per cent in 1990, before tumbling to about 10 per cent in 1992. By 1994, however, this had risen again, but only to about 12 per cent.

Gross fixed capital formation, which amounted to almost 20 per cent of GDP in 1988, fell sharply to below 10 per cent of GDP in the early-1990s. However, the government's programme of rehabilitating the war-shattered infrastructure, together with increased private investment, has led to a rebound in aggregate investment. In 1994, the proportion of gross fixed capital formation to GDP had climbed back to almost 17 per cent.

A striking development in the early-1990s has been the increasingly negative contribution of foreign trade to GDP. As the economy recovered, and also more fundamentally, due to the greater availability of foreign exchange, import growth has accelerated sharply. Thus, despite the increase in the export of goods and services, which amounted to over 12 per cent of GDP in 1994, the rapid growth in imports of goods and services meant that in 1994, net trade represented a withdrawal from GDP of some 14 per cent, sharply up from a negative 4.6 per cent in 1992.

**Table 1.7**

#### **The Demand Structure of GDP, 1988-1994**

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics

#### **External trade and payments**

Merchandise exports are dominated by coffee, which typically accounts for about 70 per cent of total exports. World coffee prices tend to be volatile, but even with the depressed prices of 1990-1993, coffee's share in total export receipts reached some 65 per cent in FY 1992/93. Amid strong international coffee prices for most of 1994, it is estimated that coffee's share in export revenue would amount to almost 80 per cent. Secondary exports include leather goods and hides, which typically account for about 10 per cent of total exports, while goods exports contribute a further five to six per cent of total exports.

Ethiopia's heavy dependence on food imports can best be seen in the country's structure of imports. Excluding FY 1991/92 - the immediate aftermath of the war - when food imports accounted for less than one per cent of total imports, the share of food imports regularly exceed 10 per cent of aggregate imports. Another major import requirement is petroleum, both crude and its derivatives. Since the loss of the refinery

facility at Assab to Eritrea, the volume of petroleum imports has risen sharply. The share of petroleum imports to total imports rose from about 10 per cent in 1990-1992, to about 20 per cent in 1993-94.

Table 1.8

**Structure of Imports, 1990/91-1993/94**  
(per cent of total)

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94
Food & live animals	12.4	0.8	13.7	10.9
Petroleum	9.9	10.7	22.7	17.5
Chemicals	4.0	2.3	3.7	5.5
Textiles	2.1	4.1	3.6	4.1
Chemicals	4.0	2.3	3.7	5.3
Metal	7.2	2.7	4.8	7.3
Machinery(including aircraft)	26.4	10.5	19.3	6.8
Road vehicles	11.7	9.8	11.1	17.8
Medical and pharmaceuticals	1.7	2.7	3.6	3.6
Other	20.6	54.1	13.8	21.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Ethiopia Customs Authority

With regards to the geographic distribution trade, trade with the industrialised countries forms the most significant proportion of the country's aggregate trade. The industrialised countries' share in Ethiopia's exports registered some 90 per cent in 1994. The two main export markets are Japan and Germany, each traditionally accounts for 20-25 per cent of total exports. In 1993, and again in 1994, Germany overtook Japan to become Ethiopia's largest export market. In 1994, exports to Germany alone represented 26 per cent of total exports and Japan contributing a further 20 per cent. Since the collapse of the Mengistu regime, exports to the US have been buoyant, rising from a share of under five per cent in 1991 to 11 per cent of total exports in 1994.

On the import side, the industrialised countries also predominate. Imports from industrialised countries at 75 per cent in 1994, marginally up on 1991. On a country-by-basis, the US is the principal source of imports, accounting for some 14 per cent of the total in 1994. Secondary sources of imports include Germany and the UK. The importance of the Middle East, primarily Saudi Arabia as a source of energy supplies, is shown by their share in total imports at just under 10 per cent in 1994.

Table 1.9

**Source of Imports, 1991-1994**  
(per cent of total)

	1991	1992	1993	1994
<b>Industrial countries</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>72.1</b>	<b>76.0</b>	<b>74.7</b>
US	13.1	21.7	13.3	14.0
Germany	11.4	8.0	10.0	10.4
UK	5.5	8.2	8.3	7.2
Japan	9.5	4.0	6.9	7.1
France	3.0	3.4	3.3	5.5
<b>Developing countries</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>27.1</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>24.4</b>
Africa	9.5	3.9	5.9	7.1
Asia	2.1	6.3	6.5	0.6

Middle East	16.5	14.9	8.6	9.1
Saudi Arabia	10.0	11.7	7.5	7.7
<b>Total (US\$ million)</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>1,263</b>	<b>1,138</b>	<b>1,125</b>

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics

### C. THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT

#### Overview

Following years of the pursuit of misguided policies, a cardinal objective of the present government has been to implement corrective measures to revitalise the economy, as well as create the policy environment conducive to the proper utilisation of the country's resources. Thus, as previously discussed, since 1992, the government has embarked on a programme of economic reform and structural adjustment aimed at establishing a market-based economy. Essentially, the reform programme encompasses three overlapping phases, namely stabilisation, structural reform, and the enhancement of international competitiveness.

The first phase of the reform programme, which has been on-going over the past three years, has sought to establish fiscal, monetary and exchange rate equilibria. In the fiscal area, reforms have sought to eliminate inflationary deficit financing by pursuing a tight fiscal regime, while at the same time attempting to meet the basic requirements for public services and infrastructure. To this end, there has been a re-ordering of fiscal priorities. The tax structure has been rationalised to enhance revenues, and both consumer and producer subsidies have been systematically eliminated.

Monetary policy has focused on restraining the rate of domestic credit expansion and rationalising the interest rate structure in order to eliminate discrimination towards the private sector and also to achieve positive interest rates. A significant dimension of monetary policy has been to increase the autonomy of the National Bank of Ethiopia, strengthen the bank's capacity in policy formulation and banking supervision, and to deregulate the financial sector to allow the establishment of private banks and insurance companies.

The second phase of the reform programme is aimed at stimulating a supply response to key reform variables and creating the enabling environment necessary to foster the development of the private sector. The emphasis of reform has included the elimination of controls on prices and distribution, as well as reform of the trade regime. Also central, has been the establishment of the appropriate legal, institutional and regulatory framework to facilitate a deepening of private sector participation in the economy.

The third phase of reform involves the development of appropriate financial sector institutions; and a comprehensive reform of the public sector. This is to include the restructuring/privatisation of the plethora of inefficient parastatals and the rationalisation of the bloated civil service. Thus, in a nutshell, the government's economic strategy involves limiting government intervention in the economy, enhancing the role of the private sector in both production and distribution, and relying on market forces as the primary mechanism for resource allocation. Central to this strategy has been the devaluation of the birr. In addition to promoting exports, the birr's depreciation to a more competitive level has led to an elimination of cost-price distortions and has improved the transparency and efficiency in the allocation of foreign exchange.

Over the medium-term, the thrust of the government's economic policy is expected to focus on the deepening of the reform process, particularly in terms of liberalisation, a further improvement in the enabling environment for private sector development, and the acceleration in the pace, as well as a broadening in the scope and extent of the country's much-vaunted privatisation programme.

#### Fiscal policy

Since Ethiopia reached agreement with the IMF over a three-year Structural Adjustment Facility in 1992, the country's international and domestic liquidity crises have abated. In 1993, the country received over US\$1 billion in aid and debt relief from both multilateral and bilateral donors. In March 1994, the Paris Clubs' Consultative Group on Ethiopia, pledged some US\$1.1 billion for FY 1994/95, of which some US\$350 million was slated towards balance of payment support.

As earlier stated, reflecting the re-ordering of fiscal priorities under the auspices of the economic reform programme, government expenditures have been restructured in favour of infrastructural development and the provision of social services. The agricultural and natural resource sectors have also been given priority. In 1993/94, the agricultural and natural resource sectors accounted for some 22 per cent of capital expenditure. Reflecting the country's extensive reconstruction programme, roads, transport and communications were the single largest component of the capital budget, represented about 25 per cent of total capital expenditures.

Additionally, in line with the government's policy of devolution, an analysis of recent expenditure trends indicates an increasing shift towards local government expenditures. In 1993/94, some 37 per cent of the total budgetary allocation went to the regions.

In addition to the distinct re-orientation of public expenditures away from military spending and the initiation of fiscal decentralisation, 1994 saw significant income and tax reform. Those earning less than Br120 monthly (about 16 per cent of the workforce), were exempt from the payment of income taxes. Moreover, the number of tax brackets were streamlined to just six and the maximum marginal tax rate of individuals was reduced to 40 per cent versus 80 per cent in 1992. The corporation tax also was reduced from 50 per cent to 45 per cent for larger enterprises and 35 per cent for smaller ones.

Fiscal policy over the near term is expected to focus on further rationalisation to minimise fiscal distortions and to seek improvements in revenue performance. In particular, customs and tax administration is expected to be strengthened, while the rationalisation of the civil service should permit modest salary increases to be implemented without creating any serious fiscal disequilibrium. Moreover, it is expected that short-term deficit financing will continue to be underpinned by concessional foreign assistance and further debt relief, and in the medium-term, the government open market operations (mainly government securities) to bridge any fiscal gaps.

### Monetary policy

In some respects, it could be argued that prudent monetary policy has been the cornerstone of the government's reform programme, as evidenced by the crucial role which has been played by the more efficient exchange rate policy. Monetary policy has ensured that rather than simply being driven by the pace of government credit expansion, overall domestic credit growth has been consistent with the requirements necessary to sustain the recovery in the economy.

In particular, monetary policy had to be tight enough to rein-in the greater price pressures engendered by price liberalisation and exchange rate adjustments. In 1991, aggregate money supply increased by 17 per cent. In 1992, it increased by a modest 15.1 per cent, but in 1993, money supply growth amounted to just four per cent. In 1994, however, a sharp rise of 19 per cent year-on-year was recorded in money supply growth.

Aside from money supply growth (and foreign exchange stability as noted below), a central tenet of monetary policy has been to ensure the development of positive interest rates. Accordingly, interest rate ceilings were abolished to enable rates to more closely reflect 'market-determined' rates. However, the liberalisation policy will be a sort of deregulation due to the rather underdeveloped nature of domestic financial institutions. Thus, presently, the National Bank of Ethiopia still intervenes directly in setting minimum and maximum interest rates. However, it is envisaged that with time, and as the financial sector becomes more developed and sophisticated, interest rates will become more market-determined.

### Foreign exchange rate policy

When the government assumed power, the birr had been set at an official rate of Br2.07:US\$1 for almost a quarter of a century, although by 1991 the parallel market rate amounted to almost Br8:US\$1. In a bid to correct the pervasive overvaluation of the domestic currency, realign relative prices between tradable and non tradable goods, and also to stimulate exports, the currency was devalued to Br5:US\$1 in late-1992.

In May 1993, the government introduced a fortnightly foreign exchange auction as a means of making the exchange rate more market-determined. However, the official rate was kept at Br5:US\$1 for strategic imports, such as the import of petroleum, pharmaceuticals and fertilisers. In April 1994, the official rate was devalued by 2.6 per cent, and in mid-May, a further 8.1 per cent devaluation was implemented, which brought the official rate to Br5.58:US\$1. Notably, the more liberal foreign exchange regime has led to a sharp improvement in the country's foreign exchange reserves. In 1992, foreign exchange reserves amounted to US\$54 million - equivalent to less than two weeks of import cover; by early 1994, foreign reserves stood at almost US\$600 million, or some 4.6 months of imports.

### Price policy

The existence of price controls had, for many years, been a feature of the Ethiopian economy. The perverse effects of such controls plus the regulation of trade, both in terms of resource allocation and production and consumption efficiencies, have been discussed elsewhere in this report. In tandem with the government's objective to develop a market economy, the government has systematically liberalised prices, with the result that except for petroleum and pharmaceutical products, virtually all price controls have been dismantled.

At the same time, as part of these efforts to foster the development of a competitive domestic market, the prices of monopoly goods, including public utility goods, have been sharply adjusted upwards to ensure cost recovery on the production side, as well as, facilitate efficiency in consumption.

### Trade policy

As part of the transition to a market economy, a number of reform measures have been taken to liberalise the trade regime. In a bid to promote and diversify exports, automatic granting of export licenses was introduced in early 1992. Concurrently, automatic, non-discriminatory and transparent licensing of importers became effective. Thus, import licenses are now automatically granted for all goods, except for a limited number of goods on a negative list. Furthermore, all non-coffee export taxes were eliminated by end-1993, while as part of measures to stimulate exports, the license fees for coffee exporters were sharply slashed.

The comprehensive process of import liberalisation pursued by the government has led to the rationalisation, as well as the reduction in the rate of effective protection. Notably, the maximum import duty rate has been lowered from 200 per cent to 80 per cent and the structure of import taxes simplified. Additionally, recognising the need to partly cushion the impact of the birr's devaluation on importers, import surcharges were eliminated in tandem with the devaluation of the currency.

Moreover as part of the reform in the coffee sector and in particular aimed at improving the efficiency of marketing, the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation was restructured in late-1993 into two entities: the Coffee Sales and Purchase Enterprise; and the Ethiopian Coffee Export Enterprises. In the short-to-medium term it is expected that trade policy will continue to focus expressly on promoting exports, but perhaps more importantly, on accelerating the removal of cost-price distortions. Specifically, it is envisaged the government will aim to further reduce average nominal tariff rates, and the number of import duty exemptions. On the export side, it is projected that the scope and pace of the government's coffee sector liberalisation programme will be accelerated to enhance private sector participation. Finally, to help bring to fruition the programme of export diversification, the government is planning a substantial pro-active campaign to market the country's export potential in overseas markets.

### Environmental Policy

Environmental issues are a major concern in Ethiopia. Indeed, the world bore witness to the problems of drought and food insecurity that afflicted the country during the 1980s, and land related issues continue to generate the major environmental challenges. In particular, degradation and loss of soil is increasing in Ethiopia every year, as is deforestation. A 1986 study by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation concluded that over 1.9 billion tons of soil have been lost from the Ethiopian highlands annually. If this trend were to continue, it estimates that 38,000 square kilometres would be eroded down to bare rock by 2010, with an additional 60,000 square kilometres being too shallow to support cropping.<sup>4</sup> Deforestation, meanwhile, amounts to 0.3 per cent annually. The quantity of forest-cover in the country has fallen from 40 per cent at the turn of the century to just 4 per cent today. This has caused soil to be washed away, thus exposing bare rock. Deteriorating and disappearing soils, in turn, mean lower yields, for both agricultural produce and livestock.

Traditionally, the environment has not had strong institutional support in Ethiopia, however. No single department within the government has had clear responsibility for it, nor has the existing national legislation been strictly enforced. Nevertheless, more recent activity suggests that the government hopes to improve land use management, water, soil and forest conservation. International actors are already making a contribution. The World Conservation Union, for example, has been involved in the development of a national conservation strategy.

Moreover, Ethiopia, like other developing countries, qualifies for concessional assistance under a variety of international environmental agreements. These present significant opportunities, both for the promotion of sustainable development in Ethiopia and for foreign investment in activities that can advance the same.

#### **D. INDUSTRIAL POLICY**

##### **Investment policy**

In line with the market-orientated economic policy being pursued, the government enacted Investment Proclamation No. 15 in 1992, which is the legislative instrument which regulates investment in the domestic economy. The 1992 Proclamation provides for major and significant liberalisation with respect to private investment, both by local and foreign entities. Critically, the new investment regime actively encourages both domestic and foreign participation in the economy, through a plethora of investment incentives. Moreover, the Proclamation sharply limits the role of the state to only the so-called strategic sectors, including defence industries, imports of armaments, large-scale production and supply of electricity, the post and telecommunications sectors, imports of petroleum, and large-scale air, rail and marine transport services. Other large-scale activities in engineering, metallurgy, mining, pharmaceuticals and fertilizers are also reserved for the state on its own or in partnership with private investors.

To facilitate investment administration, the Investment Office of Ethiopia (IOE) has been established as a 'one-stop shop' to actively promote and co-ordinate all investment activity in the country. The IOE is supervised by the Ethiopian Board of Investment, which is accountable to the Council of Ministers.

Except for strategic activities reserved for the government, domestic private investors are permitted to invest in virtually all sectors of the economy. In contrast, foreign investment is not allowed in certain activities deemed to be within the capabilities of domestic investors. The rationale of this is to discourage foreign investment in areas which are not particularly capital intensive, and require minimal skills, in terms of technical and managerial know-how.

Significantly, aside from these sectoral restrictions, a minimum capital requirement of US\$500,000 applies to foreign investment. Additionally, where joint ventures are concerned, the investment regime stipulates that private domestic partners must have a minimum of share holding of 27 per cent. Where the joint venture partner is the state, this threshold increases to 40 per cent.

In an attempt to encourage both domestic and foreign private investment flows, the government provides various incentives, including:

- 100 per cent exemption from the payment of import duties and other taxes levied on imports of capital goods, equipment and spare parts up to 15 per cent of the value of capital invested;
- Exemption from the payment of import duties levied on the import of raw material for production of export-orientated goods;
- Income tax exemption for periods ranging from three to eight years; this is a function of where the investment is located and also the priority accorded to that particular good;
- All research and development expenses are tax deductible; and,
- Remittance from the proceeds of the sale or transfer of shares or assets upon liquidation of an enterprises to domestic investors is exempt from the payment of any tax.

In addition to the above incentives, there is unrestricted repatriation of profits and dividends, as well as the unrestricted remittance of fees, royalties, principals and interests on approved foreign loans. The investment legislation prohibits expropriation of assets, except in accordance with the due process of law and upon the payment of adequate and prompt compensation.

In terms of investment protection, Ethiopia has ratified the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency convention, providing protection against political and non-commercial risks. A bilateral investment protection accord has also been signed with Italy, and one with Germany is presently pending.

According to statistics from the IOE, a total of 1,641 investment projects were approved between July 1992 and mid-July 1995. Of these, some 677 were in the manufacturing sector, 380 were in the agricultural sector, 239 comprised projects in real estate development and a further 155 were projects in the hotels and tourism sector. The total capital outlays of the projects amount to just over Br11.0 billion, of which some Br5.2 billion consists of equity financing and the remainder is the form of loan financing. The IOE figures also show that about 52 per cent of the estimated investment capital or Br5.78 billion is comprised of foreign currency, while the residual 48 per cent represents the local currency capital requirements. Estimates by the IOE suggest that, when completed, these projects would create employment for almost 100,000 people.

In addition to the above, the Tigray Investment Bureau, which co-ordinates investments in Tigray, had given approval to 227 projects with an estimated value of Br1.3 billion over the same period. The planned employment generation of these projects is estimated at an additional 131,500.

Table 1.10

Summary of approved investment projects - July 1992 -mid-July 1995

Sector	No. of projects	Estimated capital (birr million)	Employment
Agriculture	380	1,768.8	20,921
Fishing	3	3.7	446
Mining & quarrying	10	200.0	671
Manufacturing	677	4,658.6	38,942
Construction	33	1,220.2	14,300
Real estate	239	1,427.4	7,866
Wholesale & retail trade	63	227.3	4,176
Hotel & tourism	155	921.1	7,256
Transport	27	282.9	2,715
Banking & insurance	5	98.5	192
Education	12	45.9	493
Health	12	57.0	635
Other social services	25	85.6	1,256
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,641</b>	<b>11,046.1</b>	<b>99,879</b>

Source: Investment Office of Ethiopia

1. World Resource Institute, *World Resources 1994-1995*, Oxford 1994.
2. "EU Funds Fishing Development ", *African Economic Digest*, June 19, 1995 pp. 35-36.
3. "EU Funds Fishing Development ", *Africa: Economic Digest*, June 19, 1995 pp. 35-36.



## CHAPTER II: THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

### A. GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

#### Growth

Although Ethiopia has a long history of artisan manufacturing activity, the development of large-scale manufacturing did not occur until the Italian occupation of 1935-41, and it was not until the mid-1950s that manufacturing began to play any significant role in the economy. The Post-World War Two development in Ethiopian industrialisation falls into three broad phases. In the first phase, which lasted from 1952 until 1974, industrialisation was characterised by the promotion of foreign investment, the establishment of large-scale foreign-owned enterprises active in import-substitution production and strong growth. In the second phase, from the coup d'état in 1974 until the installation of the transition government in 1991, industrial activity in the country was dominated by the nationalisation of industry, promotion of state-owned enterprises and stagnation. The third phase, which began with the fall of the Dergue in 1991 and is still on-going, is characterised by the drive to liberalise the economy and promote the development of small and medium enterprises in agricultural and other local resource-based industries.

While the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 was a spur to the development of the country's manufacturing base, the real stimulus during the 1952-1974 period came from the introduction of a series of policies designed to promote foreign investor participation. These incentives included a five- to ten-year tax holiday for new investment; low duties for imported raw materials and export-value-added goods; tax exemption on dividends and the expatriation of profits and proceeds obtained from sale of assets; and high levels of protection to large-scale enterprises. Local financial institutions also provided credit on extremely favourable terms.

These policies were largely successful and industry was a major source of growth for Ethiopia in the 1960s and early 1970s. Between 1963 and 1967, industry grew at an average annual rate of more than 16 per cent and continued at an average annual rate of eight per cent per cent between 1968 and 1974. The contribution of large-scale manufacturing to the country's GDP as a whole, rose from just 2.4 per cent in 1960/61 to 5.4 per cent at the end of 1974.

As expected, the vast majority of businesses established during this period were foreign owned and engaged in import substitution-related activities. Consumer goods products in several manufacturing subsectors were produced including: food stuffs; beverages; tobacco; textiles; leather and shoes; wood; paper; printing; publishing; chemicals; and, metal products. Production was financed primarily by the sale of Ethiopian coffee on the international market.

The growth of small-scale industry during this period was not nearly as robust. These enterprises, which were largely Ethiopian owned, did not benefit from the same government support and encouragement as large-scale enterprises. As a result, although they did experience some satisfactory rates of growth, posting an annual average of six per cent between 1967 and 1974, their relative contribution to the country's total GDP did not rise nearly as much as that of large-scale industries. In 1972/73 it was still only 4.9 per cent, while it had been 4.2 per cent in 1961.

Overall, Ethiopia's industrialisation before the mid-1970s had a mixed impact on the economic well being of the country. While it did serve to expand the economy, it did not provide great employment opportunities. Most of the medium- and large-scale industries were capital-intensive. Most also continued to rely upon imports. And, over the period some 80 per cent of the profits were repatriated, not reinvested<sup>1</sup>.

The 1974 coup, however, brought significant changes to the entire Ethiopian economy. One year after coming to power, the new government nationalised virtually all the large-scale industrial operations. The country's new leaders, the Dergue (Committee), moved Ethiopia towards a centrally planned economy with the immediate goal of satisfying peoples' basic needs. Within this framework, large-scale

manufacturing enterprises under public ownership were seen as the means by which this goal could best be achieved and these enterprises were accorded priority in the allocation of resources. Some private sector manufacturing enterprises did continue to operate, but they were restricted to a limited range of small-scale manufacturing and handicraft activities.

As a result of the insecurity surrounding the new leaders attempt to consolidate their position, the level of industrial activity declined between 1975 and 1978. Many manufacturing facilities were closed, particularly in the Eritrean region, which at that time accounted for 40 per cent of the country's manufacturing output. But infrastructure, especially transportation and communication, was also affected throughout the country. In addition, the vast majority of expatriate managers and skilled staff left Ethiopia after the nationalisations, resulting in a severe shortage of the expertise needed to run the enterprises.

Much better performance was realised between 1979 and 1981. The security problems were attenuated, and manufacturing enterprises were pushed to their limits. With capacity utilisation rates of 70 to 100 per cent, amongst the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, the sector registered growth rates of 15 per cent (1978/79) and 6.5 per cent (1979/80).

By 1981, however, production had once again begun to stagnate. With enterprises already running at full capacity, any further gains in output would have had to have been realised through either productivity increases or new investment. But both were hampered by the fact that agricultural performance during this period was poor. Lower agricultural exports meant lower foreign exchange earnings, which thus limited the country's ability to import the raw materials and spare parts needed by existing enterprises, or capital goods for new investment.

Nevertheless, a major effort was made during the 1980s to establish new large-scale public enterprises and expand existing ones. Some Br640 million was invested over the period and several new enterprises were created, the showpiece of which was the Mugar Cement Factory (built in 1983 with financial assistance from East Germany). Annual growth rates in manufacturing averaged approximately three per cent during this decade.

Throughout the Dergue period, the development of small-scale industry was hindered by a number of factors. Practical constraints included the lack of access to a range of essential inputs, particularly skilled labour and raw materials. Several legal constraints were also imposed. First, private enterprises were allowed only to deal in those activities that the state was incapable of taking over. Capital was also restricted. Retail trade enterprises were limited to a capital base of Br200,000, while wholesale trade establishments were limited to Br300,000 and industrial establishments were limited to Br500,000.<sup>2</sup> The rate of growth of small-scale and handicraft industries after the 1974 revolution fell to practically nil. At the same time, it is estimated that the policies of the Dergue inspired the growth of a large underground economy, perhaps as much as 15 to 25 per cent of total GDP in 1990<sup>3</sup>

Greater insecurity and the threat of famine towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s had a negative impact on Ethiopian manufacturing activity. Real output declined between 1989 and 1991, with industrial activity falling 14 per cent in real terms and manufacturing value added (MVA) falling 17 per cent in 1990/91 alone.

The installation of the transitional government in 1991 brought a new approach to industrial policy and reversed the downward trend in output. Between 1991 and 1992, both industrial output and MVA increased more than 50 per cent. By 1993, output was at historic highs. The new industrial policy, reaffirmed by the recently elected government focuses on the liberalisation, privatisation and internationalisation of the country's manufacturing sector. The first significant measure taken by the transitional government was to declare a 'New Economic Policy'. With regard to manufacturing, the major principles of this included a commitment to replace the hitherto significant role of the state, with greater domestic and foreign private participation.

The more recently announced strategy of 'Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation' (ADLI) has as its primary goals the improvement of the Ethiopian peasantry's productivity and the development of an Ethiopian industrial sector that is both labour-intensive and utilises local raw materials. Supporting this, a number of subsidiary targets have been identified, including:

- \* the promotion of economic efficiency and growth;
- \* the promotion of inter- and intra-sectoral linkages;
- \* the development of domestic technological capabilities for the production of intermediate inputs, spare parts and capital goods;
- \* the creation of a sound base for the transfer, adoption and development of technology;
- \* the achievement of international competitiveness in areas of clear comparative advantage in industrial exports;
- \* the greater use of labour intensive technology and local resources; and,
- \* the promotion of balanced regional industrial development.

Thus, the ADLI is intended to promote the unhindered participation of the private sector in all fields of economic activity, within a framework of private property rights and competitive markets. It is accepted that the external and export sectors will be vital to the successful implementation of the ADLI.

### **Structural change**

The range of goods manufactured in Ethiopia is relatively narrow as can be seen in Table II.1. Also noticeable from the data, is the fact that the pattern of production has changed very little over time. The three major subsectors in the late 1980s were the same as those in the 1960s and 1970s: food, beverages and textiles. These three sectors have consistently accounted for over 50 per cent of the gross value of production, manufacturing value-added, and employment since well before the 1974 revolution.

INSERT

Table II.1  
Manufacturing Production, 1985/86-1989/90

Measured in terms of manufacturing value-added, manufacturing activities in Ethiopia have ranged between eight and 11 per cent for many years. As can be seen in Figures II.A and II.B, this is despite the fact that it has fluctuated in absolute terms from year-to-year, particularly during the late 1970s and early 1990s. The domination of the three sectors identified above, food, beverage and textiles, is also evident. However, Table II.2 does reveal that the contribution of the beverages subsector to total MVA has been gradually declining, to such an extent that the late 1980s' rise in the production of other subsectors, particularly leather and footwear and tobacco, has placed its position as third-largest contributor to value added in jeopardy. Table II.3 presents the distribution of gross value of production among different industrial groups.

INSERT

Figure II.A. Growth of Manufacturing  
Value Added (MVA), 1975-1993

Figure II.B  
Share of Manufacturing Value Added in GDP, 1975-1993

Table II.2  
Share of Value-Added in the National Account Concept (at factor price), by Industrial Group, 1985/86-1989/90  
(per cent share)

**Table II.3**  
**Gross value of production by industrial group, 1985/86-1989/90 (per cent share)**

Industrial group	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90
Food	25.30	23.50	22.37	26.56	26.65
Beverage	16.68	16.95	17.84	18.56	17.81
Tobacco	6.40	7.06	6.83	6.57	7.47
Textiles	19.93	20.06	20.04	16.58	18.39
Leather and footwear	6.38	6.91	8.45	9.09	8.96
Wood and Furniture	2.03	1.77	1.86	1.87	1.90
Paper and printing	4.91	4.69	4.05	4.25	4.15
Chemical	7.02	7.90	7.41	6.50	7.24
Non-metallic goods	3.61	3.13	3.57	3.61	2.98
Metallic goods	7.73	8.04	7.58	6.41	6.07
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: *Results of the Survey, of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E.C. (1989, 190 G.C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), pp. 89-90. (Figures are only for those enterprises with at least ten employees.)

Diversification, or even significant expansion, of the manufacturing base has been inhibited by a number of factors. Most significantly, the sector has not been able to provide the inputs for its own growth. The preference during the Dergue period for modern and expensive machinery increased the country's dependence upon imported capital goods and spare parts. This caused both short-term difficulties in terms of balance of payments problems or simply having to 'do without', and longer-term liabilities in terms of an ever-growing debt burden. It also inhibited the development of an indigenous capital goods and engineering industry.

The fact that the expansion that took place in manufacturing during the Dergue period was large-scale and capital-intensive also inhibited growth in employment opportunities as noted above. This was further exacerbated by the problems associated with a shortage of skilled managerial and technical staff. The contribution of rural development also remained low during this period. Aware of these problems, the new policies for manufacturing initiated under the New Economic Policy and Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation, as briefly outlined above, are designed to overcome these shortcomings.

Nonetheless, Ethiopian manufacturing continues to be characterised by a 'double-dualism' of medium (50-399 employees) and large-scale (more than 400 employees) enterprises versus small-scale (10-49 employees) on the one hand, and public versus private ownership, on the other hand. Government figures for 1989/90 suggest that there were 121 small-scale enterprises and 183 medium- and large-scale enterprises in operation<sup>4</sup>

With respect to the public/private ownership division, although the number of establishments was virtually identical in 1990, 158 public enterprises and 155 private enterprises, the public enterprises dominated on every other measure. For example, they accounted for 96.5 per cent of the gross value of production, 94.5

per cent of all wages paid, 98.0 per cent of fixed capital assets, 98.9 per cent of investment in fixed assets and 94.4 per cent of all employees<sup>5</sup>. The subsequent independence of Eritrea has resulted in a drop in the number of public enterprises in Ethiopia to 119.

## B. INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT

### Quantitative trends

The contribution of manufacturing to total employment in Ethiopia is small. Statistics on the number of people employed in manufacturing are scarce. UNIDO experts estimated that the figure in 1990 was approximately 105,000 persons. Others have suggested that it contributes about three per cent to the country's total employment<sup>6</sup>. Official figures for the public sector in 1992/93 indicated that just under 78,000 were employed in public sector enterprises. Figures for 1989/90, counted 4,586 employees in those 22 private-sector establishments that had at least 10 employees. Smaller enterprises might contribute another 10,000 to 30,000 employees to the total figure<sup>7</sup>. Regardless, it is clear that the agricultural sector remains the dominant source of employment for the Ethiopian labour force, accounting for 85 per cent of total employment.

The number of people employed in manufacturing grew as the scale of activity in the sector grew during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1956, there were about 19,000 workers in the manufacturing industries, while by the end of 1962, there were some 29,000. On the eve of the Ethiopian revolution, there were about 150,000 permanent industrial workers. Of these, the food and textile industries accounted for 37 per cent and 34 per cent of employment respectively. And, of the 37 per cent of the labour force employed by the food sector, the H.V.A. sugar company employed 70 per cent<sup>8</sup>. Moreover, large-scale enterprises dominated with 68 per cent of all employees in establishments with more than 500 workers<sup>9</sup>.

During the Dergue period, staffing levels in manufacturing (and, indeed, in all sectors) were largely inflexible. The terms of the Labour Proclamation (No. 64/1975) offered workers considerable protection against redundancy including prior notice of up to three months, powers of appeal, automatic severance pay of two months salary and redundancy compensation of one month's salary for the first year of employment and one-third of a month for each of the remaining years. The rate of growth of employment during this period was steady, yet modest. It rose from approximately 77,000 in 1980 to an estimated 88,000 in 1985, and then to 105,000 in 1990.

This growth, however, was not in response to actual increases in the demand for labour, for the capital intensive nature of the new investments meant that they did not generate significant amounts of new employment opportunities. Rather, the growth resulted from over-manning as the result of the Dergue government policy of absorbing all graduates from university, and commercial and technical high schools. This policy also deprived the private sector of skilled manpower.

Table II.4 displays the distribution of employees in 1992/93, in public manufacturing enterprises, while Table II.5 presents information about employment in all manufacturing enterprises with more than 10 employees. The largest single employer in the public sector was the textiles industry, which had over 38 per cent of the total, while the food industry was second, with almost exactly half of that share (19 per cent). The beverages industry was third, with 9.5 per cent of the total employees. These relative shares had remained virtually constant for the previous five years. Indeed, so too had the total number of people employed in these large public enterprises in each of the years between 1987/88 and 1992/93 when the figure fluctuated between a narrow band of 77,000 and 81,000<sup>10</sup>.

**Table II.4**  
**Employment in Public Enterprises, by Main Industry, 1992/93**

Source: *Facts About Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade & Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p. 2.

**Table II.5**  
**Per cent Share of Employment, by Main Industry, 1985/86-1989/90**

Industrial group	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90
Food	20.48	21.04	19.62	19.03	18.81
Beverage	9.12	9.65	9.23	9.46	9.50
Tobacco	1.10	1.01	1.03	1.05	1.05
Textiles	41.81	40.52	41.54	40.41	39.67
Leather and footwear	6.16	5.96	6.08	6.37	7.17
Wood and rapture	3.31	3.34	3.67	5.26	4.91
Paper and printing	5.19	5.38	5.42	5.57	5.44
Chemical	4.93	5.31	5.29	5.29	5.47
Non-metal	5.03	4.66	4.90	4.32	3.98
Metal	2.87	3.14	3.22	3.30	4.01
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: *Results of the Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E. C. (I 989/90 G. C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), pp. 85-86. (Figures are only for those enterprise with at least ten employees.)

With the installation of the transition government in 1991, a new approach to labour policy has been adopted which gives greater autonomy to management. The government's policies on wage and employment are now geared towards liberalisation of the labour market by removing restrictions on labour mobility, employment and wage rates (with the exception of the government-set minimum wage). The goal of these policies is to generate employment by encouraging the use of labour-intensive production methods. Such policies have caused the inevitable shake-up among employment structures and there have been a number of redundancies in the public sector enterprises. Twenty to 30 per cent of the workforce may eventually be laid off.

Ethiopia has a large pool of unskilled and semi-skilled workers upon which potential employers can draw. Although there are presently shortages of managers, trained production supervisors and some kinds of engineers, the new liberalisation of the labour market is bound to encourage a new supply (both Ethiopian and foreign) ready to meet demand.

#### **Educational background and skill levels**

At the time of the 1974 revolution, Ethiopia was at an extremely low level of development in terms of educational and skill levels, even in comparison to other African countries. In 1973, for example, the enrolment rate for primary school age children (seven to 12 years) was only 18 per cent. The illiteracy rate that year for the population over the age of 10 years was an astounding 90 per cent. And, there was a significant urban bias in education. In 1974, the rural population, which accounted for 90 per cent of the population, only made up 50 per cent of those enrolled in an educational facility.

Under the Dergue regime, basic education was given a high priority and a number of achievements were made in the 1974-84 period. Subsequent efforts were hampered by the problems of famine and insecurity between 1984 and 1989. Many steps were taken to increase literacy including the National Literacy

Campaign which the government launched in July 1979. These efforts were extremely successful and by 1990 the literacy rate had increased to 66 per cent. The government was also able to make headway in the reduction of the urban bias in education. Table II.6 reveals the dramatic increase in the number of people attending school between 1974 and 1989.

**Table II.6**  
**School attendance, 1974 and 1989**

Level/type of schooling	1974	1989	Annual change (%)
Pre school	7570	87355	19.1
Primary school	859800	2855846	9.0
Junior secondary school	101800	447587	11.2
Senior secondary school	81300	426413	12.6
Special education	522	1537	8.0
Technical education facility	5500	4101	-2.1
Primary teacher education facility	3100	4142	2.1

Source: Kinfe Abraham, *Ethiopia: From Bullets to the Ballot Box* (Lawrenceville, NJ, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994), p. 232.

Despite these efforts and the increase in the numbers of people attending school, the percentage of the eligible population enrolled in an educational facility in Ethiopia remains low. It is below not only the average for developing countries, but also for those labeled least-developed. Only 59 per cent of the country's children who are eligible ever enter primary school. In total, only 28 per cent of the country's children are enrolled in primary school, and secondary enrolment stands at only 15 per cent. Meanwhile, the figure for tertiary enrolment in 1988 was only one per cent. Enrolment in technical subjects at the secondary level is even lower, and stands at only 0.5 per cent of all secondary enrolment, as compared with 4.7 per cent for all least-developed countries and 7.5 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole<sup>11</sup>.

As a consequence, Ethiopian workers have low skill levels. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that the average member of the Ethiopian workforce has had only one year of schooling<sup>12</sup>. Moreover, there are significant gaps in the range of skills available, particularly in the area of upper and middle management.

Recent developments, however, bode well for the future. Much of the 'peace dividend' that has resulted from the cessation of hostilities has been channeled into the country's education budget. Moreover, skilled personnel, who fled during the Dergue years, are reported to be considering a return to the country. Finally, there are also efforts to use the country's educated individuals more usefully. For example, the practice of automatically hiring graduates of higher level institutions into the public service has been discontinued.

### **The role of women**

Although the Dergue regime initiated a number of changes in the legal arrangements concerning marriage, divorce and property ownership, custom and tradition still play an important role in the lives of women and the opportunities open to them. The result is that women are still limited in their participation in the modern sector. For example, the participation rate of women in the manufacturing sector barely increased over the decade of the 1980s, rising from 29 per cent in 1979-80, to just over 31 per cent by 1989/90<sup>13</sup>. And, as can be seen in Table II.7, when women are employed, it tends to be in traditionally "female occupations". Textiles provided the majority of opportunities in manufacturing employment, with just over 58 per cent of all employed women. Together, these women made up almost half of the workers in the manufacture of textiles. Smaller enterprises (less than 10 employees), not included in the figures above, are also substantial employers of women.

**Table II.7**  
**Employment by Sex and Industrial Sector, 1989/90**

Industrial group	Male per cent	Female share	Male per cent	Female per cent	Total share	Total
Food	12602	81.13	2932	18.87	15534	
Beverage	5935	75.67	1908	24.33	7843	
Tobacco	576	66.36	292	33.64	868	
Textiles	17797	54.32	14965	45.68	32762	
Leather and footwear	4460	75.38	1457	24.62	5917	
Wood and furniture	3591	88.60	462	11.40	4053	
Paper and printing	2951	65.72	1539	34.28	4490	
Chemical	3192	70.67	1325	29.33	4517	
Non-metal	2906	88.49	378	11.51	3284	
Metal	2885	87.34	418	12.66	3301	
All manufacturing	56893	68.9	25676	31.10	82569	

Source: Source: *Results of the Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E.C. (1 989,190 G.C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), pp. 24-25. (Figures are only for those enterprises with at least ten employees.)

A more dramatic rise in female participation has been experienced in education, however. As Table II.8 shows, girls, as a percentage of total number of pupils, increased during the 1970s and 1980s, with particularly strong increases in the senior secondary level. In 1989, girls made up about 40 per cent of all of the country's students. Still, less than half (45 per cent) of all girls enter primary school when they are eligible, a figure below the average for least developed countries.



**Table II.8**  
**Trends in School Enrolment, by Level and Sex, Selected Years**

	1974	1984	1986	1989
<b>Primary</b>				
Total	859800	2497100	2448800	2855800
Boys	585600	1560500	1491300	1743000
% share	68.11	62.49	60.90	61.03
Girls	274200	936600	957500	1112800
% share	31.89	37.51	39.10	38.97
<b>Junior Secondary</b>				
Total	101800	303600	363100	447600
Boys	71200	194500	221100	263800
% share	69.94	64.06	60.89	53.94
Girls	30600	109100	142000	183800
% share	30.06	35.94	39.11	41.06
<b>Senior Secondary</b>				
Total	81300	276200	292400	426400
Boys	62100	177800	178700	258800
% share	76.38	64.37	61.11	60.69
Girls	19200	98400	113700	167600
% share	23.62	35.63	38.89	39.31

Source: Kinfe Abraham, *Ethiopia: From Bullets to the Ballot Box* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994), p. 241.

### C. PRODUCTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE

#### Output

As noted in Section A of this chapter, data reveal that the share of manufacturing value added in total GDP has remained relatively constant in Ethiopia. It has ranged between 9.3 and 10.6 per cent for 16 of the 19 years between 1975 and 1993 (see Figure II.B above). This relative stability masks some variations within individual sectors, however, as is evident in Table II.9. For example, the relative share of textiles in total MVA fell dramatically between 1980 and 1990, especially between 1980 and 1985, while food products have experienced a more modest decline. Significant relative increases in the share of manufacturing value added, meanwhile, were experienced by beverages and petroleum refineries products. These figures differ from those compiled by the Ethiopian government (Table II.2), which use different years and industrial groupings.

Based on data from the Ethiopian government (Table II.10), the share of value added in the gross output of the manufacturing sector as a whole also remained relatively constant during the second half of the 1980s. It declined slightly from 23.6 per cent in 1985/86 to 21.6 per cent in 1989/90. But also concealed

within this relative stability are a number of branch-specific variations. The wood and furniture, and paper and printing sectors, were well above this average, while the beverages sector fell well below the average and was largely responsible for the slight overall decline.

#### INSERT

Table II.9  
Share of Industrial Sector Relative in Total Manufacturing Value-Added, Select Years  
(per cent share)

Table II.10

Share of Manufacturing Value-Added in Gross Output, 1985/86-1989/90

Paper and Printing	39.4	39.2	32.9		33.8	31.1
Chemical	32.9	32.1	29		25.4	25
Non-metal	22.8	19.6	28.1	1	25.7	28.7
Metal	19.4	19.8	24.5		21	16.7
All Manufacturing	23.6	23.8	22.2		21.7	21.6

Source: *Results of the Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E.C. (1989/90 G.C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), pp. 107. (Figures are only for those enterprises with at least ten employees.)

#### Labour productivity

As is evident from the data presented in Table II.11, labour productivity (measured in terms of the value added per person employed) varies greatly across industries. Between 1985/86 and 1989/90, the figures for the different industrial groups varied from approximately one-half the average for all manufacturing industries in the case of textiles, to over seven times the average in the case of tobacco. There were, as well, significant year-to-year fluctuations, with the beverages industry showing a constant decline, while the food industry experienced a gain over the period. Other subsectors had more mixed fortunes. Overall, labour productivity declined by just under four per cent in the second half of the 1980s.

Table II.11  
Relative Indices of Pre Capita Value-Added, by industrial group, 1985/86-1989/90

Industrial group	1985/86	1989/90
Food	121.14	190.03
Beverage	151.83	103.02
Tobacco	473.34	500.39
Textiles	50.93	560.03
Leather and footwear	59.04	1195.00
Wood and furniture	103.28	800.00
Paper and printing	158.01	100.00
Chemical	198.26	100.00
Non-metal	69.10	99.00
Metal	220.56	232.00
All manufacturing	100	100

Source: *Results of the Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E.C. (1989/90 G.C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), p. 108. (Figures are only for those enterprises with at least ten employees.)

The ratio of wages and salaries to value added is another indicator of labour productivity. Table II.12 shows that when using this measure as well, tobacco is the most productive subsector and textiles is the least productive subsector. These results are, of course, not particularly surprising, for the textiles industry is labour-intensive, while industries such as tobacco and chemicals have a high natural resource input and/or are highly capital-intensive.

**Table II.12**  
**Relative Indices of the Ratio of Wages and Salaries to Value Added by Industrial Group, 1985/86-1989/90**

Industrial group	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89
Food	78.11	101.65	98.50	<del>73.76</del>
Beverage	71.89	78.30	83.97	<del>108.00</del>
Tobacco	11.29	15.57	18.38	<del>19.39</del>
Textiles	173.04	146.46	157.05	<del>163.82</del>
Leather and footwear	150.23	103.77	74.79	<del>85.32</del>
Wood and Furniture	112.21	142.22	121.15	<del>133.30</del>
Paper and printing	72.35	82.78	108.97	<del>106.89</del>
Chemical	75.58	72.17	79.27	<del>82.55</del>
Non-metal	150.46	169.58	86.54	<del>82.85</del>
Metal	85.71	81.37	70.73	<del>144.98</del>
All Manufacturing	100	100	100	100

Source: *Results of the Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E.C. (1989/90 G.C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), p. 109. (Figures are only for those enterprises with at least ten employees.)

### Profitability

Given that most of the manufacturing activity in Ethiopia has been under public control since 1975, it is difficult to discuss profitability in any meaningful way. Indeed, the problem is made even more difficult by the policy in place before the transitional government came to power in 1991 which prevented public enterprises from retaining more than five per cent of net income.

Nevertheless, some observations can be made. In the mid-1980s, the large public enterprises were registering increases in their levels of profits primarily a result of the lower book value of their assets, which resulted in an overall lower cost of production. In subsequent years, however, financial performance deteriorated, with the downward trend being primarily caused by declining labour

productivity and policies that discouraged efficiency. As a result, the industrial sector public enterprises' contribution to budgetary receipts of residual surplus fell from Br84.8 million in 1987/88 to Br37.0 million in 1991/92 in current prices. In real figures, the decline is even more dramatic. Figures showing the ratio of gross profits to manufacturing value added for different industrial groups are presented in Table II.13.

**Table II.13**  
**Ratio of Gross Profit to Manufacturing Value Added by Industrial Group, 1985/86-1989/90**

Industry group	1985/86	1986/87	1988/89	1989/90
Food	65.51	56.99	<del>63.08</del>	
Beverage	68.37	67.22	<del>68.90</del>	
Tobacco	94.30	93.58	<del>90.70</del>	
Textiles	24.60	38.01	<del>20.89</del>	
Leather and footwear	34.81	56.28	<del>68.83</del>	
Wood and furniture	51.26	39.65	<del>31.38</del>	
Paper and printing	68.57	65.05	<del>58.38</del>	
Chemical	67.17	67.60	<del>68.90</del>	
Non-metal	11.84	28.06	<del>68.89</del>	
Metal	62.89	65.66	<del>68.90</del>	26.95
All Manufacturing	56.78	57.56	53.60	51.61 49.07

Source: *Results of the Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E.C. (1989/90 G.C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), author's calculations. (Figures are only for those enterprises with at least ten employees.)

#### D. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Because the vast majority of large-scale manufacturing activity was undertaken by the public sector during the Dergue period, government departments played a crucial role in industrial development at this time. Handicraft and small-scale industrial development, meanwhile, was to be the responsibility of the Handicraft and Small-Scale Industries Development Agency (HASIDA). This agency, established by the government in 1977, was designed to organise craftsman and artisans into producers' and service co-operatives of their own. Although HASIDA's work was not restricted to any specific areas of the country, in practice it achieved more in the urban centres than the rural areas.

With the liberalisation of the economy during the early 1990s, new institutional structures to promote private sector activity have emerged. Foremost among these is the Ethiopian Private Industries Association (EPIA). Founded in 1991, the EPIA is designed to promote an enabling environment for the growth and development of private industries. To achieve this end, the EPIA has been organising a number of workshops around the country, as well as establishing committees that are intended to

undertake the preparatory work for the formation of associations. It has been widely agreed that the EPIA has made great strides in reducing the psychological barriers created by the former command economy.

### E. OWNERSHIP PATTERNS

As discussed above, the majority of Ethiopian manufacturing was controlled by foreigners before 1974. A range of US, European, Israeli, Indian, Japanese and other foreign companies owned enterprises in the country. However, also as discussed above, most of these operations were taken over by the Dergue regime. More specifically, in February 1975, 72 of the largest manufacturing and commercial enterprises were nationalised, and the government assumed a majority interest in another 29 enterprises. It subsequently bought out the private interests in all but four of this latter group. The result meant that, during the 1980s, publicly-owned enterprises dominated the manufacturing sector in Ethiopia. In 1985/86 for example, as noted in Section A of this chapter, they accounted for 96.1 per cent of the gross production value of medium- and large-scale enterprises, 95 per cent of the value added, 94 per cent of the employment and 98 per cent of the fixed assets. Table II.14 shows how the public sector dominated virtually all those industry groups in 1989/90 among those enterprises with at least 10 employees.

Table II.14

Ownership by Major Industrial Group, 1989/90 (% of each industry's value of production)

Industry group	Public	private
Food	630195	28.80
Beverage	425549	92.00
Tobacco	182037	100
Textile	446266	98.25
Leather and footwear	226821	100.00
Wood and rupture	37973	100.00
Paper	37173	92.00
Printing	58167	92.00
Chemical	143148	100.00
Non-metallic mineral products	69913	92.00
Metal and electrical	140826	92.00
Total	2398068	98.54

Source: *Results of the Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industries 1982 E.C. (1989/90 G.C.)* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, April 1993), p. 46-47. (Figures for enterprises with more than 10 employees.)

A shift away from the dominance of public ownership is a central plank to the new government's economic policy. There is a commitment to ensure that the state's role is eventually limited to a selected number of activities such as the production of strategic raw materials. To achieve this end, there have been initial moves in the restructuring of public enterprises with a view to giving greater autonomy to management. In addition, a new privatisation policy is currently under development which the government plans to launch in the near future. The government has also announced (in early 1995) its intention to pay compensation or return property confiscated by the state during the 17-year period of Dergue rule.

The new government has not made a complete about-face in terms of how public ownership is valued, however. Under the country's new constitution, for example, urban and rural land is owned by the state, and only the development on the land can be privately owned.

### F. INVESTMENT PATTERNS

Given the dominance of public ownership in the country since 1974, virtually all investment in the country since then has been made by the government. This investment has been financed through various means over the years. For example, between 1980/81 and 1989/90, foreign loans comprised the largest single

contributor to the total amount of capital invested in the country at 44 per cent. The second-most important financing element was government equity, which comprised 35 per cent, followed by domestic bank loans at 19 per cent, and finally foreign grants, which made up only two per cent of total capital investment.

During the first two years of the 1990s, the rankings changed somewhat. Given the insecurity in the country at this time, it is not particularly surprising to find that foreign loans fell off during this period. In 1992/93, the shares were as follows: government equity (50.6 per cent), foreign loans (20.1 per cent), domestic bank loans (17.9 per cent), foreign grants (10.2 per cent), and a small amount labeled 'own funds' (1.3 per cent). See Table II.15.

Table II.15

Public Investment in Industry, by source of finance, 1988/89-1992/93

	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93
Government	49317	69448	105510	78953	108064
Foreign loans	110969	227543	115820	61135	42901
Foreign grants	3441	9759	4863	2518	21747
Domestic bank loans	71193	64029	60725	28601	38216
Own funds	18189	54299	47449	32662	2796
Total	253109	425078	1 334367	1 203869	213724

Source: *Facts about Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade & Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p. 65.

During recent years, the food industry has been the main beneficiary of investment. Textiles, beverages, chemicals and non-metallic industries, meanwhile, have also received significant amounts of new investment. Table II.16 lists the extent to which investment was distributed among different public sectors. Also presented, in Figure II.C, is the extent to which the investment was used for either new plant, expansion of existing facilities or the replacement of obsolete equipment. It is clear from this data that new investment projects absorbed the lion's share of available resources, almost two-thirds between 1988/89 and 1992/93.

Table II.16

Public Investment in Industry, by Industrial Group, Select Years, 1988/89-1992/93

Industry group	1988/89	% share	1990/91	% share	1992/93
Food	2870	1.13	129061	38.60	105706
Beverages	32824	12.97	22021	6.59	35299
Tobacco	459	0.18	1080	0.32	206
Textiles	100928	39.88	71964	21.52	5230
Leather and shoe	8706	3.44	12510	3.74	1048
Wood	3018	1.19	1384	0.41	0
Non-Metallic	53703	21.22	41391	12.38	34129
Printing	5054	2.00	2012	0.60	1200
Chemical	12082	4.77	39376	11.78	37460
Metals	33465	13.22	13568	4.06	4233
total	253109	100	334367	100	213700

Source: *Facts about Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade & Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p. 64.

During the Dergue period, private investment was discouraged by various means such as ceilings on permissible fixed assets, licensing requirements, high rates of personal taxation, employment protection legislation and discrimination in credit allocation. Attitudes changed modestly during the latter part of the 1980s and 1990 and in 1989, a package of investment incentives was launched. The incentives included a tax holiday based on the scale and type of investment, exemption from customs duty on capital goods

destined for investment, important concessions on imports in general, a liberalized policy on remittances derived from profits, dividends and from the sale of companies, and favorable terms for leasing land.

In 1990, initiatives continued with the issuance of Proclamation No. 83/1 on 5 May which was designed to provide further investment incentives and hoped to encourage domestic investors as well as foreign capital.

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#### **Figure H.C Industry public investment by type of investment, 1988/89-1992/93**

Source: *Facts About Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade & Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p. 65.

As part of the post-1991 liberalisation and internationalisation of the Ethiopian economy, the government has been encouraging much greater private investment. This was initially promulgated in the transitional government's Proclamation Number 23. This act opened all but large-scale energy projects, transport and financial services to foreign investors. Subject to a minimum investment of US\$500,000, investors were to be permitted up to 100 per cent foreign equity holdings. Further incentives included tax breaks of up to three years for new investment and reinvested profits, as well as the tax-free importation of up to 15 per cent of the productive capital for any new projects.

More recently, the government has stated that it will provide all the necessary assistance for domestic and foreign private investors who wish to undertake ventures in modern commercial farming. Incentives have been put in place such as the making available of suitable land, providing access to domestic credit, tax benefits and providing the necessary infrastructure.

To coordinate new investments, both domestic and foreign, a new 'Investment Office of Ethiopia' was established in July 1992. Inquiries for investment certificates have been quite brisk since then, though the number of implemented projects have thus far been quite few in number (particularly when compared to the volume of requests made). Still, the Investment Office has claimed that it has issued 1,016 private investment licences to projects worth Br8.6 million by mid-1994. However, only 15 per cent of these were actually under way at that time.

#### **G. INDUSTRIAL LOCATION**

Ethiopia's manufacturing industry is concentrated around Addis Ababa (the capital) and Dire Dawa (in the east of the country). Indeed, the Addis Ababa and the Shoa Region, along with Dire Dawa and the Hararghe Region, account for 91.7 per cent of all industrial establishments, 89.5 per cent of industrial employment and 93.0 per cent of the GDP. Wello, Gojam, Sidamo and Arsi regions account for only 3.2 and one per cent of public enterprises respectively. This concentration is not particularly surprising given that this is where the greatest concentration of infrastructure (transportation, communications and utilities), skilled labour and markets are to be found. In addition, there have traditionally been no incentives for enterprises to be located in different regions. The promotion of balanced regional development was not a high priority of the Dergue regime.

The new government, however, is committed to fostering a more balanced geographical distribution of industrial development. Entrepreneurs are already beginning to recognize the potential advantages associated with developing small-scale industries, which will be able to supply discrete, hitherto un-served, regional markets. Such enterprises would be able to take advantage of the natural protection afforded by Ethiopia's relatively high costs of transportation.

## H. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Although the level of manufacturing activity is such that pollution, the more 'traditional' environmental concern, is not yet a major problem for Ethiopia, and certainly not a high priority, the manufacturing sector does not escape the consequences of a deteriorated environment. Because so many of the inputs to Ethiopian manufacturing are derived from the land (crops for the food, beverage, tobacco and textiles industries, along with livestock for the leather industry), the country must use its natural resources sustainably if it is to increase its manufacturing base. The recent crises have illuminated this point most vividly. Indeed, it is crucial to recognize that the degradation is neither inevitable nor necessarily irreversible. Institutional development (particularly at the local level), technical assistance and supplementary food during critical periods would all help to alleviate the environmental crises.

Given the experiences of environmental crises in Ethiopia, along with the increased attention now being paid to environmental issues by both the government and the international community, it is certainly the case that pressures for the adoption of environmentally-friendly processes in the country's industry are bound to increase. This is no bad thing: it will ensure that Ethiopia's industrial development takes due regard of the country's natural resource base, and thereby augments its own sustainability.

## I. TRADE IN MANUFACTURES

### Imports

As an essentially resource-based economy, Ethiopia has long been dependent on imports to satisfy its demand for manufactures. Between 1975 and 1993, manufactures made up over 75 per cent of all imports in every year except 1991 (see Table II.18). In 1993, the latest year for which data are available, the figure stood at 85 per cent. The other characteristic to note is that there is no discernible trend in the data over this period.

**Table II.17**  
Share of Manufactures in Total Imports, 1975-1993 (per cent)

	All manu- factures	Capital goods	Processed foods
1975	89.04		30.12
1976	87.47		32.37
1977	85.28		28.00
1978	91.25		32.88
1979	83.01		36.07
1980	80.73		24.88
1981	77.12		38.85
1982	77.08		26.73
1983	76.33		30.86
1984	80.83		38.02



1985	78.37	<del>28.04</del>
1986	86.83	<del>38.04</del>
1987	88.26	<del>47.8</del>
1988	90.28	<del>40.40</del>
1989	97.88	<del>32.82</del>
1990	84.19	<del>18.19</del>
1991	47.29	<del>17.48</del>
1992	80.01	<del>9.38.18</del>
1993	85.03	<del>38.64</del>

Source: UNIDO, *Industrial Development Reviews Information Database*.

The composition of manufactured imports has remained relatively consistent. Despite Ethiopia's desire to develop a self-sustaining industrial base, the country has continued to be dependent upon foreign sources for most of its machinery and equipment, and these elements have constituted more than half of the country's manufacturing imports during eight of the 13 years between 1981 and 1993. In 1993, for example, they accounted for 56.5 per cent of the total value of manufacturing imports. Second and third in importance have consistently been the chemical products and processed foods, usually contributing about 20 per cent and ten per cent respectively to total imports. The only exceptions to this are 1985 and 1986, when the failure of domestic food production necessitated vast increases in the quantity of imported processed food. Table II.19 provides a more detailed breakdown of the composition of manufactured imports by major product groups.

**Table II.18**  
**Composition of Manufactured Imports by Major Product Category, Select Years 1975-1993 (per cent share)**

Product group	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993
Processed foods	6.86	8.98	28.96	12.10	9.49	11.74	8.11
Textiles and clothing	10.51	6.52	4.54	4.09	4.68	4.67	3.92
Wood products, furniture	0.29	0.21	0.28	0.81	0.98	1.02	1.00
Paper, printing, publishing	3.27	3.91	2.66	3.82	2.41	1.88	1.92
Chemical industry	33.1	32.44	15.44	18.16	24.42	19.68	18.70

Non-metallic products	1.23	2.20	0.75	1.20	3.16	1.34	1.57
Basic metals and iron and steel	5.50	4.64	4.19	5.15	5.19	3.08	7.71
Machinery and equipment	38.40	40.10	42.80	54.19	48.99	56.17	56.50
Misc. products	0.87	1.00	0.38	0.49	0.69	0.41	0.55

Source: UNIDO, *Industrial Development Reviews Information Database*.

### Exports

It might surprise some to see the extent to which manufactures dominate Ethiopia's exports, accounting for almost 85 per cent of total exports in 1993. A closer look, however, reveals that this figure includes processed foods which in turn includes coffee. Processed foods regularly accounted for more than 90 per cent of all manufactured exports during the 1970s and more than 80 per cent during the 1980s. Table II.20 provides full details.

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**Table II.19**

**Share of Manufactures in Total Exports, Select Years, 1975-1993 (per cent)**

Source: UNIDO, *Industrial Development Reviews Information Database*.

Although most of the manufacturing in Ethiopia has traditionally been designed to cater for the home market, there have been a number of goods in addition to coffee that have been exported, including sugar, semi-processed hides, skins and other leather work, oilseed products and some petroleum products. Moreover, Table II.21 shows that the non-food sectors have grown during recent years, so that they now occupy a greater share of total manufactured exports. The rise of textiles and clothing, along with machinery and clothing, are particularly noteworthy. Nevertheless, it is still the case that, although manufactured exports appear to have registered impressive growth in the past few years, they remain dominated by the agricultural-based leather and leather products, food and textiles.

**Table II.20**

**Composition of Manufactured Exports by Major Product Category, Select Years 1975-1993 (per cent share)**

Product group	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993
Processed foods	90.08	79.45	77.72	67.62	71.05	68.44	66.32
Textiles and clothing	0.88	2.42	3.98	13.65	11.53	14.92	13.17
Wood products,	0.75	0.25	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.05

furniture							
Paper, printing, publishing	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.03
Chemical industry	6.55	15.48	13.19	7.78	2.55	2.37	0.56
Non-metallic products	0.27	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.10	0.01	0.01
Basic metals and iron and steel	0.03	0.02	0.001	0.03	0.004	0.002	0.04
Machinery and equipment	1.27	2.35	5.02	10.70	14.63	14.11	19.79
Misc. products	0.14	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.04

Source: UNIDO, *Industrial Development Reviews Information Database*.

## J. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

As can be seen in Table II.22 which presents Ethiopia's receipts of official development assistance between 1984 and 1990, the most important bilateral donors have been Italy, the US, Sweden and Germany. Significant multilateral donors include the European Community (through the various Lome programmes), the International Development Association, the World Food Programme and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Much of the assistance Ethiopia has received over the years has been emergency relief. Many donor countries were hesitant to give to the Dergue regime, for aid donations were perceived as being tantamount to indirectly financing the ongoing civil war.

In addition to this assistance from Western countries and Western-dominated agencies, technical and educational assistance was provided by the USSR and other socialist countries, including East Germany, Bulgaria and Cuba during the period of Dergue rule. The quantity of assistance received during the 1970s and 1980s was low, however, when compared with other African countries. In 1991, it was only US\$19 for each Ethiopian. Only Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Zaire received less in per capita terms<sup>14</sup>.

**Table II.21**  
**Receipt of Official Development Assistance, 1984-1990**  
(millions of Birr)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Bilateral	195.3	434.0	405.9	320.4	569.4	598.0
of which			1			
Italy	45.9	83.0	152.9	128.9	233.3	133.3
USA	21.0	146.0	94.0	8.0	69.0	53.0
Sweden	17.9	24.6	35.2	35.1	53.2	48.9
W. Germany	29.5	26.6	27.2	27.9	38.9	36.0
UK	9.4	36.4	14.1	14.0	34.2	36.6
Multilateral	177.5	292.0	244.4	327.4	417.1	396.2
of which						
EC	57.9	103.3	85.7	96.0	153.4	54.0
IDA	42.3	111.1	150.3	85.1	76.0	70.0

WFP	27.8	47.1	30.3	31.1	40.1	66.6
UNDP	10.6	19.4	23.2	28.8	22.6	19.0
UNHCR	13.4	20.7	21.8	27.9	73.7	88.9
Total	372.7	726.0	650.2	647.8	986.5	907.2
of which grants	286.0	618.7	562.7	942.5	775.1	609.0

Source: Kinfu Abraham, *Ethiopia: From Bullets to the Ballot Box* (Lawrenceville, NJ, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994), p. 257.

With the change in government and corresponding shifts in policy during the early 1990s, there is a brighter prospect for greater international co-operation. Indeed, a number of national governments and international agencies have already committed themselves to assisting with the transition to a market economy. The United Kingdom, for example, announced in July 1995 that it would give Ethiopia £9 million in financial assistance: £5 million for balance of payments support and £4 million in commercial debt relief. The UK Minister for Overseas Development also announced that Britain will give Ethiopia 600 tonnes of food aid. In the same month, the Clinton administration announced that it would do its utmost to ensure that the horn of Africa was not affected by the cost-cutting in foreign aid that was being executed by the US Congress.

While the World Bank (in the guise of its International Development Association) has been at the forefront of the renewed activity on the multilateral front, the African Development Bank and the European Union have also been important players. Furthermore, UN agencies have been providing specialist assistance. With Ethiopia now firmly on the road towards economic liberalisation, it is expected that, notwithstanding the growing pressures upon aid budgets worldwide, the country should continue to have the opportunity to benefit from international assistance and cooperation.

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- . Girma Kebede, *The State and Development of Ethiopia*, Humanities Press, London, 1992 pp. 33-34.
  - . Befekadu Deguefe, "Profile of the Ethiopian Economy", in *Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa, Volume 1: Country Perspectives*, The World Bank, Washington DC 1990, p. 67.
  - . Deguefe, op. cit., p. 70.
  - . Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, *Ethiopian Statistical Abstract 1992*, Addis Ababa, p. 95.
  - . Ethiopia, Central Statistical Authority, *Ethiopian Statistical Abstract 1992*, Addis Ababa p. 95.
  - . Berhane Mewa, *The Industrial Development Policy and the Present Situation in Ethiopia*, paper presented to the Regional Workshop on Industrial Policies and Strategies, Seoul, Korea, 1995.
7. Incompatibility between different sets of statistics makes it difficult to estimate the number of people who have been, let alone continue to be, employed in private manufacturing. The Central Statistical Office has produced figures for those private enterprises with 10 or more employees, while the Handicraft and Small-Scale Industries Development Agency (HASIDA) counted those in enterprise with assets, excluding land, of less than Br200,000. Consequently, there could be both double-counting (enterprises with many employees but small assets) or neglect (enterprises with few employees but large assets). Nevertheless, a HASIDA survey from 1979/80 estimated 16,314 people engaged in small-scale private manufacturing, while a study by Eshetu Chole reported that, as of 1986 there were only 842 co-operatives in the handicrafts and small-scale industries subsector, with a total membership of about 39,000 workers. Eshetu Chole, 'Reflections on Underdevelopment: Problems and Prospects', in Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang (eds), *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy*, London: British Academic Press, 1994, p. 115.
- . Aria, Ghelawdewos, *Ethiopia: The Political Economy of Transition*, New York, 1995, pp. 48-49.
  - . Wubneh, Malatu, "Manufacturing Productivity in Ethiopia, 1960-88", in Berhanu Abegaz, *Essays on Ethiopian Economic Development*, Aldershot, 1994, p. 257.
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  - . Figures are for 1988. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1993*, 1993, p. 163 and 1995.
  - . Cited in Ben Parker, *Ethiopia: Breaking New Ground*, Oxford, 1995, p. 45.
  - . Griffin, Keith (ed), *The Economy of Ethiopia*, London 1992, p.233.
  - . *World Resources 1994-95* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Resources Institute, 1994), p. 258.

## CHAPTER III -- INDUSTRIAL BRANCH PROFILES

### A. -- FOOD PROCESSING AND RELATED AGRO-INDUSTRIES

The Ethiopian economy is dominated by agriculture. In 1993, agriculture generated 43.3 per cent of the country's GDP, and it made the largest contribution to the country's export earnings as well.<sup>1</sup> The sector is also an important input for manufacturing within Ethiopia, for the sector is dominated by processed foods, beverages and textiles.


Given the centrality of agriculture to the country's economy as a whole, the steady recovery of the sector since the dark days of the mid-1980s is obviously welcomed: in constant prices, the value of production from the agricultural sector increased by 116.2 percent between 1985 and 1993.<sup>2</sup> The good rains that occurred in late 1994 and early 1995 suggest that this figure should continue.

The increase in absolute terms, however, masks the problems that the country experiences in attempting to feed itself. With an annual population growth rate of approximately 3 per cent, Ethiopia must produce enough additional food to feed an additional 1.6 million people every year.<sup>3</sup> The shortage in recent years has been considerable.


To meet this deficit, Ethiopia has been forced to buy more foodstuffs from abroad. Its imports exceeded 1 million tonnes in each of the years 1988, 1992 and 1994. (There were particularly poor rainy seasons in 1993 and early 1994.) However, it was estimated that the 1995 needs would be less -- perhaps only 500,000 tonnes of food aid. (Even with a good harvest, it is estimated that the country requires 500,000 tonnes a year of cereals in order to feed its population.)

About one-eighth of the Ethiopian land-area can be used for crop production. Another three-eighths is permanent pasture.<sup>4</sup> Most of the agricultural activity takes place on the country's highlands and its central plateau, where farmers grow a range of crops, including teff, barley, wheat, maize, beans, peas and lentils. At intermediate altitudes, sorghum and millet are farmed. In the southern highlands, meanwhile, the 'false banana' tree (enset) is the main staple crop, with tubers, vegetables and grains as secondary crops. Livestock husbandry, common as a subsidiary activity in all regions, is virtually the only source of food production in the nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoral lowland areas.

The vast majority of agricultural activity is undertaken by peasants on small plots (1 or 2 hectares in size). This is a legacy of major land-reform schemes that took place after 1975; the involvement of the state in primary agriculture is relatively small. In Ethiopia, there are two harvests a year: the smaller one in the highlands after the small rains in mid-year (this accounts for about one-tenth of the annual harvest) and the main harvest in November-December. Table III.1 presents the production figures for some of the country's major agricultural products, while the subsequent sections consider a range of agricultural crops individually. To place this discussion within the broader context of the chapter, Figures III.A and III.B compare the size of the country's major industries (ranked by the value of production in 1992/93).



Source: *Facts about Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade and Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p.p. 52-54.



Source: *Facts about Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade and Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p.p. 52-54.

**Table III.1 -- Annual harvest (in thousand tonnes) of selected crops, selected years, 1981-1993**

Crop	1981	1983	1984	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993
Cereals	5799	6360	4115	5320	5727	6355	6305	6617
Pulses	978	1053	804	944	616	686	824	802
Vegetables and melons	496	507	513	533	577	588	594	574
Fruits excluding melons	203	209	210	212	218	226	231	230
Sesame seeds	35	36	36	36	37	35	35	32

Source: *FAO Yearbook, Production* (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation, Volume 47, 1994). Figures for 1991 and 1993 are estimates; figures for 1993 exclude Eritrea.

### Cereals

*Maize*: In terms of both the area under cultivation and the quantity produced, maize grew dramatically during the first half of the 1980s. This expansion took mainly place on state farms, though some peasants also substituted maize for sorghum. The trend continued -- though somewhat subdued -- during the latter part of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s. Consequently, maize now provides almost 30 per cent of the country's cereals, having surpassed both teff and sorghum during the past ten years. In 1991/92, it was estimated that 986,500 hectares were under cultivation, an area which produced 15,106.2 thousand quarts.<sup>5</sup>

*Teff*: Teff is a fine-grained cereal which is used in the cooking of injera, the staple food of most Ethiopians. Grown predominantly in the highlands, it is a relatively low-yielding crop which requires great attention. (In order to grow teff, for example, the land must be ploughed about eight or nine times. This would, in any case, make the crop a demanding one; it is even more so given that as many as one-third of Ethiopia's subsistence farmers do not own traction animals.) Nevertheless, the amount of land devoted to the production of teff has expanded during the past few years (primarily at the expense of other cereals -- cereals which often offer greater returns to land, if not to labour as well). About 1.37 million hectares were under cultivation in 1991/92, and 11,845.5 thousand quarts were produced.<sup>6</sup>

*Barley*: Barley is another major cereal grown in the Ethiopian highlands. In 1991/92, 736,000 hectares were under cultivation, and production amounted to 7,851.4 thousand quarts. This represented about 15.8 per cent of Ethiopia's total production of cereals.<sup>7</sup>

*Wheat*: The amount of land devoted to wheat increased considerably during the 1980s. As a result, about 560,000 hectares were under cultivation in 1991/92. This expansion was, in part, in response to the growing demand for bread (which, in turn, had resulted from greater urbanisation). Wheat production in 1991/92 was 7,556.7 thousand quarts.<sup>8</sup>



*Sorghum*: Sorghum has traditionally been the most preferred crop in the Ethiopian lowlands. Approximately 460,000 hectares were devoted to this cereal in 1991/92, and the output in the same year was estimated to be 5,647.3 thousand quarts (representing about 11.3 per cent of the country's total cereal production).<sup>9</sup>

*Other*: Millet is also produced in the lowlands (where, in terms of quantity produced, it is second only to sorghum) -- in 1991/92, 1,283.4 thousand quarts were produced on 152.1 hectares. Small amounts of oats (approximately 300,000 quarts annually) are also produced.<sup>10</sup>

### **Pulses**

The production of pulses peaked in 1979/80 at 933,650 tonnes. Since that time, there has been a decline in production levels, with some reduction in the land-area under cultivation as well. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has estimated that, in 1993, 802,000 tonnes of pulses were produced from 891,000 hectares.<sup>11</sup> The relative constancy of the production figures between 1979/80 and 1993 masks some wider fluctuations within individual crops. More specifically, there was a significant increase in the production of haricot beans, but an equally significant decrease in the production of broad beans. (Nevertheless, Ethiopia still produced about 6 per cent of the world total of the latter.) Other pulses of significance are peas and chickpeas.

In the past, pulses have formed a significant export commodity for Ethiopia -- over the period 1971/72 to 1973/74, for example, 109,900 tonnes were exported annually.<sup>12</sup> Though this subsequently fell, it still amounted to 23,354 tonnes in 1989/90 -- a figure which represents almost 5 per cent of the value of all Ethiopian exports in that year (and almost 11 per cent of all non-coffee exports). Reductions continued, however, and by 1992/93 the share had fallen ten-fold to just over one-half of one per cent.<sup>13</sup> During the past decade, haricot beans have come to dominate pulse exports (always constituting at least half of the weight of total pulse exports, and rising to a 97.7 per cent share in 1992/93, with an absolute figure of an extremely modest 1,493 tonnes).<sup>14</sup>

### **Oilseeds**

The UN Food and Agricultural Organisation reports that Ethiopia's estimated production of oil seeds in 1993 were as follows: rapeseed (82,000 tonnes on 151,000 hectares), sesame seeds (32,000 tonnes on 62,000 hectares), linseed (33,000 tonnes on 67,000 hectares), safflower seeds (36,000 tonnes on 70,000 hectares) and seed cotton (46,000 tonnes on 41,000 hectares).<sup>15</sup> What was an important export sector in the early 1970s has since virtually dried up: in 1983/84, exports were still above 33,000 tonnes, but had fallen to under 1,000 tonnes in both 1991/92 and 1992/93.<sup>16</sup> The fall has been particularly dramatic in the case of sesame seeds (which are primarily grown in Humera). In 1974, exports of this commodity amounted to 84,600 tonnes, netting US\$38 million in foreign exchange (nearly 15 per cent of total foreign exchange earnings).<sup>17</sup> Since 1984/85, however, sesame seed exports have been under 2,500 tonnes a year, falling below 400 tonnes in both 1991/92 and the following year.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, given that the government has lifted restrictions upon the use of private labour, there is optimism that the production of sesame seeds can start to increase. (It is a labour-intensive activity which requires a large seasonal work-force.)

## **Fruits and vegetables**

A wide range of fruits and vegetables are cultivated by peasant farmers on small horticultural plots, both for personal consumption and for market. Production for the latter, however, has traditionally been dominated by the state-owned Horticultural Corporation. In 1993, output of vegetables and melons was estimated to be 574,000 tonnes, and fruits (excluding melons) 230,000 tonnes. The largest single commodities, in terms of weight, were estimated to be bananas, tomatoes, cabbages and onions.<sup>19</sup>

Modest quantities of fruits and vegetables are usually exported (contributing between 0.5 and 2.0 per cent to the value of total exports). In 1992/93, for example, exports amounted to just over 6,000 tonnes (valued at 2.7 million Birr).<sup>20</sup>

## **Sugar**

There are approximately 14,000 hectares under cultivation for sugar cane in any given year, with the production figure for 1993 being 1.45 million tonnes.<sup>21</sup> Most of this came from two large facilities: one, at Wonji in Shoa, which has a potential of about 10,300 hectares; while the other, at Methara, has about 9,000 hectares which could be potentially under cane.


## **Coffee**

Coffee is the country's most important export. The commodity has deep roots in the country, with Ethiopians claiming that coffee in fact originated in their country. (The Yemenis make the same claim.)<sup>22</sup> What is indisputable is the value of the crop to the national economy. Between 1980/81 and 1992/93, it generated 63 per cent of total export revenues (see Figure III.C), and taxes on it are the largest single source of government revenue.<sup>23</sup>


Although coffee is grown in many parts of the country, the production which supplies the export market is concentrated in four areas in the south and south-west of the country -- namely, Sidamo, Kefa and Illubabor, Wollega and Hararge.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, the variety produced in this last location is considered to among the best in the world -- consequently, premium prices can often be obtained. In all areas of the country, it is the peasant farmers who produce most of the coffee. The central grading and marketing centres, meanwhile, are located in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.<sup>25</sup>

Most of the Ethiopian production is processed by the sun-drying method and then hulled. Hulling capacity, however, is limited by old plant. In 1985/86, for example, only 13,000 tonnes (less than 10 per cent of that year's crop) was processed as washed coffee (a commodity which sells at a premium). Meanwhile, most domestically consumed coffee is roasted and ground at home, while exported coffee undergoes no further processing.<sup>26</sup>

As Figure III.D reveals, the export figures for coffee -- in terms of both quantity and value -- have fluctuated considerably during the past 30 years. The variations in the quantity of coffee exported are explained by a number of factors. Most importantly, coffee berry disease (CBD) has been a severe problem.



Source: National Bank of Ethiopia, *Quarterly Bulletin* (Addis Ababa, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1993/94, 1995), pp 70 and 79.



Sources: Keith Griffin (ed.), *The Economy of Ethiopia* (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 79; and National Bank of Ethiopia, *Quarterly Bulletin* (Addis Ababa, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1993/94, 1995), p. 70.

During the 1980s, CBD affected up to 30 per cent of the country's trees. In response, a programme of replanting with disease-resistant strains was instigated. This has served to remove a proportion of the diseased trees from production each year. Given, however, that it takes five years after replanting for the new coffee tree to reach maturity, there is necessarily a lag-time associated with any such programme. Other physical problems which have served to inhibit production have included drought, rust, aging trees and the inadequate use of fertilisers.

Economic and social factors also impact production levels. When world prices are low, it may be in farmers' interest to switch to other cash crops -- for example, qat. Additionally, in times of food shortages, other kinds of pressures may force farmers to substitute subsistence crops for their coffee trees. Either way, the land-area devoted to coffee falls, and the quantity available for export declines accordingly.<sup>27</sup> (Additionally, when the prices paid by government were relatively low during the 1980s, a substantial illegal export market emerged, with farmers striving to profit more from their production.<sup>28</sup>)

For many years, Ethiopian exports of coffee were also regulated by international agreement. As a signatory of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), Ethiopia was allocated quotas which accounted for the majority of its exports. Its share of the world coffee trade under quota agreements fell from about 2.5 per cent in the late 1960s to 2.2 per cent in the late 1970s. This decline was offset to some extent by a growth in exports to countries not covered by quota agreements -- particularly the Middle East and Japan. Consequently, the proportion of exports to quota markets to total exports fell from about 90 per cent to just less than 80 per cent.<sup>29</sup> With, however, the suspension of the ICA in July 1989, this agreement no longer presented a constraint.

Additionally, coffee is also an important domestic consumer good: it is drunk by almost all Ethiopians, with people brewing up three times a day in the areas where it is grown. This love for coffee among Ethiopians has a considerable impact upon export performance, for domestic demand sometimes consumes about half of the total output.

The corresponding value of coffee exports has also fluctuated -- within the last 20 years, world coffee prices in 1977/78 were particularly high, while those during 1989/90 and 1991/92 were extremely low (indeed, because of the collapse of the ICA, they were at their lowest level in real terms since the 1920s). Preliminary indications, however, suggest that both export volumes and export values may be rising to historic highs.

Explaining this are a combination of good rains in Ethiopia in 1994 and the frost and drought that hit Brazil at the same time. Consequently, one report suggests that coffee exports could have reached US\$250 million in 1994, as compared with US\$100 million the previous year.<sup>30</sup> Production, meanwhile, was also predicted to increase: officials have forecasted that the country will export more than 120,000 tonnes of coffee during the 1994/95 crop year.<sup>31</sup> More tangibly, it was reported that the country's Jimma zone had increased coffee production by 600 tonnes to 12,000 tonnes between September 1994 and April 1995.<sup>32</sup> Farmers have been tempted back into coffee producing by many factors: not only the higher world prices, but also by the fact that the government has set a minimum producer price, thus allowing them to earn a higher return (and thereby reducing the incentive for smuggling).

The prospects for Ethiopian coffee are generally good. Yields are continuing to rise as management practices are improved and as applications of fertilizer are increased. The fate of the sector, however, is heavily determined by climatic factors (affecting not only the production of the crop itself, but also the production of other crops, and thereby determining whether they -- in particular, cereals -- will place demands upon those lands currently under coffee cultivation). World prices are, of course, the other main determinant of the health of the Ethiopian coffee industry.

### **Cotton**

Cotton plantations were first established in the Awash valley during the 1960s. Between 1975 and 1985, the area under cotton cultivation increased by 50 per cent, and production increased by 66 per cent, to 34,000 hectares and 75,000 tonnes respectively.<sup>33</sup> The increase in quantity produced was realised through large investments in both irrigation and fertilisers (with cotton farmers being one of the country's largest users of the latter). Since that period, however, production figures have been disappointing -- according to the FAO, the harvest fell to only 30,000 tonnes in 1992, rebounding to 46,000 tonnes the following year.<sup>34</sup>

### **Tea**

Recently, there have been efforts to increase the amount of tea grown in the country. This has been primarily in an attempt to encourage domestic consumption -- by tempting Ethiopians away from coffee, more of that commodity could be made available for export. (Notwithstanding this motivation, there are also hopes that tea may prove to be a valuable export crop in itself.) While there was no production in 1980, an estimated 2,000 hectares were under cultivation in 1993, producing a relatively modest 1,000 tonnes of tea.<sup>35</sup>

### **Tobacco**

Tobacco is cultivated along side food crops on numerous peasant farms, in addition to a 1,100 hectare state farm in the Billate river valley. Production peaked in 1981 at 11,700 tonnes, since falling to its present level of approximately three to four thousand tonnes a year (grown on about 6,000 hectares).<sup>36</sup> All of the harvest is used domestically.

### **Qat**

Qat (also known as chat, khat or miraa), a tree crop with leaves rich in amphetamines, is used socially as a stimulant. It is grown in the highland areas, where it is often the dominant cash crop. Many farmers have turned to qat -- intercropping it with vegetables like sweet potatoes -- for two major reasons: first, it is relatively reliable; and second, it is highly-profitable. This latter characteristic is derived from the fact that most of the crop goes for export, primarily to Djibouti and Somalia. During the past ten years, the quantity of qat exported has been as high as 3,363 tonnes (1987/88) and as low as 251 tonnes (1991/92), with the most recent figure being 1,936 tonnes (1992/93).<sup>37</sup>

### **Livestock**

Ethiopia boasts the largest livestock population in Africa.<sup>38</sup> The numbers grew steadily during

the 1980s (in spite of the drought), and the cessation of Eritrea has had relatively minimal impacts upon numbers (reducing total populations by, on average, between 3 and 4 per cent). Table III.2 presents a fuller picture.

Livestock plays an important role in the economy of the highlands, where oxen are used for agricultural work, sheep and goats for meat and/or sale, and equines for transport.<sup>39</sup> In the lowlands, meanwhile, livestock is the mainstay of a pastoral-nomadic subsistence economy. In all parts of the country, livestock is regarded as an asset, potentially protecting individuals against economic or climatic distress.

**Table III.2 – Livestock populations in thousands of heads, selected years.**

	1979-81	1991	1992	1993
Horses	1602	2700	2750	2750
Mules	727	610	630	630
Asses	3925	5100	5200	5200
Cattle	26000	30000	31000	29450
Camels	980	1060	1070	1000
Pigs	18	20	20	20
Sheep	23250	23000	23200	21700
Goats	17177	18000	18100	16700
Chickens	52000	58000	59000	54000

Source: *FAO Yearbook, Production* (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation, Volume 47, 1994). Figures for 1991-93 are estimates; figures for 1993 exclude Eritrea.

The export of live animals has increased during the 1980s, more than doubling in terms of numbers and value. In 1983/84, for example, less than 5 million tonnes were exported (at a value which represented 1.5 per cent of total exports), while in 1987/88, the respective figures had climbed to 14.1 million tonnes and over 4 per cent. Since that time, however, exports have fallen, with less than 1 million tonnes being exported in both 1991/92 and 1992/93. Bovine cattle and sheep traditionally dominate the exports.<sup>40</sup> A relatively small number of those animals that remain in the country, meanwhile, are slaughtered for both their meat and hides. Others of course provide a variety of dairy products.

### **Fisheries**

In the early 1980s, the Red Sea provided around 25,000 tonnes of fish annually. With the loss of the Eritrean province, however, Ethiopia lost this coastline and thus a large part of its national fisheries industry.

The fisheries sector, nevertheless, has considerable potential. In addition to the lakes in the famous Rift Valley (which include the Kora, Zwai, Longano, Abiata, Shala, Awash, Abaya and Chamo), there is Lake Tana. Located in the northern part of the country with an area of

3,600 square miles, Tana is the country's largest lake. Together with the country's rivers, it is estimated that inland fishing has the potential to produce about 30,000 tonnes a year (with the vast majority of that -- about 24,000 tonnes -- being supplied by Lake Tana and the Rift Valley Lakes), as compared with the current production of slightly less than 5,000 tonnes a year.<sup>41</sup>

In early 1995, the European Union granted the Ethiopian government 20.15 million Birr (US\$3.2 million) in order to develop the fisheries sector.<sup>42</sup> Most of the money will be used to buy modern fishery equipment in a bid to encourage investors deployed in the sector. Some will also be used to try to increase the relatively low fish consuming habits of the country -- fish is rarely eaten other than during the Lent fast, when meat is prohibited to Orthodox Christians.<sup>43</sup>

### Food manufacturing

Food manufacturing as a group accounted for 16.8 per cent of the value of total production from public enterprises in 1992/93, as well as employing 19.4 per cent of all people working in manufacturing.<sup>44</sup> (As with most branches of industry, food manufacturing is still dominated by the public sector -- in 1989/90, the last year for which statistics are available, private

**Table III.3 -- Major products of food manufacturing (percentage share of total production, by value), 1988/89-1992/93**

	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93
Flour	22.97	25.76	22.82	17.88	18.47
Edible oil	5.17	5.01	4.08	4.91	5.13
Pasta and macaroni	3.10	2.88	4.58	1.13	2.61
Fafa products	1.57	1.93	1.81	2.31	0.58
Bread, galleta and biscuit	0.47	0.31	0.25	4.77	1.91
Flour by-products	0.92	1.07	8.87	1.48	0.96
Oil cake	1.93	1.90	1.90	2.19	1.85
Spice products	2.19	1.86	1.99	2.25	3.67
Sugar	34.12	35.15	32.74	55.09	59.48
Molasses	1.10	1.14	1.08	1.66	1.95
Wat	12.12	10.54	7.68	0	0
Other	14.34	12.44	12.20	6.33	3.38
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: *Facts About Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade & Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p. 52.

sector establishments contributed only 4 per cent to the total value of production in the food manufacturing sector.<sup>45</sup>) The 1992/93 contribution was well down from, for example, 1989/90, when food manufacturing contributed 28 per cent to the total value of production from public enterprises. Capacity has, accordingly, fallen from 100 per cent in 1988/89 (which represents the maximum production during the past 20 years) to 43.6 per cent in 1992/93.<sup>46</sup> The government reports that in 1993/94, there were 30 publicly-owned establishments involved in food manufacturing -- most of which were located in Obomiyaa and Region 14. Table III.3 summarises the major elements of the Ethiopian food manufacturing, and the following sections consider them individually.

### *Sugar*

The sugar industry came to the country in the early 1950s. HVA, a Dutch enterprise, was looking for a new location after it had been forced to leave Indonesia in the late 1940s (after that country's independence). It chose Ethiopia, and its first sugar mill began production in 1954. In 1958, the official name of the company became HVA Ethiopia, with the government receiving a 20 per cent stake in the company, and the balance remaining in Dutch hands.<sup>47</sup> As with virtually all major industry, the company was nationalised in 1975.

The large Wonji and Methara estates, at which sugar cane grows, have production facilities associated with them.. (Each has a production capacity of 100,000 tonnes of refined sugar a year.) Ethiopian production of sugar peaked at 181,196 tonnes in 1985/86, again coming close to that figure 4 years later (in 1989/90, when 171,263 tonnes were manufactured).<sup>48</sup> The production of refined sugar fell once again the following two years, however. Despite rebounding slightly during 1991/92 (to 149,516 tonnes), decline returned again the next year, with a production figure of only 136,727 tonnes for 1992/93.<sup>49</sup> Notwithstanding these figures, it is important to recognise that the two enterprises weathered the turbulent period of 1991/92 rather better than most other industries. Although output and value fell, the decline was not as dramatic as was seen in other parts of the food sub-sector. Indeed, what was a one-third contribution to the overall food sector in 1988/89 had become almost 60 per cent by 1992/93. This is indicative of a particular resilience in the industry.<sup>50</sup>

In 1992/93, the total value of production of sugar and sugar-related products by publicly-owned enterprises was 125 million Birr. Moreover, both the Wonji-Shoa Sugar Factory and the Methahara Sugar Factory were reported to have made profits in that year.<sup>51</sup>

Production is mainly for the domestic market, and what little exports there have been have been declining in recent years. They totalled approximately 42,000 tonnes a year in the mid-1980s (with a value of just over one per cent of all Ethiopian exports), but had fallen to 2,500 tonnes in 1991/92 and 13,123 tonnes in 1992/93.<sup>52</sup>

Although the sugar sector is dominated by the two large facilities at Wonji and Methara, there is another publicly-owned enterprise (the Addis Ketema Sweet Factory, which produces a small amount of sugar confectionaries), along with five privately-owned facilities. The latter, however, are relatively minor players -- in 1989/90, they together employed 119 people, less than 4 per cent of the sector total.

Given that domestic demand for sugar and sugar products surpasses supply, there is scope for



expansion in the sector. Although desires, announced in 1989, to build a new sugar complex at Finchaa were dented by the change of government in the early 1990s, the sector has seen some more recent interest. More specifically, Serv-Techn (a company based in Houston, USA) has announced its plans to construct a sugar factory and ethanol distillery. (This was agreed after the US Overseas Private Investment agreed to provide US\$50 million in political risk insurance.) The facility will be capable of processing 4,000 tonnes of sugar and producing 45,000 tonnes of ethanol a day. It has been estimated that the project will increase Ethiopia's sugar production by 40 per cent.<sup>53</sup>

#### *Flour, bread and pasta*

The second-largest component of the food manufacturing industry is that made up of flour, bread, pasta and related products. With regard to flour, there were reported to be, in 1992/93, ten publicly-owned factories that primarily produce flour -- the largest of these were located at Awassa, Anbessa, Misrak, and Kokeb. Following the broader trend within the sector, output from these facilities fell during the late 1980s and early 1990s, with production declining by almost two-thirds between 1988/89 and 1992/93 (from 185,500 tonnes to 63,500 tonnes) and the value of production, in constant prices, falling by a similar amount (from 104,111 Birr (1973 prices) to 36,889 Birr over the same period).<sup>54</sup> In addition to these public enterprises (which predominantly supply the urban areas), smaller-scale operations strive to meet rural demands. According to the 1985/86 HASIDA survey there were between 10,000 and 20,000 small-scale mills in operation, each employing 2 or 3 people.<sup>55</sup>

Within the public sector, there is also 2 factory producing pasta at Ada, and two establishments, at Kaliti and Fafa, which produce a wider range of foods (including flour and pasta). Output of pasta grew dramatically during the late 1970s, when the factory at Ada came on line: indeed, production almost quadrupled, from 14,000 tonnes to 53,600 tonnes, between 1978/79 and 1979/80. By the mid 1980s, however, the figure had fallen back down to an average of 19,000 tonnes a year, with decline continuing since then. In 1992/93, for example, the Ada Pasta and Macaroni Factory produced only 3,689 tonnes, compared with 8,296 tonnes four years earlier.<sup>56</sup>

Because the production of bread is better suited to small-scale operations, serving a local market, than large industrial operations, most is produced by smaller, privately-owned enterprises -- a 1989/90 government survey reports that there were 52 private sector entities involved in the manufacture of bakery products, which together employed 1,213 people.<sup>57</sup> To meet the demands from a larger urban population, bread production grew dramatically during the 1980s: from about 30,000 tonnes in each of 1985/86 and 1986/87 to 156,977 tonnes in 1989/90.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, it appears to have rebounded from the troubles of 1991 more quickly than some other sub-sectors within the food industry -- the real value of output actually increased between 1990/91 and 1992/93.<sup>59</sup>

#### *Edible oils*

In 1992/93, there were eight factories primarily producing edible oils. This figure was a drop from previous years, because the age of a couple of the factories had forced them to be phased-out and recently shut down. As a result, Ethiopians remain relatively small consumers of these substances -- less than 1 kilogram a year.

The Bahir Dar Edible Oil Factory produced the largest single amount of edible oil in the country during 1992/93 -- 859 tonnes. This facility is located in the northwest of the country and was constructed in 1983/84, with the assistance of East German financing. During the previous two years, the Modjo Edible Oil Factory -- which came on line in 1985/86 -- had been the largest single producer. These two, along with the Dil Edible Oil Factory, are the top three producers of edible oils. (This having been said it should be recognised that production is rather evenly distributed amongst the largest seven producers.) The three major producers each were unprofitably in 1992/93, though the Dil Edible Oil Factory showed the smallest losses. Two smaller factories -- in Teramaj and Edget -- registered small profits.<sup>61</sup>

In 1989/90, 8,669 tons of edible oils were produced in the country as a whole, this was down from a peak in 1986/87 of 15,302 tons.<sup>61</sup> In 1992/93, however, the figure had fallen further, to 3,658 tonnes. This decline is explained not only by the aging of the plant, but also by the fact that it had proved to be more difficult to acquire the necessary raw materials. (Between 1990/91 and 1991/92, for example, the government reported that the production of oil seeds fell by almost 75 per cent.<sup>62</sup>) In 1992/93, edible oils accounted for 5.1 per cent of the total value produced in the food industry, which placed it third after sugar and flour. The value of production in constant terms has fallen steadily over the past five years, falling by approximately one-half between 1989/90 and 1992/93. This, however, generally mirrors broader trends within the food industry as a whole.

However, production of edible oils is set to increase during the coming years. This will result not only from greater use of existing capacity, but also because a new facility is set to come on line. The Addis-Mojo Oil Factory, which has been built with Italian assistance, begin trial production during September 1995. One report estimates that this factory will cover 28 per cent of the country's and 100 per cent of Addis Ababa's oil consumption. The US\$9 million enterprise will have an annual output of 17,000 tonnes of cooking oil, 5,850 tonnes of vegetable oil, 754 tonnes of margarine, 250 tonnes of sari acid and 45 tonnes of fodder.<sup>63</sup>

Another product coming out of this industry is oil cake. This good, which is an important byproduct of the oil seed milling process, is used as an animal feed supplement. Production of oil cake peaked in 1978/79 at 74,200 tonnes, falling to 17,100 tonnes in 1985/86. It then rose during the second half of the 1980s, reaching 40,684 tonnes in 1988/89. It has again fallen, however, with the figure standing at 16,478 tonnes in 1992/93.<sup>64</sup> Given that it is a by-product of the process producing edible oils, it is somewhat surprising to discover that production is more concentrated than in this primary good: the Modjo Edible Oil Factory produced almost one-third of the total amount in 1992/93, with the Nazareth Edible Oil Factory and the Adama Edible Oil Factory -- the second and third largest producers -- each producing less than half this figure. In total, oil cake is the eighth most valuable product coming out of the food industry, accounting in 1992/93 for 1.8 per cent of the total.<sup>65</sup>

Oil cake was also an important export commodity for Ethiopia during the first half of the 1980s. In 1983/84, for example, it accounted for 4.8 per cent of the value of non-coffee exports (16.1 million Birr on a quantity of 49,218 tonnes). A combination of declining production and increasing domestic demand has meant that exports have fallen -- to less than one million Birr by 1988/89 and they have not rebounded since then. (In terms of quantity, they stood at 300 tonnes in 1990/91 and 0 the following year.)<sup>66</sup>

Beyond the production coming from publicly-owned facilities, figures from 1989/90 reveal that there were three private establishments involved in the manufacture of 'vegetables and animal oils and fats', between them employing 110 people (6 per cent of all employees). Alternatively, a HASIDA survey estimated that, in 1985/86, there were about 17 private sector mills operating (ten of these employing less than ten people), and were thought to produce about 5,000 tonnes per year.

### *Spices*

In 1970, a spice extraction plant was established as a joint venture between an Ethiopian and a US company. The facility -- the Ethiopian Spice Factory -- primarily produces spiced ground red pepper, paprika and semi-finished capsicum. Using inputs from domestic small-holders, production in 1992/93 was valued at 7,335,000 Birr. This was exclusively generated by the relatively more-lucrative paprika and capsicum.<sup>67</sup>

Much of the output is exported -- between 1985/86 and 1989/90, an average of 105 tonnes was sent to (primarily) the USSR and Europe annually, generating 6.7 million Birr.<sup>68</sup> There is good potential for expansion in the export of spices. Not only would rehabilitation of the domestic plant increase output, but there is the possibility for diversification with ginger, garlic and black pepper turmeric showing the greatest potential.<sup>69</sup>

### *Meat*

The Ethiopian Meat Concentrate, the Dire Dawa Meat Factory, the Sopral Combolcha Meat Factory, the Gondar Meat Factory and the Ethiopian Livestock Development (Melge Wondo) -- all publicly-owned -- are the five enterprises involved in the production, processing and preserving of meat products. (This is, of course, in addition to the backyard slaughtering that takes place, primarily in rural areas.) Most of the output is in the form of canned wot (or 'watt'), which is an Ethiopian curry made from beef and mutton. (In 1989/90, for example, this accounted for 55 per cent of the value of total production). Other products of significance include corned beef, beef in jelly, boiled beef, minced meat and products which undergo no processing (that is, frozen carcasses and boned meat). The turmoil of the early 1990s hit this industry particularly hard, for production fell dramatically in both 1991/92 and 1992/93.<sup>70</sup>

Given the size of the Ethiopian livestock population, there is considerable scope for the export of manufactured meat products. During the first half of the 1980s, an average of 1,900 tonnes was exported annually -- this figure fell to under 1,000 tonnes after 1986/87, with no exports at all registered in 1991/92 and only 40 tonnes the following year. Thus, what had been worth about 5 million Birr a year in foreign exchange earnings during the earlier period had completely dried up by the beginning of the 1990s.<sup>71</sup>

### **Prospects**

There is great promise in the food sector, both in terms of agricultural crops and manufactured products. With regard to the former, the potential for increasing harvests could be realised by, for one, increasing the use of irrigation. Kinfu Abraham argues that there are '14 large river basins with a total runoff of 105.5 billion cubic metres, 96 per cent of which flows to neighbouring countries. This offers immense potential for irrigation ... 3.5 million

hectares of land ... could be developed to make the country the bread basket of the Middle East and North Africa'.<sup>72</sup> Only 1 per cent of Ethiopia's cropland is presently irrigated, a figure that places it well below the African average of 6 per cent. Indeed, it has been estimated that the amount of land-area irrigated could be doubled relatively easily. Fertiliser use is also below the continent's average -- 7 kilograms per hectare of crop land in Ethiopia annually, as compared with 20 kilograms in Africa.<sup>73</sup>

National and international agencies are starting to take up to these possibilities. The International Development Association, for example, has recently approved two schemes of credits. One, valued at US\$120 million, will develop a national project designed to liberalise the fertiliser sector and involve the private sector in what has hitherto been the preserve of the state. This is expected to contribute significantly to enhanced food security at national and household levels, improve soil management and strengthen fertiliser-related institutions. Another is a seed systems development project. Valued at US\$22 million, it will contribute to the goal of increased agricultural output by laying the foundation for the development of a broad-based and competitive seed industry.

Improved technology and practices will also increase yields. Much of the outmoded machinery in the sector is to be replaced, and the breeding and feeding practices of livestock are to be scrutinised, so that the incidence of animal diseases -- which have, in the past, plagued livestock development -- can be reduced.

Institutionally, meanwhile, state farms are to be consolidated, rationalised and privatised on the basis of an in-depth study of their financial and managerial problems. More generally, the previous policies -- which served to obstruct private farming -- have been reevaluated. Amongst the changes (some of which were set in train before the change of government in 1991) include: an elimination of compulsory sales to the state, the establishment of legal tenures, the acceptance of the use of private labour and the creation of large commercial farms.

### **Beverage industry**

There were 14 publicly-owned establishments involved in the beverages industry in 1992/93. Although most (that is, one-half) were located in Region 14, the industry showed a more even distribution than virtually all the other manufacturing sectors (not surprising considering the domestic demand). Together, these enterprises employed 7,421, operated at 67.4 per cent capacity, and contributed 15.9 per cent to the value of all industrial production. Table III.4 reveals the main products from this sector.

#### *Beer*

Within the beverage sector as a whole, the largest single component was the 'malt liquors and malts' category, accounting for almost half (49.2 per cent) of the value of total production in the sector in 1992/93.<sup>74</sup> The beer element of this was realised by three breweries, each of approximately the same size. They were located in Addis Ababa (the St. George Brewery, which was opened in the 1920s), in Sebetta (the Meta Brewery, built in the 1960s) and in Hararge (the Harar Brewery, completed in the mid 1980s with financial assistance from the Czechoslovakians).

**Table III.4 -- Major products of beverage manufacturing, percentage share, 1988/89-1992/93**

	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93
Liquor	12.06	15.30	18.97	16.46	10.65
Wine	7.21	7.87	0.00	9.81	7.12
Beer	49.82	44.65	57.38	32.39	26.71
Soft drinks	7.49	7.90	9.33	11.58	7.36
Mineral water	1.92	2.11	1.68	2.13	2.10
Malt	8.87	9.89	9.80	10.98	22.51
Other	12.61	12.28	2.84	16.65	23.56
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: *Facts About Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade & Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p. 52.

Before the Assela Maltery in Arsi was completed in 1984, most of the malt required for the industry had to be imported. With this constraint relaxed, however, production figures increased dramatically during the second half of the 1980s. Output from the three breweries, however, fell steadily between 1988/89 and 1991/92 -- from just over 60 million litres to just under 19 million litres. Recovery is well underway -- in 1992/93, the production figures had risen to almost 24 million litres.<sup>75</sup>

In addition, the production of malt itself has increased to such an extent that it is rivalling beer in terms of value (84.3 per cent of the value in 1992/93). After the Assela Maltery opened, malt production grew rapidly, with an output of 11,000 tonnes in 1988/89 -- 110 per cent of nominal installed capacity. Expansion of the Assela Maltery and the production of malt at the St. George Brewery helped to double this production figure to 22,000 tonnes in 1992/93 (with a value of over 42 million Birr).<sup>76</sup> The development of the malt industry has also strengthened the backward linkages to the agricultural sector.

#### *Soft drinks and carbonated water*

Of the other elements making up the beverage industries, the soft drinks and carbonated water industries is second to beer. They are produced from seven facilities, two (at Am'bo and Babile) produce mineral water, while the others produce a relatively narrow range of soft drinks (of these, the most significant are the Addis Soft Drinks Factory, the Abay Mesk Soft Drinks Factory and the Dire Dawa Soft Drinks Factory). Each serves a regional market.

The output of soft drinks rose steadily during the 1980s -- within the public sector, for example, production rose from 10.4 million crates in 1985/86 to 13.1 million in 1988/89.<sup>77</sup> As with most manufacturing activity, however, production and sales suffered during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, the worst seems to have been weathered, for the real value of production in 1991/92 and 1992/93 was virtually identical. Mineral water production,

meanwhile, appears to be well on its way to recovery: output at the Ambo Mineral Water Factory increased by 30 per cent between 1991/92 and 1992/93.<sup>78</sup>

There are plans to partially privatise parts of the industry in the near future. It is proposed that the soft drinks and mineral waters factories will be jointly operated by government and private enterprise, with the government retaining a stake of between 25-49 per cent.<sup>79</sup>

### *Spirits*

Spirits make up the third largest component of the sector, with araki (pastis), brandy and rum being the major products. They are produced at eight distilleries and blending plants (some of which are private, which is unique in the beverages industry). Output doubled during the first half of the 1980s, thereafter levelling off at an average of about 55,000 hl a year. The largest publicly-owned factory, the 'National Alcohol and Liquor Factory', produced about 3 million litres in 1992/93.<sup>80</sup>

### *Wine*

Finally, the wine industry rounds out the beverage industry. There are two wineries in Addis Ababa (publicly-owned by the Ethiopian Beverage Corporation) and one private one. Approximately 1,000 hectares are under cultivation for grapes, and these form the basis for much of the export wine produced. Wine for domestic consumption, meanwhile, is produced from raisins imported from Turkey and the Yemen Arab Republic. Production during the second half of the 1980s was steady at just under 100,000 hl. There are some export possibilities in the sector. All elements of the beverage industry, however, are hampered by two major problems: bottle shortages and problems with the country's transportation infrastructure.

### **Tobacco industry**

Cigarettes, retailing largely under the name 'Nyala', are produced at a publicly-owned factory in Addis Ababa. This establishment employed 984 people in 1992/93, and produced just under 1.3 million units. Valued at 79.4 million Birr, the factory contributed 6.7 per cent to the value of the country's industrial production. Although the production represented a decline compared with two, three or four years previously, it was not down as much as some other industries; moreover, recovery appears to be well underway. Capacity had already increased to 67.5 per cent (as compared with the previous maximum production) by 1992/93.<sup>81</sup>

Given the modest-size of the Ethiopian tobacco crop, the industry is relatively import-dependent (averaging 64 per cent of raw material costs between 1988/89 and 1992/93). Nevertheless, it is still a profitable one, making 13,000 Birr in 1992/93. Moreover, it has achieved this with relatively little public investment (for example, it received less than 0.25 per cent of all industrial public investment between 1988/89 and 1992/93).<sup>82</sup>

## **B. -- TEXTILES AND CLOTHING**

In the late 1940s, the textile industry ranked second only to the food industry in terms of

production and employment. Within this, the cotton industry was dominant. The majority of it, however, was made up of foreign capital. The Indo-Ethiopian Factory, for example, was 41 per cent Indian-owned, with only 25 per cent Ethiopian participation (both public and private). By the same token, the so-called Ethiopian Cotton Company was originally organized by the Italians and later taken over by the Japanese. Another major cotton factory located at Asmera was owned by an Italian, and the so-called Ethio-fabrics Share Company was dominated by Swiss capitalists. Likewise, the Tendaho cotton plantation was virtually completely owned by the British company Mitchel Cotts.<sup>83</sup>

With the revolution in 1975, however, came nationalisation of the industry. Even with the onset of economic reform after 1991, the industry still remains predominantly in public hands. There are a number of privately-owned knitting mills, but they contribute less than 2 per cent to the value of the production in the sector.

Thus, textiles and clothing are dominated by the 17 publicly-owned establishments. They are located around the country: nine in Region 14, three in Region 3, two in Oromiyaa and one in each of Southern Ethiopia, Region 12 and Dire Dawa. Together, they employed 19,717 people in 1992/93, worked at 61.6 per cent of capacity and contributed 19.3 per cent to total value of industrial production.

The major products coming from this sector are fabrics and yarn (accounting for, respectively, 58 and 15 per cent of the total value of production in the textiles industry). The most important mills producing these goods (in order of value of production in 1992/93) are located in: Akaki, Awassa, Combolcha,<sup>84</sup> Dire Dawa and Bahir Dar. Major garment factories (which contribute 13 per cent to total value) can be found in Addis Ababa and Akaki, with blankets (8 per cent) being produced at Bebre Berbane and sacks at the Ethiopian Fiber Product. Other products being produced -- in smaller values -- include sewing thread, twine and rope. Table III.5 presents the major products.

**Table III.5 -- Major products of textile manufacturing, percentage share, 1988/89-1992/93**

	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93
Fabrics	48.60	48.82	49.25	55.31	57.98
Yarn	14.73	15.63	12.37	15.15	14.73
Blankets	5.86	4.46	4.11	2.47	7.80
Garments	14.57	19.71	16.71	12.71	13.27
Sacks	7.46	6.29	6.74	3.86	2.46
Sewing thread	2.78	2.15	2.87	1.35	0.46
Other	6.00	2.95	7.94	9.15	3.29
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: *Facts About Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade & Tourism* (Addis Ababa: Industry and Trade Department, March 1995), p. 52.

## **C. -- LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR**

With Ethiopia being home to Africa's largest livestock population, the country has been encouraged to develop a significant industry in hides and skins. It ranks as the second largest export commodity, accounting for 21 per cent of export earnings in 1991/92 and 17 per cent the next year.<sup>85</sup> Preliminary figures suggest that its contribution has continued to be important since then: one source reports that the value of exported goat hides for gloves has recently been about US\$2 million a year.<sup>86</sup>

In Ethiopia in 1992/93, there were 10 publicly-owned establishments in the leather and shoe industry in operation -- together they employed 6,283 people, were working at 100 per cent capacity (that is, the greatest output for the previous 20 years) and contributed 11.3 per cent to the total value of industrial production. The largest tanneries were the Ethiopian Tannery, the Medjo Tannery, the Awash Tannery and the Addis Tannery. Leather shoes were produced at the Tikur Abbay Shoe Factory and the Anbessa Shoe Factory, while canvas shoes were made at the Ethiopian Rubber and Canvas Shoe Factory (which also produced a smaller number of wellington boots). Universal Leather Articles produces a small amount (in terms of value) of higher-quality leather goods -- for example, briefcases, hand-bags and wallets.

It is widely agreed that this sector offers great potential for export expansion and the promotion of national development. Relatively few skins are currently processed locally. The government's new programme of reforms is intended to change this -- increasing both the quality and quantity of production. (Quality can often suffer from poorly prepared hides, which decay and lose their grain quality with delays in distribution.)

## **D. -- WOOD AND WOOD PRODUCTS**

Forests once covered most of Ethiopia -- even in 1950, there was six times more forest cover than there is at present. It is estimated that only 4 per cent of the country is presently under forest cover (though a larger area has open woodland savannah). The annual rate of deforestation during the 1980s was approximately 0.3 per cent. The Economist Intelligence Unit quotes a World Bank report which says that Ethiopia needs a 20-year programme costing more than US\$400 million to replant 4 million hectares. Without it, the Bank calculates that the demand for wood for fuel will exceed resources within two decades.<sup>87</sup>

Because of the demand for wood to meet household energy requirements, the worst deforestation has taken place around urban areas. Most -- that is more than one-half -- of the forests that remain can be found in the western part of Ethiopia (particularly the regions of Kefa and Ilubabor); a further one-third are in the south.<sup>88</sup>

Deforestation obviously has implications for the wood and wood products industry, and the industry has experienced a corresponding decline since the early 1980s. Nominal installed saw capacity at that time was estimated to be 220,000 cubic metres per year. Most of the saw mills were old, even then, working with obsolete machinery and finding it difficult to secure spare parts. Consequently, many mills subsequently closed.<sup>89</sup> Output of finished timber declined steadily during the 1980s: the FAO reports that the production of sawnwood fell from 45,000 cubic metres in 1982 to 12,000 cubic metres in 1993. Reductions were also experienced in the production of fibreboard, sawlogs and veneer, and wood-based panels.<sup>90</sup>



This has been accompanied by an increase in demand for fuelwood and charcoal. The FAO also reports that the production of these goods increased from 33 million cubic metres in 1982 to 45 million cubic metres in 1993 -- not surprising given the increase in the size of the population.<sup>91</sup>

In 1992/93, the government reported that there were eight publicly-owned establishments in the wood and wood products industry in operation. All were located in Region 14, and together they employed 4,297 people, operated at 78 per cent capacity and accounted for 2.2 per cent of industrial production. Of these, half produced furniture (with the most significant being at Warka [a facility called Mosvold] and Finfine [3F]), and, of the others, the enterprise at Ecafco was the most important, producing less-refined products.<sup>92</sup>

#### **E. -- PULP AND PAPER; PRINTING AND PUBLISHING**

Activity in Ethiopia's pulp and paper industry centres around two publicly-owned enterprises. The largest of these is the Ethiopian Pulp and Paper Share Company, which is located in Wonji. Established in 1955, its capacity is nominally 10,000 tonnes a year. In 1992/93, it produced just under 7,500 tonnes, the majority of which (almost 63 per cent) was 'writing and painting' paper.<sup>93</sup> Notwithstanding the name of this factory, Ethiopia produces no pulp. Consequently, domestic demand can only be met when sufficient foreign exchange can be found to pay for imports (the price of which fluctuates dramatically). In 1989/90, the country imported 6,084 tonnes of the material.<sup>94</sup> The country also imports quantities of 'paper and paperboard'. The FAO estimated that in 1993, 5,000 tonnes were imported -- they have been as high as 13,000 tonnes (1985).<sup>95</sup> These imports are, of course, also restricted by the amount of foreign exchange available.

With regard to the printing and publishing industry, there were seven publicly-owned establishments in operation in 1992/93. Five of these were located in Region 14, while there was one in each of Regions 3 and 13. Together they employed 5,613 people, operated at 67 per cent capacity (as compared with the maximum production over the past 20 years) and contributed 5.5 per cent to the total value of industrial production in the country. The Berhane Selam Printing Press, the Artistic Printing Press and the Commercial Printing Press were the most significant ones that produced the traditional range of publishing materials. A wider range of goods (including toilet paper), meanwhile, is produced by the Yekatit Paper Converting. A number of smaller, private printing presses have also traditionally operated.<sup>96</sup>

The prospects for the industry are good. The value of output, in real terms, grew between 1991/92 and 1992/93, and it is generally thought that this has continued since. In particular, with the expansion in education, there will be greater demand for paper products. Indeed, exercise books were the largest-single contributor to the industry's value in both 1991/92 and 1992/93. This is all the more remarkable given that none were reported to have been produced during the previous three years.<sup>97</sup>

#### **F. -- PETROLEUM REFINING**

Oil exploration has been carried out sporadically in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia since the 1930s. During the 1970s, Americans undertook exploratory drilling in the region, followed by Soviet geologists during the 1980s -- though traces of oil were found, they were not of the

size to be commercially-exploitable. Nevertheless, geologists are still cautiously optimistic,<sup>98</sup> and an oil concession was granted in the Afar region (in the northeastern part of the country) in 1994.<sup>99</sup> Under the terms of this agreement, Afar Oil Exploration of the US has a six-year contract to search 23,206 square kilometres. The Ethiopian Minister of Petroleum Development said in February 1995 that an international oil company was also seeking exploration rights in the western Gambela region. In 1994, moreover, the International Petroleum Corporation reported it was involved in regional studies on this huge block on the border with southern Sudan. The Minister also announced that studies were being planned for the Wereilu region in northern Ethiopia.<sup>100</sup> Hence, activity is brisk with respect to oil exploration.

There is, meanwhile, also potential for natural gas production. In 1987, the government had announced the discovery of a deposit with an estimated reserve of 25 billion cubic metres, in Hararge. Although the size made the find attractive, the deposit's remote location made it somewhat more daunting. Nevertheless, a feasibility study was prepared.<sup>101</sup> More recently, the World Bank has invested about US\$150 million to develop the Calub gas field (which is located in the southern extreme of the country).<sup>102</sup> Finally, the government disclosed, in June 1995, the discovery of a natural gas deposit of 68,000 million cubic metres in the Gode area.<sup>103</sup>

These various developments bode well for the future, though at present, Ethiopia continues to be dependent upon foreign sources of oil and gas. In addition, with the independence of Eritrea, Ethiopia has also become entirely dependent upon imported petroleum products -- most of which are now obtained from the refinery in Assab (Eritrea).<sup>104</sup>

## G. -- CHEMICALS

There were 12 publicly-owned establishments in the chemical industry in 1992/93. They employed 2,824 people, operated at 67 per cent capacity and contributed 9.7 per cent to the national value of industrial production.<sup>105</sup> The following sections briefly examine the major products of this sector.

*Soap:* There are three soap producing factories: the Gulelie Soap Factory, the Nazereth Soap Factory (both of which produce primarily laundry soap) and the Repi Soap Factory (which produces powder soap, bleaching liquid and detergent). Production increased dramatically between 1991/92 and 1992/93, to such an extent that soap accounted for 22 per cent of the sector (as compared with 15 per cent and 8 per cent the previous two years).<sup>106</sup>

*Carbon dioxide:* Production of carbon dioxide increased dramatically during the mid-1980s, in response to greater demand from the beverage industry. Production figures went from 480 tonnes in 1985/86 to 788 tonnes in 1989/90. In 1992/93, the main reported producers were the Meta Brewery and the Addis Gas and Plastic Crates Factory (Ethio-Gas and Plastic Factory).<sup>107</sup>

*Oxygen:* Oxygen is primarily produced at the Chora Gas Products Factory. Output peaked at 186,000 cubic metres in 1987/88 and has been relatively constant -- varying between 148,000 cubic metres and 170,000 cubic metres -- since then.<sup>108</sup>

*Paints, varnishes and lacquers*: Paints are primarily produced at the Tsedey Paints (No. 1 and 2) Factory (Nefas Silk Paint and Oil Paint) in Addis Ababa. The value of production has grown in recent years. Other products -- for example, shoe polish and floor wax -- are produced at the Chora Gas Products Factory (also located in the capital).<sup>109</sup> The Kokeb Paints Factory, meanwhile, is a privately-operated enterprise which also operates in the sector.

## H. -- NON-METALLIC MINERALS (BUILDING MATERIALS)

The building and construction contributed 2.5 per cent to the country's GDP in 1993.<sup>110</sup> Cement is by far the most important construction material manufactured in Ethiopia, accounting for 87 per cent of value in the 'non-metallic' manufacturing sector. Of this, the vast majority is produced at the Muger Cement Factory. This facility, which came into production in 1983 with financial assistance from East Germany, produced 343,918 tonnes in 1992/93. An additional 33,167 tonnes was produced at the Addis Ababa Cement Factory - this facility, which was established in 1964, has a nominal capacity of 70,000 tonnes per year.<sup>111</sup>

Bricks, meanwhile, are produced at the Burayu Bricks Factory and the Ethio Bricks Factory (each producing about 9 million annually), while marble is produced at the Ethio Marble Industry. In the 'non-metallics' industrial sector as a whole, there were nine publicly-owned establishments -- three in Oromiyaa and six in Region 14 -- which together employed 4,415 people in 1992/93, operated at 100 per cent capacity and contributed 7.4 per cent to the total value of industrial production.<sup>112</sup>

The above are only the publicly-owned operations in the sector. The construction industry is relatively unique in Ethiopia, given the high rate of private sector participation, even during the Derg regime. Chole, for example, states that the state accounted for only 48.4 per cent of all activity.<sup>113</sup> Keith Griffin further reports that the 'construction sector ... has about 160 small-scale building contractors and for policy purposes should be thought of in conjunction with small-scale manufacturing ...'<sup>114</sup>

Prospects for the industry are good. Given the increase in tourism -- both that which has already been realised and that which is expected to occur -- there will be greater demand for new buildings (for example, hotels and recreation facilities). Supply, moreover, could be increased. There has traditionally been a bottleneck in construction, primarily caused by problems with the transportation infrastructure. Overcoming these would open up even greater opportunity for the industry. It would also bring benefits by replacing what now has to be purchased with precious foreign exchange (that is, some cement) with domestic production. Additionally, the elements of a construction industry could be created based on local needs and local supplies: a small quarry, a brick kiln, a sawmill or a cement plant.<sup>115</sup>

At present, the range of non-metallic mineral products used outside the construction sector is extremely limited. Glass is the most important of these products -- 'bottles' contributed 2.5 per cent to the total value of the 'non-metal industry' in 1992/93.<sup>116</sup>

## I. -- IRON AND STEEL

The government has claimed to have discovered proven reserves of 60 million tonnes of iron

ore in Welega province.<sup>117</sup> At present, however, because Ethiopia has no iron ore reduction facilities, it must import its steel.

Thus, the national production of metal products is usually derived from a combination of imported steel and imported and local scrap metal (imports account for over 80 per cent of total raw material costs). The largest facilities are the Akaki Metal Products Factory (which produces galvanized plain and corrugated steel sheets and, since 1985, galvanized metal pipes), the Ethiopian Iron and Steel Factory (which primarily produces reinforcement bars and nails) and the Kaliti Steel Industry Factory (which produces the largest range of products, both for the general market and custom built for clients in industry and the construction sector). The quality of the steel is generally poor. Still, all three reported profits in 1992/93.<sup>118</sup>

Within the sector as a whole, corrugated iron sheets, reinforcement bars, household utensils (which are produced at a factory in Kolfe) and nails are the most valuable products. The industry appears to have recovered from the difficulties that afflicted manufacturing as a whole in 1991/92, for production in all of these areas increased between 1991/92 and 1992/93, while the value of the sub-sector as a whole increased by 67 per cent (in constant prices).<sup>119</sup>

## **J. -- NON-FERROUS METALS**

In 1993, mining and quarrying contributed only 0.3 per cent to the country's GDP.<sup>120</sup> There is, however, considerable potential. This section briefly considers a couple of the most promising non-ferrous metals.

### **Gold**

The country currently has one operating gold mine -- that is at Lega Dembi (in Sidamo), some 350 kilometres south of Addis Ababa, which opened in February 1991. The annual output of this facility is approximately 3 tonnes. Additionally, there is mining of alluvial gold deposits at Adola in the Sidamo region -- this produces an additional 400 kilograms per year. Table III.6 reports upon gold production in Ethiopia during the 1980s.

There are large hopes for future activity in the sector, for proven deposits amount to 300 tonnes and potential reserves have been estimated at 500 tonnes. Moreover, the prospect for more finds is strong.<sup>121</sup> Accordingly, the government has been promoting foreign investment in the gold sector.

In August 1994, the government put four gold projects up for international tender. Three -- that is, those at Dul near Assosa in the west (about 800 kilometres from the capital), and Adola-Megado-Seredo and Dawa-Digati near Adoua in the south -- subsequently attracted interest; no investors registered curiosity in the fourth project, near the southern border town of Moyale.<sup>122</sup> In all, 13 companies bid for the licences to produce gold -- four were American, three Canadian, two Italian, and one each from the UK, Ireland, Saudi-Swedish and an indigenous consortium.<sup>123</sup> (The mining laws had been revised in 1991, thus inviting in foreign capital and experts to participate in the exploration of the country's natural resources.)

Table III.6 -- Quantity and value of production of gold, 1981/82-1990/91

	weight (kg)	value (thousands of Birr)
1981/82	492.1	13782.7
1982/83	463	13140
1983/84	661.6	16936.8
1984/85	918.2	19373.4
1985/86	923	20951.7
1986/87	643.3	17983.2
1987/88	728.3	21243.2
1988/89	745.5	20410.9
1989/90	848.1	21476.3
1990/91	3038	79647.3

Source: *Ethiopian Statistical Abstract 1992* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority).

One agreement was eventually signed with a Canadian-registered company called Golden Star Resources. In April 1995 (after the selection had been made in January), 90 exploration licenses (each with an initial three-year term) covering the 1,800-square-kilometre Dul gold project were granted to the company. The project area covers three proterozoic greenstone belts within which there has been significant historical artisanal gold mining. Small scale gold mining is still active in the area (and there is evidence of small scale open pit and underground mining). The company said that the Ethiopian Institute of Geological Surveys had carried out exploration work in the area since 1985 and had identified six gold prospects (and perhaps some chromate occurrence as well). Of these, the Dul mountain prospect was the most advanced, with previous work consisting of soil geochemistry, geophysics, pitting, trenching and diamond drilling. Six drill holes were completed by the Institution in 1993-94, for a total of 697 meters, prior to the decision to offer the property to international tender. Two of these holes were abandoned before they reached target depth due to drilling problems. Golden Star said it intended to operate the Dul project through its 91.4 per cent-owned Pan African Resources Corp. As part of the agreement, the company said it had undertaken to commit up to US\$7.3 million to exploration of the project area during the initial term. It said that it was committed to spending US\$2.15 million during the first year of the agreement.<sup>124</sup>

Another was signed with Canyon Resources Corp. in January 1995, when this company received two exploration contracts in the Megado-Seredo and the Meleka Abeba areas. The two areas comprise about 205 square kilometres in the greenstone belt in southern Ethiopia. (The Megado Seredo exploration area includes 97 square kilometres immediately south and adjoining the Lega Dembi mine area.) One prospect area at Megado Seredo has already been extensively trenched and sampled, yielding an average of 2.5 grams per ton (or 0.08 ounce per ton) of gold within a quartzite horizon over a strike length of 800 meters and an average thickness of 10-30 meters. In addition, visible gold has been found in trenches in other areas

of the Megado Seredo exploration area. The Meleka Abeba exploration area, meanwhile, includes 108 square kilometres with several favourable gold-bearing horizons north of the Lega Dembi mine within the Adola gold belt.<sup>125</sup>

September 1995 saw the conclusion of another agreement -- this one with a US company called Canyon Resources Africa. The agreement gives the latter exclusive rights to explore for gold in an area covering 23 square miles in the Adola gold belt. The company was expected to start exploration within 45 days and had indicated that it would spend around US\$2.3 million during the initial exploration period of three years.<sup>126</sup>

The government hopes to the country to be producing up to 30 tonnes of gold annually within five years. Moreover, the government is confident that developments will bring other benefits as well -- creating employment opportunities and helping to develop more remote areas. (The mining law provides for exploration licenses which are convertible to mining licenses.)

### **Tantalite**

Tantalite is a hard mineral which is primarily used in the electrical components industry. A significant deposit of tantalite has been identified in Kenticha (in the south-west of the country),<sup>127</sup> which could yield 200 tonnes a year. Given the high international price of the commodity, this is a potentially-strong export material.<sup>128</sup> The government is keen to encourage development.

### **Other**

There are already limestone (for cement) and salt works in operation. (The former is processed at the Ethio Lime Senkelle Factory.) The government has claimed to have discovered proven reserves of 300 million tonnes of coal in Kaffa, 400 million tonnes of bicarbonate in Shoa and potassium deposits with a potential yield of 1.5 million tonnes a year in Tigray.<sup>129</sup> Abraham, meanwhile, reports that copper reserves are estimated to be 660,000 tons.<sup>130</sup>

What is beyond doubt is that the government would like to develop potential mineral seams - - in addition to those already mentioned, others include soda ash, nickel, tin, cadmium, platinum, potash and marble. Not only does it provide the potential to benefit the country as a whole, but, given that most of the mineral wealth is located in the peripheries of the country, mining (and other industries based on mineral resources) would help further the government's goal of more balanced national development. Therefore, to encourage exploration, prospecting and production, new investment and tax incentives have been introduced.<sup>131</sup>

## **K. -- MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT**

The Nazereth tractor factory, which is located about 100 kilometres from Addis Ababa, was completed in 1984/85 with financial assistance from the USSR. Production from the factory was reported to be consistent for each of 1989/90, 1990/91 and 1991/92, but had some increase in output in 1992/93.<sup>132</sup> The factory has historically been hindered by the difficulty in securing the spare parts necessary for assembly operations.

## ENDNOTES

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34. *FAO Yearbook, Production*, *op. cit.*
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55. *Ethiopia: New Directions of Industrial Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
56. *Facts about Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade and Tourism*, *op. cit.*
57. *Ethiopian Statistical Abstract 1992*, *op. cit.*, p. 88. This is the only sector within food manufacturing that had more people employed in the private sector than in the public sector (1989/90).
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60. *Facts about Public Manufacturing Enterprises, Trade and Tourism*, *op. cit.*



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