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## Independent Evaluation Report

# IRAQ

### Promotion of micro industries for accelerated and sustainable livelihood recovery – Ninewa Governate of Iraq (MISP-V)

UNIDO project numbers: TE/IRQ/09/008, TE/IRQ/09/A08, TE/IRQ/09/B08 and TE/IRQ/09/C08



UNITED NATIONS  
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UNIDO EVALUATION GROUP

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN
GAP	Good Agricultural Practice
GHP	Good Hygienic Practice
GLP	Good Laboratory Practice
GMP	Good Manufacturing Practice
IAA	Inter-agency Agreement
IAU	Interagency Analysis Unit
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MISP	Job Creation through Cottage and Micro Industries
MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MVTC	Municipal Vocational Training Centre
NVTC	Ninewa Vocational Training Centre
PMU	Project Management Unit
PSC	Project Steering Committee (of the MISP V project)
PSC	Project Steering Committee
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SME	Small and Medium-scale Enterprises
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG-ITF	United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
USD	United States Dollar
VTC	Vocational Training Centres



## Glossary of Evaluation Related Terms

Term	Definition
Conclusions	Conclusions point out the factors of success and failure of the evaluated intervention, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results and impacts, and more generally to any other strength or weakness. A conclusion draws on data collection and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.
Impacts	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.
Institutional development impact	The extent to which an intervention improves or weakens the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources, for example through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Such impacts can include intended and unintended effects of an action.
Lessons learned	Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact.
Logframe	Management tool used to improve the design of

Term	Definition
	interventions, most often at the project level. It involves identifying strategic elements (inputs, outputs, outcomes, impact) and their causal relationships, indicators, and the assumptions or risks that may influence success and failure. It thus facilitates planning, execution and evaluation of a development intervention. Related term: results based management.
Outcome	The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. Related terms: result, outputs, impacts, effect.
Outputs	The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
Recommendations	Proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a development intervention; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. Recommendations should be linked to conclusions.
Relevance	<p>The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.</p> <p>Note: Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances.</p>
Results	The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention. Related terms: outcome, effect, impacts.
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.

## Executive Summary

The UNIDO project Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery - Ninewa Governorate of Iraq (MISP V) was implemented in the Ninewa Governorate over a three year period between 2009 and 2012. The project was the fifth iteration of the MISP model in Iraq and built on the experience, capacities and relationships established through earlier projects.

The intended outcome of MISP V was to “assist the Government of Iraq to address the socio-economic priorities of the Ninewa Governorate with a focus on community empowerment, and the promotion of income generating activities and employment creation”. The project aimed to “increase the capability of rural and urban communities ... to engage in viable non-farming enterprises, reducing dependency on relief aid and helping them to move towards sustainable livelihoods in more efficient way”.

**MISP V was organised in three components: building local capacity, providing training to 2000 beneficiaries and a specific targeting of 500 youth beneficiaries.** The project was designed for implementation over 24 months in five districts of the Ninewa Governorate (Mosul, Sinjar, Talafar, Talqaif and Al-Hamdaniya) and through 18 distinct counterparts. Of these, seven were state institutions and the remaining 11 were non-state organisations. The use of a “satellite” approach was intended for rapid scale-up of delivery and access to training opportunities, including to under-serviced areas of Ninewa.

**This independent evaluation of MISP was commissioned by UNIDO’s Evaluation Group, and conducted between May and November 2012.** The evaluation was mandated to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the project. The methodology included at review of documentation, field study in Iraq based on interviews with key stakeholders, site inspections and a random survey of Vocational Trainers, Beneficiaries and participating Small and Medium Enterprises. The evaluation was also directed to draw lessons of wider applicability for the replication of the experience gained in this project in other projects.

**The relevance of MISP V was high.** Based on strong assessment and national ownership, MISP V effectively identified and addressed the priorities of key Iraqi stakeholders, UNIDO’s own Iraq priorities and trends in the programme environment. Relevance was strengthened through UNIDO’s assessments of the labour and enterprise environment, and by **robust Iraqi ownership that was exercised through Steering Committee**, and in the ongoing relationship between UNIDO and training counterparts.

**The Effectiveness of MISP V was high.** As of May 2012, 24 distinct vocational training courses were delivered, to a total of 2146 beneficiaries. The final beneficiary number exceeded the original target of 2000 by seven percent, and included 788 females (36 percent and slightly below the 40 percent target) and 1021 youth (47 percent and well above the 25 percent target). With some exceptions, the beneficiaries were selected according to robust criteria and appeared qualified to participate in the project. In addition, MISP V provided rehabilitation and equipment to selected training locations, skills upgrading to 48 Vocational Instructors and enterprise support to 24 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME). Implementation targets, therefore, were met or exceeded for most components.

Key MISP V outputs:

- a. *Community capacity development activities were delivered and of good quality, including some activities beyond the scope of the original project design.*
- b. *Skills upgrading was highly assessed by the Vocational Trainers. In turn, the performance of the instructors was also highly assessed by the beneficiaries taking MISP V courses.*
- c. *Rehabilitation work was done according to specification and generally of good quality. There were some exceptions related to inappropriate design, particularly for welding workshops.*
- d. *Equipment delivered to training locations was generally found to have been delivered according to specification, to be in good working order, used appropriately and maintained.*

*As a result, there was an overall improvement in the level of economic activity and income, for men, women and youth. The number of women reporting they earned no income declined 30 percent, and there was a 38 percent increase in the number of women reporting they earned over between IQ 2000 a day. The number of men reporting no income began at a low level and declined modestly, from five to three percent. However, the number of men reporting an income of more than IQ 10,000 daily almost doubled after training, from 18 percent of 35 percent. Further, men reporting an income of between IQ 2000 and 9999 declined, from 54 percent to 46 percent, as many moved into the higher income category.*

*Importantly, beneficiaries were finding opportunities that offered more predictable employment, at highly skill and salary levels than before taking the MISP V training. Women participating in Sewing and Leather courses, and beneficiaries in the Computer Training were the least likely to show improvements. Beneficiaries reported that MISP V training contributed to tangible improvements to both individual and household living conditions. While beneficiaries noted that overall improvements to the economy and security conditions were contributing factors, they made a direct attribution between MISP V and better living conditions. In addition, support to SMEs resulted in overall improvement to business performance, and a 167 percent increase in employment among the survey cohort, and an improvement in the living conditions of immediate and extended families.*

**Efficiency of MISP V was good.** The project was based on a proven and effective implementation structure that was well implemented. Allocation of resources focused on project activities, and project management effectively leveraged MISP V with external resources, although no synergies with other UNIDO programmes were identified. However, efficiency was undermined by a one year overall implementation delay, from 24 to 36 months. This delay resulted from two primary factors: start-up difficulties related to governance arrangements, which were resolved by mid-2010 and an under-estimation of the impact that the security situation would have on implementation. Regarding the latter, the design of the project was not based on a robust risk analysis and integration of mitigating measures into the implementation strategy. As a result, the project timeline was not realistic and the design of implementing across a broad geographic area with multiple partners increased risk.

**Sustainability of MISP V was mixed.** The seven state-owned institutions receiving MISP V support showed a high probability that investments and activities will be sustained. In

contrast, activities with the project's eleven non-state counterparts showed a lower probability. The non-state counterparts were generally credible organisations and showed good performance in the delivery of training. However, most appeared financially unstable. Further, MISP V investments in courses and facilities were lower than at state-owned facilities, with less installed capacity left at project closure.

**The main factor affecting sustainability, therefore, was the decision to work through a combination of state and non-state counterparts.** This design choice was based on the analysis that the combination offered the greatest possibility for rapid expansion and access to training opportunities, and reaching under-serviced areas where state systems were not present. However, the strategy had a short-term focus, and there was no evidence of state commitment to sustain the "satellite" approach. MISP V, therefore, had an embedded tension between rapid expansion of services and sustainability that was not resolved; sustainability outside of state institutions was effectively not built into the project design. The tension is characteristic of "recovery" oriented projects, where rapid delivery of goods to stabilizing a situation may be more important than sustainability considerations.

## Summary of Recommendations

1. UNIDO should conduct an internal review of the requirements for labour market and private sector development in Iraq. The review should be designed to identify what elements of the MISP project model are relevant to the emerging context, and to the priorities of Government. The review should be conducted as part of overall strategic planning for UNIDO's positioning in Iraq, taking into consideration and reinforcing the objectives of UNIDO's contributions to private sector development and transition in Iraq's State Owned Enterprise sector.
2. To ensure highest value added from its technical assistance, UNIDO's strategy should be to move out of direct implementation of vocational training activities and into both upstream and downstream contributions. Based on the experience of the MISP project model, these might include:
  - a. Favouring vulnerable groups in targeting, but generally moving away short-term training delivered in a "humanitarian" or "recovery" framework. Evaluations find that providing a month of training is sufficient for only basic proficiency in a vocational area but has limited long-term livelihood potential.
  - b. Labour market assessments conducted with the VTCs to identify viable economic sectors for private sector development, the human resource requirements within the market and the appropriate training packages. The objective would be to align the VTC system more closely to the requirements and dynamics of the market.
  - c. Measures to strengthen the VTC system focused less on the delivery of material goods to individual VTC locations and more at the level of strengthening Governorate or national systems, as appropriate. UNIDO has already demonstrated its ability to provide technical assistance to upgrading Vocational Instructor knowledge and skills, opening new vocational areas and developing

curriculum. There is an opportunity to work at an institutional level in these and other areas, based on market assessments.

- d. Measures to link training to actual job placement, further skills upgrading or other opportunities.
3. NGOs can be effective partners for the delivery of punctual activities, and to compliment the MOLSA system. However, there is an implicit trade-off between support to NGOs and sustainability. Investment in building the capacity of NGOs as Vocational Training Centres (VTC) has a lower possibility of being sustained. In a stabilizing development context, UNIDO should focus on expanding the state vocational training system, including into under-served communities. Working through the state system has a higher probability of being sustained, strengthens overall public service delivery and provides better linkage into social service delivery programmes, such as those targeting unemployed persons. In the future, if UNIDO chooses to collaborate with NGO counterparts, the NGOs should be under MOLSA supervision and there should be clarity on how NGO participation strengthens state capacity rather than filling gaps.
  4. Gender is an area where UNIDO can make a significant contribution. However, progress towards expanding women's participation in the labour force and improving livelihood opportunities require a dedicated gender assessment and strategy. The MISIP project model has important gender-based objectives and targets, but is not based on such assessment. Focus should be placed on non-traditional areas of employment and activity, including those with a higher income potential. This will require some innovation identifying new livelihood options within Iraq's cultural context, and the support of Iraqi counterparts.
  5. Important elements of project design require revision and strengthening. These issues appear throughout MISIP evaluation reporting, and should be addressed. Specifically:
    - a. The overall quality of project result matrices must be strengthened, to show a clear *Theory of Change*, causal chain and indicators.
    - b. Supported by improvements to the results matrices, project monitoring and reporting should give greater emphasis to gather data and analysis at the output and outcome level, and be less activity-focused.
    - c. Project design must be based on robust risk analysis and mitigation. The challenges related to insecurity and political uncertainties are well understood by UNIDO and its counterparts, and can be expected to exist into the foreseeable future. Projects must be based on related assumptions, with risks and mitigation measures built into realistic designs.
    - d. Regarding risk assessment, insecurity is likely to remain in the Iraq programme context, at least over the medium-term. Insecurity does not need to deter UNIDO from working in Iraq. On the contrary, UNIDO's ability to deliver should be a core comparative advantage. However, projects must be designed to accurately reflect conditions and mitigate the risk to implementation performance, personnel

and materials; insecurity should be identified as a design issue and addressed accordingly. With almost ten years of operating experience in Iraq, it should no longer be acceptable to identify insecurity as a project “constraint”.

# 1. Introduction

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The UNIDO project *Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery - Ninewa Governorate of Iraq* (MISP V) was inaugurated in May 2009, with the budget of Euro 3.6 million donated by the Government of Germany. Project implementation began 12 November 2009, on receipt of the first instalment of funds. The project was designed for implementation over 24 months, in five districts of the Ninewa Governorate; Mosul, Sinjar, Talafar, Talqaif and Al-Hamdaniya. As of May 2012, 24 distinct vocational training courses were delivered at 18 locations in five Ninewa districts, to a total of 2146 beneficiaries. The final beneficiary number exceeded the MISP V target of 2000 beneficiaries by seven percent, and included 788 females (36 percent) and 1021 youth between 18 and 24 years of age, or 47 percent of beneficiaries. In addition, MISP V supported rehabilitation of 24 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME).

The philosophy of MISP project model has been to “increase the capability of poor and marginalized war-affected communities to engage in economically viable small-scale productive activities, to generate income and increase employment opportunities.”<sup>1</sup> MISP V was the fifth in a series of UNIDO Iraq projects. Previously called *Community Livelihoods and Micro Industry Support Projects*, the project name was changed to *Job Creation through Cottage and Micro Industries Promotion* (MISP). The first MISP project was implemented in the Thi-Qar Governorate, the second in the Erbil and Suleiymaniyah Governorates of Northern Iraq, the third in the Qadisiya Governorate and the fourth in the Al-Anbar Governorate. The fifth iteration of the project MISP model, therefore, built on the experience, capacities and relationships established in earlier projects.

## 1.1 Objectives of the MISP V project

From the MISP V *Project Document* (2009), the intended Outcome of the MISP V project was “assist the Government of Iraq to *address the socio-economic priorities of the Ninewa Governorate with a focus on community empowerment, and the promotion of income generating activities and employment creation*”. The project aimed to “*increase the capability of rural and urban communities ... to engage in viable non-farming enterprises, reducing dependency on relief aid and helping them to move towards sustainable livelihoods in more efficient way*” (2009: 6).<sup>2</sup>

The MISP V project was designed with three supporting outputs:

- a. Providing targeted communities with the *capacity to plan and manage* their development activities and restoring a functional base for economic growth and social peace.

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<sup>1</sup> Quote from the *Terms of Reference* for the MISP V evaluation, included as Annex A to this report.

<sup>2</sup> Emphasis added



- b. *Improving the livelihood of approximately 2,000 households* living in the project area through the strengthening of their productive capacities in post-harvest and other income-generating activities by enhancing their skills and promoting micro-industries. The project document included criteria for selection of the households, focusing on the most vulnerable. These included households headed by widows and women, youth, marginal farmers and manufacturing workers, returnees, and residents directly affected by conflict (2009: 5).
- c. *Enabling a minimum of 500 youth to gain basic knowledge in productive skills* through practical experiences and activity-based learning. Particular emphasis will be placed on providing the youth with marketable skills effectively meeting the labour demand requirement in the agro-industrial processing and manufacturing and services sectors.<sup>3</sup>

Key indicators from the project's results matrix included:

- a. *Increase incomes* of targeted communities through expanded diversification of non-farm jobs.
- b. *Revitalize the productive capacity* in project areas, leading to marked improvements in reducing the extent and incidence of poverty.
- c. *Develop the skills of a large number of widows, women headed households, marginal farmers and manufacturing workers, youth, returnees and residents ...* providing them with the capacity for either self-employment or to obtain jobs to sustain livelihoods for themselves and their families.
- d. *Improve food security, health and nutrition indicators,* and household assets in Ninewa Governorate.<sup>4</sup>

The *Project Document* (2009a) and *Inception Report* (2009b) identify security as the sole risk to implementation. UNIDO determined security conditions were improving, and that the opening of a UN office in Mosul would provide the basis for effective management and oversight. On this basis, UNIDO concluded "no other critical factors are foreseen to negatively impact the project, as it was developed in close consultation with national authorities. Furthermore, representatives of beneficiaries will be involved in decision-making at each stage of implementation..." (2009a: 9).

## 1.2 Purpose, scope and methodology of the MISP V final evaluation

The purpose of the MISP V evaluation was to assess the:

- a. Project *relevance* with regard to the priorities and policies of the Government of Iraq, the UNDG ITF and UNIDO.

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<sup>3</sup> A summary of the MIVSP V project's results matrix, including indicators, is included as Annex B to this report.

<sup>4</sup> Points are paraphrased from the *Project Document* (2009: 6). They are consistent with the project indicators, from the results matrix.

- b. Project *effectiveness* in terms of the outputs produced and outcomes achieved as compared to those planned.
- c. *Efficiency* of implementation: quantity, quality, cost and timeliness of UNIDO and counterpart inputs and activities.
- d. Prospects for *development impact*.
- e. Long-term *sustainability* of the support mechanisms results and benefits.<sup>5</sup>

The evaluation was directed to provide the necessary analytical basis and make recommendations to the Government, to the donor and to UNIDO for the closure of the project and for ensuring its sustainability. Further, the evaluation was to draw lessons of wider applicability for the replication of the experience gained in this project in other projects.

The methodology for the MISP V evaluation consisted of four components: inception, the field study in Iraq, and debriefing of stakeholders in Istanbul and Vienna, and the drafting and revision the evaluation report:

- a. The complete evaluation methodology was outlined in the approved *Inception Report* (June 2012). The report was based on a review of project documentation, and participation in a Project Steering Committee (PSC) meeting (Istanbul, 24 to 25 April 2012).<sup>6</sup> It included final design of the field survey sampling and the survey tools, including. i) criteria for selection of a representative sample of trainers, beneficiaries and SMEs; ii) identification of the sampling composition; iii) interview guides for stakeholders, and iv) survey questionnaires for MISP V trainers, beneficiaries and SMEs.
- b. The field study took place in Ninewa during July 2012. The evaluation team conducted structured interviews with the principle MISP V stakeholders, and a random sample field survey methodology for the three main beneficiary groups.<sup>7</sup>
- c. Results of the field study were compiled and analysed by the evaluation team at a two day meeting in Istanbul, followed by a one-day debriefing with the UNIDO project manager (*in lieu* of the Steering Committee) and with UNIDO stakeholders in Vienna.

### 1.3 Design and Validity of the survey samples

The MISP V field survey had three components:<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The complete *Terms of Reference* are included as Annex A to this report.

<sup>6</sup> The survey questionnaires are included as Annex D, Annex E and Annex F of this report. The criteria for selection of the survey sample are included as Annex G.

<sup>7</sup> The complete data set from the field mission is included as Part Two of the report, the *MISP V Data Annex*.

<sup>8</sup> All information on the samplings is included in the *MISP V Data Annex* and in Annex G to the main report, *Selection Criteria for the Survey Samples*.

- a. An *Instructor's Survey*, based on interviews with 32 of the 48 Vocational Instructors that received skills upgrading under MISIP V, for a sample cohort of 67 percent.
- b. A *Beneficiary Survey* covering 160 of the approximately 1760 beneficiaries that completed their training prior to May 2102, for a sample cohort of 9.5 percent. Further disaggregated, 39 percent of the survey participants were women, 61 percent were male and 39 percent were youth. The numbers are comparable with actual male and female participation. The cohort was drawn from 19 distinct courses, delivered at ten of the 18 training locations in three of the Governorate's five districts.
- c. An *SME Survey*, comprising seven of the 24 Small and Medium Businesses that received support from MISIP V, for a 30 percent sample cohort.

**Representation in the survey cohort appeared valid**, both in terms the beneficiary groups covered and the survey's geographic and programme scope. The exception was in the area of youth, where the survey's 39 percent sample cohort did not fully represent the final 47 percent of beneficiaries that fell into the "youth" classification. In part, this resulted from the project surpassing its initial objective of 25 percent youth participation (2009a: 3).

## 2. Situation analysis for the Ninewa governorate

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### 2.1 UNIDO's situation analysis and theory of change (2009)

The *MISP V Project Document* (2009) and *Inception Report* (2009) include limited context analysis.<sup>9</sup> The document concludes that Ninewa had been one of the Iraqi Governorates most affected by insecurity and conflict. Levels of poverty and unemployment were above the national average, showing sharp geographic and social disparities within the Governorate, with rural areas and women and youth particularly disadvantaged.<sup>10</sup> UNIDO further reported a sharp decline in agricultural production, which was previously an important economic sector.

UNIDO assessed agriculture production declines as relating to violent conflict, the lack of efficient harvesting, storage and food processing industries, and the collapse of marketing infrastructure. One impact was outmigration from rural areas and the agriculture sector, with migrants lacking the education, training and skills to work in other sectors. Youth were identified as particularly affected, and large sections of the population relied on relief assistance.<sup>11</sup>

In this context, the MISP V project was based on the following assumptions:

- a. The security situation showed improvement during 2009, in both Iraq and the Ninewa Governorate. Improvements were likely to continue, and did not require special risk mitigation measures.
- b. Improvements to security created an opportunity to shift the focus of international assistance to economic development at the local level, and income generating livelihoods. There would also be a more permissive environment for project implementation, including with international personnel based in Mosul.
- c. National vocational training institutions and organisations lacked the capacity and equipment to provide services, with many areas outside of Mosul being underserved.
- d. Strengthening vocational institutions, providing training to disadvantaged groups and support to Small and Medium Enterprises would generate

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<sup>9</sup> Project analysis is paraphrased from the *MISP V Project Document* (May 2009) and the *MISP V Inception Report* (December 2009).

<sup>10</sup> UNIDO reported that between 25 percent and 57 percent of the Ninewa Governorate population earned within the lowest income quintile. Unemployment rates for women were estimated as high as 62 percent for women and 33 percent for men, in the most disadvantaged districts. The Project Document does not provide detailed information on either poverty or unemployment, either aggregate for the Governorate or by district.

<sup>11</sup> The project documentation does not provide data on the percentage of the population receiving relief assistance, either from national or international sources.

employment and micro-enterprise opportunities, and increase household incomes.

- e. UNIDO further takes a community-based approach (community empowerment), as the basis for both identifying relevant activities and ensuring sustainability.
- f. UNIDO had the necessary competence and experience, based on previous use of the MISP project model.

**Several additional contextual factors influencing MISP V design emerged from interviews with UNIDO personnel and Iraqi stakeholders**, although these were not developed in the early project documents. Ninewa was one of the most diverse governorates in Iraq, with a large number of ethnic and religious minorities. As well, the Governorate is affected by on-going disputes over Iraq's internal boundaries. Large areas are under contention and the overall situation places some restrictions on Government's ability to establish programmes. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is the Government entity with responsibility for vocational training. However, the main MOSLA facilities are in Mosul, and not accessible to much of the population.

UNIDO advised that project's "satellite" approach of working through a variety of state and non-state organisations and facilities was intended to expand access to: i) vocational training opportunities and services, including in underserved areas; and ii) and for the ethnic and minority groups in these areas, where movement outside of communities can be restricted by security and cultural concerns. Information sources do not indicate whether MOSLA had a strategy to expand into underserved areas, or whether the MISP V project was a stand-alone initiative.<sup>12</sup>

## 2.2 Evaluation situation analysis (2012)

### The Security Situation

**Available analysis confirms the UNIDO's assessment of the security and development conditions in Ninewa and Iraq, in 2009 and over the programme period.** Ninewa has been one of the Iraqi Governorates most affected by insecurity. However, the security improvements anticipated in the early project documentation did not materialise. *As a result, there was no significant reduction in security risk in the project environment during implementation.* Difficulties are confirmed in MISP V Progress Reports and the Mid-Term Evaluation (2011), which identified insecurity as a significant obstacle to project implementation.

**The overall security trend for Ninewa since 2008 has been gradual improvement.** There was an absolute decline in the number of security incidents, and some improvement in conditions for economic development. Regardless, Ninewa continues to experience levels of violence and instability that exceed most other Governorates. In 2009 at MISP V inception, a quarter of all security incidents in Iraq

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<sup>12</sup> The Governorate's 2011 Strategic Plan commits to "create and rehabilitate primary and secondary education schools and institutions as well as vocational training centres" (2011: Section 4-11).

occurred in Ninewa (IAU 2011). While the implementation period was characterised by relative improvements, there were spikes in violence related to specific events (for example, elections) and/or unresolved conflict issues. The area in and around Mosul was particularly affected, as were several other project locations (Talafar and Sinjar among them).

**A lack of predictability in the security situation meant no relaxation in either the Government or United Nations' security posture.** There have been no UNIDO international personnel in Ninewa since May 2011, at the point all UN personnel were evacuated for security reasons (UNIDO 2011b: 22). UNIDO field monitoring missions (2010a) highlighted the extraordinary measures required prior to 2011 for maintaining an international presence in Mosul, including the heavy security requirements for movement to locations under US Army duty care. Over the full implementation, security restrictions in force at many project locations also meant restricted movement and concern for the safety of national personnel, and for project goods and materials. Project design with a broad geographic scope contributed to security-related challenges.

#### Key Development and Economic Indicators

**Ninewa has the lowest average income rates in Iraq, estimated at just above IQ 400,000 a month in 2011** (IAU 2011).<sup>13</sup> It also performs poorly on many development and humanitarian indicators, in absolute terms and relative to other Iraqi Governorates. Further, the Ninewa Governorate *Development Strategy* (2007-2009) identifies poor performance on income and development indicators as an essential social and security challenge. In addition to having the lowest income nationally, there are sharp disparities within the Governorate, between districts, urban and rural areas and between men and women.<sup>14</sup> *MISP V, therefore, correctly assessed Ninewa's poor performance on income and development indicators, and the challenges to economic development these posed.*

**Unemployment rates for Ninewa are slightly above the national average,** again with spatial, gender and age variations (IAU 2012). Estimates of Iraq's actual unemployment rate vary widely. The official GOI rate for 2012 ranges between 12 percent and 15 percent, with Ninewa situated in the middle range at about 13 percent. UN estimates note the situation appears to be more difficult for Iraqi women and youth; nationally, the youth unemployment rate in 2012 was 18 percent for males and 27 for young (IKN 2011).<sup>15</sup> Labour force participation for women is particularly low, at between 12 (NDP 2010) and 18 percent nationally (IKN 2011). Education levels are a significant obstacle to finding employment; about half the Iraq population has completed at least primary education and 11 percent have degrees. However, an estimated 38 percent of the adult population has not completed

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<sup>13</sup> <http://www.iauiraq.org/gp/default.asp>. The highest incomes were reported in Baghdad, estimated at IQ 680,000 a month.

<sup>14</sup> The lowest monthly incomes were reported in Telafar district (approx. 300,000) while the highest were in Mosul (approx. IQ 460000).

<sup>15</sup> The overall employment situation has improved significantly since 2003, given the extraordinary economic conditions following the international occupation. According to the *Iraq National Development Strategy*, "unemployment surveys for 2003, 2004, 2005 showed huge decrease in unemployment rates from 28.1% to 26.8% to 17.9% during the past three years as a result of reactivating the Iraqi economy" (2007: 6).

primary education, and lack basic literacy skills. Rates are significantly higher for women. United Nations data draws a correlation between education and literacy levels, and employment (IKN 2011).

As elsewhere in Iraq, women in Ninewa have more difficulty finding employment than men. Ninewa exceeds the national average for women's participation in the labour force in only one district (Hatra at 30 percent). Otherwise, between three percent (Baaj and Talkaif) and ten percent (Mosul and Hamdaniya) of women are economically active. Female unemployment is also higher in Ninewa compared to the rest of the country; 35 percent compared to the national average of 27 percent. The highest rate is estimated at 62 percent in the Hatra district. Even for men, there is high unemployment in specific areas, although 85 percent of working age men are economically active. Unemployment is still slightly higher in Ninewa than the national average, with 21 percent in Telafar, 23 percent in Shikhan and 33 percent in Hatra (IKN 2012).

**The structure of economic activity and employment favours the public sector.** *The MISP V project, therefore, correctly identified the need to promote economic diversification by strengthening the private sector.* Employment opportunities in the private sector tend to be with smaller companies, are less secure and pay at a lower wage level. While the number of small- and medium-sized enterprises has grown in Iraq since 2003, they are often undercapitalized and lack access to current technology and business practices. However, these businesses can contribute to change Iraq's economy, moving away from a state-centred and oil-dominated structure towards a more sustainable and diverse economic model.

**Growth of Iraq's public sector and the costs of sustaining it crowd out the private sector and much needed capital investment.** Two major items account for the outsized nature of the Iraqi state: public employment and support for State Owned Enterprises. In the first instance, the number of public employees has increased sharply in recent years. The Government of Iraq employed about 28 percent of the working population in 2005, a figure that grew to 43 percent by 2008.

Public-employee salaries accounted for 38 percent of government's operating expenses in 2008, but are projected to constitute more half (51%) of operating expenses in 2012. It is estimated that the government maintained a payroll of more than 3.4 million employees, or 10 percent of Iraq's entire population of approximately 32 million people. In addition, numerous reforms to the compensation packages of state employees have driven government operating costs still higher and, to date, the government has lacked the political will to resist using the public payroll as an expedient substitute for private-sector-led employment growth.<sup>16</sup>

**Small and Medium Enterprises are an important driver of private sector development.** While still a relatively new phenomenon in Iraq, SMEs contribute to reducing unemployment and making income distribution more equitable, as they tend to employ more labour intensive production processes. SMEs also smooth the

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<sup>16</sup> Data for this section was taken from USAID, USAID-Tijara, "Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priorities in Iraq," 10/4/2012, [https://tijara-iraq.com/?pname=resources\\_tech&doctype=21&t=Technical Reports](https://tijara-iraq.com/?pname=resources_tech&doctype=21&t=Technical Reports). Data was cross referenced with information available on the *Interagency Analysis Unit* portal.

transition from predominantly agricultural economies to more urban, industrial economies by providing for accessible value-adding processing activities. In addition, SMEs can serve as an entry point for foreign investors. However, while SMEs play a role fostering economic diversification, they are also important to social cohesion in Iraq. By reducing economic disparities and spreading economic gains throughout society, a healthy SME sector acts as a stabilising influence, making the economy more resilient in the face of commodity price shocks and other destabilizing events.

**There may be 1 million informal businesses in Iraq, the overwhelming majority of which are SMEs.** In 2009-2010, USAID surveyed the owners of 11,800 SME owners from 15 provinces, finding that:

- 76 percent were less than 10 years old, highlighting their relative novelty in Iraq. The average SME was less than 5 years old, consistent with UNIDO's own experience in Iraq.
- 83 percent of the businesses surveyed fell into the category of "small" enterprises, having one to 10 employees. Only 14 percent were classified as "medium-sized" enterprises, having 11-30 employees.
- The majority of SME owners rented their business locations, and less than 10 percent used email or the internet. Only 10 percent of SMEs in the survey had a business plan, and 54 percent relied on "word of mouth" to obtain customers.
- According to USAID, the bulk of SMEs then in operation were valued at less than USD 80,000, and more than half of those were valued at less than USD 8,500. Most SME owners financed operations either through sales revenue or personal savings, with only about four percent obtaining funding from banks. When asked about the amount of a loan needed to get an SME started, respondents said about USD 15,000.<sup>17</sup>

Other studies of SMEs have largely concurred with USAID's findings, noting that:

- Many SMEs are informal and, for better and for worse, do not comply with GOI laws and regulations.
- Security matters affect the operations of SMEs, including the obvious threats of terrorist activity and organized crime (which particularly affects jewellers and other SMEs with valuable, portable merchandise), and the more subtle disruptions caused by large-scale military and police sweeps and intrusive checkpoints.
- Access to markets is a major obstacle to the success of many SMEs. Access to venture capital, banking, and business-support services are also obstacles.
- There is a low-level of awareness among many entrepreneurs about the kinds of business services that are actually available.

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<sup>17</sup> Data from this section is taken from the Iraq Partners Forum, *The Iraq Briefing Book: Executive Summary*, <http://unami.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3441&language=ar-JO>



- Inputs necessary to fabricate products are difficult to obtain. Imported goods are often expensive and of poor quality, and government corruption continues to be a concern.

## 2.3 Findings and conclusions

**UNIDO did not correctly assess that security improvements in Ninewa would contribute to a more permissive project environment.** An overall decline in the absolute number of violent incidents notwithstanding, Ninewa remains one of the Governorates most affected by violence. A decline in the number of incidents has not translated into a more predictable environment that would allow both the Government and United Nations to relax their security protocols. MISP V, therefore, was implemented in an insecure project environment and the assumptions about increased mobility and reduced threats to personnel and material did not materialise.

**UNIDO correctly assessed the situation related to other project elements.** Ninewa has levels of poverty and unemployment that are generally above the national averages. There are important disparities within the Governorate itself; women, youth and rural populations face particular challenges. The lack of education and training is a major obstacle to livelihood opportunities, and growth in the private sector is both a national development priority and a primary source of economic opportunity. Focusing on livelihoods, vocational training for disadvantaged groups in society and on SME development situated MISP V well to address these challenges.

## 3. MISP V: Project structure and implementation

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### 3.1 MISP V: Duration

**MISP V had a one year implementation delay.** The original MISP V project was approved for implementation over 24 months, and closure in 2011. The *Mid-Term Evaluation* notes start up delays during the first year of operation. The evaluation attributed constraints (continuing insecurity) and changes in needs as the factors contributing to initial delays (2011: 87- 88). As a result, the project closed in 2012, approximately one year behind schedule. The main reason for delays cited in the project reporting was security considerations. Further, the evaluation noted that initial problems with project governance contributed to a significant start-up delay during inception, consistent with the duration described by the *Mid-Term Evaluation* (2011).<sup>18</sup>

### 3.2 Logical framework design

**MISP V follows the same basic philosophy and logical design as the four previous MISP project iterations.** The project's *Theory of Change* was consistent with the overall MISP project model; increasing the capability of poor, marginalised and war-affected individuals and communities to engage in economically viable small-scale productive activities to generate income and employment. There were two specific innovations to the MISP V iteration. First, the project used a "satellite strategy" to deliver vocational training to under-serviced areas, through a combination of state and non-state organisations.<sup>19</sup> Second, the project increased beneficiary targets for youth, and conducted specific youth surveys and assessments.

The *Development Objective* of "economic recovery and restoration of livelihoods of the most vulnerable living in Ninewa Governorate" was to be achieved through a combination of strengthening the capacity of communities to deliver vocational training services and providing training to beneficiaries that met specific selection criteria.<sup>20</sup> **However, design of the MISP V logical framework does not provide a clear causal chain for how the objective would be achieved:**

- a. The MISP V *Development Objective* and *Immediate Objectives* are clearly stated.
- b. The statement of *Outputs* is actually indicators for the *Immediate Objectives*, and not of the "products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention", and will contribute to the outcome (DAC 2002: 28).<sup>21</sup> Examples of some *Outputs* for MISP V might have been: i) rehabilitation of vocational training centres; ii) training provided to 2000 beneficiaries, of

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<sup>18</sup> See section on MISP V Efficiency

<sup>19</sup> See section, MISP V Satellite Strategy and Counterparts

<sup>20</sup> The MISP V results matrix is summarised in Annex B

<sup>21</sup> See Annex B

whom 25 percent are youth and 40 percent are women; and iii) micro-enterprises established and SME's strengthened.

- c. Some project indicators are poorly drafted, and indicators do not always directly correspond to the outcome or output where they are situated.
- d. Overall project design has a robust organisation of activities, in support of objectives. The sequencing is consistent with other MISP projects and well understood by UNIDO.

**Inadequacies in the design framework did not appear to undermine the effectiveness of implementation for project activities.** However, there were at least two broader consequences:

- a. Overall project implementation is activity-focused with less attention to the desired outcomes.
- b. Project reporting is also activity focused and largely narrative. Reporting does not effectively describe progress towards desired outcomes and outputs; in part because outputs and indicators are not well defined but also because the project does not gather much information beyond the activity level.

### 3.3 MISP V: Governance

**MISP V followed a standard governance and implementation design**, which has proven successful on previous iterations of the project model. Project governance occurred through a three level structure:

- a. *A High Level Coordinating Committee* was convened to ensure effective cooperation between the stakeholders, and to provide strategic direction and guidance to the project. The committee included ranking officials from Government stakeholder entities: the Ministry of Planning (MoP), Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA), the Labour and Vocational Training Directorate of MOLSA and the Governor of Ninewa's office (including the Governor).<sup>22</sup> Among other roles, the committee secured high-level commitment and support for MISP V, which was covered to the state institutions participating.
- b. *A Project Steering Committee* comprised of representatives of UNIDO and the primary Government stakeholders (Governor's office, MOP and MOLSA). The committee was mandated to provide guidance to the project, at the strategic and operational levels, and to make decisions on project design and strategy. The first committee meeting approved the district focus, institutions to receive assistance, the beneficiary profile, inclusion of targets for women and youth and budget review and allocations.<sup>23</sup>

Documentation and interviews indicate that committee met as required and was informed about project activities. The initial meeting included an

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<sup>22</sup>See *Minutes of the First High Level Coordination Meeting*, Amman, Jordan 28-29 July 2010.

<sup>23</sup> See *Minutes of the First Project Committee Meeting*, Amman, 26-27 May 2010

overview of objectives, governance and UNIDO procedures, and clarification of roles and responsibilities. Discussions were substantive, and committee members expressed satisfaction with their level of engagement with the project.

Project design called for the creation of a *Technical Working Group*. Among its responsibilities, the group was to advise the PMU on the implementation of operational and technical issues. The working group met initially in Amman. However, following the *High Level Coordination*, the group was dissolved and the *Project Steering Committee* became the sole focal point for coordination and technical advice. The evaluation did not have documentation on the group's activity, frequency of meeting or support provided.

*The project was managed through the Project Management Unit (PMU), responsible for the day-to-day implementation and coordination of project activities. The PMU was based within UNIDO office in Amman, Jordan, with national personnel located in Ninewa. The PMU was led by a Chief Technical Adviser (Amman-based), assisted by the project Field Coordinator and national Project Field Assistants (Ninewa-based).<sup>24</sup>Documentation and interview indicate that the PMU had an effective relationship with Iraqi counterparts.*

### 3.4 MISP V: Satellite strategy and counterparts

**An objective of MISP V was to “increase the capability of rural and urban communities in [Ninewa] to engage in viable non-farming enterprises...”** (UNIDO 2009a: 3). MOLSA had limited capacity for training outside of its central facilities in Mosul, and the Governorate's priority was to ensure equal access to training opportunities outside of Mosul. Accordingly, the project used a “satellite” approach to deliver activities in rural and underserved areas; MISP V was delivered through a combination of State and non-State organisations and facilities, with the intention of expanding capacity.

**Of the 18 MISP V counterpart organisations, seven were state entities.** These included the *Ninewa Vocational Training Centre (MOLSA)*, the *Mosul Municipal Vocational Training (Governorate)*, the *Ashur Industrial High School (Ministry of Education)*, the *Talafar Youth Centre (Ministry of Sport and Youth)*, the *Sinjar Mayor's Office (Local Government)*, the *Talafar High School for Girls (Ministry of Education)*, and the *Talafar High School for Boys (Ministry of Education)*.

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<sup>24</sup> Reporting indicates the management structure included two international personnel based in Amman (the Project Coordinator and a Senior Engineer) and eight Iraqi national staff, including the Field Coordinator an Engineer and two part-time Field Assistants. UNIDO clarified that a Senior Engineer and other project personnel were recruited as needed on specific activities, such as designing technical specifications and carrying out thematic studies on youth and the wool industry. The core members of the local staff in Ninewa were the Field Coordinator, Field Engineer, one Assistant and one Finance clerk. Core field staff, therefore, was comprised of four persons.

**Most MISP V training occurred through the state locations.** *Sixty-five percent* of all beneficiary training occurred at the seven state-managed locations. The *Ninewa Vocational Training Centre (MOLSA)* and the *Mosul Municipal Vocational Training Centre* accounted for 31 percent of the training. Forty-eight training events took place at the MOLSA VTC, making it the most active training location. The remaining five state sites accounted for 34 percent of trainees. The MOLSA VTC, Municipal VTC, Ashur, Talafar Youth Centre and Sinjar Mayor’s Office received either rehabilitation, equipment upgrading and/or participated in the Training of Instructors.

**The remaining 35 percent of beneficiaries received their training at 11 non-state facilities.** UNIDO advised it worked with these counterparts to: i) ensure access to project activities by the diverse groups within Ninewa and disputed areas with restricted movement; ii) build upon synergies from other agencies; and iii) target and support women and minorities.<sup>25</sup> Inputs to non-state locations were considerably lower relative to inputs to the state locations. Also, the evaluation did not find evidence of state owned entities providing support to training at the non-state locations.

According to project information, the non-state organisations received the following support.

Facility	UNIDO Inputs	# ToB Rounds	Remarks
<b>Substantial Project Support</b>			
Al Hadbaa	Rehabilitation, equipment and benefited from out of country ToT	11	Land and facility owned by MOLSA & employees funded by MOLSA
WDC	Computer lab, packaging and labelling equipment, generator, vacuum packer, in country ToT, study tours	9	US Provincial Reconstruction Team supplied several food kits
Talafar Wool Coop	Rehabilitation, basic olive processing equipment, generator, study tour	6	Also considered SME, Provincial Reconstruction Team supplied olive processing machine
<b>Limited or No UNIDO Inputs</b>			
Al Malak Association	No project inputs	1	

<sup>25</sup> Statements on the project’s “satellite” strategy emerged from interviews and UNIDO commentary, and are not explicitly developed in the *Project Document (2009)* or *Inception Report (2009)*. From interviews and PSC meeting minutes, the Governor’s Office and PSC strongly promoted the use of satellite locations, given the need to ensure equality of access to the Governorate’s diverse population.

Beth Nahrain	Food processing lab, in country ToT	4	PRT supplied several food and all first aid kits
Etana	No project inputs	1	
IFA	In country ToT and food	2	
Marpolis	In country ToT and aluminium partition of workshop space	6	Operated and well -funded by Syrian Catholic Church, all tools and toolkits supplied by PRT
Sinjar Ag Coop	No project input	1	
Sinjar Roj	Food lab	3	
Sinjar Youth	No project input	4	

### 3.5 Findings and conclusions

MISP V experienced a one year implementation delay, attributed largely to inception problems with the governance arrangements and on-going insecurity in the project environment. Other MISP projects have experienced delays of similar or longer duration. MISP V followed the establish MISP project model and *Theory of Change*, with some innovation in its implementation arrangements and beneficiary targeting. Governance arrangements also followed the established format, with some revision during the first year of implementation as the *Technical Working Group* was discontinued and its responsibilities integrated into those of the *Project Steering Committee*. The project's results matrix did not include a clear causal chain, and lacked a clear statement of Outputs and relevant indicators. The weakness contributed to the project being activity focused, and reporting problems.

## 4. Key field survey results

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**The complete field survey results are found in Part Two of the MISP V Evaluation Report; Data Annex.** The following is a summary of key survey results for each of the three components. The results are the primary evidence body supporting findings on the evaluation criteria; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

### 4.1 Survey of vocational instructors' skills upgrading

The objective of the MISP V "Train the Trainers" component was to create "a core cadre of vocational-training technicians that will contribute to building the capacity of various stakeholders in the governorate ..." (UNIDO 2009a: 19). For this to occur:

- a- The Vocational Instructors receiving skills upgrading needed the appropriate pre-qualifications and experience.
- b- The skills upgrading courses need to be of good quality, and improve the knowledge and skill of the Instructors.
- c- The Instructors needed to deliver their project-related courses, and preferably remain at the host training institution.<sup>26</sup>

Selection of Vocational Instructors for skills upgrading

**The Vocational Instructors selected for MISP V skills upgrading courses were appropriately qualified.** The Instructors were nominated by the participating training institutions and organisations. Those in the survey cohort had an average seven years of relevant experience, with 39 percent of the Instructors reporting more than 10 years of experience. An almost equal number upgraded their skills in an existing area of specialisation (55%) as those reporting the vocational area was new (42%). The finding appeared to reflect MISP V innovation in opening new vocational areas, where sufficiently qualified Instructors were not available.<sup>27</sup>

Quality of MISP V skills upgrading courses

**MISP V skills upgrading was of good quality, and improved knowledge and skill of Vocation Instructors.** The Instructors rated their overall satisfaction with the MISP V upgrading courses at between 3.9 out of 5. The highest satisfaction was shown with the quality of course instruction (4.1 out of 5), while the lowest training facilities received the lowest ratings (3.7 out of 5).<sup>28</sup> On completion of the MISP V skills

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<sup>26</sup> These criteria were developed from stakeholder interviews, and do not appear in the project documentation.

<sup>27</sup> *MISP V Data Annex*, Table 35 and Table 36

<sup>28</sup> From interviews, Vocational Instructors stated that the level of the training, curriculum and facilities for the autobody repair courses were low, and that the instructors did not have sufficient experience. UNIDO advised that an assessment conducted by the training institution cited personality conflicts and motivation issues on the part of the instructors that may have contributed to the lower ratings.

upgrading courses, 81 percent of Instructors felt their knowledge and skill had improved and that they were better qualified and more effective teachers.<sup>29</sup>The majority of Instructors stating their knowledge and skills did improve were found the auto-body courses.

**The Instructors' perception of improved knowledge and skill was verified by the beneficiary survey.**<sup>30</sup>Ninety-eight percent of beneficiaries that completed the MISP V courses responded they were either "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the quality of instruction they received. No generalised concerns about the quality of instruction emerged from the survey. Perceptions were further confirmed by interviews with managers of the collaborating training centres, who highly rated both the quality of their Instructors and their teaching performance after upgrading.<sup>31</sup>

Building capacity in local institutions

**MISP V Instructors expanded the capacity of local training institutions, during the immediate period of MISP V implementation.** On completing their skills upgrading, Instructors taught an average of 2.5 each within the MISP V project, in addition to other teaching assignments. There appeared to be few or no instances where Instructors did not fulfil their teaching commitments. The Instructors, therefore, returned at least a portion of the investment in their training as expanded capacity to the host centres.

**Instructor turn over at the non-state centres was high.** Out of the 56 instructors trained, 36 were from state-supported facilities and 20 from the non-state facilities.<sup>32</sup> Employment turn-over among the Vocational Instructors was high. Forty-two percent of the survey cohort reported they would leave their training institution when MISP V closed. Most of the turnover occurred at the non-state centres and was the result of unstable funding. Many of these counterparts hired Instructors on a contract basis for the duration of MISP V. They were not permanent employees and their contracts expired with the project. Also, no equipment was procured at some non-state locations, which may have resulted in institutional difficulties sustaining activities. In contrast, the MOLSA-funded VTCs offered more stable employment.<sup>33</sup>

Instructors' perception of training outcomes

**The Instructors believed that MISP V would improve the livelihood opportunities available to beneficiaries.** Instructors were asked about the accomplishments of

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<sup>29</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 39 and Table 40

<sup>30</sup>This statement is made in the absence of a baseline on the Instructors' knowledge and skills, but was a confirmation that the beneficiaries believed MISP V Instructors delivered good quality training.

<sup>31</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 13

<sup>32</sup> The total number of individuals was 48. However, the figure of 56 counts some trainers who received either advanced training or training in more than one subject. The survey findings on high turnover may have over represented the non-state component, given the number non-state sites visited.

<sup>33</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 37 and Table 38. The survey did not track whether the Instructors would take new employment at another training centre or project, just whether they would remain in their current employment after MISP V closed.



MISP V beneficiaries; whether beneficiaries improved their knowledge and skill, had would have more employment or income generating opportunities after the MISP V training. Instructors were also asked whether they observed positive change in the confidence and personal aptitudes of beneficiaries. The Instructors believe that:

- a. *The right beneficiaries were chosen for MISP V courses, consistent with the selection criteria and showing good learning ability, aptitude, motivation and ambition. Notwithstanding, concern was expressed that beneficiaries at several NGO training sites were not properly qualified, as inappropriate selection criteria were used.*
- b. *Beneficiaries showed limited improvement to their vocational knowledge and skill. The main reason cited was the limited duration of the training. Instructors believed only basic proficiency in many of the vocational areas could be achieved over a one-month training period. The Instructors' concern, therefore, was for the limitations of the MISP V project rather than the learning ability or aptitude of the beneficiaries.*
- c. *Instructors held a strong belief that taking the MISP V training would improve the opportunities available to beneficiaries, even if the proficiency gained through MISP V training was basic. However, Instructors observed only limited positive change in the confidence and personal aptitudes of beneficiaries that would make them more likely to find an opportunity. Again, the reason cited was the short duration of the training.<sup>34</sup>*

## 4.2 Survey of beneficiaries

Profile of the MISP V beneficiaries

**The profile of MISP V beneficiaries was consistent with project's objectives, criteria and targets,** based on UNIDO reporting and the evaluation survey.<sup>35</sup> The large majority of beneficiaries from the survey cohort appeared eligible to participate in the project, based on the criteria established in the *Inception Report* (2009a: 8-10). The beneficiaries:

- a. *Reflected the targeted gender balance (approximately 40 percent female and sixty percent male). The Youth target was exceeded by 100 percent; with almost 50 percent of beneficiaries being under 24 years of age compared to the MISP V target of 25 percent.*
- b. *Were either unemployed or working in low income, low skill and unpredictable employment (eg: day labour).<sup>36</sup> Eighty-seven percent of beneficiaries earned less than USD 8.5 a day, with 24 percent reporting no income.*

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<sup>34</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 41

<sup>35</sup>Composition of the survey cohort is outline in the *MISP V Data Annex*, Table 1 to Table 4.

<sup>36</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 6 and Table 8. Women in the cohort were particularly disadvantaged, with 92.5 of women reporting they did not have "employment" although many appeared to be making some form of income.

- c. *Had a negative perception of their quality of life and employment opportunities, with 56 percent stating that quality was either “bad” or “very bad”. The beneficiary’s perception of their household situation was also negative, with 62 percent describing their household situation as “bad” or “very bad”.*<sup>37</sup>

**Field Inspection identified some unqualified beneficiaries, at non-state managed training activities.** As examples, computer training at the *Ashur Industrial High School* was being given to high school students that would not be entering the labour market within the project period; the students did not meet the project criteria. Instructors at the *Hamdaniya Women’s Development Centre* advised that women in computer training lacked sufficient literacy skills to work with the curriculum. Problems resulted from a combination of weaker enforcement of the selection criteria by non-state counterparts, and pressure from local officials to include certain groups within the courses. No problems were identified at the two VTCs, where selection criteria were strictly enforced through MOLSA systems. The number of unqualified beneficiaries did not appear significantly enough to undermine overall project achievement, although it did have a negative bias on the data for employment and income.

#### Quality and relevance of MISP V training

**Beneficiary satisfaction was high, with the overall quality of the MISP V vocational training programme.** Ninety four percent of beneficiaries responded they were either “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the overall quality of the vocational training they received.<sup>38</sup> Satisfaction levels were consistently high across gender and age, and through beneficiary perceptions of the quality of instruction, the quality of materials and facilities and the course curriculum.<sup>39</sup> Further, 89 percent of beneficiaries in the cohort believed that the new knowledge and skills they acquired during MISP V training was be either “relevant” or “highly relevant” to the labour market, and to employment or livelihood opportunities.<sup>40</sup> Based on their experience, beneficiaries were generally optimistic about their employment prospects after the training. The majority, 76 percent, believing they were more likely to find employment as a result of MISP V.<sup>41</sup> Results indicate improved self-confidence, which was reflected in the site interviews.

#### Beneficiary income and employment after training

**There was an overall improvement in income levels, for men, women and youth.** A core MISP V objective was to increase income and employment for beneficiaries. The finding is presented noting that 44 percent of women and 16 percent of men did not

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<sup>37</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 9 and Table 10. Data was based on income and quality of life perceptions at the prior to taking MISP V training. It was cross-referenced with the MISP V baseline data gathered from beneficiary registration. The survey did not test for some of the criteria, such as widows or female heads of households.

<sup>38</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 11

<sup>39</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 12, Table 13 and Table 14. Some punctual concerns in each of these areas emerged during site interviews. However, these did not change the overall response.

<sup>40</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 15

<sup>41</sup>*MISP V Data Annex*, Table 16

answer questions related to their current income, which is a common problem with surveys in Iraq.<sup>42</sup> From the available data on female participants:

- a. *The number of women reporting they earned no income declined 30 percent, down to from 18 percent after the training from 26 percent of women before training.*
- b. *There was a 25 percent increase in the number of women reporting they earned between IQ 2000 and 9999 a day, up to 34 percent after the training from 27 percent before.*
- c. *Thirteen percent of women reported they earned over IQ 10,000 a day, compared with three percent on entry to the course.*

<b>Women's Income Before and After MISPV Training</b>		
<b>Daily Income Expected</b>	<b>Women Income before MISPV Training</b>	<b>Women Income After MISPV Training</b>
<b>IQ 10,000 and above</b>	3%	13%
<b>IQ 2000 - 9999</b>	27%	34%
<b>No income reported</b>	26%	18%
<b>No response</b>	44%	35%

With the available data for men, there was:

- a. *There was a modest decrease in the number of men reporting no income, from five percent before the training to three percent after training.*
- b. *The number of men reporting an income of more than IQ 10,000 daily almost doubled after training, from 18 percent of 35 percent.*
- c. *Men reporting an income of between IQ 2000 and 9999 declined, from 54 percent to 46 percent. The shift out of the mid-income category was based largely on increased earnings, and movement into the upper-income category.*

<b>Men's Income Before and After MISPV Training</b>		
<b>Daily Income Expected</b>	<b>Men's Income before Training</b>	<b>Men's Income After Training</b>
<b>IQ 10,000+</b>	18%	35%
<b>IQ 2000 - 9999</b>	54%	46%
<b>No income reported</b>	5%	3%
<b>No response</b>	12%	16%

<sup>42</sup> There was a much higher level of non-response on current income levels when compared to responses on past incomes.

**The most significant overall increase was in the over 10,000 IQ daily bracket.** For women, the most important gains were among those moving into the mid-income category of between IQ 2000 and IQ 9999, up from reporting no income. Men, who already started with higher income and employment levels than women, showed the largest gains moving from the mid to upper income range. The statistics for men are more reliable given the higher response rate to questions. Taken together, the largest gains were made among men and women moving into the upper category.

**The highest incomes for women were earned among graduates from the food processing training.** These women were most likely to make IQ 10,000 and over, or to otherwise move into the mid-income range. Their employment situation also appeared more stable. Women taking sewing showed the lowest incomes, and were most likely to not respond to income questions. Regardless, women in the sewing did report an improvement. For men, the highest incomes were earned among carpentry, welding and wool sheering, noting that data for wool sheering may be bias given the composition of the sample. The evaluation was also aware of male graduates that moved to Erbil to work in construction, but could not be reached for interviews.<sup>43</sup>

**Beneficiaries report an overall improvement in economic activity, compromised of employment and livelihood opportunities through temporary work or self-employment.**<sup>44</sup> Prior to the MISP V training, 59 percent of beneficiaries reported they were unemployed, while 41 percent of the cohort at pre-training responded they had some form of employment. The post-training unemployment level dropped by to 29 percent of the survey cohort. This included 24 percent of beneficiaries that reported they had “employment” and 46 percent that had some form of “self-employment”, which generally appeared to be casual work but also a number that had formed small businesses. Taken together, there was a drop in the level of unemployment of 50 percent among the cohort, and a higher level of overall economic activity.<sup>45</sup> The results for both men and women were similar, indicating higher gains for women.

**Interviews indicate that some of the employment is more stable, and at higher skill levels.** Of the beneficiaries that responded they found “employment”:

- a. Eighteen percent said they had a part-time job.
- b. Forty-five percent found “regular” employment, which the evaluation interpreted as either full time or predictable temporary employment.
- c. Thirty-seven percent had a casual work or income earning activity.<sup>46</sup>

**The survey did not test for the specifics of how beneficiaries defined “self-employment”.** The question was presented in the context of project objectives; whether beneficiaries were able to start small businesses, or otherwise find work on a contract or pay for service basis. For example, short term work servicing a satellite

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<sup>43</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 17.

<sup>44</sup> Issues related to the definition of “employment” among beneficiaries are addressed in the data annex. The fact that there is no commonly understood definition had an effect on answers to survey questions. Greater emphasis, therefore, is placed on gains in the number of persons that are economically active and earning income.

<sup>45</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 18

<sup>46</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 19a and Table 19b

dish or air conditioner unit. From the interviews, it was not always clear whether “self-employment” meant generating new employment in the relevant vocational area or simply returning to casual employment.

**Regardless, there was an improvement in the stability and predictability of employment.** The results were most positive among male beneficiaries. Men were almost twice as likely as women to find regular work, in any of the livelihood categories (employment, self-employed or casual/temporary). However, the biggest real gains for women were in the “regular” employment category.

**The survey data provides some insight into the areas where beneficiaries were more likely to find opportunity.** Beneficiaries *were least likely to find opportunity* with Leather Work, Domestic Electrical, and Computers, noting that Computers included some high school students who would not be entering the labour market. Female dominated courses were less likely than male dominated areas to generate opportunity, although there were greater possibilities in food processing. Aluminium fabrication, construction, auto-body repair, car mechanic and welding were the male dominated areas with the greatest possibility of finding “employment”. There was also a good possibility in carpentry, with anecdotal information about male beneficiaries finding employment in the Erbil area, given the higher demand for labour there. Lower results for Vehicle Diagnostics reflected the fact that specialized computer diagnostic equipment is required, and a limited number of shops have such equipment.<sup>47</sup>

**Beneficiaries perceived a strong attribution between MISP V training and the employment or livelihood opportunities.** Among those beneficiaries that found some form of employment or livelihood, 90 percent said that MISP V vocational training helped them to find that opportunity, either directly or indirectly.<sup>48</sup> Further, 90 percent said they attributed improved income levels to the training, and 92 percent of the beneficiaries stated they were using the skills they learned during the training, even when not employed in the same vocational area.<sup>49</sup>

Tool kits and employment

**Of the beneficiary cohort that received Tool Kits, 66 percent responded that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the kits.** The remaining 24 percent showed varying degrees of dissatisfaction while 11 percent did not respond. Among those expressing dissatisfaction, many referred to the sharing arrangements where one kit was given to two persons. Beneficiaries noted that the arrangement was not practical, and would likely lead to the sale of kit from one. This problem was particularly noted by instructors and management at the *Mosul Vocational Training Centre*.

**Regardless, there appeared to be a good attribution between the kits and employment or income opportunity.** Of the survey cohort that received a Tool Kit and found employment or an income opportunity, 64 percent responded that the

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<sup>47</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 20

<sup>48</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 22

<sup>49</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 23 and Table 25

Tool Kit was either important or very important to finding employment or opportunity.<sup>50</sup>

Improvements to beneficiary living conditions

**MISP V training resulted in tangible improvements to beneficiary conditions.** The question was asked in terms of general perceptions. Ninety-three percent of the beneficiaries responded that they considered their lives had generally improved as a result of taking the MISP V training. The response was through a combination of perception of well-being and material improvement. For perception, some beneficiaries interviewed expressed a belief that they had more possibilities after the course, resulting in more optimism. Among women, there was also a perception of improved well-being generated from having better social contact with other women, through course attendance.

**Overall, beneficiaries considered their life conditions had improved between 2009 and 2012.** For individuals, a total 45 percent reported that their situation was “better” or “much better” after the training, while 53 percent said their lives were the “same”. In householders, the majority of beneficiaries responded that their situation was the same (54 percent). 43 percent responded that the situation was “better” or “much better”. Only a small number of beneficiaries described their situation as worse, between one and three percent.

### 4.3 Survey of small and medium business

Selection of SMEs

**All of the SMEs in the survey cohort had a business record and appeared well positioned to receive assistance.**<sup>51</sup> There was one exception, which is described at the end of this section and was removed from the survey cohort as an outlier. The SMEs in the cohort were family owned and situated in the service and manufacturing sectors.<sup>52</sup> They appeared well established; all seven SMEs had been in business for at least three years and five were established prior to 2006, with six years or more in operation. The survey also found that all of the SMEs had made financial investments to upgrade their businesses, during MISP V implementation. The project, therefore, contributed to the conditions needed for expansion, including the confidence of the owners.<sup>53</sup>

SME satisfaction with MSIP V support

**SME owners showed a high level of satisfaction with the quality and relevance of MISP V support.** Six of the SME owners responded that they were “very satisfied” with the support received, with one owner being “satisfied”. Further, all owners considered that MISP V support was either “very relevant” or “relevant”, and that the project was responsive to their needs. Some concerns were expressed about the

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<sup>50</sup> *MISP V Data Annex*, data taken from Table 26 to Table 29 inclusive

<sup>51</sup> *MISP V Data Annex*, Table 43

<sup>52</sup> Six of the total SME cohort was in food processing activities, but were not included in the survey given their locations.

<sup>53</sup> *MISP V Data Annex*, Table 50

quality of equipment. Also, according to the owner of the Hamdaniya Welding Shop, the equipment provided by MISP V was either the wrong specification and/or it arrived with parts missing, rendering some of the equipment unusable. Regardless, three of the owners considered the quality of the equipment they received was “very good” with the remaining four owners responding that it was “good”.<sup>54</sup>

Improvement to business performance and job creation

**The business performance of the MISP V-supported SMEs improved, comparing the situation in 2012 to 2009.** SME owners were asked whether their business situation had improved since 2009, and since receiving MISP V support. Six of the seven SMEs surveyed responded they were doing “much better” when compared to 2009, the highest rating. The sole remaining SME said it was doing “better”. No SME responded that its situation was the same or worse compared to 2009. When asked to describe the areas of improvement:

- a. Four of the seven SMEs had increased their sales and revenues;
- b. Four of the seven SMEs experienced growth in demand or markets for their products; and
- c. All of the SME owners showed a perception of improvement and optimism.<sup>55</sup>

**SMEs supported by MISP V reported a net gain in employment creation since 2009, both full and part time.** Six of the seven SMEs had recruited new employees. Broken down, three of the SMEs recruited part time employees, while six SMEs had to recruit full time employees to meet new business demand. Only one of the seven SMEs in the cohort did not recruit new employees. Overall, the owners reported:

- a. *A 167 percent increase in full time employment.* Combined, the seven companies employed 32 persons full time in 2012, compared to 12 in 2009. This was an increase of 20 full time positions over the 2009 baseline.
- b. *An increase in the size of the supported SMEs.* In 2009, the largest SMEs in the survey cohort employed three persons, while the smallest employed only one person. The average size in the cohort was less than two persons. By 2012, the largest company employed eight persons while three other companies employed between five and seven persons. Only one company remained at one employee. Average SME size, therefore, increased to 4.5 persons.
- c. *There was a smaller net gain in the number of part time jobs created.* The SMEs reported employing five persons on a part time basis in 2012, up from two persons in 2009.<sup>56</sup>

**Employment creation occurred in the general labour market.** Previous UNIDO studies have found that family-owned SMEs recruit almost exclusively within extended family or community networks, rather than in the general labour market

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<sup>54</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 51

<sup>55</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 46. The evaluation relied on perception as an indicator of improvement, as financial data was not available.

<sup>56</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 47 and Table 48

(TARGET SME Evaluation: 2012). Data gathered from the MISP V SME survey found a broader recruitment situation. Three of the SMEs recruited employees from the general labour market while three responded that they recruited new employees from among extended family. Only one SME owner responded that he recruited from both family and general labour market sources.

#### Change in the situation of SME families

**The overall situation of the families of SME owners by 2012 had improved,** compared to 2009 and prior to receiving MISP V support. Five of the seven SMEs said the situation of their families was “much better” in 2012 than in 2009, one owner said his family was “better” and only one said the situation was the “same”. Most SME owners also had some level of financial responsibility for extended family members. Six of the seven said they were better able to provide support, and that the situation in their extended family was “better”. MISP V benefits, therefore, were being shared within larger family and community networks.<sup>57</sup>

**Interviews identified multiple factors external to MISP V as contributing to the improvements.** There has been a general improvement in business environment and economy, even while security conditions remain unstable. In addition, there has been some improvement to the delivery of basic services, on which both businesses and families depend. For example, there are more hours daily of electricity from the public grid. Also, two SMEs had moved to more secure locations since 2009 (just prior to receiving MISP V support), with better business prospects. MISP V, therefore, was delivered during a period of improving security and economic conditions. The project both benefited from and reinforced those improvements.<sup>58</sup>

**External factors notwithstanding, SME owners made a direct attribution between their participation in MISP V and improvements in their situation.** The owners generally stated during interviews that MISP V support allowed them to consolidate their business operations and respond to changing conditions. The project was unique, in that other sources of financial and technical support were not available to them. The level of appreciation for support expressed by owners for MISP V support was high, regardless of any concerns expressed.

#### SMEs component performance issues

**As noted, there was at least one instance of an inappropriate SME being chosen for support.**<sup>59</sup>The *Al Qush Pastry Company* (Talkaif district) had not yet unpacked their

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<sup>57</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 49

<sup>58</sup>MISP V Data Annex, Table 49. Improvement is relative. Security, the economy and public service delivery in Ninewa all remain unstable and subject to shifts in the overall situation. Increasingly, the situation in Syria will be a factor affecting security and economic performance in the region.

<sup>59</sup> The *Al Qush Pastry Company* was not included in the cohort, while the *Shrafia Food Processing Company* was included. UNIDO advised that the Al Qush SME had previous business experience, which the evaluation could not verify. Two local women had been employed on a casual basis; whom the site inspection found did not have the qualifications to produce pastry and had only done a limited number of tasks. No qualified chef had been employed. While UNIDO reported some production and sale had occurred, the inspection found that this activity was limited and the sale had not been up to market standards.



equipment from the boxes, approximately four to six months after delivery. From site inspection, the SME had previously received equipment from the US military, but did not use that equipment as planned. The co-owners both had full time employment elsewhere, and were not dedicating the effort necessary to develop a business. They could not demonstrate that they intended to make appropriate use of the equipment in the near future, or that they had relevant past experience to develop such a business. The inspection concluded there was a risk that the equipment could be sold without use. The source of the problem appeared to be inadequate planning and inspection prior to approval of MISP V assistance, and inconsistent monitoring.

The site inspection found that the *Shrafia Food Processing Company* (Talkaif district) was operating, and had a good probability of being successful. However, the company had inadequate facilities, which affected operations and was an obstacle to becoming licensed. MISP V supported construction of business space on the second floor of a building owned by a Student Union. However, toilets and water were located on the first floor of a Student Union building and were shared, as was electricity. Site inspection found that the Student Union was not satisfied with the arrangement, and reluctant to share. As a result, the company did not have adequate facilities for hygiene, and its operations were constrained. Construction of an external stairway did not resolve the problem.<sup>60</sup>

#### 4.4 Equipment and rehabilitation of training centers

**Assessment of rehabilitation work and training equipment was done at the same time as the field survey.** From the original project, Euro 170,000 was allocated for rehabilitation of facilities and approximately Euro 1.5 million was allocated to the purchase of equipment. Combined, these accounted for approximately 50 percent of the MISP V project budget. UNIDO reported that assessments and work on Bill of Quantity (BoQ) was completed during fifth reporting period, ending November 2011. Purchase of equipment was on-going through 2010 and 2011.

##### **The field inspection noted the following:**

- a. *At the Women's Development Centre in Al Hamdaniya*, the computer laboratory, food processing kitchen, sewing workshop and generator were found in good working order and delivered according to specification. Equipment and materials were being used appropriately and being well maintained. The management of the centre expressed their satisfaction, for MISP V support and the quality of equipment received. Notwithstanding, management expressed concern that they did not have a sufficient number of sewing machines to properly run the courses (eight machines were on

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Regardless, equipment received from the project was not being used and the inspection concluded there was no evidence that the owners intended to make the necessary investments. No business activity was on-going. UNIDO was advised and looking into the matter.

<sup>60</sup> UNIDO advised that it was aware of the problem, but did not have additional funds to further upgrade facilities. UNIDO maintained that the owner could have invested part of the equipment as cost-sharing, which was done in several businesses. However, at inspection the owners did not appear to have funds.

site). Delivery was also affected by a rental disagreement with the landlord, which resulted in a temporary relocation of training activities into facilities that were not adequate for training.<sup>61</sup> The matter was resolved, but with disruption to the training.

- b. *The Ashur Industrial School* at Talkaif held computer, welding and general electric courses. Equipment had been received for the courses, and facilities were rehabilitated. Management expressed its satisfaction with the equipment through MISP V. Site inspection confirmed that the equipment had been delivered as per specification, installed, was in good working order and being maintained.
- c. *Inspection of the welding shop and rehabilitation works identified design flaws.* The equipment layout in the welding shop did not follow normal standards; the welding tables were not appropriately placed in the workshop and the work environment was smoky as the extraction fans had been installed into the windows. Welding tables should be close to the wall and a hood with an extracting fan should be placed directly overhead. This prevents smoke from spreading around in the workshop. Problems originate in the BoQ and building design. Concerns on this matter were expressed by course instructors during the site inspection.<sup>62</sup>
- d. *The Ninewa Vocational Training Centre (NVTC)* is located in one of the most deprived areas of Mosul. The area surrounding the NVTC is affected by a high incidence of insecurity and unemployment. Women in particular use the center to learn new skills. MISP V supplied NVTC with three workshops and a store, in addition to training equipment. Equipment for the computer laboratory, aluminum workshop and leather workshop appeared to be to be present, in good working order, being maintained and delivered according to specification.<sup>63</sup> Management expressed its strong satisfaction for the quality of materials received through MISP V.

MISP V built new workshops for aluminum fabrication and leather. The US Provincial Reconstruction Team Provincial Reconstruction Team provided the financing while UNIDO supplied the B&Q for the building. The building is an “I” beam steel structure with inverted “V” shape roof. The roof is made of corrugated sheets without insulation, while the walls are concrete block covered with cement plaster inside and outside. The building is considered as one of those “quick to build low cost buildings” with a concrete floor and galvanized corrugated sheet roof. Some concern was noted for the quality of

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<sup>61</sup> The WDV relocated two times during the project implementation. The first time, Peshmerga soldiers arrived and removed all equipment and put it in the street. They had a long-term (20+) year lease with the landlord who negated the contract. Related matters appeared to be resolved, and could not have been foreseen by the project.

<sup>62</sup> UNIDO maintains that the system of exhaust fans was adequate, and approved by qualified engineers. The evaluation team disagrees with UNIDO’s position.

<sup>63</sup> MISP V also supplied training equipment for: generator repair, autobody, welding (TIG/MIG), mobile phone repair, A/C Repair and vehicle diagnostics. All were new training subjects for the facility.

work and building design, which was not well suited to the climate in Mosul.<sup>64</sup> In addition, a spray booth for auto repair was added, fully funded and designed by the project. The booth structure was designed by UNIDO and fully funded by the project.

- e. *The Al- Hadbaa Centre* is located in the western side of the city of Mosul, in a highly populated and low income area. MISP V provided equipment for the welding, carpentry and sewing workshops, in addition to rehabilitation works. Equipment was found in good working order, according to specification and being maintained. The management expressed strong satisfaction on equipment quality. However, the inspection noted that carpentry equipment was designed for teaching and not professional or industrial use. As such, its practical application for beneficiaries was limited.<sup>65</sup>

General works for rehabilitation were found in good order, including for the workshops. The exception was for the welding workshop, where the extraction fans were insufficient. The fans were attached to windows, rather than overhead exhaust hoods. As a result, the workshop was not properly ventilated, and full of smoke. Building design, therefore, made the same error as at the *Ashur Industrial Training Centre*.

- f. *Mar Polis Church Services* is located in Quaraqush (Hamdaniya), and is a suitable building for training. The center is well located and some workshops were previously supplied by the American Army. Four types of courses were given at this center; first aid, leather work, generator repair and computer courses. MISP V participation was limited to providing the center with tools for the repair of generator, equipment for leather industry work and materials for First Aid. UNIDO also supported with sourcing some in-kind tool contributions from other sources, effectively leveraging MISP V's contribution. Nothing else was required or provided. MISP V goods were in good order, in use and appreciated by management.

Marpolis is an example where a small MISP V input was required to enable training. UNIDO managed the technical training element of the training programme. Other sources supplied the tools and toolkits, in coordination with the project. Instructors were either trained in-country or the positions were contracted out. The facility was a Church, was set up as a school and training facility after the May 2 2010 bombing of Christian students on way

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<sup>64</sup> The evaluation's site inspection found that the new structure was not "fit for purpose", given climate conditions and the requirements for work. UNIDO project management maintains that the structures perform their required functions.

<sup>65</sup> UNIDO noted that training equipment was procured as teaching equipment, as that was the main purpose of the project. Regardless, during site interviews, the management and instructors at the centre noted that they count on selling some of their work to generate income for the centre, and for the handicapped students. The tools were not suited for this purpose, and the centre was not able to fully utilise its facilities. The evaluation did not have information on whether this was discussed during the assessment process.

to Mosul. It is a non-state but has an institutional structure that will enable its sustainability.

- g. *The Beit Nahrain Society for Women* is an NGO located in Bartilla, a small town 23 Km. north of Mosul. Most of the inhabitants are Christian, and the society is for all women from all background and origins. The society offered Food Processing Courses. However, MISP V gave only a limited part of the equipment required, including a fridge, cooker, kitchen counters, pots and pans, food processor, two sun cell operating drying Ovens and scales and other kitchen accessories. MISP V did not supply the society with items such as fruit and vegetable drying oven or air extracting (Vacuum) machine used in packaging of food or vegetables.

Management was grateful for the equipment provided, and inspection confirmed it was in use and in good order. However, management also noted that lack of key processing equipment limited the training, and the ability of beneficiaries to subsequently engage in commercial or livelihood application. UNIDO confirmed that it did not provide a drying oven or air extracting (Vacuum) machine. Due to the costs, MISP V could only provide such machines to the Women's Development Centre, the largest women's association. Beit Nahrain and other centres did not have such equipment, which placed limits on their training capacity and market application of what beneficiaries learned.

- h. *The Municipal VTC (MVTC)* is operated by the Ninewa Governorate. It is located in a central part of Mosul, and easily accessible. The MVTC is used largely for the training Government officials, including as a requirement for their promotion. MISP V provided both training equipment for courses on generator repair and domestic electrical repair, in addition to rehabilitation works. Training equipment was found in good order, in use and being well maintained. Management expressed strong satisfaction for the quality of the equipment provided by MISP V, and did not identify any deficiencies. Rehabilitation works had been completed according to specification, and found in good order. No design or installation problems were identified.
- i. *The Talafar Cooperative* is located west of Mosul towards Syria. It is the second biggest town in Ninawa Governorate. Courses were given by Talafar Youth Centre and Talafar Cooperation, such as Sheep Wool Shearing and Olive Oil Extracting course. These courses were unique to Talafar, as there is a large number of sheep farms and wool industry. There are also olive trees and a market for oil extracting. An Oil Extracting Machine was supplied to Talafar Cooperation earlier by an US Provincial Recovery Team (the US Army Construction Team). The machine was installed at the location outside Talafar in discussion between the Coop and UNIDO. at the recommendation of the UNIDO representative. Rehabilitation work was done to prepare the house and build a bungalow for the generator and other goods.

The Talafar Cooperative was concerned that the location of the house and facilities were not appropriate. They are a significant distance from the growing areas, and the market. The cooperative believed that no producers

would bring olives to the facility, given the distance. In addition, the Cooperative is paying rent despite the fact that MISP V invested in rehabilitation.<sup>66</sup> The Cooperative does not own the building, and the ultimate beneficiary of the rehabilitation is the private owner of the property. Distance also makes the location inappropriate for training activities. The Cooperative proposed that a new site be found closer to olives trees farms and the equipment moved. In the meantime, the facility is not being used as foreseen given the poor location, and rehabilitation investments may be lost to the property owner.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> UNIDO and the evaluation field mission have different information on this point. UNIDO's position is that no rent has been paid since UNIDO collaboration with the Coop.

<sup>67</sup> UNIDO advised that the site was identified before MISP V became involved. UNIDO was informed that the site had been agreed upon by the Coop and the CTA carried out a site visit with the Coop manager. It is unclear from the documentation and interviews whether location was noted as a concern during this process.



## 5. MISP V evaluation findings

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### 5.1 Relevance of the MISP project

**Relevance is the extent to which MISP V was aligned with the strategic plans and priorities and policies of the key stakeholders;** the Government of Iraq, the Governorate of Ninewa, the United Nations and UNIDO's programme in Iraq. Relevance also considers whether the project addressed key issues in the project environment, and the extent that MISP V objectives are still valid.

**Relevance of the MISP V project was high.** Project design was relevant to priorities outlined in the Government of Iraq's *National Development Strategy* (2009), the Ninewa Governorate's *Strategic Plan* (2007), the United Nations *Iraq Assistance Strategy* (2008), UNIDO's own *Framework Strategy* for Iraq (2008) and to the programme context in Ninewa.<sup>68</sup> Project design was also relevant to the Ninewa Governorate's priority of extending training into under-served areas, based on the principle of equal access for all citizens regardless of their location and religious or ethnic background. In this regard, design relevance also had the potential to contribute to the legitimacy of the Iraq state, as a provider of basic public services.

**Stakeholder priorities, therefore, were given appropriate consideration in the design process.** Relevance was maintained over the full duration of the project, as economic diversification, private sector development, poverty reduction through employment and gender equality all remained key objectives of project stakeholders into the 2010 to 2014 strategic planning period, and beyond.

**Relevance of MISP V to the needs of the context in Ninewa was high.** The project correctly identified key needs in the Ninewa Governorate; employment and livelihood creation, promotion of private sector development through SMEs, strengthening human resources through skills training and building the capacity training institutions. MISP V effectively focused in conflict-affected and in low income geographic areas and communities, and on vulnerable populations. The relevance of working with non-state counterparts was also good, noting concerns for the sustainability of capacity development and investments and less robust beneficiary targeting (See section on Sustainability).

**The internal relevance and coherence of MISP V activities in relation to project objectives was good.** Activities were generally aligned with the project's development goal of increasing "the capability of rural and urban communities in this governorate to engage in viable non-farming enterprises, reducing dependency on relief aid and helping them to move towards sustainable livelihoods" (UNIDO 2009b). There was no significant deviation from objectives within the design of activities.

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<sup>68</sup> A matrix of stakeholder strategic objectives for the implementation period is included in Annex C.

## 5.2 Effectiveness of the MISV V project

**Effectiveness is the extent to which project objectives were achieved, or are likely to be achieved.** The Effectiveness of MISV V was good, assessed against its development goal and the objectives of Component 2 and Component 3. MISV V was less effective in attaining the objectives of project Component 1. Accomplishments were achieved under difficult circumstances, including but not limited to insecurity in the project environment and the inherent difficulty moving materials and personnel.

**Component 1: Enhanced capacities at the community level in support of socio-economic growth and peaceful coexistence by creating an environment for productive self-employment.**

MISV V was based on strong national ownership, and assessment of local market conditions and the situation of youth. The technical assessments were completed, and community-level capacity was strengthened to the extent that local training institutions were more effective. UNIDO also implemented a *Community Leadership Training* programme, in which 16 community leaders participated, and training programmes on *Executive Management and Leadership Training* for senior Governorate officials. UNIDO advises that these officials were involved in strategic planning activities, including the Governorate development plan.

Regardless, the *field study did not identify improvements to institution capacity resulting from MISV V*, understood as the ability to plan, implement and sustain training activities. The statement is based on the results of capacity-development activities and not on rehabilitation works or supply of equipment. No such achievements appear in the MISV V *Progress Reports*. The limitations on project monitoring may have been a factor contributing to this finding. The field survey also did not identify specific results from the *Community Leadership Training* programme, and no such achievements appear in *the MISV V Progress Report* for the relevant period (2011b).

**Long-term progress to building community training capacity will have limitations, given concerns for sustainability.** The majority of MISV V activities were implemented by state-owned institutions, including the two VTC centres. These are likely to continue with training programmes, and have been strengthened as a result of MISV V. However, there was no information on whether the Governorate will continue the “satellite strategy” approach, and support to non-state counterparts. These organisations generally appeared financially insecure and dependent on external funding, while most of the centres had a proven operational record, it was often unclear how they intend to finance future activities after scaling up with MISV V activities.

**Component 2: Sources of income and employment increased for 2,000 beneficiaries via locally relevant vocational training, provision of livelihoods enhancing**



**'toolkits' for individuals and the establishment of a number of high quality Production Groups in a variety of food and non-food micro-industries.**

**MISP V exceeded its beneficiary target of training for 2000 beneficiaries.** As of May 2012, 24 distinct vocational training courses were delivered at 18 locations in five Ninewa districts, to a total of 2146 beneficiaries. The final beneficiary number exceeded the MISP V target by seven percent, and included 788 females (36 percent, or four percent below target) and 1021 youth (47 percent and well above the 25 percent target) In addition, MISP V supported rehabilitation of 24 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME).

The beneficiaries were generally qualified to participate in the training, based on good application of selection criteria that targeted vulnerable groups. Some exceptions were noted at locations managed by the Ministry of Education (high schools). The target set of 40 percent women's participation in the training was almost met, with a four percent shortfall that the evaluation did not consider significant under prevailing conditions. In the case of youth, the MISP V target of 25 percent participation was exceeded by approximately 100 percent. In this regard, MISP V implementation complied with both its numerical targets, and achieved the desired beneficiary profile balancing gender and youth.

**MISP V met its objective of enabling livelihood and employment opportunities for beneficiaries.** Based on the beneficiary survey, the quality of training activities was good, and generally relevant to the requirements of entering the job market. The survey did identify some vocational areas in which beneficiaries were unlikely to find opportunity; Leather Work, Domestic Electrical and Computers among them. Also, sewing courses generated the lowest income levels. Notwithstanding, the beneficiary cohort surveyed showed: i) increased confidence that they would find employment; ii) an increase in their level of economic activity, including a decline in the level of unemployment; iii) The employment and livelihood opportunities found by many beneficiaries appeared more predictable, and at a higher level of skill and payment. Incomes in the survey cohort, therefore, tended to increase and be more stable, and; iv) an overall improvement in living standards, as perceived by both individual beneficiaries and in their households.

**Progress towards creating micro-enterprises was unclear,** notwithstanding support to SMEs. Beneficiaries reporting they went into business for themselves were usually referring to contract work as individuals, for example in generator or air-condition repair. MISP V did not provide support for the formation of micro-enterprises beyond the provision of tool kits, nor did such support appear to be available from the training institutions.

**Beneficiaries directly attributed positive changes in their situation to participation in MISP V,** while also acknowledging other improvements in the security and economic situation where enabling factors. Most significantly, data indicates that many beneficiaries had some form of economic activity prior to MISP V. However, there their opportunities and income potential were limited by low education and skill levels. The chance to improve skills had a positive impact, in moving some beneficiaries into higher skill and more stable positions.

This trend was limited by the short duration of MISP V training, which was sufficient only for basic proficiency in most of the vocational areas. Movement from training back into the job market and/or formation of SMEs was also hindered by the lack of post-course assistance or guidance.<sup>69</sup> These are requirements beyond what a limited duration project such as MISP V can provide, and responsibility sits with the overall vocational training and labour market systems.

**Tools kits were an important factor enabling beneficiaries to find opportunity.**

The kits were the largest single investment item in the MISP V budget. The majority of beneficiaries that received tool and found an economic opportunity attributed their success, at least in part, to the kits. However, an important minority were required to share the kits between two persons, and the arrangements appeared unrealistic. Many of these beneficiaries reported selling the kits, either from one beneficiary to another or in the market and splitting the proceeds. As a result, the effectiveness of tool kit distribution among these beneficiaries was reduced.

**Support to SMEs resulted in the strengthening of participating companies and increasing employment.**

The finding is notwithstanding difficulties experienced by two SMEs in the survey cohort, one of which was not eligible to receive support. Generally, SMEs showed a higher level of business activity and income and were better positioned to take advantage of improvements to the overall economy. Growth in business resulted in a creation of employment, with the large majority of positions being full time. Importantly, employment creation extended beyond immediate extended family networks and included recruitment from the general labour market. The majority of SME owners were also making their own investments in upgrading business facilities and infrastructure, with the effects of leveraging the MISP V contribution, further expanding operations and improving sustainability.

**The success of the training was based, in part, on MISP V capacity building initiatives.**

The training of Vocational Instructors under MISP V was assessed as being high quality, by the Instructors. In turn, the performance of the Instructors was also highly assessed by their host institutions and the beneficiaries. MISP V further expanded the curriculum of the host training institutions, by introducing new vocational areas and instruction capacity. Overall capacity development was hindered by the high turnover rate of Vocational Instructors at NGO training institutions, given their financial instability and dependence on external project funding.

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<sup>69</sup> UNIDO advised that each beneficiary was provided a short business management course following each round. Copies of the material were distributed to the facility as a resource. Names of beneficiaries are to be submitted to the governorate to follow-up and prioritize them for loans or further training. Beneficiaries also informed of local loan opportunities to further enhance micro-industry development. However, the evaluation did not identify any direct results from these actions, nor were they identified by beneficiaries in the survey process as enabling employment.

**Component 3: A minimum of 500 youth are provided with marketable skills to enable them to obtain jobs and/or start up an economic activity to sustain livelihoods for themselves.**

**MISP V exceeded its youth target by approximately 100 percent;** actual youth enrolment approached was 47 percent of the total beneficiary cohort, compared to the 25 percent target set in the original results matrix. The shift in beneficiary profile appeared to respond to the demographic and labour market demands; Ninewa has a high youth population and significantly higher levels of youth unemployment. The performance of youth in finding employment and livelihood opportunity was consistent with the overall beneficiary cohort. Course design was supported with assessment of the situation of youth and opportunities in the labour market.

**Training equipment expanded the organisational capacity of the centres, and range of courses they can offer.** The equipment was generally found in good working order, delivered or installed to specification and of good quality. It was being used appropriately and maintained. New equipment use appeared to be effectively reinforced with training for instructors, and with rehabilitation work. There were punctual concerns some deficiencies in the equipment package (*Beit Nahrain Society for Women*), and for the location of facilities (*Talafar olive oil*). Some of the equipment supplied to the training centers is for teaching and has limited practical use (*Al- Hadbaa Centre*).

**MISP V rehabilitation work expanded the capacity of the centers, and range of courses they can offer.** As with the equipment, rehabilitation works were generally found to be delivered according to specification, of good quality and being appropriately used and maintained. There were some punctual exceptions; the potential loss of rehabilitation investments at the *Talafar Olive Oil* cooperative and design problems with the welding workshops (no hood exhaust fans result in a smoky and contaminated work environment). Also, design the workshops at the *Ninewa Vocational Training Centre* was not optimal, given climate.

### 5.3 Efficiency of project implementation

**The overall efficiency of MISP V was good.** The budget was properly aligned to focus resource allocation on activities. There are examples of the project leveraging its own financial and material resources with resources from other sources and stakeholders, including from American project assets handed. There was no evidence of synergies with other UNIDO programme streams in Iraq. Overall, funds have been effectively used for the intended purposes and the project implementation structure has worked well (Steering Committee and Project Management Unit).

**Effectiveness was undermined by two factors, both of which contributed to implementation delays.** First early difficulties with MISP V governance contributed to start-up delays, during late 2009 and the first half of 2010. In November 2009, UNIDO sent a communication to the Ninewa Governor's Office, informing the Governor the MISP V was ready to commence. At that time, UNIDO requested the Governor nominate representatives from both the

Governor's Office and from the Ninewa Provincial Council, to participate in project governance and technical support. However, working relations within the *Technical Working Group* between representatives of Ninewa Provincial Council and the Governor's Office were problematic. From interviews, the source appeared to be larger political tensions between the Provincial Council and the Governor's Office. Interviews also suggest that Council representatives attempted to influence resource allocation according to political objectives.

Several efforts to resolve the situation were unsuccessful, leading to a *High Level Committee* being formed and convened in July 2010, at UNIDO's request. The Committee was a high level intervention specifically intended to address governance problems, and to reaffirm the Governorate's commitment. The Governor replaced some of his representatives on the *Project Steering Committee*. Further, the responsibilities *Technical Working Group* were transferred to the *Project Steering Committee*. UNIDO, therefore, acted promptly and at a high level resolve project governance problems, and efficiency increased as a result. However, UNIDO's incomplete understanding of institutional and political dynamics in the Ninewa Governorate was a contributing factor behind the original problem.

**Second, original project design was based on an inaccurate assumption that security conditions would improve.** While there was a reduction in the absolute number of security incidents after 2008/9, the overall situation remained volatile. Effectively, there was only limited improvement in the operational conditions for MISP V. UNIDO maintained an international presence in Mosul for short missions until April 2011, at which point the United Nations chose to evacuate international personnel. Prior to evacuation UNIDO personnel, who used the American Forward Operating Base to carry out field missions, had severe restrictions on movement. They visited project sites under military escort. Even while in Mosul, therefore, international personnel had restricted access to project stakeholders, activities and its own national staff.

UNIDO had a proven system for national management of project activities after evacuation. Regardless, inaccurate security assumptions were embedded into project design; inefficiency occurred not because insecurity existed in the project environment but because design that did not take measures to mitigate risk. They were inherent in the decision to spread implementation over a large geographic area, with a large number of counterparts and requirement to move goods and personnel.<sup>70</sup> With many years of experience in Iraq by 2009, UNIDO should have been in a position to conduct a proper risk assessment, as there were already clear indicators that security improvements would be relative.

Regarding design, the project was thinly spread over a large geographic area, with multiple project locations and activities. The design did not take into consideration the risk to movement of personnel and materials, or possible delays and costs that would result from insecure conditions. All information sources (interviews, observation, progress reporting and the *Mid-Term Evaluation*)

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<sup>70</sup> The argument is not whether the project objectives were correct, but that design and implementation timelines should be realistic and reflect field conditions.

subsequently identify insecurity as the primary source of delays and ineffectiveness. Such risk should have been identified and mitigated in the design process and reflected in the project strategy (concentration of resources in fewer locations).

## 5.4 Ownership

**The project showed a high level of ownership.** Ownership was initially undermined, by the ineffective working relationship between representatives of the Ninewa Provincial Council and Governor's Office during project inception. It was strengthened through adjustments to governance design, formation of the *High Level Coordinating Committee* and an active *Project Steering Committee*. Iraqi stakeholders were fully engaged in the governance and implementation processes, including on substantive and technical matters and in strategic-level decision making. UNIDO personnel generally maintained good relationships with implementing counterparts at the institutional level.

## 5.5 Crosscutting issues (gender)

**MISP V made an important investment towards improving the situation of women, including female youth.** Project design in this regard was consistent with the four earlier iterations of the MISP project model. Data generated during project design, recruitment and during the evaluation identify the importance of UNIDO and stakeholder commitment to gender equality. Women have significantly lower levels of labour market participation. Those seeking employment have difficulty entering the labour market; they have higher levels of unemployment, fewer professional options and training opportunities. In addition, working women earn less than men in the same beneficiary cohort.

In response, MISP V specifically targeted women as beneficiaries, worked with several organisations dedicated to women's training and developed both home and market-based courses. Thirty-six percent of beneficiaries were female and survey data found a 30 percent decline in the number of women reporting they had no source of income and an increase in the earnings among those women that found opportunities.

**These achievements notwithstanding, MISP V's commitment to equality was not supported by an assessment of the situation of women in Ninewa, or strategy for improving livelihood opportunities and market entry.** The evaluation noted that MISP V invested in such an assessment on the situation of youth. Training options were limited to four courses, three of which had the lowest income potential (sewing, leather and computers). As with other MISP iterations, the majority of female beneficiaries enrolled in sewing, which had the lowest income possibility. In this regard, MISP V's commitment to equality was not supported by a specific gender strategy, expansion of training options or strategy for market entry.

## 5.6 Prospects for sustainability

**Sustainability of MISP V achievements appeared mixed.** Work with the seven state-owned counterparts appeared to have a high probability of sustainability, particularly for the two vocational training centres that receive the largest support. The state appeared committed to maintaining some form of training activities, MISP V rehabilitation and equipment is being maintained and instructors have more secure employment. Curriculum is also being used, and developed.

**In this regard, on-going support for state institutions has a good probability of ensuring training activities will continue, in some form.** Investment served to strengthen public institutions, and was linked into the broader social service delivery system of MOLSA and the Governorate. The ties allowed the possibility of more coherent service delivery into the labour market in the future (linking MOLSA services related to employment to training opportunity).

**The work done through non-state organisations has a lower probability of being sustained.** MISP V made significantly lower investments in building up these locations, and their funding base often appeared insecure. Some exceptions were noted, such as in Marpolis, where the centre has institutional support from a religious organisation. However, the strategy for rapid scale-up of training delivery and access through the satellite strategy did not come with a medium-term commitment to sustain works, from MISP V, the Governorate or other source to maintain funding. By themselves, these organisations have limited capacity to continue training after support is completed.

**The main factor was affecting sustainability, therefore, was the decision to work through a combination of state and non-state counterparts.** The design choice was made based on stakeholder analysis that the combination offered the greatest possibility for rapid expansion and access to training opportunities. Also, it offered the greatest possibility for reaching under-serviced areas where state systems have not been able to expand, either as a result of resource constraints, conflict dynamics or other cultural considerations. However, the strategy had a short-term focus, and there was no evidence of state commitment to sustain the “satellite” approach.

**MISP V, therefore, had an embedded tension between rapid expansion of service access and sustainability that was not resolved;** sustainability outside of state institutions was effectively not built into the project design. The tension is characteristic of “recovery” oriented projects, where rapid delivery of goods to stabilisation a situation may be more important than sustainability considerations. However, this approach is now less relevant to the Iraqi context.

## 6. Conclusions and recommendations

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### 6.1 Conclusions

Iraq is moving out of a “recovery” to a “development” context. Insecurity and political uncertainty are likely to remain concerns into the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding, Iraq now has an established government and sufficient income to be classified as a low-middle income state. There has been a significant reduction of international assistance to Iraq, as former donors move from humanitarian and recovery assistance to strengthening commercial relations. The underlying assumption is that the Iraqi has sufficient income to pay for its own development. At the same time, there is still a significant need for international cooperation around forms of technical assistance.

Economic diversification, promoting growth in the private sector and labour market development have emerged as core Government priorities. Their importance will grow given two trends: i) the continuing expansion of Iraq’s public sector and increasing concentration of economic activity in the oil sector, and; ii) weakness in Iraq’s labour market, for the human resources need to achieve diversification and the weak linkage between the current vocational training system and labour market development.

Within these trends, the Iraqi labour market will have a human resource deficit into the future, which is a constraint on both economic and human development. UNIDO support to the vocational training system is both relevant and appreciated by the Iraqi Government, and can be revised and expanded. There are also opportunities to link training into private sector initiatives. Expansion of Government revenue should mean there are opportunities for national funding and less reliance on declining international assistance.

Some core objectives of the MISP model remain highly relevant, and can be adapted to the new Iraqi context. However, the model will require important revisions to ensure continuing relevance. These changes would position UNIDO to shift focus from recovery-oriented provision of short-term training to vulnerable population groups to: i) greater engagement with labour market development, and; ii) strengthening the relevance and capacity of the vocational training system as a key input to Iraq’s human resource development.

### 6.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations are intended to support the evolution of the MISP model:

1. UNIDO should conduct an internal review of the requirements for labour market and private sector development in Iraq. The review should be designed to identify what elements of the MISP project model are relevant to the emerging context, and to the priorities of Government. The review should also be

conducted as part of overall strategic planning for UNIDO's positioning in Iraq, taking into consideration and reinforcing the objectives of UNIDO's contribution to private sector development and transition in Iraq's State Owned Enterprise sector.

2. To ensure highest value added from its technical assistance, UNIDO should move out of direct implementation of vocational training activities and into both upstream and downstream contributions. Based on the experience of the MISP project model, these might include:
  - a. Favours vulnerable groups in targeting but generally moving away short-term training delivered in a "humanitarian" or "recovery" framework. These contributions are less relevant to the emerging Iraqi context. Evaluations find that providing a month of training is sufficient for only basic proficiency in a vocational area, and has limited long-term livelihood potential.
  - b. Labour market assessments conducted with the VTCs to identify both viable economic sectors for private sector development, the human resource requirements within the market and the appropriate training packages. The objective would be to align the VTC system more closely to the requirements and dynamics of the market, and to the needs of Iraq's economic diversification strategy.
  - c. Measures to strengthen the VTC system focused less on the delivery of material goods to individual VTC locations and more at the level of Governorate or national systems, as appropriate. UNIDO has already demonstrated its ability to provide technical assistance to upgrading Instructor knowledge and skill, opening new vocational areas and developing curriculum. There is an opportunity to work at an institutional level in these and other areas, based on market assessments.
  - d. Measures to link training to actual job placement, further skills upgrading or other opportunities.
3. NGOs can be effective partners for the delivery of vocational activities, and to complement the MOLSA system. However, there is an implicit trade-off between support to NGOs and sustainability, and investment in building the capacity of NGOs as vocational training centres has a lower possibility of being sustained without on-going state or other institutional support. In a "development" context, UNIDO should focus on expanding the state vocational training system, including into under-served communities. Working through the state system has a higher probability of being sustained, strengthens overall service delivery and provides better linkage into social service delivery programmes, such as those targeting unemployed persons. In the future, if UNIDO chooses to collaborate with NGO counterparts, the NGOs should be under MOLSA supervision and there should be clarity on how NGO participation strengthens state capacity.
4. Gender is an area where UNIDO can make a significant future contribution. However, progress towards expanding women's participation in the labour force and improving livelihood opportunities require a dedicated gender assessment and strategy. The current MISP project model has important gender-



based objectives and targets, but is not based on such assessment. Focus should be placed on non-traditional areas of employment and activity, including those with a higher income potential. This will require some innovation identifying new livelihood options within Iraq's cultural context, and the support of Iraqi counterparts.

5. Important elements of general project design require revision and strengthening. Specifically:
  - a. The overall quality of projects' result matrixes must be strengthened, to show a clear *Theory of Change*, causal chain and indicators.
  - b. Supported by improvements to the results matrix, project monitoring and reporting should give greater emphasis gather data and analysis at the output and outcome level, and be less activity-focused.
  - c. Project design must be based on robust risk analysis and mitigation. The challenges related to insecurity and political uncertainties are well understood by UNIDO and its counterparts and can be expected to exist into the foreseeable future. Project must be based on related assumptions, with risks and mitigation measures built into realistic designs. As one measure, this may lead to a reduction in the complexity of project design.
  - d. Regarding risk assessment, insecurity is likely to remain in the Iraq programme context, at least over the medium-term. Insecurity does not need to deter UNIDO from working in Iraq. On the contrary, UNIDO's ability to deliver should be a core comparative advantage. However, projects must be designed to accurately reflect conditions and mitigate the risk to implementation performance, personnel and materials; insecurity should be identified as a design issue and addressed accordingly. With almost ten years of operating experience in Iraq, it should no longer be acceptable to identify insecurity as a project "constraint".

# Annexes

## Annex A: Terms of Reference

### Terms of Reference

#### Independent Final Evaluation of the UNIDO Project

#### ***“Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery - Ninewa Governorate of Iraq”***

**Project numbers: TE/IRQ/09/008, TE/IRQ/09/A08, TE/IRQ/09/B08<sup>71</sup>  
Period covered: 2009-2012<sup>72</sup>**

### **I. GENERAL BACKGROUND**

Since 1980, Iraq has been embroiled in long-running geo-political disputes and conflicts that have significantly reversed her earlier human development gains. Since then, Iraq’s human and economic development indicators have fallen from some of the highest in the region to some of the lowest. The conflicts have furthermore caused enormous social, cultural and economic harm. The country has suffered significantly from the neglect and degradation of its infrastructure, environment, and social services.

The political milestones achieved to date in Iraq have not as yet had the anticipated degree of impact on the quality of life for the general population. There remain continuing challenges in terms of provision of basic services, rule of law, human rights, and transparency and accountability within governmental institutions and policies, as well as the overall transformation of the country towards democracy and economic development. This is particularly the case of Ninewa, one of the poorest governorates in the country.

Ninewa Governorate is characterized by slow social progress and economic recovery. Most of the population has neither access to basic services or sustainable sources of income. Poverty levels remain high reflected by statistics that, on average, 26% of residents are in the lowest per capita income quintile (the average for whole Iraq is 20%).<sup>73</sup> These numbers, however, differ enormously between different districts in the Governorate; for Telafar for example it is as high as 58.2%.<sup>74</sup> The rate of unemployment in some districts is as high as 62% for females and 33% for males.<sup>75</sup> Unemployment among youth is also especially high and there are

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<sup>71</sup> Sub-projects TE/IRQ/09/A08 and TE/IRQ/09/B08 established for financial administrative purposes to record contributions received in 2010 and 2011. TE/IRQ/09/008 will only cover 2009 contributions, since donor does not allow rephrasing of unspent balances. Separate sub-projects were established to record each year’s contributions. (UNIDO Infobase)

<sup>72</sup> Initially, the project had been approved for a period of 24 months until November 2011. This initial duration has been extended until September 2012.

<sup>73</sup> Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (<http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/477/GP-Ninewa.pdf>), 2011.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> WFP 2007.

reports of insurgents targeting unemployed youth for recruitment. There are approximately 20,000 internally displaced households in Ninewa of which only 20% have one or more family members employed. The remaining 80% of households have no means of steady income generation.<sup>76</sup>

Livelihoods are predominantly based on agriculture: vegetables and grains in small farms, rain fed farming or livestock.<sup>77</sup> However, agricultural productivity has dramatically declined in recent years due to the war and factors limiting productivity such as the scarcity of inputs and the limited capacity of farmers to save and finance their enterprises. Lack of efficient post harvest system and food processing industries have created disincentive for improved agricultural production and productivity. In addition, much of the harvest is wasted because of a lack of basic post-harvesting equipment, improper storage and transport means, and the collapse of the marketing infrastructure. All these factors are exacerbating the situation in terms of poverty, food insecurity and migration outflows.

Existing training institutions have difficulty in providing their services effectively and efficiently due to a lack of trained manpower and poorly-equipped training facilities. The young make up a large portion of the population that has been most seriously affected by these deficiencies and are increasingly dissatisfied with lack and quality of training, and employment opportunities in their home-areas. This segment of the population lacks both the marketable skills/knowledge and the funds to initiate any kind of income-generating activity such as trading or the provision of services.

## II. PROJECT BACKGROUND

Initially, a project document for an intervention in Ninewa had been signed in October 2007 and was to be carried out in 2008 and 2009 (“Support for Job Creation and Self-Employment through Promotion of Micro Industries in Ninewa Governorate of Iraq (MISP IV)<sup>78</sup>”). Due to the deteriorating security situation in Ninewa, FAO/UNIDO and the Government of Iraq decided in spring 2008 to transfer the project to the Al-Anbar Governorate. Subsequently, a new project document for a project in Ninewa was signed in May 2009 with the following title: “Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery – Ninewa Governorate of Iraq (MISP V)”.

MISP V is the fifth in a series of similar UNIDO projects in Iraq. Previously called “Community Livelihoods and Micro Industry Support Projects (CLARIS)”, the project name was changed for CLARIS III onwards to “Job Creation through Cottage and Micro Industries Promotion” (MISP). The first CLARIS/MISP project has been implemented in the Thi-Qar governorate in South Iraq, the second in the Erbil and Suleiymaniyah governorates of Northern Iraq, the third in the Qadissiya Governorate and the fourth in the Al-Anbar Governorate. The project in the South has been evaluated in 2007, the one in North Iraq in spring 2009, the one in Qadessiya in spring 2010 and the one in Al-Anbar Governorate in 2011.<sup>79</sup> In addition to these projects, a MISP I -follow-up project focussing on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been implemented in the Thi Qar Governorate between 2008 and 2011 (“Micro-Enterprises for Reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons in Thi Qar Governorate”) and has been evaluated in 2011.

The basic project philosophy of MISP is to increase the capability of poor and marginalized war-affected communities to engage in economically viable small-scale

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<sup>76</sup> IOM 2008.

<sup>77</sup> Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (<http://www.iauiiraq.org/documents/477/GP-Ninewa.pdf>), 2011.

<sup>78</sup> MISP= Micro-Industry Support Programme

<sup>79</sup> Evaluations available from the UNIDO website.

productive activities in order to generate income and increase employment figures. The main levers in order to achieve this objective are technical and business management trainings provided in cooperation with existing vocational training centres and the delivery of technical tools (“toolbox”) and basic technical equipment to the successful trainees. Furthermore, the approach involves a certain amount of rehabilitation or upgrading of vocational training centres; training of trainers and the production of training material.

In spring 2010 the UNIDO Evaluation Group conducted a “thematic evaluation” of UNIDO projects in “post-crisis” environments. This thematic evaluation was based on a sample of 10 UNIDO projects and a number of project evaluations, among which MISP I and MISP II. The present evaluation should build upon the findings and lessons learned from the four MISP, the ‘Thi Qar IDP’ and the thematic evaluation. It should furthermore use a methodology that would allow for cross-cutting comparisons and build upon Chapter 6 of the MISP IV evaluation report comparing the evaluation of MISP I – IV.<sup>80</sup>

A major commonality of all MISP projects are adverse conditions, including security problems, which have led to periods of partial or total implementation standstill. According to UN security rules, international experts and UN officials are not allowed to enter into the areas of implementation. This restriction is a major challenge for any international evaluation and will influence the design and implementation of the present evaluation.

### III. PROJECT INFORMATION

The project pursues the promotion of self-employment and job creation in micro-enterprise industries in the Ninewa Governorate. The geographical focus is on the districts of Mosul, Sinjar, Talafar, Talqaif and Al-Hamdaniya.<sup>81</sup>

The expected outcomes (immediate objectives), of the project are to:

1. Provide targeted communities with the capacity to plan and manage their development activities and restore a functional base for economic growth and social peace.
2. Improve the livelihood of approximately 2,000 beneficiaries living in the project area through strengthening their productive capacities in post-harvest and other income-generating activities.
3. Enable large number of youth who have been deprived by the conflict to gain basic knowledge in new productive income generating skills through practical experiences and activity-based learning.

The expected outputs are the following:

1. Enhanced capacities at the community level in support of socio-economic growth and peaceful coexistence by creating an environment for productive self-employment.

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<sup>80</sup> MISP IV Evaluation Report, pp. 47.

<sup>81</sup> See Annex 3.

2. Sources of income and employment increased for 2,000 beneficiaries via locally relevant vocational training, provision of livelihoods enhancing 'toolkits' for individuals and the establishment of a number of high quality Production Groups in a variety of food (fruit and vegetable processing, etc.) and non-food micro-industries (welding, vehicle mechanics, woodwork, construction, electronics, tailoring, etc.).
3. A minimum of 500 youth (out of the total beneficiaries) are provided with marketable skills to enable them to obtain jobs and/or start-up an economic activity to sustain livelihoods for themselves and their families.

Furthermore, the goal for women beneficiaries has been set at 700 during the first PSC meeting in May 2010.

According to the Progress Report 4 (January to June 2011), the project pursues to offer trainings in 18 different training centres in the 5 core districts in Ninewa and is expected to deliver trainings in generator repair, leatherwork, autobody repair, woodwork, auto mechanic, welding, air conditioning repair, mobile phone repair, aluminium fabrication, computer networking, IT software applications, sewing, vehicle diagnostics, domestic electric wiring, domestic plumbing, satellite TV installation, food processing, fruit and vegetable drying, computer applications, AUTOCAD programming, industrial first aid, sheep shearing, olive pickling, wool processing, building construction and carpentry construction.<sup>82</sup> Trainings perceived as "appropriate for women" in the Ninewa Governorate are Sewing, Fruit & Vegetable Pickling, Bread & Pastry, Computer, Dairy, Bee Keeping, Olive Pickling and Soap Making as decided during the first PSC Meeting in May 2010.

According to the Progress Reports, UNIDO's direct partners for the implementation of the project are the Ministries of Planning and Development Cooperation (MOPDC) and of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA). Collaborating Partners are the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, the Ninewa Provincial Council and the Governor's Office (Ninewa).

The project is implemented by UNIDO. It is managed through a Field Coordination Unit (FCU), which is responsible for the day-to-day implementation and coordination of project activities. The FCU reports to the Project Management Unit (PMU) at the UNIDO-Iraq Country Programme Office in Amman. The PMU is headed by a Chief Technical Adviser (CTA). According to the mid-term evaluation, "project stakeholders are organized in a Project Steering Committee (PSC) that meets regularly to discuss project activities, decisions to be made and address issues or constraints faced by the project. Furthermore, to help further facilitate the coordination of project decision making and overall strategic direction, the PMU has also operationalized a High Level Coordination Committee (HLCC). The committee includes the Governor of Ninewa, the Deputy Minister of MoLSA, and the UNIDO-Iraq Chief Technical Advisor. Another important mechanism used by the PMU to address technical matters related to the project is the Technical Working Group (TWG). The TWG has been designed to advise the FCU and PMU on effective field level implementation modalities in support of activities for the training of project beneficiaries, rehabilitation of training facilities, guidance on technical specifications and equipment requirements, upgrading training curriculum, and the development of micro-enterprises in project targeted areas."<sup>83</sup> At headquarters, the project manager, operations officer and technical backstopping officer are assigned to coordinate the overall planning and

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<sup>82</sup> See Annex 3.

<sup>83</sup> Mid-term evaluation, p.12-13.

implementation the project. Short-term international and national consultants are recruited for specific activities.

The project receives its funding by the Government of Germany. Initially, the project had been approved for a period of 24 months until November 2011. This initial duration has been extended until September 2012.

#### IV. MID-TERM EVALUATION

In the first half of 2011, a mid-term evaluation was conducted. The evaluator carried out a “desk review by examining the wide selection of written sources that document project design and execution, including the Project Document (May 2009); the Inception Report (December 2009); three Project Progress Reports (November-December 2009, first and second half of 2010); three monthly reports (January, February and March 2011); the Minutes of Meeting for the Technical Working Group (TWG), Project Steering Committee (PSC) and High Level Coordination Committee (HLCC); beneficiary selection forms; and various reports on production group assessment, training programmes for trainers and Community Leaders, budget and procurement status.”<sup>84</sup>

The report concludes with the following two recommendations:

**“Recommendation 1:** In terms of project design, extending the length of training per trainee should be considered, especially in the more complex vocational subjects such as welding, aluminium fabrication and electrical wiring, to increase the trainees chances of finding employment or becoming self-employed. The same applies to the ToT component of MIS V. As noted by the training provider for ToT, following the completion of training many trainees still require further formal training, supervision and guidance to reach appropriate levels of competency. It is vital that these trainees – soon-to-be trainers – are adequately instructed since they are supposed to become the core cadre of vocational training technicians that will contribute to capacity building in the governorate by enhancing skills of beneficiaries and promoting micro- and small-scale enterprises. Similarly, support for some of the weaker training centres might have to be continued beyond the current implementation period to ensure a greater sustainability of project outcomes.

**Recommendation 2:** Taking into account project constraints to date, where timely implementation of initiatives, feedback from the field and project coordination continue to be affected by the security situation, extending the implementation period of MIS V – not necessarily the project budget – should be strongly considered to ensure that adequate time is allocated for training beneficiaries, providing start-up capital to successful trainees and small-scale entrepreneurs, linking the targeted communities to markets and facilitating access to finance. Monitoring community organisation and project impact on productivity, income, employment opportunities and social activities, evaluating the effectiveness of capacity building interventions and taking corrective measures where necessary, are all essential activities that require sufficient time before project completion, as they contribute to the success and sustainability of MIS V and any subsequent UNIDO micro-industry support programme.”

In this regard, the present evaluation should build upon the findings of the mid-term evaluation and should in particular assess whether the above-mentioned recommendations were taken into account for the period following the evaluation.

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<sup>84</sup> Mid-term evaluation, p. 7.

## V. PROJECT BUDGET

Total Allotment

Government of Germany EUR 3,595,321

## VI. EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the:

1. Project relevance with regard to the priorities and policies of the Government of Iraq, the UNDG ITF and UNIDO;
2. Project effectiveness in terms of the outputs produced and outcomes achieved as compared to those planned;
3. Efficiency of implementation: quantity, quality, cost and timeliness of UNIDO and counterpart inputs and activities;
4. Prospects for development impact;
5. Long-term sustainability of the support mechanisms results and benefits;

The evaluation should provide the necessary analytical basis and make recommendations to the Government, to the donor and to UNIDO for the closure of the project and for ensuring its sustainability. The evaluation should also draw lessons of wider applicability for the replication of the experience gained in this project in other projects.

## VII. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation will be carried out in keeping with agreed evaluation standards and requirements. More specifically it will fully respect the principles laid down in the “UN Norms and Standards for Evaluation” and Evaluation Policies of UNIDO.<sup>85</sup> The evaluation shall determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, achievements (outputs, prospects for achieving expected outcomes and impact) and sustainability of the project. To this end, the evaluation will assess the achievements of the project against its key objectives, as set out in the project document and the inception report, including a review of the relevance of the objectives and of the design. It will also identify factors that have facilitated or impeded the achievement of the objectives.

While maintaining independence, the evaluation will be carried out based on a participatory approach, which seeks the views and assessments of all parties. It will address the following issues:

### Project identification and formulation:

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<sup>85</sup> All documents available from the websites of the UN Evaluation Group: <http://www.uneval.org/>

- The extent to which a participatory project identification process was applied in selecting problem areas and counterparts requiring technical cooperation support;
- Relevance of the project to development priorities and needs;
- Clarity and realism of the project's development and immediate objectives, including specification of targets and identification of beneficiaries and prospects for sustainability.
- Clarity and logical consistency between, inputs, activities, outputs and progress towards achievement of objectives (quality, quantity and time-frame);
- Realism and clarity in the specification of prior obligations and prerequisites (assumptions and risks);
- Realism and clarity of external institutional relationships, and in the managerial and institutional framework for implementation and the work plan;
- Likely cost-effectiveness of the project design.

#### Project ownership:

- The extent to which the project was formulated with the participation of the national counterpart and/or target beneficiaries;
- The extent to which counterparts have been appropriately involved and have been participating in the identification of their critical problem areas, in the development of technical cooperation strategies and in the implementation of the project approach
- The extent to which counterpart contributions and other inputs have been received from the Government (including Governorates) as compared to the project document work plan, and the extent to which the project's follow-up is integrated into Government budgets and workplans.

#### Project coordination and management:

- The extent to which the national management and overall field coordination mechanisms of the project have been efficient and effective;
- The extent to which the UNIDO based management, coordination, quality control and input delivery mechanisms have been efficient and effective;
- The extent to which monitoring and self-evaluation have been carried out effectively, based on indicators for outputs, outcomes and objectives and using that information for project steering and adaptive management;
- The extent to which changes in planning documents during implementation have been approved and documented;
- The extent to which coordination envisaged with any other development cooperation programmes in the country has been realized and benefits achieved.
- The extent to which synergy benefits can be found in relation to other UNIDO and UN activities in the country.

#### Efficiency of Implementation:

Efficiency and adequacy of project implementation including: availability of funds as compared with the provisional budget (donor and national contribution); the quality and timeliness of inputs delivered by UNIDO (expertise, training, equipment, methodologies, etc.) and the Government as compared to the work plan(s); managerial and work efficiency; implementation difficulties; adequacy of monitoring and reporting; the extent of national support and commitment and the quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by UNIDO.

#### Effectiveness and Project Results:



Full and systematic assessment of outputs produced to date (quantity and quality as compared with work plan and progress towards achieving the immediate objectives); The quality of the outputs produced and how the target beneficiaries use these outputs, with particular attention to gender aspects; the outcomes, which have occurred or which are likely to happen through utilization of outputs. In particular, this includes an analysis of the likely effects of micro-enterprise industry activities as a means of creating employment and raising household incomes.

Prospects to achieve expected outcomes, impact and sustainability:

Prospects to achieve the expected outcomes and impact and prospects for sustaining the project's results by the beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the project, and identification of developmental changes (economic, environmental, social) that are likely to occur as a result of the intervention, and how far they are sustainable.

Cost-effectiveness of the Project

Assess whether the project approach represented the best use of given resources for achieving the planned objectives.

Recommendations for a possible next project phase, or replication elsewhere

Based on the above analysis the evaluators will draw specific conclusions and make proposals for any necessary further action by Government and/or UNIDO and/or the UN or other donors to ensure sustainable development, including any need for additional assistance and activities of the project prior to its completion. The mission will draw attention to any lessons of general interest. Any proposal for further assistance should include precise specification of objectives and the major suggested outputs and inputs.

*VIII. EVALUATION TIMING AND MAIN TASKS*

The evaluation is scheduled to take place between April and July 2012.

**Tentative schedule for the evaluation:**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Activities</b>
April 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultation phase: desk study of available documents and meetings with project personnel in the field; participation of the team leader and national evaluator in the PSC meeting in Istanbul (tentatively 24/25 April 2012) → writing of a detailed evaluation plan and concept</li> </ul>
May 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Design and conduction of surveys among beneficiaries</li> </ul>
June 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation mission</li> </ul>
July 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Drafting of evaluation report, incorporation of comments and completion of the final report</li> </ul>

The evaluation will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information, including desk analysis, field visits, survey data, and interviews with counterparts, beneficiaries, donor representatives, programme managers and through the cross-validation of data. In view of the particular aspects of this evaluation particular attention will be given to the elaboration of a strategy for field surveys, the elaboration and test of questionnaires and the implementation of the surveys in line with agreed professional and impartiality standards.

The evaluation will encompass the following main tasks:

1. During a first consultation phase the evaluation team should do a desk study of available documents and meet project personnel in the field in order to become acquainted with the project. On the basis of this, the evaluation team shall produce an evaluation plan that sets out in a detailed manner the concept and schedule for the actual evaluation. That plan shall include a definition of the evaluation methodology with a catalogue of project specific evaluation questions, to which the evaluation should provide answers; this methodology will have to be discussed and agreed within the evaluation unit of UNIDO;
2. Organization of a kick-off meeting in Istanbul during a PSC meeting (tentatively on 24-25 April), involving national and international project staff, counterpart representatives and the international and national evaluator; the evaluators will conduct interviews among project staff and stakeholders;
3. Analytical review of the economic, political and security conditions in the region of intervention (drawing on information received from policy makers, and also other UN Organizations and providers of technical assistance in Iraq and in the region, e.g. ) and assessment of the relevance, needs orientation and realism of the project design and implementation (gathering information from project stakeholders and private sector players in the region);
4. Design and execution of a survey on the capabilities of the trainers; this survey shall assess *inter alia*: the profile of the trainers and whether their professional qualification and experience are appropriate with a view to empowering vulnerable and marginalized groups to engage in income creation; whether the quality of the training of trainers (TOT) they received has been adequate; how many beneficiaries they have trained; under which conditions these trainings occurred; whether there have been follow-up activities (coaching); and how trainers assess the success of the trainings; this survey would address at least 50% of the trainers who received training under the project;
5. Design and execution of a survey among trainees; this survey would address a representative sample of at least 10% of trainees, if possible more; this survey shall assess *inter alia*: the profile of the trainees and to what extent the selection of trainees matches the objectives of the project to support vulnerable and marginalized groups; the quality of the training and of the equipment received and whether these inputs are perceived as adequate with a view to empowering the target groups to engage in income creation; the status of the income creation activities of the trainees (self employment; business creation; employment in existing companies); the impact of the project on their income and living conditions;
6. On-site visits of various project sites (vocational training centres; alternative training providers; interviews with project partners from the public and private

sectors; workshops/micro-enterprises set up by individual beneficiaries and producer groups); the exact methodology and number of sites to be visited and persons to be interviewed will be defined in the Inception report.

7. Organization of a Field Study Team Debriefing in Istanbul where the team will conduct data entry and discuss and analyze results and prepare survey reports. In addition to that, the team leader will travel to Vienna for a debriefing where s/he will present raw results and preliminary findings to Project Managers and staff and counterparts and collect their feed-back;
8. Production of a first draft evaluation report and submission of this report to the evaluation departments and project manager of UNIDO for feed-back;
9. Incorporation of comments into a second draft and submission of this draft to the government, project participants and stakeholders for comments;
10. Incorporation of comments into final draft.
11. Final debriefing and presentation of the final report in UNIDO, Vienna and/or Amman.

## *IX. SERVICES REQUIRED*

The evaluation team must have the necessary technical competence and experience to assess the quality of the technical assistance provided under this project to small scale and micro-level production in the areas of the above-mentioned areas of training content (see III. Project information).

The execution of the evaluation will require full command and control of the specific situation in Iraq and full respect of the UN security rules for Iraq. The ability to carry out field operations in Iraq is a key requirement and must be demonstrated.

The evaluation team leader will be responsible for elaboration of an evaluation strategy, including the design of field surveys and elaboration of questionnaires; guiding the national evaluator for his/her field work in Iraq; analysis of survey results; gathering of complementary information from project staff, collaborators and stakeholders through telephone interviews and other means; and preparing a presentation of conclusions and recommendations as well as a final evaluation report.

The national evaluator and two local staff (enumerators) will be responsible for carrying out the field surveys (under the guidance of the team leader). The field surveys will provide the foundation for the evaluation and must therefore be executed in line with the highest standards of professionalism and impartiality.

The data analyst will be responsible for developing the field study tools and a data base framework. He/she will also be responsible for managing the field survey, doing the data entry and prepare survey reports (in English).

The evaluation will require the following functions, competencies and skills:

1. Evaluation team leader with documented experience in:
  - a. Designing and managing complex evaluations;
  - b. Leading multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural teams of evaluators;

- c. Development projects in Arab speaking countries;
  - d. Development projects related to income generation for vulnerable groups;
  - e. Designing and supervising qualitative and quantitative field surveys;
  - f. Preparing evaluation reports in line with agreed UN and DAC standards;
  - g. Drafting reports in English (excellent drafting skills to be demonstrated).
2. National Evaluator with documented experience in executing:
- a. Development projects for income creation of vulnerable groups;
  - b. Analysis of micro-enterprise industry activities as a means of creating employment and raising household incomes;
  - c. Evaluation of vocational training schemes;
  - d. Evaluations in Arab speaking countries;
  - e. Qualitative and quantitative field surveys;
  - f. Interviews in Arab language with the entire range of stakeholders from vulnerable war-affected groups to high-level officials.
3. A data analyst with documented experience in:
- a. Conducting evaluations in Arab speaking countries;
  - b. Analyzing qualitative and quantitative field surveys;
  - c. Developing survey techniques;
  - d. Managing field surveys from remote;
4. Two local staff to help collect data and to conduct surveys and interviews (National Enumerators), as required with a range of skills and experience in:
- a. Native Arabic speakers
  - b. Translation of English to Arabic and vice versa
  - c. Proven track record in conducting interviews;
  - d. Ability to prepare interview/site visit reports;
  - e. Preparing basic data files

The above-mentioned functions, competencies and skills may be distributed among several persons in the evaluation team. Team members may be located in different countries but an effective coordination mechanism will have to be demonstrated. Evaluation team members must be independent and not have been involved in the formulation, implementation or backstopping of the project.

The UNIDO Evaluation Group will be responsible for the quality control of the evaluation process and report. They will provide inputs regarding findings, lessons learned and recommendations from other evaluations, ensuring that the evaluation report is in compliance with established evaluation norms and standards and useful for organizational learning of all parties.

The project office in Amman will logistically and administratively support the evaluation team to the extent possible. However, it should be understood that the evaluation team is responsible for its own arrangements for transport, lodging, security etc.

## *X. CONSULTATIONS AND LIAISON*

Liaison of the evaluation team with the Iraqi authorities will be provided by an official nominated by the Government of Iraq.

The evaluation team will maintain close liaison with the representatives of UNIDO, other UN agencies and UNDG as well as with the concerned national agencies and with national and international project staff. The evaluation team is free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor or UNIDO.

## **XI. LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS**

Local interviews and surveys will be conducted in Arabic. All data and interview reports must be translated into English. Performing a linguistic quality control of all interview reports is part of the scope of contract. The evaluation report must be delivered in English.

## **XII. DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING**

1. Final evaluation report (English)
2. Initial and final survey reports (English & an additional copy in Arabic if available)
3. Draft evaluation report (English)
4. Draft survey questionnaire (English & Arabic)
5. Copies of all completed survey questionnaires (Arabic)

The evaluation report shall follow the structure given in Annex 1. Reporting language will be English. The executive summary, recommendations and lessons learned shall be an important part of the presentations to be prepared for debriefing sessions in Amman and/or Vienna.

Draft reports submitted to UNIDO Evaluation Group are shared with the corresponding Programme or Project Officer for initial review and consultation. They may provide feedback on any errors of fact and may highlight the significance of such errors in any conclusions. The consultation also seeks agreement on the findings and recommendations. The evaluators will take the comments into consideration in preparing the final version of the report.

One copy of all survey interview reports (English & an additional copy in Arabic if available) and a copy of all completed survey questionnaires (Arabic) must also be shared with UNIDO.

The evaluation will be subject to quality assessments by UNIDO Evaluation Group. These apply evaluation quality assessment criteria and are used as a tool for providing structured feedback. The quality of the evaluation report will be assessed and rated against the criteria set forth in the Checklist on evaluation report quality.

## Template of in-depth evaluation reports

### I. **Executive summary**

- Must be self-explanatory
- Not more than five pages focusing on the most important findings and recommendations
- Overview showing strengths and weaknesses of the project

### II. **Introduction**

- Information on the evaluation: why, when, by whom, etc.
- Information sources and availability of information
- Methodological remarks and validity of the findings
- Project summary (“fact sheet”, including project structure, objectives, donors, counterparts, timing, cost, etc)

### III. **Country and project context**

This chapter provides evidence for the assessment under chapter VI ( in particular relevance and sustainability)

- Brief description including history and previous cooperation
- Project specific framework conditions; situation of the country; major changes over project duration
- Positioning of the project (other initiatives of government, other donors, private sector, etc.)
- Counterpart organisation(s); (changes in the) situation of the

### IV. **Project Planning**

This chapter describes the planning process as far as relevant for the assessment under chapter VI

- Project identification (stakeholder involvement, needs of target groups analysed, depth of analysis, etc.)
- Project formulation (stakeholder involvement, quality of project document, coherence of intervention logic, etc.)
- Description of the underlying intervention theory (causal chain: inputs-activities-outputs-outcomes)
- Funds mobilization

### V. **Project Implementation**

This chapter describes what has been done and provides evidence for the assessment under chapter VI

- Financial implementation (overview of expenditures, changes in approach reflected by budget revisions, etc.)
- Management (in particular monitoring, self assessment, adaptation to changed circumstances, etc.)
- Outputs (inputs used and activities carried out to produce project outputs)
- Outcome, impact (what changes at the level of target groups could be observed, refer to outcome indicators in prodoc if any)

### VI. **Assessment**

The assessment is based on the analysis carried out in chapter III, IV and V. It assesses the underlying intervention theory (causal chain: inputs-activities-outputs-outcomes). Did it prove to be plausible and realistic? Has it changed during implementation? This chapter includes the following aspects:

- Relevance (evolution of relevance over time: relevance to UNIDO, Government, counterparts, target groups)

- Ownership
- Efficiency (quality of management, quality of inputs, were outputs produced as planned?, were synergies with other initiatives sufficiently exploited? Did UNIDO draw on relevant in-house and external expertise? Was management results oriented?)
- Effectiveness and impact (assessment of outcomes and impact, reaching target groups)
- Sustainability
- If applicable: overview table showing performance by outcomes/outputs

**VII. Issues with regard to a possible next phase**

- Assessment, in the light of the evaluation, of proposals put forward for a possible next phase
- Recommendations on how to proceed under a possible next phase, overall focus, outputs, activities, budgets, etc.

**VIII. Recommendations**

- Recommendations must be based on evaluation findings
- The implementation of the recommendations must be verifiable (indicate means of verification)
- Recommendations must be actionable; addressed to a specific officer, group or entity who can act on it; have a proposed timeline for implementation
- Recommendations should be structured by addressees:
  - UNIDO
  - Government and/or Counterpart Organisations
  - Donor

**IX. Lessons learned**

- Lessons learned must be of wider applicability beyond the evaluated project but must be based on findings and conclusions of the evaluation


## Checklist on evaluation report quality

Report quality criteria	UNIDO Evaluation Group Assessment notes	Rating
A. Did the report present an assessment of relevant outcomes and achievement of project objectives?		
B. Were the report consistent and the evidence complete and convincing?		
C. Did the report present a sound assessment of sustainability of outcomes or did it explain why this is not (yet) possible?		
D. Did the evidence presented support the lessons and recommendations?		
E. Did the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity)?		
F. Quality of the lessons: Were lessons readily applicable in other contexts? Did they suggest prescriptive action?		
G. Quality of the recommendations: Did recommendations specify the actions necessary to correct existing conditions or improve operations ('who?' 'what?' 'where?' 'when?'). Can they be implemented?		
H. Was the report well written? (Clear language and correct grammar)		
I. Were all evaluation aspects specified in the TOR adequately addressed?		
J. Was the report delivered in a timely manner?		

Rating system for quality of evaluation reports

A number rating 1-6 is used for each criterion: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, Highly Unsatisfactory = 1, and unable to assess = 0.





## Annex B: Summary of Project Results Matrix

Objective	Measurable Indicator
<p><i>Development Objective:</i> Economic recovery and restoration of livelihoods of the most vulnerable (2,000) living in Ninewa Governorate by increasing their productive capacities in sustainable and profitable income generating activities through the provision of training and equipment.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased income as measured by income and consumption level</li> <li>• Increased food security in households</li> <li>• Diversification of economic/income generating activities</li> </ul>
<p><i>Immediate Objectives:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provide targeted communities with the capacity to plan and manage their development activities and restore a functional base for economic growth and social peace.</li> <li>2. Improve the livelihood of approximately 2,000 households living in the project area through strengthening their productive capacities in post-harvest and other income-generating activities.</li> <li>3. Enable large number of youth who have been deprived by the conflict to gain basic knowledge in new productive income generating skills through practical experiences and activity-based learning.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project is implemented efficiently and in accordance with the plan and timing.</li> <li>• Number and types of income-generating activities and micro-enterprises generated.</li> <li>• Number of existing training/extension facilities strengthened for training and production.</li> <li>• Number of youth trained, number of youth who started their own businesses/employed</li> </ul>
<p><i>Outputs:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Enhanced capacities at the community level in support of socio-economic growth and peaceful coexistence by creating an environment for productive self-employment.</li> <li>5. Sources of income and employment are increased for a minimum of 2,000 households through training and provision of tools for individuals and organized business associations in food (fruit and vegetable processing, etc.) and non-food micro-industries (welding, vehicle mechanics, woodwork, construction, electronics, tailoring, etc.).</li> <li>6. A minimum of 500 youth are provided with marketable skills to enable them to obtain jobs and/or start-up an economic activity to sustain livelihoods for themselves and their families</li> </ol>	<p>Number of community leader trained Master plan and work programmes are available and in use</p> <p>Number of households that benefited from the project both in terms of increased income or diversification of economic activity.</p> <p>Number of youth trained to either start their own business or obtain a job which will allow them to supplement/generate their income</p> <p>2 training/extension facilities rehabilitated</p>

## Annex C: Relevance Matrix

Strategic Document	Strategic Objective
<p><b>GoI, National Development Strategy 2007- 2010, 2007</b></p>	<p><i>Pillar One:</i> Strengthening the Foundations of Economic Growth. ... a strong foundation for economic growth in an economy with a huge natural resource endowment (oil and gas) requires a diversified economy... Promoting small and medium size enterprises through the creation of industrial clusters</p> <p><i>Pillar Two:</i> Revitalizing the Private Sector ... a vibrant private sector (and not the public sector) is the engine of growth and job creation. Creating a pro-business investment climate for both domestic and foreign business, for small and large enterprises, for agriculture as well as manufacturing and services is therefore a top priority. This will require... Promoting private sector-led implementation of local community projects... <sup>86</sup></p>
<p><b>United Nations, United Nations Country Assistance Strategy for Iraq, 2008- 2010</b></p>	<p><i>Economic Reform and Diversification:</i> Over 50% of the active population is unemployed or underemployed and over 55% may face difficulties in covering basic living costs.</p> <p><i>Outcome 1:</i> Improved policies, strategies and related institutional developments that are sensitive to the MDGs, social inclusiveness, gender equality and pro-poor economic growth</p> <p><i>Outcome 2:</i> Enhance key sectors of local economy in most deprived areas</p>
<p><b>Governorate of Ninewa, Strategic Planning for the Ninawa Province (2008)</b></p>	<p><i>Improving</i> the life and health conditions of all the residents of the province.</p> <p><i>Improving</i> the economic situation and achieving comprehensive development</p> <p><i>Promoting</i> the role of the private sector in the province.</p> <p><i>Activate</i> the role of the private sector in the province.</p>
<p><b>UNIDO Framework Strategy (2008)</b></p>	<p><i>Objective 1:</i> To assist the GoI in strengthening income and employment generating opportunities for a variety of vulnerable groups, with a major focus on rural areas and the promotion of micro-industries.</p> <p><i>Objective 2:</i> To contribute to the revitalization of the productive capacity of the agro-industrial sector and core agro-industrial infrastructure that helps to drive economic and commercial mechanisms.</p>

<sup>86</sup> The strategy identifies economic diversification, private sector development and the promotion of SMEs as core elements of the GOI's economic strategy for the period 2007 to 2010.

## Annex D: Beneficiary Questionnaire

<b>Beneficiary Questionnaire</b>	
<b>Question</b>	<b>Value for Data Entry</b>
<b>Background Information</b>	
1. Name	Name for confirmation against Database
2. Age	Age for confirmation against Database
3. Where do you live?	Residence for confirmation against Database
4. What training course did you take?	Course title
5. Was this training course a new occupation (skill?) for you?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
6. Where did you take the training course?	Name of the training facility for confirmation against the Database
7. On what date did you complete the course?	Date of completion for confirmation against the Database
8. Did you receive a tool kit after the course?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
9. If so, on what date did you receive the tool kit?	Date tool kit received, for confirmation against the Database
<b>Individual and Household Situation before the Training</b>	

10. What was your occupation before you took the training course?	Name of profession
11. Did you have employment before you took the course?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
12. If so, what kind of work did you do?	F= Full time P= Part time A= Agriculture F= Food Industry M= Manufacturing S= Service Industry  Interviewee can chose several options
13. If you did not have a regular job, did you have other activities that generated income for your household?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
14. If so, how did you generate income?	What options should we provide as values?
15. What was your regular daily income in the year before you took the training course?	What options should we provide as values? We have a baseline in the original survey.
16. How would you describe the general quality of your life before the training?	Very Good= VG Good = G Medium= M Bad= B Very Bad= VB
17. How did you assess the general situation of your household in the year before the training course?	Very Good= VG Good = G Medium= M Bad= B Very Bad= VB
18. Before the training and if you were unemployed, how did you assess your prospects for finding employment?	Very Good= VG Good = G

	Medium= M Bad= B Very Bad= VB
<b>The Training Course</b>	
19. Were you satisfied with: a. The overall quality of the course? b. The quality of the course curriculum? c. The quality of the course instruction? d. The quality of the training facility? e. The quality of the training equipment and materials?	Very satisfied = 5 Satisfied= 4 Quality was adequate= 3 Not satisfied = 2 Very Unsatisfied= 1
20. When you completed the course, did you believe there were opportunities to find work or earn income in the course area that you chose?	Very likely to find work= 5 Likely to find work= 4 Not significantly greater possibility= 3 Not more likely to find work=2 Very unlikely will find work= 1
21. When you completed the course, did you believe that you had the knowledge and skills needed to take advantage of those opportunities?	New knowledge and skills very relevant = 5 New knowledge and skills relevant = 4 Not significantly greater = 3 New knowledge and skills not very relevant =2 New knowledge and skills are irrelevant to opportunities = 1
<b>Employment Situation after the Training Course</b>	
22. Have you found employment since completing the training course?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>

23. <u>If you found employment:</u> a. Do you believe the training helped you find work?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
b. What kind of company or enterprise do you work for?	Should we assign a value to the type of business?
c. How many employees does the company have?	Number of Employees
d. Do you use the skills learned during the training in your work?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
24. Is this a regular full time job, a part time job, or a temporary work?	Regular= R Temporary= T Part Time= PT
25. <u>If you did not find employment, are you self-employed?</u>	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
26. If so, do you use the skills learned during the training in your work?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
27. Do you believe that you have this opportunity to generate income as a result of the training?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
28. <u>If you have not found employment or self-employment opportunities</u> , what kinds of difficulty do you encounter as you look for work?	1 = <There are no jobs or self-employment opportunities for the skills that you learned> 2 = <Do not have the connections or support necessary to find opportunities> 3= <Need more training to be qualified for the employment that is available> 4 = <You do not have tools or support or money to start your own business> 5= <Other reasons >
29. Do you believe that the skills you learned during the training will lead to employment or self-employment soon?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>

<b>The Tool Kit</b>	
30 <u>If you received a tool kit:</u>	
a. Was the tool kit of good quality?	Yes =<Y>
b. Was the content of the tool kit relevant to the skills that you learned?	No = <N>
c. Was the tool kit important to finding work, or income generating opportunities?	
d. Is the tool kit still important to your work? (Do you use it regularly in your work?)	
e. Do you use the tool kit at home, to assist in the household?	
<b>Situation of Individual and Households</b>	
30. In general, do you believe that taking the course has improved your situation?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
31. What is your estimated daily income after the course?	Daily income as a number per day
32. Is the situation of your household better or worse than before?	Much Better = 5 Better= 4 Same= 3 Worse= 2 Much Worse= 1
33. Is your household better able to meet its basic needs (housing, water, electricity) as a result of your income?	Much Better = 5 Better= 4 Same= 3 Worse= 2 Much Worse= 1
34. Did participating in the training make you feel more optimistic or hopeful that your situation will improve?	Much Better = 5 Better= 4



	Same= 3 Worse= 2 Much Worse= 1
35. How would you improve the training course?	NARRATIVE

## Annex E: Trainer Questionnaire

<b>Questionnaire for the Trainers</b>	
<b>General Information</b>	
1. Name	Name
2. What training institution do you work at?	Name of Institution
3. How long have you been an instructor?	Years of Instruction
4. What is your area of instruction, as part of the project?	Course Area
5. Is this a new area of instruction for you?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
6. How many courses did you teach, as part of the project	Number of Courses
7. Will you stay at your training institution after the project is complete?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
<b>Quality of Training Received by the Instructors</b>	
8. Did you attend a training course, before serving as an instructor in the project?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
9. Where did you take the training?	Name of Institution
10. What dates did you take the training?	Date
11. In general, were you satisfied with the quality of the training course?	Very satisfied = 5 Satisfied= 4 Quality was adequate= 3 Not satisfied = 2 Very Unsatisfied= 1
12. How do you assess the professional	Very satisfied = 5

quality of the instruction at the course?	Satisfied= 4 Quality was adequate= 3 Not satisfied = 2 Very Unsatisfied= 1
13. How do you do you assess the quality of the curriculum used on the course?	Very satisfied = 5 Satisfied= 4 Quality was adequate= 3 Not satisfied = 2 Very Unsatisfied= 1
14. How do you assess the quality of the facilities where the course took place?	Very satisfied = 5 Satisfied= 4 Quality was adequate= 3 Not satisfied = 2 Very Unsatisfied= 1
<b>Relevance of the Training to Vulnerable Groups/the Beneficiaries</b>	
15. Are there any important differences between working with the vulnerable student groups that participated in this project, and were your students? If so, what are those differences?	Yes =<Y> No = <N> And Narrative Response
16. Did the training adequately prepare you to work with vulnerable student groups? Did it give you a good methodology for working with the students?	Yes =<Y> No = <N> And Narrative Response
<b>Outcome of the Training for the Instructors</b>	
17. Do you believe that the course improved your knowledge and skill as an instructor?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
18. If so, how did the course improve your knowledge and skills? <b>The focus is on whether they learned to be better instructors.</b>	Narrative Response
20 Do you believe that the course improved your knowledge and skill, in the vocational or subject area in which you are instructor?	Yes =<Y> No = <N>
21. If so, say how the course improved your knowledge and skill in your vocational area? <b>The focus is on improved knowledge and skills.</b>	Narrative Response
<b>Outcome of the Training for the Beneficiaries</b>	

<p>22. Do you believe that the right students were selected for the course(s) that you taught? (Coming from a vulnerable background, possessing the necessary prerequisite knowledge and skills, available, willing and able to learn?)</p>	<p>Yes =&lt;Y&gt; No = &lt;N&gt;</p> <p>Narrative Response</p>
<p>23. What do you believe are the accomplishments of the training for the beneficiaries?</p> <p>a. Do you believe that the students improved their knowledge and skill as a result of the course?</p> <p>b. Do you believe that the training will result in the beneficiaries having more employment and income generating opportunities? Why or why not?</p> <p>c. Did you observe any change in the confidence and personal aptitudes of the students, that make them more likely to improve their lives?</p>	<p>Yes =&lt;Y&gt; No = &lt;N&gt;</p> <p>Much improved knowledge and skill= 3 Improved knowledge and skill =2 No improvement in knowledge and skill= 1</p> <p>Very Likely = 5 Likely= 4 Adequate= 3 Not Likely = 2 Very Unlikely= 1</p> <p>Much improved confidence and personal aptitudes = 3 Improved confidence and personal aptitudes =2 No improvement in confidence and personal aptitudes= 1</p> <p>Narrative Responses</p>
<p><b>Final Questions</b></p>	
<p>24. How would you improve the project?</p>	<p>Narrative</p>
<p>25. How do you rate the project accomplishment overall?</p>	<p>Very satisfied = 5 Satisfied= 4 Quality was adequate= 3 Not satisfied = 2 Very Unsatisfied= 1</p>

## Annex F: SME Questionnaire

<b>SME Questionnaire</b>	
<b>Question</b>	<b>Value for Data Entry</b>
<b>Background Information</b>	
1. Name Of Company	Name for confirmation against Database
2. Name and position of the person interviewed	Name and position
3. Location of the Business	Location of business
4. Type of business	A= Service B= Manufacturing C= Construction or Repair D= Food Processing D= Other (please specify)
5. Year the company was started?	Year company started
6. Who owns the business?	A= Family B= Partnership C= Other
7. What kind of assistance did you receive from the project?	A= Financial B= Equipment C= Technical Assistance D= Training E= Other (please specify)
<b>Part Two: Part One: Business Performance</b> Questions designed to assess performance changes to the business before and after the project	
8. How is your business doing compared to 2009 (or the year prior to being in involved in the project)?	A= Much Better B= Better C= Same D= Worse E= Much Worse

<p>9. If your business has improved since 2009, in what ways has it improved?</p>	<p>A= Increased sales and revenues  B= Growth in demand or markets for your product  C= Opening new business areas and products  D= Improved access to other forms of business support  E= More employees  H= Other (Describe)  <b>May chose more than one answer</b></p>	
<p>10. If your business has gotten worse since 2009, in what ways has it improved?</p>	<p>A= Worse sales and revenues  B= Decline in demand or markets for your product  C= No new business opportunities/opportunities hoped for have not developed  D= Worse access to other forms of business support  E= Fewer Employees  F= Other  <b>May chose more than one answer</b></p>	
<p>11. How many full time employees do you have today?</p>	<p>NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES</p>	
<p>12. How many part time employees do you have today?</p>	<p>NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES</p>	
<p>13. If you have more employees, what is the main reason that you hired them?</p>	<p>A= Stronger business demand and need for more employees  B= New skill areas required to expand business  C= Other</p>	
<p>14. How many full time employees did you have in 2009(or the year prior to participating in the project)?</p>	<p>NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES</p>	
<p>15. How many part time employees did you have in 2009?</p>	<p>NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES</p>	
<p>16. Is this an increase or decrease in the number of persons that you employ?</p>	<p>I= Increase  D= Decrease  S= Same</p>	
<p>17. Where did you recruit your new employees?</p>	<p>A= Family members  B= Known persons in the</p>	

	community C= General recruitment D= Other (describe)	
<b>Part Four: Family Situation</b>		
Questions designed to identify whether the family situation has changed since joining the project, and the reasons for the change.		
18. Has your family's general situation improved or declined since 2009, or the year prior to your participation in the project?	A= Much Better B= Better C= Same D= Worse E= Much Worse	
19. Why? Give the reason behind your answer.	A: Change in the political situation B: Change in the safety situation C: Change in the business and income D: Improvement to basic services E: Others (please state)	
20. Does this project help you to improve the life of other relative's families that suffered from the conflict?	A= Yes, support has contributed to the situation being Much Better  B= Yes, support has contributed to the situation Better  C= The project has not really helped and the situation is the Same	
<b>Part Five: Type of Support Received from the Project</b>		
21. What kind of support did you receive from the project?	A= Equipment only B= Rehabilitation only C= Equipment and Rehabilitation D= Technical Assistance E= Training F= Other	
22. Is the support now in place and operational?	Y= Yes N= No	
23. Did your company invest any of its own financial capital in the rehabilitation?	Y= Yes N= No	
24. If yes, what part of the rehabilitation did you invest in?	A= Rehabilitation of your building B= Construction to expand your building	

	B= Services to your building (water/electricity/sanitation) C= New equipment D= Other	
25. If yes, approximately how much of your own capital did you invest in the reconstruction?	AMOUNT	
26. Was receiving support from the project a positive factor in your decision to invest your own capital?	Y= Yes N= No NA= It was not a Consideration in the decision	
<b>Part Six: Impact of the Project on Your Business</b> Based on the changing situation documented in the previous sections, what can we attribute to the project?		
27. Has the project contributed to an improvement in your business?	A= Has contributed very much B= Has contributed C= Our situation is the same D= Has not contributed and the situation is worse E= Has not contributed and the situation is the much worse	
28. If the support contributed to an improvement in your business, what was the contribution?	NARRATIVE Statement	
29. If the support did not improve your business, why did it not lead to an improvement?	NARRATIVE Statement	
30. Overall, are you satisfied with the support given?	A= Very Satisfied B= Satisfied C= Not satisfied D= Very Unsatisfied	
31. Overall, was the support relevant to what you needed?	A= Very Relevant B= Relevant C= The support could have been more relevant to what my business needed D= The support was not relevant to what my business need	
32. How would you evaluate the quality of the equipment supplied?	A: Very good. B: Good. C: Bad. D: Very bad	
33. How would you rate the quality of any technical assistance and/or training provided?		



## Annex G: Selection Criteria for the Beneficiary Sample

1. The total number of persons trained as of 31 March 2012 was 1763, in all activities. The evaluation is directed to look at a sample of 10 percent. The size of the sampling, therefore, shall be 180 persons.
2. The sampling will be drawn from three of the five districts where the project was implemented; Al Hamdaniya, Mosul and Talafar. There were 956 beneficiaries from these locations: 270 from Al Hamdaniya, 560 Mosul; 126 Talafar. Together, they comprise approximately 55 percent of all the training activity, completed as of 31 March 2012.
3. The 180 survey participants shall be selected from the following criteria:
  - a. Representative of the number of persons trained in each of the districts, as a percent of the total sampling. Therefore, 55 percent of the sample shall come from Mosul (100 persons), 30 percent from Al-Hamdaniya (55 persons) and 15 percent from Talafar (25 persons).
  - b. A representative sample of each vocational training area. Initial review indicates there were courses in 19 different vocational training areas.
  - c. 40 percent of beneficiaries' cohort was to be women. The existing data indicates that 692 women have completed training, just fewer than 40 percent. Accordingly, 40 percent of the sampling shall be women, or 72 persons.
  - d. 500 of the beneficiaries were to be Youth, or 25 percent of the total beneficiary cohort. Youth is defined by UNIDO as 18-24 years of age. The total number was Youth beneficiaries as of 31 March 2012 was 792, approaching 50 percent. Accordingly, 90 persons should be Youth, 54 male and 36 female:
  - e. At least 50 percent of the beneficiaries should have received a tool kit. As of the 31 March 2012, approximately 40 percent of the beneficiaries in the relevant courses had received tool kits. A further number in Mosul courses received tool kits in during May 2012, and shall be included (in the area of welding).

## Annex H: List of Documents Consulted

Government of Iraq, *National Development Plan 2010 to 2014*, 2010

Government of Iraq, *National Development Strategy 2007 to 2010*, 2007

Governorate of Ninewa, *Strategic Planning for the Ninawa Province*, 2008

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UNIDO, *Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery in Ninewa Governorate (MISP V), Project Report #4 for 1 January – 30 June 2011*, 2011c

UNIDO, *Promotion of Micro Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihoods in the Ninewa Governorate, Iraq; Monitoring and Field Missions*; (updated) 2010a

UNIDO, *Inception Report, Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery- Ninewa Governorate of Iraq*, December 2009b

UNIDO, *Project Document, Promotion of Micro-Industries for Accelerated and Sustainable Livelihood Recovery- Ninewa Governorate of Iraq*, May 2009a

UNIDO, *Framework Strategy for UNIDO'S Assistance in the Republic of Iraq, 2009- 2012; Livelihood recovery and support for the revitalization of the agro-industrial sector*, October 2008

United Nations, *United Nations Country Assistance Strategy for Iraq, 2008- 2010*

## Annex I: List of persons met

To be added.