



OCCASION

This publication has been made available to the public on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation.

TOGETHER

for a sustainable future

DISCLAIMER

This document has been produced without formal United Nations editing. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries, or its economic system or degree of development. Designations such as "developed", "industrialized" and "developing" are intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process. Mention of firm names or commercial products does not constitute an endorsement by UNIDO.

FAIR USE POLICY


Any part of this publication may be quoted and referenced for educational and research purposes without additional permission from UNIDO. However, those who make use of quoting and referencing this publication are requested to follow the Fair Use Policy of giving due credit to UNIDO.

CONTACT

Please contact <u>publications@unido.org</u> for further information concerning UNIDO publications.

For more information about UNIDO, please visit us at <u>www.unido.org</u>







Dietr. LIMITED ID/WG.257/1 1 September 1977 ENGLIBH

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

Expert Group Neeting on Industrialisation in Relation to Integrated Rural Development

Vienna, Austria, 12 - 15 December 1977

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF RURAL AREAS CASE SPUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF RURAL INDUSTRIAL BUTATE FOYA, LOFA COUNTY, LIBERIA 1/

1/ This paper was propared by <u>Nr. D. Skinner</u>, the UNIDO Project Manager; Nr. L. Randall, the UNIDO Senior Industrial Development Field Advisor; and Nr. L. Bruyntjes, Junior Professional Officer. The writing of the paper was co-ordinated by Nr. Bruyntjes.

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Liberian Authorities or the secretariat of UNIDO. This document has been reproduced without formal editing.

14.77-6579

mb

TABLE OF CONTRIPES

1

and an and a second of the second		Piuro
THE LIBERIAN STRUCTOR, BACKGROUTS SERVED AS	••••	. 1
Introduction	• • • • •	• 1
General policy and long-larm objectives of Hiberia's mono-economic development	••••	• 1
Key problems in card development	• • • • •	• 1
Background of the miral industrial estate (RIE) concept	••••	• :'
Location of much inductival volute, Poya, Lofa County	• • • • •	• ?
Deperturion of the project	••••	• 4
Development of the project to the present miknation	• • • • •	• 5
Bottleneeks, key problem areas and limitations of the project	• • • • •	. 11

AA 2

THE LIBERIAN SITUATION, BACKGROUND SETTING.

1. INTRODUCTION

General policy and long term objectives of Liberia's socioeconomic development.

- diversification of production based on renewable resources.
- dispersion of sustainable socio-economic activities throughout the country.
- equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth and diversification so as to ensure an acceptable standard of living to people throughout the country.
- 2. The cornerstone of the diversification strategy is <u>Integrated Rural</u> <u>Development</u> (IRD), through balanced regional planning.

Priorities:

- Agriculture
- Education
- Health
- Transportation and Communication.

Although these priorities are very general, it is noteworthy that industry is not on this list.

3. Key problems in rural development:

- low productivity of land as well of labour caused by:
 - low yielding crop varieties and shifting cultivation
 - not enough soil and water conservation measures have been taken
 - inadequate research and extension services
 - lack of suitable or accessible credit, marketing and processing structures
 - lack of experienced management and entrepreneurial skills
 - poor infrastructure (roads, power, water) facilities.
 - lack of technically qualified people.

- 1 -

- 4. Enckyround of the dural Industrial Estate (RIE) concept. In order to improve pricultural performances the Liberian Government established during the last 4 to 6 years, a number of farmers cooperatives which create a network of cooperatives throughout the country. These cooperatives, who have been given a monopoly position in terms of selling a ricultural produce to the governments' central buying organization LFMC (Liberian Produce Earketing Corporation, should not only provide the member formers with a fixed and stable centre to cell their surplus produce, but should also be seen as an important part of a general integrated rural development programme. Muong others these cooperatives should facilitate the distribution of improved inputs (NDP paragraph 80), and could at different levels be focal points for non-formal education.
- 1 . Location of Rural Industrial Estate. Foya. Lofa County, a brief geographical and historical description.

Lofa is the monthern most county in Liberia and is to date almost entirely depending on agriculture. The monthern part of the county (Upper Lofa) with a population of approximately 58,000 is somewhat more developed than the rest and most of the development efforts are concentrated in here. Forld Bank is executing a \$17 million a,ricultural development programme, comprising crop improvement, establishment of credit facilities, road building and improvement and of oourse manpower development.

The expectation is that within 6 to 3 years the huge iron ore deposite in central Left will be exploited, which will create a new growth pole in the county.

Foya is a town of about 3,000 inhabitants in the western part of Upper Lofa, approximately 12 miles from the Sherra Leone border and on equal distance from Coinca. Benides being an agricultural accountity the town has been a trade centre for a long time. Each week the Caturday market attracts five to seven thousand people.

U. In the loginning of 1971 a farmers cooperative was founded in Foya. It was called Intofawor, which means in the local language "Let us try". It provides a marketing centre for the fastly expanding commercial agriculture, where main products are coffee, palm kernel, cocon and to a lesser extent rice. Last yours turnover was close to \$990,000. Because membership of a Cooperative, in districts where they exist is compulsory these institutions have a very strong position, and can show a substantial profit, due to a 6% sales commission from LPMC if managed property.

- 7. At the moment of introduction of the cooperative a minority of the population was involved in cash crop forming while the vast majority was involved in subsistence farming. The trade sector was and is mainly in the hands of non-locals (Guineans, Lebanese, Mauritanians) and a service and manufacturing sector was virtually non-existing. During the first years of its existence Intofawor was monaged by Peace Corps Volunteers who trained Liberian counterpart staff. In the second half of 1974 Intofawor was turned over to the Liberian staff and two Peace Corps Volunteers remained as auvisors. The cooperative at that time was probably the only employer of any scale in the region, providing job to approximately 15-20 mainly semi or un-skilled labourers.
- The above was the situation as found by the Rural Industrial 8. Estate at its inception early 1975, meaning that there was hardly basis of any value for industrialization which implies a foundation in the form of some skilled or semi-skilled labour some basic management skills and a transport and communication system. This foundation has to be Luilt rather than to be used by the RIE proj ct, to facilitate industrialization in a second stage. Inspite of this, the general trends could be assessed as favourable for the establishment of an RIS which could provide processing services for agricultural products and set up other small enterprises for which the need arose in this rapidly developing area. The agricultural prospects were very good. Farm efficiency was rising due to improved land clearing methods, diminishing of shifting cultivation practices and the introduction of better yielding crop varieties. Farming for market purposes of oil palm, coffee, cocoa and rice was encouraged by the existence of the farmers cooperative as a stable purchaser.
- Opposite this feature it was clear from the beginning that managerial and technical skills would be extremely scarce and that also the aspirations of the "ordinary" people were not to be over-estimated.
 Leadership was incorpor ted in the Faramount Chief and other tribal leaders who generally did their very best to follow and understand new developments from the outside world, but were never part of it.

- 3 -

9. The high cost of transport of agricultural products led the way to the belief that establishing of processing industries could be feasible. In older reports on agro-industries development in the regions (deizmann, UN/OTC, August 1973, and in November, 1972 Adams UNIDO project manager-designate for LIR/72/012, Construction of Agro-Industrial Distates in Dural Liberin, pre-project investigation report) there was a montion of fruit canning industries and other technologically complicated industries, but at the start of the BLD the level was already bet much lower. For the RIE, activities like rice milling, cocoa drying, coffee cleaning and oil milling were seen as the limits of the possible in terms of manpower and resources availability.

Furthermore, there was the fact that virtually all menufactured goods had to be imported from Lenrovia. Foya's development created a greater demond for among others more durable building materials than the commonly used mud.

10. On the national level the approach of these problems could unfortunately not be founded on a national runal industrialization plan. Liberia is still in the stope of formulating runal development policy.

Description of the project

- 11. The Foyn pilot rural industri 1 cathte was established not because the local community directly full a strong need for it, but because the concept appended to the covernment which believed the, at the time, most promising formers cooperative, to serve as a beckbone for this new type of service organization.
- 12. The objectives of the projects can be divided in two categories: The first is to expend and/or develop entrepreneurial capability in the area. This is supposed to be done by direct training of RIE staff, a memoger, an accountant and one or more supervisors of the different activities, in a counterpart framework. It was anticipated that more people could be trained then would be necessary for Foya and that they could eventually manage other RIE's. The second objective is to establish and manage profitable commercial enterprises, as a way of demonstrating the viability of industrial activities.

- 13. Although the Ministry of Agriculture (MCA) is officially the Government agency to execute the project, it has delegated its authority to Intofawor Cooperative as being the most desirable vehicle for carrying its development message to the farmer. It is the government's policy to create a network of agricultural cooperatives throughout the country and the RIE was attached to the originally best operating cooperative. It is organised as an integral part of Intofawor and is meant to facilitate and expand its activities. Being a pilot operation its success is likely to lead to the establishment of more RIE's linked to other cooperatives.
- 14. Financially it had been agreed that UNDP would contribute \$290,700, for one expect (project manager), equipment, consultants and a mechanical engineer. The counterpart contribution of the government of Liberia would be\$120,320 for local personnel, training and equipment. Intofawor's counterpart contribution was agreed to be \$205,240, for counterpart personnel and equipment (\$115,000) and finally the US Peace Corps would contribute \$96,000 for 8 man years volunteer service.
- 15. A noteworthy statement about the organization of the project can be found in the project document annex I, pars. 4; "Upon commencement of the project the Executing Agency may be requested to assume primary responsibility for project execution. However that primary responsibility shall be exercised in consultation and in agreement with the Cooperating Agency. Arrangements to this effect shall be stipulated in the project workplan as well as for the transfer of this responsibility to the government or to an entity designated by the government for the expenditure incurred." It does not need much interpretation from this and similar other points in the project document that the government on the secuting agency played a very dominant role. I will refer to this when discussing development of the project.

Development of the project to the present situation.

16. The project started in March, 1975. By that time the counterpart organization Intofewor was managed by Liberians already, but on the background there still were two very experienced Peace Corps Volunteers, knowing the strong and the weak sides of the management, guiding them through a myriad of smaller and bigger problems. After they left in February and March 1976 the resistance against the RIE by the cooperative management proved heavier than expected and even to day this remains the most important impediment for the further implementation of the project. As originally designed presently it appears that the concept of investing in activities that will only be profitable after some time, but will provide repulse employment is still hard to introduce to runal people. Primarily this seems to be caused by the lack of understanding of the management of Intofawor and the reluctance of the Einistry of Agriculture (MCA) to impose its authority on matters considered within the competence of the cooperative.

- 17. Bearing this brokground in mind it is interesting to review the immediate objectives listed in the project document LIR/73/016/B/01/37 of May 1975:
 - (a) to expand on develop entrepreneurial capability in the Foya area; Up till March 1977 it h d not been possible for the cooperative and the RTE to agree on a counterpart for the PN. Some qualified people presented thempelves, but were either denied a reasonable salary by Intofawor, or refused to work under the cooperative in the present situation. The can who was finally assigned to be his counterpart (which happened during PD's home leave!) shows little interest and dees not deem to have many ther capabilities that could make him a suitable estate manager.
 - (b) to establish and develop the first stage of the curve industrial estate in Poya,.....
 - (c) to select and train local personnel, initially on a counterpart basis, who subsequently will assume full responsibilities as menagers, and operators of industrial estates; see remark under (a).
 - (d) to train process and machine operators for future industrial expansion. PM never had adequate time and/or possibility to do this. There is one man in RTE service with a technical background. He supervises the daily operations very well but is otherwise not educated or technically qualified to instruct at higher level.

- 6 -

- (e) to undertake the training in craft skills through apprenticeships; One local woman has a keen interest in developing her already existing craft skills and is stimulated and supported wherever possible. Straining the development of her potential business capabilities is that she, like the vast majority of the people, is illiterate. Other people will probably go along as long as the project exists, unless someone in the cooperative can be trained to act as an intermediate between producers and consumers (mainly in Monrovia).
- (f) to establish and manage profitable commercial enterprises such as:
 - (i) sand and grovel sales. RIE does not have means of transportation for these items, and since everyone is free to dig sand and gravel out of the nearby river, transportation is the only thing to sell.
 - (ii) Intofawor (The Foya farmers cooperative) Utilities Division.
 - (111) Coop. Store; agricultural, electrical and household appliances. Because of the strained financial situation the coop. there has been no possibility to initiate it.
 - (iv) Automotive and farm implement service station, gas oil and general repairs. Recently the gas station was finally completed and is in service now. Expansion into repairs has not been feasible.
 - (v) Others have met the expressed needs of the people.
- (g) to assist in developing the capacity of agricultural cooperatives and farmers associations in increasing agricultural productivity and earned income through the establishment of secondary processing units and improved marketing methods. In the circumstances no activities except the establishment of a small rice mill have been possible. However, the insvailability of spare parts for the MOA donated rice huller precludes operations. Other activities, for simple processing of coffee, cocoa and palm kernels, which were

anticipated were never able to come off the ground due to lack of finances or simply luck of supmort from the counterpart organization.

1

- (h) to construct facilities for and initially manage the following industries, considered as a first phase:
 - (1) manufacture of (laterite, sand, ceant) Cinva-Ram type blocks; Two Cinva-Ram block machines and one cement block machine are available, but there is no work shed available, which virtually clops all operations during the wet senson and there is a continuous struggle for the supply of raw materials, cenent (from Henrovia) and sand (from the border giver with Guinea)
 - (ii) processing of building, construction and ceneral utility lumber.
 - (111) manufecture of standard door and window frames, shulters, screens and doors;
 - (1v) manufacture of achiel office and nonsehold furniture
 - (v) manuf crure of preforming ted roof truemes

The necessary woodworking equipment has partially arrived while more is on requisition. Alta agh money for a building for a woodworking shop has been budgetted by Jaiofawor, it is not available, and thus there is no place for these operations.

- (vi) establishing of Mastifiable secondary processing units for rice, oil pulm and coffee crops; A small rice mill was erected in Sugart 1076 but it struggles continuously with opere part problems, and there are no drying and perboiling facilities. (see further under (g)
- (vii) manufacture of bambee, rattan and read items, furniture, fencing and agricultural and tools for domestic and export market. On a small scale rattan and read furniture is manufactured, mathly for the Hamrovia market. The irregularity and undependability of transport to Forrovia and the lack of mwarehouse facilities in Honrovia are the main constraints.

- (viii) upgrade automotive and farm equipment repair shop to include general engineering services and welding. No building and no well trained mechanic who is able to instruct others are available. Welding equipment arrived in May, but is of use as long as the UNIDO don: ted generator has not been installed.
 - (ix) identify and develop where possible other viable industries for the utilization of locally available raw materials etc. In this connection attention is and will be paid to the feasibility of establishing a bio-gas plant, a brick plant and the production of charcoal using wood waste.
- 18. In March of this year the board of directors of Intofawor at the insistence of the MOA decided to transfer their tractors and some other farm equipment to the RIE because the cooperative was not able to maintain the vehicles properly, which results in frequent breakdowns during which it was almost impossible to transport produce to the cooperative warehouse. RIE maintains and leases this equipment now.

1

19. As can be noted from the previous paragraphs the problems of running a relatively big cooperative were too big for the capabilities of the present management. In the first stage this was more or less concealed by the presence of the Peace Corps Volunteers but from the moment they left they were basically fighting a lost battle. As early as at the end of 1975 the Ministry of Agriculture recognized the need for an experienced and highly qualified cooperative officer. Since also the board of directors of the cooperative is not capable of guiding the management or at least suprvise its dealings properly, mistakes were not corrected and problems became inextricable. Frustration took over and what first could be called insufficient management gradually developed into mis-management. Finally in May 1977 after several abortive other attempts to rectify the situation, the MOA suspended the manager and the cashier, made the accountant acting manager, and sent a special advisor from the Ministry to assist the board of directors and the acting manager. At the same time an audit of the cooperative books (the third in ten months) was ordered. The audit showed a considerable loss of which only a part could be retrieved, and no improvement has been noticed since.

- 9 -

20. The rainy sesson severely affected the block making operations, one of the potentially most profitable activities, because there was no shed available to store the freship made coment and disvo-nom blocks protected against the rain. Although Intefewer had budgetted 10,000 \$ for a building, the money is simply not evailable.

On June 3, 1977 the gas station ran dry and there was not enough money to buy new stoch because part of it had disappeared into Intofawor and was impossible to retrieve in the books of the Intofawor/RIE organization. It took more than three weeks of concerted offerts, in which the RIE foreman played a surprisingly active role (the only positive point) to stanighten out the difficulties and misunderstandings between Intofawor/RIE the MOA and the gasoline supplier and to order a new load of gas.

Unaffected by problems in the counterport organization the furniture and crafts division standily developed. It will not be long before the ration and need furniture operation can be self surthining. The handleraft notivities, although not so far developed yet are potentially selfsustaining if a good business music, can be found or the present one can be trained to that level. (see remark under 17 e). In general it can be said though that the level of self-mustaining growth has certainly not been reached yet.

21. By far the most interesting development and maybe even the main achievement to date is the growing interest in the RIE concept, in spite of all the problems with Intofawor, by two neighbouring farmers cooperatives. Both have expressed their desire to get assistance from the Foya RIE in expanding their facilities and have indicated a willingness to invest their own money in a number of RIE related projects which have their special interest.

\$.

4

Bettlepecks, key problem areas and limitations of the project.

- 22. Problem areas can generally be divided in two categories, i.e. the physical ones, the ones that can be solved with more money or more people and the non physical ones. These can either originate from inability to cope with organizational and technical problems, and eftem require a change of attitude, or from conflicting interests and priorities or vaguely formulated policies on the various levels. In the light of this framework the following observations can be made regarding this project.
- The physical problems can slmost all be brought under 25. the hesdline, Infrastructure. Although much work has been done the transport remains a major constraint. Up till today many truckdrivers are very reluctant to go to Foys during the monsoon. The solution of the transportation problem would greatly help the furniture menufacturing end to e lesser extent the crafts activities, because these are primarily depending on the Monrovis market, and the block making operations and the gas station, being dependent on the copital for the supply of cament and gas. Other physical support functions like electricity, water and a communication system with the rest of the country are non existent. As noted under 17(h)(viii) the UNIDO donated generator hes not yet been installed. Lack of motivation from the side of Intofawor and lack of money for a generator building can be regarded the main reasons.
- 34. Institutional infrastructure is limited to the declining influence of government institutions in the area. Both structures however are (still) too weak to provide e solid framework to support this kind of development

programme. In this connection it is noteworthy that just 6 weeks ago in the capital of Lofa County, 50 miles from Foys the first bank, outside Monrovia and the iron-ore and rubbur concession arons, was opened.

- 25. Contrary to the expectations Intofawor never managed to make any savings from which it would have been able to meet its financial obligations as agreed upon in the prodoc. For a while a 100,000 working capital grant from the UN Capital Development Fund looked within reach but since Intofawor/RIE has never been able to produce a financial statement which proved its creditworthiness this possibility looks rather memote at this moment. No other alternatives to obtain working capital seem to be available. Complicating the issue of financial situation is the fact that Integraph and RIE had only one set of books up till April 1977. Inputs from RIE are generally not entered separately naking it impossible to actually assess the economic viability of the project activities.
- 26. Underlying most of the bottlenecks and limitations of the programme is the lack of qualified manpower, resulting in lack of motivation and in a basic relatance against taking responsibility. Illiteracy in general and technical and managerial inabilities are major constraints for the implementation of the project.
- 27. The lack of entrepreneurial motivation and the lack of understanding small scale industrial development is shown in the reluctance of the cooperative management and board of directors to invest in longer term profitable RIE activities, although they provide employment and training for a relatively big group of local people, as opposed to the fast profit made by buying and selling of agricultural produce.

- 12 -

- 28. A crucial bottleneck for the project, resulting from the manpower deficiency, is the low efficiency of the edministrative and managerial counterpart structure. The leaders of the cooperative, traditionally, heevily lean on the central government for explicit direction. For every major decision, even though it clearly falls within their competence they prefer the government to take responsibility.
- Other limitations derived from social and cultural 29. barriers are less easy to define. One notices the reluctance of people to act in a way different from the traditional and like in most traditional societies outsiders are not too easily accepted. In the same way there is no clear conflict of interest between groups in the society concerning the development of an RIE. On the other hand it is clear that the more developed groups of the community benefit more from the Coop/PIE concept than the poorer, but there seems to be no elternative. One cannot reach the lowest classes in these societies without touching the more priviledged. In this case it can be said that all the undertaken activities are directly beneficial to the local community, either by using and processing local neterials or by directly producing for the local market, and thus reducing "imports" from Monmovia or other areas.
- FC. Vagueness can be considered a last general problem for the execution of the project. Vagueness rules the project document when it comes to defining responsibilities for and relations between the different contributing partners.

Many problems between Intofewor and RIE could have been avoided if the project document would have been in outlining their relation and more specific obligations. Vagueness in the form of the lacking of well formulated policies and strategies concerning rural development forces government officials into sd hoc decisions and a less firm line of action than desired. In this connection it is easier to cope with the fact that no industrial incentives, services or physical facilities specifically designed by the government to promote industry in the rural areas are provided than with the definition of the programmes' socio economics objectives which is stated as: "to support the governments' policy of balanced and sustained economic progress of all parts of the country and all people through integrated rural regional development and small scale industries by establishing a network of small scale rural industrial estates in selected areas".

Future of the project and lessons from the past 31. In spite of all the problems and setbacks over the past period of the project, expansion of the programme in the form of a multiplication of RIE's whether attached to other institutions as farmers cooperatives or not, looks desirable. This kind of development has the best possibilities to leave social structures and cohesiveness intect, and to raise the standards of living of a mejority of the local groups involved. The project provides for a very gentle introduction into industrialisetion. This way a rural population has a chance to grow along with new developments, and will not immediately be drowned in it as could easily be the case in a large scale approach. As noted before, notivation and interest sre growing, most notably in neighbouring communities.

4

32. From the production results of the PIE the following conclusion can be drawn: for every "product" demands exceed the supply, and increase of "productivity" of the block making operations, the gac-station, the tractor-service, as well as the fumiliare manufacturing and the handieraft activities, can all be easily absorbed by the Libertan market. Except for the furniture and craft, which are sold wainly in Henrovia emphasis is entirely on the local market. If it will be possible to use the grown interest of other in the concept of the PIE it will be feasible to deversify production within the same technological level, which will head to a stronger development of rappower, the overall constraint, and increase local production capability. Given the Upper Lofa antural resources. agricultural products as coffee, oil palm, cacao, rice and not to forget timber, the physical possibilities for small and even middle size enterprises are on somewhat ' englar terms (two to fire years) multe good. National marketing will be a logical next step which however can only be taken after considerable improvement of both the manpower and infamiliation.

> Till now the project is still is a very confraince concerning the development of entrepresented stills. The stage is which the project is alterial out is that of deconstructing the visbility of small entrepresented and to attract the interest of potential entrepresenter mong the rural population.

For the present time and near future the unjer contribution of the project towards the (industrial) development of the region such be that it induces a growing american of their own possibilities. The belief of being dependent on Honrowin will at the same time be likely to decrease. not in the last place because some "import substitution" from the capital will be the result of project activities. It can never be forgotten that the project is a very first step to institutionalize activities that are not directly farm related, and at such must be considered one of the first steps on the way to an institutional infrestructure in this part of Liberia.

34.

1

Concluding from the experience with this project it can be said that a major shortcoming and lesson for the future has been the insdeguate assessment of the level from which an RIE could be started. Although the concept has been studied extensively in the years preceding the project, (Adams UNIDO 1972, Weizman UN/OTC 1973 and several others) no report managed to make a realistic esessment of available resources and required inputs. Evaluating the reports after two years RIE one notices that the operations are much more modest than was foreseen in the above mentioned reports, and that the emphasis of the RIE has shifted from actually establishing business to training and demonstration. Clearly the starting level of RIE operations has been miscalulated in ell of the previous studies, overestimating the availability of local entrepreneurial skills and experience. In this connection one connot help but feel that agency salesmanship sometimes influenced sound judgement.

35. Certainly in a beginning stage of industrialization, like in this case, the abcomptive aspecity of the local community is limited. The list of immediate objectives in the project document against the actual achievements, gives an indication of having overestimated this capacity. It will not be possible to give hard byidence in this case, but it seems that all the development inputs in the area

t

(cooperative, RIE, World Bank project plus government projects) have been more than could be absorbed and have partially caused the situation of confusion and resistance that presently exists. The solf molinnee approach which was adopted by this project can only be successful if the scale of the activities is compfully kept within the limits of the absorptive capacity. Defining and assessing this capacity must be extensively discussed in future project proposing reports. Determining the local development lovel will greatly assist in assessing the viability of a mural industrialization plan, for which a certain minimum lovel is required. In this case the RIE has to provide a gentle introduction into industrialization by developing basic shills that will lead to the establishment of an entreproneumini class in the local community. The stage in which the RIE can make use of managerial and technical shills has not come yet.

36. Although the existence of a favourable environment was overestimated, the project can be considered to be a result of the agricultural developments in the area. These developments have caused the increased domand for technical services, building materials and most of all for managerially chilled people. In its activities the project uses locally available raw materials whenever possible; and, laterite and wood for building materials, rattan, bitter-root and reed for furniture and indigenous materials for crafts articles, to strengthen the self supportive capacity of the programmes.

57. Regular visits by UNIDO field staff to the project site, the 6 months progress reports and evaluation reviews are means to monitor the programme. Because the project staff has no other regular means of communication with the outside world than through the UNDP office in Monrovis, it turns out to be very important to keep that staff closely informed and give them continuous feedback to help them to keep in touch with the project as a whole and prevent them from getting lost in the innumerable daily problems and details.





78. 1.08