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# Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement JP Final Evaluation Report

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30 July 2013



## Joint Programme Fact Sheet

<b>Joint Programme Number</b>	MDG-F-2053-D-ETH
<b>Joint Programme Title</b>	Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement
<b>Thematic Window</b>	Private Sector Development
<b>Joint Programme Location</b>	Ethiopia
<b>Participating UN Agencies</b>	UNIDO (lead agency) FAO ILO
<b>Joint Programme Budget (detailed budget found below)</b>	\$2,999,956 US UNIDO - \$1,156,724 FAO - \$1,061,062 ILO - \$782,170
<b>Joint Programme Committed Expenditure</b>	US\$ 2,783,086.15 UNIDO - \$1,142,846.61 FAO - \$881,163 ILO - \$759,076.54
<b>Joint Programme Timeline</b>	Start date: 1 January 2010 End date: 31 December 2012 No-cost extension granted to 30 June 2013.
<b>National Implementing Partners</b>	Ministry of Industry (lead ministry) Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<p>The project document is silent on planned beneficiaries. However, the Joint Programme has reported regularly on targets in four separate categories.</p> <p>Oil Producers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted – 4 large processing plants(see 2.3 &amp; 2.4).</li> <li>• Reached – 92 SMEs – oil processors.</li> </ul> <p>Small holder farmers of oil seed (men):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted – 8,800.</li> <li>• Reached – 1467.</li> </ul> <p>Small holder farmers of oil seeds (women):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted – 4,600.</li> <li>• Reached – 68.</li> </ul> <p>Farmers Unions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeted – 4.</li> <li>• Reached – 4.</li> </ul>

## Detailed Budget For The JP By Category And Participating UN Agency (US Dollars)

Item	Participating UN Agency		
	FAO	UNIDO	ILO
Supplies, commodities, equipment and transport	258,000	360,000	162,000
Personnel (staff, consultants, travel and training)	301,000	284,200	154,000
Training of counterparts	237,647	275,000	390,000
Contracts	170,000	95,000	0
Other Direct Costs	25,000	66,850	25,000
Total Direct Costs	991,647	1,081,050	731,000
UN Agency Indirect Cost	69,415	75,674	51,170
Total per Agency	1,061,062	1,156,724	782,170
		Grand Total	2,999,906

## Acknowledgements

This report presents the findings of the final summative evaluation of the Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme. The evaluation process underpinning this report was carried out in June and July of 2013.

The evaluator wishes to thank all the representatives of national institutions, agencies and organisations, as well as the Joint Programme team members that were interviewed during the evaluation exercise and contributed to the quality of the analysis through their insights, knowledge and support. Particular thanks goes to Muluneh Woldekidan (Joint Programme Coordinator), technical team members Olijira Kuma, Tsegabu Teka, Amare Negash, Assegid Adane, Aresawum Mengesha, Shumet Chanie and Kidist Chala for providing extensive factual and analytical inputs, as well as Hailegebriel Habte, Haregewoin Gochel and Seyoum Semu who provided great logistical support.

James A Newkirk  
Belgrade, 24 July 2013

## Table Of Contents

Joint Programme Fact Sheet	
Acknowledgements	
Table Of Contents	
Acronyms And Abbreviations	
Executive Summary	
1 Background and Rationale .....	1
1.1 Introduction .....	1
1.2 Situational Background in the Oil Seed Sector .....	1
2 Description of the PSD Programme in Ethiopia .....	3
2.1 Introduction .....	3
2.2 Results Structure of the JP .....	3
3 Purpose and Methodology of the Final Evaluation .....	5
3.1 Purpose .....	5
3.2 Methodology.....	6
3.3 UNEG Ethical Principles .....	7
4 Review of Implementation.....	8
4.1 Outcome 1 - Productivity and competitiveness of private sector led agricultural production of oil seeds is enhanced.....	8
4.2 Outcome 2 - The capacity and competitiveness of the stakeholders for processing of edible oil seeds is enhanced. ....	12
4.3 Outcome 3 - Access to local and international markets for edible oil producers is improved. ....	17
5 Beneficiaries.....	19
6 Presentation of Findings .....	20
6.1 Design level.....	20
6.2 Process level.....	23
6.3 Results level.....	25
7 Conclusions .....	28
7.1 General .....	28
7.2 Lessons learned and good practices.....	29
7.3 Recommendations.....	30
8 Annexes.....	32
8.1 List of Interviewees/ Participants in Focus Groups.....	33
8.2 Document Review List.....	36

8.3 Evaluation Matrix ..... 37

8.4 Evaluation Terms Of Reference ..... 45

8.5 Inception Report ..... 55



## Acronyms And Abbreviations

AECID	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo / Spanish Agency for International Cooperation Development
AIMP or Master Plan	Agro-Industry Master Plan. The AIMP comprises five volumes, each related to a specific sub-sector. For the purposes of this report, references to the Master Plan or the AIMP refer to the Ethiopian Agro-Industry Strategy - Oil seeds Sub-sector, which is Volume III of the Master Plan.
BDS	Business Development Services
BOLSA	(Regional) Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs
CSA	Central Statistical Agency
DBE	Development Bank of Ethiopia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEMSEDA	Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency
GoE	Government Of Ethiopia
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JP	Joint Programme
MDG-F	Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund
MoA	Ministry Of Agriculture
MoI	Ministry Of Industry
MoLSA	Ministry Of Labour and Social Affairs
MoU	Memorandum Of Understanding
NSC	National Steering Committee
OSH	Occupational Safety and Health
PLC	Private Limited Company
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PPP	Public Private Partnership
RCO	Resident Coordinator Office (of the United Nations)
REMSEDA	Regional Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency
RLMC	Regional Level Management Committee
RLTC	Regional Level Technical Committee
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SNV	Dutch development organisation. SNV provided sub-contract services to the JP.
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
Woreda	The Ethiopian word for district – the third level administrative divisions of Ethiopia, administered by local government.

## Executive Summary

### Introduction

The Joint Programme (JP) was designed as a pilot project to address the issues of the oil seeds sector indicated in the Master Plan. The JP worked to showcase development of an efficient oil seed value chain that would promote entrepreneurship, provide capital and services to farmers, raise demand for agricultural products and connect farmers with markets, addressing the production, handling, processing, marketing and distribution of oil seeds. Through the JP it was anticipated that employment and income would be generated, and that the productivity and quality of oil seeds and edible oil production would be enhanced. The process was intended to lead to increased food security and innovation throughout the value chain, increasing the income of farmers, processors and traders, and in so doing, addressing three MDGs: Goal 1 – poverty reduction, Goal 3 – gender equity improvement, Goal 7 - sustainable development.

The JP was initiated in January 2010, with a project period of 3 years. By late 2011, the mid-term evaluation was undertaken, followed by the preparation and implementation of an improvement plan based upon the mid-term evaluation's recommendations. Per this process, the JP requested and was granted a no-cost extension of six months, through 30 June, 2013. The JP was conducted in two regions, Amhara and Oromia.

The JP was implemented by UNIDO as the lead agency, with FAO and the ILO, together with national counterparts which include the Ministry of Industry as the lead governmental institution, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as well as their regional and woreda-level representatives. The JP was governed according to the MDG-F governance structure which includes a National Steering Committee, Programme Management Committee, Regional Level Steering Committee and Regional Level Technical Committee.

### Situational Background in the Oil Seed Sector

The issues and priorities critical to achieving the potential of the oil seeds sector in Ethiopia are varied. They include the general level of growth of the country, requiring long-term solutions, to those that are specific to the sector. Issues and priorities of immediate and particular concern to the sector include production, processing and marketing aspects.

*Production.* Oil seeds are the third most important commodity in terms of production and export in Ethiopia. According to the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, oil crops are currently (2008/09) cultivated in about 0.86 million hectares, involving close to four million smallholder producers in the main production areas. The main oil seed crops include sesame, niger seed and linseed. Though this production contributes to household income, it is constrained due to too small-scale and fragmented land holdings. In this regard, it is revealing to note that eighty-six per cent of the sizes of holdings under oil seeds production fall in the range of less than five hectares. Holdings of greater than five and less than ten hectares account for twelve per cent. Holdings of greater than ten hectares account for less than two per cent of the total estimated area under oil seeds. A low use of agro-inputs and poor farm management, and a lack of market-oriented production such as contract farming, together with the high cost and limited availability of inputs (improved seeds, fertilizer and chemicals) add to overall low productivity.

*Processing.* Most domestic oil processing is undertaken by an estimated 850 small-scale and micro oil processing plants, accounting for ninety-five per cent of the manufacturing base of

the edible oil industry. Capacity utilization in the industrial branch is seriously constrained both by the quantity and quality of oil seeds available. Many of these small and medium enterprises use obsolete equipment and technology. Working conditions and the level of sanitary and hygienic standards is far below acceptable levels. Edible oil refining capacities are limited to some twenty-six medium and large industries, utilizing about thirty per cent of capacity. Considering import-intensity (a technical coefficient that measures the share or magnitude of imported intermediate goods to produce a unit of final demand) the edible oil industry, at less than two per cent, provides an opportunity/ potential to be competitive both domestically and internationally given the domestic base of the raw material, oil seeds, and integration with the local economy. The edible oil sub-sector, however, does not perform well in all aspects of its operational parameters. Capacity utilization of the edible oil sub-sector is by far the lowest among the food manufacturing sector industries and the average of the Ethiopian manufacturing industries over the past few years. The sub-sector has diverse and significant constraints.

*Marketing.* Marketing and distribution of oil seeds is mainly done by small and medium scale traders with poor marketing facilities, especially for collection, storage and transportation, which cause high post-harvest losses. The marketing chain is long, with many intermediaries adding little value to the final product, with high transaction costs being incurred. Lack of access to packaging services, poor access to financial services, and poor vertical and horizontal collaboration within, as well as external to the chain, all negatively impact on the industry.

### **The Joint Programme**

The JP's stated objective was to 'enhance the sustainable supply system of raw material at desired quantity and quality, promote efficient processing capacity and improve access to markets by the effective *integration and lead role of the private sector* in the entire value chain'. The JP did not intend to provide producer-oriented support for production – it intended to integrate the private sector in all aspects of the value chain, from production to processing to marketing and business support services. The JP was mainly targeted at small farmers, and small and medium enterprises in the Oromia and Amhara Regions, as well as their supportive public bodies and private sector counterparts. The JP intended to pioneer a 'private sector led supply of raw material, capacity building for enhanced processing technologies and linkage promotion for access to finance and local and international markets'.

### **Evaluation Purpose and Methodology**

The intent of the evaluation was to understand in detail what the JP undertook *to do* and what it undertook *to accomplish*, and to use the experience and knowledge of key JP stakeholders to analyse JP activities and results against the JP design.

The evaluator used project documentation to provide the indicators of success against which analysis was undertaken. These indicators, together with the specific requirements of the evaluation Terms of Reference, provided the framework in which the project was evaluated. The evaluation methodology incorporated four key components to provide the information and reflection required to understand JP implementation and results. The four were:

- Review of project documentation. The desk-top study provided the opportunity for the evaluator to assess actual project activities, outputs and outcomes against the JP plan.
- Field work. Interviews and focus group conversations with JP personnel and other JP stakeholders were undertaken at national and local levels. The intent of these interviews/ focus group discussions was to draw out further information and analysis regarding the design, process and results of the project.

- Analytical processes. The evaluator used the material from the desk-top study and the field work as the basis for an analysis of the JP.
- Reporting. The evaluation report provides the detailed discussion of the analysis, and addresses each of the evaluation questions.

### **Contribution to Outcomes**

The full text of the report provides much important detail on all findings/ recommendations.

#### **Outcome 1 - Productivity and competitiveness of private sector led agricultural production of oil seeds is enhanced.**

The JP has made an important contribution, in the context of a pilot programme, to delivering this outcome. For the group of oil seed farmers who have been involved with the JP, and for their related primary cooperatives, productivity and competitiveness of oil seeds has been enhanced. Much more work is yet to be done, and many more farmers and primary cooperatives must participate in the JP, or a related programme, for there to be significant benefit to the sector, and to Ethiopia as a whole, but the JP has demonstrated, clearly, the direction this work should take.

#### **Outcome 2 - The capacity and competitiveness of the stakeholders for processing of edible oil seeds is enhanced.**

The JP has made a significant contribution to this outcome. Processors of oil seeds have experienced, and express, a renewed confidence in the sector, and through linkages within the processing component of the value chain, and up and down the value chain (but particularly with seed growers and their related cooperatives and cooperative unions). These linkages, which function within the cluster arrangement of the sector, are the strongest indicator from the JP of the necessary future directions both for a potential scale-up of the JP and for the development of the sector nationwide. There is significant potential in Ethiopia for domestic production of edible oil to replace imports, and the JP has demonstrated a particularly effective and successful approach to improving processor competitiveness and capacity to achieve this result. With one particular development, the JP has gone well beyond its design, and has established a clear plan for potentially critical changes to the structure and functioning of the oil seed sector in the future. This development, the establishment in both the Amhara and Oromia regions of joint processing facilities, has been an exemplary demonstration of a public private partnership, and sets the stage for potentially significant developments in the sector.

#### **Outcome 3 - Access to local and international markets for edible oil producers is improved.**

The JP has made a strong contribution to the achieving of this outcome. The most important aspect of the JP's success in this component of the value chain was not in relation to international markets, but in the development of the vertical linkages within the value chain that have contributed to an improved marketing framework for seed growers, cooperatives and processors. Much more work is required within the value chain, and in the establishment of significant markets arrangements for the domestic edible oils, but clear directions have been demonstrated.

### **Beneficiaries**

The project document is silent on planned beneficiaries. However, the Joint Programme has reported regularly on targets in four separate categories.

Oil Producers:

- Targeted – 4 large processing plants (see 2.3 & 2.4).
- Reached – 92 SMEs – oil processors.

Small holder farmers of oil seed (men):

- Targeted – 8,800.
- Reached – 1467.

Small holder farmers of oil seeds (women):

- Targeted – 4,600.
- Reached – 68.

Farmers Unions:

- Targeted – 4.
- Reached – 4.

## **Key Findings**

### **Relevance**

The JP:

- Has been a very important intervention, and pilots clear directions forward for the edible oil seed sector.
- Has demonstrated clear and specific responses to the oil seed production and oil seed processing problems described in the design.
- Has provided very practical ways forward for the edible oil value chain in how to substitute imported oil with domestic production.
- Has shown the significance of taking a value chain approach.

### **Efficiency**

The JP:

- Has reached an important level of implementation, and can be described as having been efficient in delivering planned outputs and outcomes.
- Benefited from Government leadership, and its insistence on a limited number of UN agencies, and from the related close correlation between output/ outcome areas, agency mandates and experience, and the related correlation with the value chain.
- Was hampered to a certain extent by the short timeframe, and by slow delivery of some critical aspects of the programme, notably on the oil seed production side.
- Successfully addressed the critical aspects of the slow delivery following the mid-term evaluation and delivered visible change in production and processing practice, and in market linkages.

### **Effectiveness**

The JP:

- Has achieved specific results, as planned, within a constrained timeframe and budget.
- Has delivered visible change in production and processing practice, and in market linkages.
- Has demonstrated a clear path forward for the achievement of development results in the sector.

- Has demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of the involvement of national, regional and local government, as well as private sector actors in addressing the needs and future directions of the sector.
- Has demonstrated significant synergies between UN agencies and Government Ministries which have assisted in the delivery of the JP's development results.
- Requires a much more significant time frame and budget to consolidate the achieved results, and to ensure the on-going nature of change in the sector.
- Achieved, almost completely, the intended outputs from the programme design, and has made significant contributions to the achievement of the JP's intended outcomes. With specific reference to the JP's outcome, the JP has contributed in significant ways to achieving these outcomes across the sector.
- Contributed to achievement of Millennium Development Goals in Ethiopia, and particularly in relation to poverty eradication, by demonstrating improvements in the oil seed sector that can contribute to improved economics in production, processing and marketing of oil seeds.
- Contributed significantly to the goals set out in the private sector and development thematic window of the MDG-F: the work and results of the JP bolster an economic sector where the poor are strongly represented, open markets to improved access and support small and medium enterprises. Future possibilities through a scaling-up can have significant impact in all of these areas.
- Demonstrated particular strength in fulfilling the intent of the Paris Declaration, in particular the principle of national ownership. The JP fulfils national strategies, public policy directions and the Ethiopia UNDAF. Within the structure of the JP, the UN concept of *delivering as one* was demonstrated effectively.
- Was particularly effective with the specific targets of farmers, farmer cooperatives and processors. The demand from farmers for a widening/ strengthening of JP practice in cultivation is strongly expressed. The clear view of processors is that the JP has given them renewed confidence in their industry, and a clear path for their involvement. Marketing linkages have been strengthened.
- Demonstrates the effectiveness of a cluster approach, with specific reference here to the value of involvement of the Ministries, Bureaus, Universities and Municipalities.

### **Sustainability**

The JP:

- Has demonstrated an effective and sustainable approach to development of the oil seed sector. However, as the implementation currently stands there is no guarantee that results will be sustained.
- Cluster stakeholders from government and the private sector demonstrate a strong commitment to the initiated change. However, this change is still fragile.
- A second phase of the JP is required to consolidate the change that has been demonstrated by the JP. A second phase has the potential to be a significant initiative for the sector, and for Ethiopia as a whole.

Not enough work has been done to ensure funding for a Phase 2. All partners 'support' the JP, and the concept of a Phase 2, but there is no work being done to ensure more tangible support in the form of funding for the scale-up. The JP is eminently replicable. It can be argued that the JP *demand*s scaling-up, given that clearly effective approach it demonstrates, and the potentially significant results for the sector, and Ethiopia generally, from a successful programme to implement JP approaches across the country.

## **Lessons learned**

The following summarises the key lessons which have been learned:

- The strong leadership on the government's side ensured a more strongly correlated design (related to the value chain), a tighter logic to the results framework and a drive to the programme throughout implementation.
- This close correlation between the priorities, skills and experience of UN Agencies, and Agency staff, and the requirements of the different components of the value chain added clear strength of direction to implementation.
- The number of UN Agencies was limited, strictly, to critical, core components of the JP. There were no 'add-ons' – the design logic was tight, within the JP and within the value chain and the Agencies each had clear, and specific result areas within component – and in linking components.
- The cluster methodology has been an effective approach to a 'whole of value chain' implementation.
- Implementation was much more effective where specific, trained resources were assigned to delivery – the cluster development specialists added value throughout implementation of the work with processors; the agronomist specialists engaged following the mid-term evaluation to address weaknesses on the production side had a significant positive impact, both on implementation activities and on results.
- The 'inception period' allowed some redefinition of activities (based on the diagnostic studies) while retaining the output framework within the value chain structure.
- The contribution of the Universities has added particular technical and social/ ethical value to implementation approaches.

## **Good practice**

The following summarises demonstrated good practice:

- The cluster methodology added value to JP implementation – the effectiveness of coordination, communication and 'whole of value chain' engagement contributed specifically to the JP's success.
- The value chain approach was a key success factor in JP design and implementation.

## **Recommendations**

### **Phase 2**

The Joint Programme has been a very important intervention, and pilots clear directions forward for the edible oil seed sector. The importance of a Phase 2 of the JP cannot be overstated. The JP has been a particularly important and successful initiative, and it is critical that it is scaled-up and consolidated. A Phase 2 would, for good reason, closely align with the current JP, and aims to improve the function and outcomes of the whole of the edible oil value chain.

Three key actions are required, and should be implemented immediately:

- A donor strategy must be developed and implemented. The sector strategy, JP reports and this evaluation report all provide strong arguments for how and why contributing to a Phase 2 will be effective, and extremely important in Ethiopia's economic development.
- Phase 2 development needs a driver, an organisation or agency responsible for the preparations and negotiations necessary to complete documentation and to find and



- engage a donor. As well as an organisation or agency, a specific individual should be nominated as the driver, on behalf of the partner organisations of the Phase 2.
- Through Phase 2 there should be a shift toward a more significant Government of Ethiopia governance and management model.
    - Sector developments are ready for this.
    - The donor strategy will be strengthened in this context.
    - The critical area *may* be the *ownership and direction at the regional/ local levels*. From the beginning of the second phase, drivers at Bureau level will be important, and Government leadership is simply of greatest importance.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

The implementation of a Phase 2 requires a significant focus on monitoring and evaluation approaches. Specifically, the implementation needs to be able to quantify the work and results of the intervention. A fully developed plan to measure, quantitatively and qualitatively, the change brought about by the programme is required, and should be developed as part of inception processes to ensure it is an effective tool throughout implementation.

### **Marketing**

As discussed in the body of the report, the marketing component was the least visible aspect of the JP. While there were strong marketing outputs, notable the value chain linkages and the work on packaging and labelling, Phase 2 needs to incorporate a more well-developed marketing approach and strategy, across all components of the scale-up.



# Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme – Final Evaluation Report

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## 1 Background and Rationale

### 1.1 Introduction

The following provides an introduction to the sector framework in which the *Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme* fits, as well as introducing the JP itself. The material below draws heavily on the JP's project document, and on the sector strategy of the Agro-Industries Master Plan. The JP was designed as a pilot project to address the issues of the oil seeds sector indicated in the Master Plan<sup>1</sup>. The JP worked to showcase development of an efficient oil seed value chain that would promote entrepreneurship, provide capital and services to farmers, raise demand for agricultural products and connect farmers with markets, addressing the production, handling, processing, marketing and distribution of oil seeds. Through the JP it was anticipated that employment and income would be generated, and that the productivity and quality of oil seeds and edible oil production would be enhanced. The process was intended to lead to increased food security and innovation throughout the value chain, increasing the income of farmers, processors and traders, and in so doing, addressing three MDGs: Goal 1 – poverty reduction, Goal 3 – gender equity improvement, Goal 7 - sustainable development.

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The JP was implemented by UNIDO as the lead agency, with FAO and the ILO, together with national counterparts which include the Ministry of Industry (MoI) as the lead governmental institution, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) as well as their regional and woreda<sup>2</sup> level representatives. The JP was governed according to the MDG-F governance structure which includes a National Steering Committee (NSC), Programme Management Committee (PMC), Regional Level Steering Committee (RLSC) and Regional Level Technical Committee (RLTC).

### 1.2 Situational Background in the Oil Seed Sector

The issues and priorities critical to achieving the potential of the oil seeds sector in Ethiopia are varied. They include the general level of growth of the country, requiring long-term solutions, to those that are specific to the sector. Issues and priorities of immediate and particular concern to the sector include:

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<sup>1</sup>Master Plan – this refers to the Agro-Industries Master Plan worked on by collaborating UN agencies, in cooperation with and on behalf of the Ethiopian Government. The Master Plan is a national strategy document to guide the development of agro-processing in Ethiopia.

<sup>2</sup>Woreda – 'Districts' – third level administrative divisions of Ethiopia, administered by local government.

- The transfer and adoption of suitable production technologies and farm practices.
- Input supply and planting material at close proximity.
- Appropriate post-harvest treatment and storage.
- Availability of finance to farmers for commodity production and on-farm activities.
- Diversification of production into non-traditional commodities.
- Institutional and human capacity to meet challenges.

*Production.* Oil seeds are the third most important commodity in terms of production and export in Ethiopia. According to the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA), oil crops are currently (2008/09) cultivated in about 0.86 million hectares, involving close to four million smallholder producers in the main production areas. The main oil seed crops include sesame, niger seed and linseed. Though this production contributes to household income, it is constrained due to too small-scale and fragmented land holdings. In this regard, it is revealing to note that eighty-six per cent of the sizes of holdings under oil seeds production fall in the range of less than five hectares. Holdings of greater than five and less than ten hectares account for twelve per cent. Holdings of greater than ten hectares account for less than two per cent of the total estimated area under oil seeds. A low use of agro-inputs and poor farm management, and a lack of market-oriented production such as contract farming, together with the high cost and limited availability of inputs (improved seeds, fertilizer and chemicals) add to overall low productivity.

*Processing.* Most domestic oil processing is undertaken by an estimated 850 small-scale and micro oil processing plants, accounting for ninety-five per cent of the manufacturing base of the edible oil industry. Capacity utilization in the industrial branch is seriously constrained both by the quantity and quality of oil seeds available. Many of these small and medium enterprises use obsolete equipment and technology. Working conditions and the level of sanitary and hygienic standards is far below acceptable levels. Edible oil refining capacities are limited to some twenty-six medium and large industries, utilizing about thirty per cent of capacity. Considering import-intensity (a technical coefficient that measures the share or magnitude of imported intermediate goods to produce a unit of final demand) the edible oil industry, at less than two per cent, provides an opportunity/ potential to be competitive both domestically and internationally given the domestic base of the raw material, oil seeds, and integration with the local economy. The edible oil sub-sector, however, does not perform well in all aspects of its operational parameters. Capacity utilization of the edible oil sub-sector is by far the lowest among the food manufacturing sector industries and the average of the Ethiopian manufacturing industries over the past few years. The sub-sector has diverse and significant constraints.

*Marketing.* Marketing and distribution of oil seeds is mainly done by small and medium scale traders with poor marketing facilities, especially for collection, storage and transportation, which cause high post-harvest losses. The marketing chain is long, with many intermediaries adding little value to the final product, with high transaction costs being incurred. Lack of access to packaging services, poor access to financial services, and poor vertical and horizontal collaboration within, as well as external to the chain, all negatively impact on the industry.

## 2 Description of the PSD Programme in Ethiopia

### 2.1 Introduction

The JP involved itself in this framework. Its stated objective was to ‘enhance the sustainable supply system of raw material at desired quantity and quality, promote efficient processing capacity and improve access to markets by the effective *integration and lead role of the private sector* in the entire value chain’. The JP did not intend to provide producer-oriented support for production – it intended to integrate the private sector in all aspects of the value chain, from production to processing to marketing and business support services. The JP was mainly targeted at small farmers, and small and medium enterprises in the Oromia and Amhara Regions, as well as their supportive public bodies and private sector counterparts. The JP intended to pioneer a ‘private sector led supply of raw material, capacity building for enhanced processing technologies and linkage promotion for access to finance and local and international markets’.

The JP has drawn on a number of lessons learned from other initiatives in agro-processing in general and in the oil seeds sub-sector in particular. One such lesson, as stated in JP documentation, comes from the SNV-supported project on the oil seed value chain. It is that ‘intervention in the sub-sector needs to focus on the whole value chain. Intervention either at processing, production or marketing would not help much’. Moreover, from the SNV experience it was also decided that the JP would ‘enhance coordination and dialogues among various stakeholders in the value chain in the Oromia and Amhara Regions at local level in order to catalyse improvement of productivity and competitiveness for sustainable growth’, ie it would not focus at the national level but locally.

A further lesson that has been applied in design was the need to focus on policy level linkages. The JP design included ‘development of policies and strategies as required under the framework of the existing government strategies’, to strengthen and ensure an appropriate policy framework. Finally, based on the work of the ILO with member-based associations, as an effective way of promoting the rights, responsibilities and entitlements of marginalised groups, the JP design incorporated the involvement of small and medium enterprises in the value chain.

### 2.2 Results Structure of the JP

The following summarises the results structure of the JP, and is the structure against which the JP is assessed for relevance and effectiveness. The assessment of results in these output/outcome areas is detailed in a later section.

#### 2.2.1 Outcome 1 - Productivity and competitiveness of private sector led agricultural production of oil seeds is enhanced.

##### 1.1 The supply of farm inputs (seeds, fertilizers and chemicals) is improved.

- 1.1.1 Technical support given to seed producers/farmer associations to enhance quality/quantity in oil seed production.
- 1.1.2 Capacity building on entrepreneurship, business planning production and marketing provided to seed producers.
- 1.1.3 Access to fertilizers facilitated by a government and private sector facility.
- 1.1.4 Support and incentives to enhance cooperatives and private sector participation in input supplies for oil seed producers.

## **1.2 Access to credit is facilitated for the small holder and commercial farms to enable easier procurement of inputs.**

1.2.1 Credit facilities supported through financial intermediaries for procurement of farm inputs. (linked to 1.1.3).

## **1.3 Market-oriented farming is enhanced.**

1.3.1 Contract farming procedures between producers and agro-processors/ exporters are developed and implemented –linked to cluster zones approach (see 3.1).

1.3.2 Capacity building and institutional support provided to cooperatives, small traders and other SMEs to improve their management skills and capabilities, to enhance their competitiveness and profitability.

1.3.3 Pilot system in warehouse receipts linked to ECEX set up.

## **1.4 Enhanced investment in the production of oil seeds.**

1.4.1 Investment enhancing strategy is developed verified.

## **2.2.2 Outcome 2 - The capacity and competitiveness of the stakeholders for processing of edible oil seeds is enhanced.**

### **2.1 Storage, cleaning and grading of the oil seeds improved.**

2.1.1 Cleaning and grading facilities (including storage) established in four market oriented cooperatives on a pilot basis.

2.1.2 Results of the pilot effectively disseminated among other market-oriented cooperatives and processor.

### **2.2 Improved processing efficiency in the targeted oil seed processing industries.**

2.2.1 Oil extraction technology modernized in targeted processing plants.

### **2.3 Product safety and quality improved.**

2.3.1 Selected processing plants upgraded to improve overall quality and food safety.

2.3.2 Selected processing plants HACCP certified (ISO 22000).

### **2.4 The packaging of the final product is made more attractive for the market.**

2.4.1 Packaging lines of selected processing plants in Oromia and Amhara Regions upgraded.

### **2.5 Edible oil producers capacity and competitiveness enhanced through PPP.**

2.5.1 Working group on edible oil with in PPP structure established and capacity to dialogue strengthened.

2.5.2 Knowledge and best experience gained from other countries on edible oil sub sector.

2.5.3 Agro-industry master plan promoted through PPP.

### **2.6 Access to finance for the processors including processors cooperatives improved.**

2.6.1 Barriers to access financial services lifted.

2.6.2 Processors are linked to financial service providers.

2.6.3 Capacity of processors and financial institutions enhanced.

## **2.7 Capacity of Business Development Service(BDS) providers enhanced to deliver relevant and effective services to the processors including processors cooperatives**

2.7.1 BDS providers linked to the processors.

2.7.2 BDS providers avail BDS that is demand driven and responds to the needs of SMEs and larger processors.

## **2.8 The Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) practice of the large processors and cooperatives strengthened.**

2.8.1 The state of OSH practices and gaps in the processing industry identified.

2.8.2 Enterprise level OSH programmes in place.

## **2.9 Processors organized to get economic of scale, representation and voice.**

2.9.1 Association and/ or entrepreneurs' cooperatives formed which provides relevant and effective services to the processors (linked to 2.5 and 3.1).

## **2.10 Processors in the informal economy upgraded to graduate into the formal economy.**

2.10.1 Key drivers of informality among the processors identified.

2.10.2 Enabling capacity, system and infrastructure in place to facilitate the transformation. (Linked to 2.6 and 2.7).

### **2.2.3 Outcome 3 - Access to local and international markets for edible oil producers is improved.**

## **3.1 Vertical linkages between oil seed producers, traders and processors are improved through clustering.**

3.1.1 SME Networks formed and joint actions undertaken.

3.1.2 Business Development Service upgraded to offer services to SME oil processors.

## **3.2 Linkages between the processors and marketing agents are enhanced.**

3.2.1. Joint marketing actions facilitated to networks of processors.

## **3.3 Access to finance for the marketing agents and marketing cooperatives improved to enable bulk orders and bulk purchasing.**

3.3.1 Marketing agents and cooperatives are linked to financial service providers.

3.3.2 Savings and credit cooperatives established.

## **3.4 Marketing agents are enabled to access local, regional and international markets.**

3.4.1 Capacity of marketing agents strengthened to access new markets (linked to 2.3 and 2.4).

# **3 Purpose and Methodology of the Final Evaluation**

## **3.1 Purpose**

The intent of the evaluation was to understand in detail what the JP undertook *to do* and what it undertook *to accomplish*, and to use the experience and knowledge of key JP stakeholders to analyse JP activities and results against the JP's design.

## 3.2 Methodology

The evaluator used project documentation to provide the indicators of success against which analysis was undertaken. These indicators, together with the specific requirements of the evaluation Terms of Reference, provided the framework in which the project was evaluated. The evaluation methodology incorporated four key components to provide the information and reflection required to understand JP implementation and results. The four were:

- Review of project documentation. The desk-top study provided the opportunity for the evaluator to assess actual project activities, outputs and outcomes against the JP plan. This analytical process allowed the key evaluation questions to be developed further and in more detail. Reports indicated the appropriateness of design, and where further questions on design issues were necessary. The documentation itself gave insights into project management processes and approaches that were useful in assessing project efficiency. Quality of activity implementation and of outputs and outcomes were apparent in the reports, or the reports indicated where further enquiries were required.
- Field work. Interviews and focus group conversations with JP personnel and other JP stakeholders were undertaken at national and local levels. Interview questionnaires were developed along the lines of the evaluation questions, refined based on the desk-top analysis of project documentation and in relation to the specific role and background of the interviewee. The intent of these interviews/ focus group discussions was to draw out further information and analysis regarding the design, process and results of the project. The discussions were a qualitative process.

The evaluator spoke with a total of 73 people: 3 government representatives, 5 representatives of other agency stakeholders (Universities, AECID and SNV), 11 JP personnel or UN representatives, 12 representatives of regional technical and steering committees, 11 processors and 32 farmers, cooperative and cooperative union representatives.

A range of interviews were undertaken in Addis Ababa. These included JP and UN personnel, and representatives of Government – partner Ministries.

The evaluator visited the Amhara region. During this visit, the evaluator interviewed and visited processing facilities in Bahir Dar and Hamusit, as well as the Bahir Dar Edible Oil Producers Association and the Nile Edible Oil Manufacturing Industry PLC. Discussions focused on changes in hygiene and other production practices, including technological improvements in processing and packaging, as well as improvements in the marketing chain.

A visit was also undertaken to a producers cooperative in AlemBer, where a focus group discussion was held with farmers, growers of noug (niger) seed, together with employees of the cooperative. The discussion focused on support provided by the JP and, specifically, changes in practice and the farmers' experience of improvements in production and income as a result of the JP.

A focus group discussion was held with representatives of the JP's technical and steering committee for the Amhara region.

The evaluator visited Adama and the Arsi Zone. As with the Amhara region visits, discussions were held with farmers (in Aleko village; linseed growers) a farmer's cooperative and a cooperative union, where the discussion was on JP support to changes in practice in agronomy. Visits were also undertaken to processors, and the

processor's association and PLC (Right Oil PLC), for discussions on improvements in processing practice and technology and marketing linkages.

A focus group discussion was held with representatives of the JP's technical and steering committee for the Oromia region.

- Analytical processes. The evaluator used the material from the desk-top study and the field work (interviews and focus group discussions) as the basis for an analysis of the JP in the context of the defined evaluation questions.
- Reporting. The evaluation report provides the detailed discussion of the analysis, and addresses each of the evaluation questions. The process was heavily qualitative, drawing on the experience of participants, stakeholders and the evaluator in understanding and commenting on JP design and implementation.

### 3.3 UNEG Ethical Principles

The evaluator's approach followed the ethical principles and standards of the UNEG:

- Anonymity and confidentiality. The evaluation respects the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.
- Responsibility. The report mentions any dispute or difference of opinion that arise between the evaluator and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/ or recommendations. The report corroborates all assertions, and notes disagreements.
- Integrity. The report highlights any issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is required to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.
- Independence. The evaluator confirms his independence from the JP, and that he is not involved in its management or any element of the JP.
- Incidents. The evaluator undertakes to advise the MDG-F Secretariat immediately of any problems arising during fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, and acknowledges that any failure to notify such problems immediately means they cannot be used to justify any failure to complete the activities and achieve the outcomes anticipated in the evaluation ToR.
- Validation of information. The evaluator is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected and for the information presented in the evaluation report.
- Intellectual property. In handling information sources, the evaluator will respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities under review.
- Delivery of reports. If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than agreed, the penalties stipulated in the ToR will be applicable.



## 4 Review of Implementation

The following discusses in detail the changes occasioned as a result of the JP, and looks at each anticipated outcome and output of the JP in understanding the results of the joint programme.

### 4.1 Outcome 1 - Productivity and competitiveness of private sector led agricultural production of oil seeds is enhanced.

The JP has made an important contribution, in the context of a pilot programme, to delivering this outcome. For the group of oil seed farmers who have been involved with the JP, and for their related primary cooperatives, productivity and competitiveness of oil seeds has been enhanced. Much more work is to be done, and many more farmers and primary cooperatives must participate in the JP, or a related programme, for there to be significant benefit to the sector, and to Ethiopia as a whole, but the JP has demonstrated, clearly, the direction this work should take.

#### 1.1 The supply of farm inputs (seeds, fertilizers and chemicals) is improved.

This output has been delivered. Farmers, JP participants, have improved access to inputs for oil seed production through their primary cooperative, and a further developed relationship with the related cooperative union in support of a stronger structure of access to inputs. There is an improved supply of quality linseeds for target farmers – although the same cannot yet be said of niger seed.

1.1.1 Technical support given to seed producers/farmer associations to enhance quality/quantity in oil seed production.

The output has been fully delivered for the seed multiplication farmers and primary cooperatives involved in the JP. Specific outputs include 1121 farmers involved in improved seed production, through distribution of certified seeds, as well as the distribution of improved seeds to some farmers. A total of 519 ha of certified seed were planted.

Significant impetus was given to the JP's processes through the engagement of an agribusiness facilitator in each of the Oromia and Amhara regions. Prior to the engagement of these facilitators, the JP activities and outputs were behind schedule and weak in their implementation. The facilitators enabled successful outcomes to be achieved through the technical guidance and support of the country office.

1.1.2 Capacity building on entrepreneurship, business planning, production and marketing provided to seed producers. (Linked to 1.3.2.)

The output is delivered - for the farmers (and their primary cooperatives) involved in the JP, farmer capacity, particularly in the production and marketing of oil seeds has been built.

The training focus is on development of trainers, with 'development agents' and 'cooperative organisers', locally, and regionally. These are government funded positions. The training also targets primary cooperative and cooperative union personnel. Business planning is one area where capacity *has* changed– there are 54 primary cooperatives now having business plans that give them clear developmental directions for the near future.

The training with farmers focused on improved agronomic practices, including such as planting, fertilising, seed multiplication and 'post-harvest management'. One further



aspect of this has been the change in thinking of some farmers about the physical location of their oil seed produce, based on a proper thinking through of the costs/benefits. And, there are demonstrated changes for some farmers in the physical construction of their planting – some have moved their oil crop ‘inwards’, away from the border, based on what they learned. Some farmers are also renting land for oil crops.

1.1.3 Access to fertilizers facilitated by a government and private sector facility. (Linked to 1.2.1.)

The output is delivered - farmer participants in the JP have improved access to fertilizers, and have an increased understanding of how these can be best utilised to increase oil seed production. Systems for resolution of financial shortages for procurement of inputs during cultivation of edible seeds were demonstrated, and farmers were able to give full attention to cultivation of crops.

1.1.4 Support and incentives to enhance cooperatives and private sector participation in input supplies for oil seed producers.

The output is delivered – this is a strong output of the JP in the context of a pilot project. Much more needs to be done, nationally, but the JP’s work demonstrates an effective collaboration between cooperative unions, primary cooperatives and farmers in how supply of quality inputs can have a positive impact on production. Further, the established relationship ‘downstream’, to processors, has increased demand, on the supply side, for quality of supply systems and quality of material. (Linked to 1.2.1.)

## **1.2 Access to credit is facilitated for the small holder and commercial farms to enable easier procurement of inputs.**

This output has been delivered, although no ‘commercial farms’ have been included – the output area and JP activities have been focused only on small holders. Through JP work in this area a revolving fund was established, with cooperative unions, and farmers were able to access funds for procurement of inputs (seed, fertiliser, chemicals).

1.2.1 Credit facilities supported through financial intermediaries for procurement of farm inputs. (Linked to 1.1.3.)

The output is delivered - farmer participants in the JP have improved access to fertilizers, and have an increased understanding of how these can be best utilised to increase oil seed production. Systems for resolution of financial shortages for procurement of inputs during cultivation of edible seeds were demonstrated, and farmers were able to give full attention to cultivation of crops.

Four farmer cooperative unions and 31 primary cooperatives established a revolving fund to assist in input purchasing and aggregation of farmer produce. Credit agreements were established between the cooperative unions and the primary cooperatives.

## **1.3 Market-oriented farming is enhanced.**

The output has been delivered. It is a strong aspect of the JP for the farmers, primary cooperatives and cooperative unions involved in the JP, as the downstream linkages that have been created are important changes, and indicate important directions in future development along the value chain. The farmer’s market is processors, largely, and very good linkages with processors, their associations and PLCs are being developed.

1.3.1 Contract farming procedures between cooperative unions/ primary cooperatives and agro-processor exporters are developed and implemented –linked to cluster zones approach (see 3.1).

The output is delivered, although there has been no focus on export. It is the view of the evaluator that all references to an export focus for the JP, at the design stage, were not relevant, as the actual focus on import replacement is more likely to succeed, and is of greater relevance to the sector. The JP has demonstrated how strong, effective linkages can be made between farmers (together with primary cooperatives and cooperative unions) and processors (individuals as well as associations and PLCs).

1.3.2 Capacity building and institutional support provided to cooperatives, small traders and other SMEs to improve their management skills and capabilities, to enhance their competitiveness and profitability.

The output is delivered. Capacity-building activities have been provided at both producer (cooperative) and processor level. A total of 1467 farmers, 241 persons from farmer cooperatives, 180 subject matter specialists and 111 oil producers and small traders took part in the training. Whether or not the activities associated with this output will be effective in the longer term, ie whether or not management capacity has been built, cannot be assessed at this time.

1.3.3 Pilot system in warehouse receipts linked to ECEX set up.

Some efforts were made in introducing a warehouse receipts system, including a study on a system, input vouchers and contract farming. As well, training was organised for partner institutions. However, the output was not delivered. From inception, it became clear that private warehouses were extremely limited in availability, nor at a standard optimal for operationalization of a warehouse receipts system. Upgrading of existing warehouses from JP funds was not possible due to the high costs. In this context activities related to the warehouse receipts system were not fully implemented.

#### **1.4 Enhanced investment in the production of oil seeds.**

Some change is visible on the seed production side of the value chain, with farmers, primary cooperatives and cooperative unions – participants in the JP – all demonstrating stronger investment practices in oil seed production. However, no real focus was placed specifically on this output area during the JP, and the enhancements to investment which are visible are more likely to be attributable to other activities of the JP.

1.4.1 Investment enhancing strategy is developed verified.

Activities related to this output area were not undertaken, and the output was not delivered.

<b>Table of changes as a result of the JP</b>	
<b>Prior to the JP</b>	<b>As a result of the JP</b>
<p>Limited farmer knowledge of seeding, cultivation and harvesting of oil seed.</p> <p>Traditional farming practices for oil seed.</p> <p>Oil seed not seen as a key cash crop.</p> <p>Poor quality seed stock available to farmers.</p> <p>Limited, and poor quality land selection for crop cultivation.</p>	<p>Improved access to improved seed stock.</p> <p>Improved knowledge of oil seed planting, cultivating and harvesting.</p> <p>Demonstrated improvements in practice, by farmers, in oil seed cultivation and harvesting.</p> <p>Demonstrated improvements in oil seed production quantities.</p> <p>Improved quality of product supplied to the market (processors).</p> <p>Improved sales prices for oil seed production.</p> <p>Improved attitude of the target farmers in production of oil seed, with a perspective of oil seed as a major crop being developed.</p> <p>Expressed and communicated need for an expansion of growing areas, and for an improvement in selection of land for cultivation.</p>
<p>Limited or no support to farmers from primary cooperatives and/ or cooperative unions in farming practices.</p>	<p>Development of the relationship between cooperative unions/ primary cooperatives and farmers in support of improved farming practice.</p> <p>Improved access to quality seeds for farmers.</p>
<p>Limited support to farmers from regional governments in farming practices.</p>	<p>The Amhara region has prepared an extension package for edible oil crops.</p>
<p>Limited support to farmers from primary cooperatives and/ or cooperative unions with market linkages.</p>	<p>Improved access to markets (processors) via cooperatives and cooperative unions, including Memorandums of Understanding.</p> <p>Improved seed cleaning capacity and systems for farmers and primary cooperatives at the cooperative unions.</p> <p>The supply of Noug and linseed in quality and quantity has been improved as a result of the created market linkages.</p> <p>The quality of oil seeds supplied to the processors has been improved as a result of the 2% price incentive provided as per the contractual agreement and after the post-harvest handling and storage management training was delivered.</p> <p>Processors express an interest in the purchase of oil seeds from the target cooperative unions/ primary cooperatives due to the supply of quality products. This has created trust among cooperatives and traders.</p> <p>Some of the target primary cooperatives have employed staff such as a cashier and a grain purchaser to aid the proper functioning of their marketing activities.</p>
<p>No linkages, no cooperation with oil seed processors.</p>	<p>Two Regional Steering Committees, comprising members representing all relevant stakeholders, formed and meet regularly. Acts as governing body for cluster activities.</p> <p>MOUs signed between Nile PLC and Right PLC and Primary Cooperatives in the project area.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Processors purchasing directly from primary cooperatives.</li> <li>• Prices agreed directly that are to the advantage of farmers.</li> <li>• Producers providing unadulterated seeds direct to processors – better quality in larger quantities.</li> <li>• Middle men (brokers/ traders) no longer a factor in supply or pricing.</li> <li>• Trust and friendship is developing between producers and processors.</li> <li>• Farmers have good reasons and motivation to cultivate more oil seed.</li> </ul>
<p>No linkages, no cooperation with other stakeholders.</p>	

## **4.2 Outcome 2 - The capacity and competitiveness of the stakeholders for processing of edible oil seeds is enhanced.**

The JP has made a significant contribution to this outcome. Processors of oil seeds have experienced, and express, a renewed confidence in the sector, and through linkages within the processing component of the value chain, and up and down the value chain (but particularly with seed growers and their related cooperatives and cooperative unions). These linkages, which function within the cluster arrangement of the sector, are the strongest indicator from the JP of the necessary future directions both for a potential scale-up of the JP and for the development of the sector nationwide. There is significant potential in Ethiopia for domestic production of edible oil to replace imports, and the JP has demonstrated a particularly effective and successful to improving processor competitiveness and capacity to achieve this result.

### **2.1 Storage, cleaning and grading of the oil seeds improved.**

This output has been delivered. The JP has been able to bring a much improved process of storage and cleaning to farmers and farmer cooperatives.

2.1.1 Cleaning and grading facilities (including storage) established in four market oriented cooperatives on a pilot basis.

This output has been delivered, with the construction of buildings and installation of seed cleaning and grading equipment now completed in both cooperative unions (one in Amhara and one in Oromia). As well as the hardware, there is a system in place for cleaning that is remarked on by producers, producer cooperatives and processors alike – seed is reaching the processors cleaner, and without contamination.

2.1.2 Results of the pilot effectively disseminated among other market-oriented cooperatives and processor.

This output was not delivered. A study on the supply of cottonseed, and its preparation, was completed but has not yet been shared across the sector. It is understood the intent is to make this a component of Phase 2 of the JP.

### **2.2 Improved processing efficiency in the targeted oil seed processing industries.**

This output has been delivered. Indeed, this component has been both the focus of the JP and its most apparent success. There are a number and range of success stories on the processing side, stories that present improvements in the quality of production and in the economic benefits which accrue from improvements in supply chain and processing technologies. These stories represent the JP's strong outputs, and its importance as a pilot for the oil seed processing sector in Ethiopia.

The evaluator particularly notes:

- The improved confidence among processors related to their future in the industry, and in the industry itself.
- The improved processing practice, visible in a wide range of plants.
- The improved quality of product, notable particularly with certified production.
- The development in both regions of a joint processing facility (see discussion at 2.5 below).

2.2.1 Oil extraction technology modernized in targeted processing plants.

This output has been delivered. As well as improved access to better quality and unadulterated seed, processors also demonstrate a better appreciation of the link

between production practice and income, and the importance of cleaner processing practices, improved packaging and labelling. Targeted processors are seeing improved quantity of production, improved quality of oil and better access to markets, all of which contributes to improvements in incomes and increased employment in their factories.

### **2.3 Product safety and quality improved.**

This output has been delivered. The JP has demonstrated both the possibility and the positive benefits for processors of improvements in processing practice that deliver higher levels of product safety and quality.

#### **2.3.1 Selected processing plants upgraded to improve overall quality and food safety.**

This output has been delivered. There is a visible improvement in the physical status of processing plants, with a related improvement in the overall quality of the product. Most notable is the number of partner processors whose production has been certified by the Ethiopian Quality Standards Agency. Activities and outputs of the JP in this output area are strong indicators of what can be achieved through a scaling-up of the JP.

#### **2.3.2 Selected processing plants HACCP certified (ISO 22000).**

HACCP certification has not been achieved. HACCP certification will be one focus of the developing joint processing facilities (see 2.5).

### **2.4 The packaging of the final product is made more attractive for the market.**

This output has been delivered. The JP's work with processors in terms of packages and labels, and the related participation in a variety of trade fairs, has given these producers a better visibility in the market, and a position that is clearly more attractive to consumers. Product is now sold beyond the immediate, local market, and is visible on supermarket shelves.

#### **2.4.1 Packaging lines of selected processing plants in Oromia and Amhara Regions upgraded.**

See above.

### **2.5 Edible oil producers capacity and competitiveness enhanced through PPP.**

With one particular development, the JP has gone well beyond its design, and has established both the nature of and a clear plan for potentially critical changes to the structure and functioning of the oil seed sector in the future. This development, the establishment in both the Amhara and Oromia regions of joint processing facilities, has been an exemplary demonstration of a public private partnership, and sets the stage for potentially significant developments in the sector. The most critical aspects of this output, each of which points in particularly important directions of success, include:

- The provision of land for the facilities by the regional governments.
- The contributions being made by each individual processor to the financial establishment costs of the facilities.
- The involvement of the regional steering and technical committees (ie, involvement of the cluster) in development activities.
- Processor Associations established and functional, providing a single voice for processors, improving communication up and down the value chain, and with government.

- Two processor PLCs established – formal entities that will form the core of joint processor involvement in the sector. The PLCs are strongly supported, including financially, by processors, and provide both a strong linkage to farmers and farmer cooperatives and to all areas related to the production of quality oil and its marketing.

2.5.1 Working group on edible oil with in PPP structure established and capacity to dialogue strengthened.

This output was delivered. See above.

2.5.2 Knowledge and best experience gained from other countries on edible oil sub sector.

This output was delivered. A number and range of oil seed sector actors, from political, extension, production and processing components of the sector, have benefited from study tours and exchanges with the edible oil sector in India and Malaysia.

2.5.3 Agro-industry master plan promoted through PPP.

This output was delivered. The AIMP and the JP have demonstrated significant synergy in their joint contributions to sector developments. The Master Plan provides a well-considered structure and strategy, and JP demonstrates effective implementation. Together they provide a clear ‘road map’ for the future of the sector.

## **2.6 Access to finance for the processors including processors cooperatives improved.**

This output was delivered. See below.

2.6.1 Barriers to access financial services lifted.

This output was delivered. The Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) has approved three new lines of credit relevant to the edible oil value chain, for:

- Edible oil refining projects.
- Integrated projects from farming to processing of oil crops.
- Cotton seed processing projects.

2.6.2 Processors are linked to financial service providers.

This output was delivered. The JP and DBE jointly organized two seminars at the two project sites to discuss on these new developments and other access to finance issues. The seminars were targeted at private sector operators, public sector organizations, the financial sector and support service providers.

2.6.3 Capacity of processors and financial institutions enhanced.

This output was delivered. A range of training programmes were delivered, to processors and service providers, as part of the JP. The training included a focus on entrepreneurship, and on enterprise development.

## **2.7 Capacity of Business Development Service(BDS) providers enhanced to deliver relevant and effective services to the processors including processors cooperatives.**

This output was delivered. A training program on Cluster Development Approaches was organized. The training targeted public and private sector BDS providers and enhanced the capacity of local and federal government organizations and BDS providers, particularly:

- Senior and mid-level officers from the Ministry of Industry.
- Federal Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency (FEMSEDA).

- Regional Micro and Small Enterprises Development Agency (REMSEDA).
- Industry and Urban Development Bureaus, the relevant Bureaus of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing, Cooperative Development, and Labour and Social Affairs.
- Local administration and municipalities.
- Financial institutions.
- Private consulting firms.
- Universities.

2.7.1 BDS providers linked to the processors.

See above.

2.7.2 BDS providers avail BDS that is demand driven and responds to the needs of SMEs and larger processors.

See above.

## **2.8 The occupational safety and health (OSH) practice of the large processors and cooperatives strengthened.**

This output has been delivered. The JP worked together with the Bureaus of Labour and Social Affairs in the delivery of activities related to this output area. Delivered activities did not focus on ‘large processors and cooperatives’, but across all of the JP’s participant processors. Having said this, much work remains: as with food safety and product quality, while significant change is visible, two significant issues remain, although they are beyond the scope of the JP. One, more improvement is needed for the individual processors who have participated in the JP to date. Two, participant processors comprise only a small representation of the sector nationwide. Both these issues must be addressed, if the health and safety of the industry (both in terms of the product and in terms of employees) is to achieve appropriate levels.

It is noted that the design and implementation of the joint processing facilities incorporate worker and product health and safety considerations and practice.

2.8.1 The state of OSH practices and gaps in the processing industry identified.

This output has been delivered, within the context of the JP’s target processors. As a result, work has been undertaken and changes begun that have the potential for significant change in workplace practice. See above.

2.8.2 Enterprise level OSH programmes in place.

This output has been delivered. There is a visible change in the structure and application of OSH practice with JP processors, including some demonstrations that processor understanding goes beyond a simple application of ‘the law’ to an understanding that improvements in OSH can bring improvements to the organisation’s bottom line. See above.

## **2.9 Processors organized to get economic of scale, representation and voice.**

This output has been delivered. The complete discussion can be found at 2.5 above.

2.9.1 Association and/ or entrepreneurs’ cooperatives formed which provides relevant and effective services to the processors (linked to 2.5 and 3.1).

This output has been delivered. See 2.5 above.

## **2.10 Processors in the informal economy upgraded to graduate into the formal economy.**



This output has been delivered. The complete discussion can be found at 2.5 above.

#### 2.10.1 Key drivers of informality among the processors identified.

This output has been delivered. See above.

#### 2.10.2 Enabling capacity, system and infrastructure in place to facilitate the transformation. (Linked to 2.6 and 2.7).

This output has been delivered. See above.

<b>Table of changes as a result of the JP</b>	
<b>Prior to the JP</b>	<b>As a result of the JP</b>
No linkages, no joint action and no cooperation among processors.	Amhara Edible Oil Processors Sectoral Association, a registered not-for-profit organisation, formed. Adama Edible Oil Producers Association, a registered not-for-profit organisation, formed. Right Edible Oil Producers PLC formed. Nile Edible Oil Manufacturing Industry PLC formed.
No linkages, no cooperation with oil seed suppliers.	Professional and business relationships established between processors and: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Universities (training, laboratory services, study).</li> <li>• Cooperative Promotion Agency (facilitating linkage with union/primary association for bulk purchasing, training).</li> <li>• Ethiopian Conformity Assessment Enterprises (training, testing, consultation, provision of certification of quality).</li> <li>• Professional associations (ESME) for the design of manufacturing technology.</li> <li>• BDS providers (Study, training, consultancy services).</li> </ul> Two Regional Steering Committees, comprising members representing all relevant stakeholders, formed and meet regularly. Acts as governing body for cluster activities. MOUs signed between Nile PLC and Right PLC and Primary Cooperatives in the project area. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Processors purchasing directly from primary cooperatives.</li> <li>• Prices agreed directly that are to the advantage of farmers.</li> <li>• Producers providing unadulterated seeds direct to processors – better quality in larger quantities.</li> <li>• Middle men (brokers/ traders) no longer a factor in supply or pricing.</li> <li>• Trust and friendship is developing between producers and processors.</li> <li>• Farmers have good reasons and motivation to cultivate more oil seed.</li> </ul>
No linkages, no cooperation with other stakeholders.	
No linkages with existing refinery services.	A number of processors now sell their crude oil production to a large refinery, improving the consistency of their income.
Cutthroat competition occasioning falling profit margins and bitter conflicts – loss of business confidence and loss of sense of future directions.	Municipal support, through a land grant, for the establishment of the two joint refining operations, one in the Amhara region and one in Oromia. The land has been provided, and initial designs prepared. Processors have contributed financially to the development, and a line of credit has been established. As a result, a cluster engagement is underway, within a defined industrial zone. Amhara Edible Oil Processors Sectoral Association, a registered not-for-profit organisation, formed. Adama Edible Oil Producers Association, a registered not-for-profit organisation, formed. Right Edible Oil Producers PLC formed.
No joint investment initiatives in existence.	



<b>Table of changes as a result of the JP</b>	
<b>Prior to the JP</b>	<b>As a result of the JP</b>
	<p>Nile Edible Oil Manufacturing Industry PLC formed.</p> <p>The PLCs demonstrate a number of important developments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bulk purchase of raw materials from union and cooperative associations.</li> <li>• Establishment of a common refinery, packaging and joint marketing.</li> </ul>
No formal, responsible sectoral and business associations providing leadership to the sector.	<p>Amhara Edible Oil Processors Sectoral Association, a registered not-for-profit organisation, formed.</p> <p>Adama Edible Oil Producers Association, a registered not-for-profit organisation, formed.</p>
Production and sale of a low quality product (crude, unpackaged, unlabelled and unbranded oil).	<p>A number of processors now have production quality certified by the Ethiopian Quality Standards Agency.</p> <p>A number of processors now bottle and label their production, and have a brand identity.</p> <p>Production is being promoted through trade fairs.</p>
Sales restricted to the locality of processors – in proximity to their processing plants.	A number of JP stakeholders sell much more widely than in the past, including through regional consumer associations and in Addis. The packaged product is visible on supermarket shelves.
Processing plants operating at low levels.	Visible improvement in quantity of processing; visible increase in employment numbers in partner plants.
Low technical skills and knowledge.	Visible improvements in partner processor knowledge of food safety, quality production and processing technologies. Visible and verified improvements in the quality of production.
Use of obsolescent and out-dated technology and inappropriate production processes.	A number of partner processors have updated their equipment, and well as their processing lines, producing a higher quality final product. Some have moved from crude oil sales to semi-refined sales – some even to refined production.
Inappropriate working premises (processing plants).	<p>Processors have developed new knowledge and skills in OSH, as well as in the effective operation and maintenance of equipment. As a result, there is a visible improvement in the cleanliness and operational systems in processing plants, with four particular improvements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Processors now know how to set up and maintain their own screw presses.</li> <li>• Extraction efficiency has increased.</li> <li>• General plant economics have improved.</li> <li>• Sanitation and food safety has improved.</li> </ul>
Limited or no access to training/ capacity building services.	<p>Processors have participated in skill training and business management training, and have been directly exposed to high-quality processing in other countries. They have demonstrated improvements in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scientific processing and the importance of refining oils.</li> <li>• The knowledge and application of Quality and Standard requirements.</li> <li>• Identification of their product's quality status.</li> <li>• Required technologies.</li> <li>• Development of effective business relationships and the importance of sectoral association.</li> </ul>

### **4.3 Outcome 3 - Access to local and international markets for edible oil producers is improved.**

The JP has made a strong contribution to the achieving this outcome. The most important aspect of the JP's success in this component of the value chain was not in relation to

international markets, but in the development of the vertical linkages within the value chain that have contributed to an improved marketing framework for seed growers, cooperatives and processors. Much more work is required within the value chain, and in the establishment of significant markets arrangements for the domestic edible oils, but clear directions have been demonstrated.

### **3.1 Vertical linkages between oil seed producers, traders and processors are improved through clustering.**

This output has been delivered. The vertical linkages, represented by MoUs between the PLC and the farmer's primary cooperatives/ cooperative unions, are a critical JP outcome. These MoUs, and the functioning of the relationship between seed growers and processors, is a particularly strong output of the JP, and a particularly strong indicator of future directions for development of the sector. The agreements benefit all components of the value chain, and the Ethiopian economy generally. 2.5 above provides a summary of outputs and outcomes.

#### 3.1.1 SME Networks formed and joint actions undertaken.

See above. Further, the establishment of the PLCs and the joint refining operations are specific examples of the formation of SME networks and the undertaking of joint actions. The JP has been particularly effective in demonstrating the value and effectiveness of networking, and of joint activities by growers, grower cooperatives and processors.

#### 3.1.2 Business Development Service (BDS) upgraded to offer services to SME oil processors.

See 2.7 above.

### **3.2 Linkages between the processors and marketing agents are enhanced.**

This output has been delivered. 2.5 above provides a summary of outputs and outcomes. It is worth noting, on the marketing side, that the JP's emphasis has been on the linkages within the value chain, and on strengthening the market relationships therein, as opposed to finding and developing markets outside. As packaging and labelling improved, as a result of the JP's efforts, participation by processors in trade fairs has been enabled, and markets for these processors are developing.

Further, a study, *Market Assessment and Development of a Marketing Strategy for the Edible Oil Sector of Ethiopia* was completed, and the results of the study will inform and assist producers and processors going forward.

#### 3.2.1. Joint marketing actions facilitated to networks of processors.

See above.

### **3.3 Access to finance for the marketing agents and marketing cooperatives improved to enable bulk orders and bulk purchasing.**

See 2.6 above.

#### 3.3.1 Marketing agents and cooperatives are linked to financial service providers.

See 2.6 above.

#### 3.3.2 Savings and credit cooperatives established.

See 2.6 above.

### **3.4 Marketing agents are enabled to access local, regional and international markets.**

The JP did not directly address ‘marketing agents’, and their access to markets, as such did not exist. The JP focused on marketing internal to the value chain, ie strengthening linkages between farmers and processors and strengthening the quality of edible oils and the presentation of these products, as described at 3.2 above, and within the framework of the developing PLCs. Moving forward, more emphasis will be required in this area if fundamental change is to be achieved in the sector, however it is the view of the evaluator that focus should only be on local and regional markets – the intent of the structural change should not be on international markets, but on replacing imported oil with domestic production.

3.4.1 Capacity of marketing agents strengthened to access new markets (linked to 2.3 and 2.4).

See above.

<b>Table of changes as a result of the JP</b>	
<b>Prior to the JP</b>	<b>As a result of the JP</b>
No linkages, no joint action and no cooperation among processors.	Vertical linkages, represented by MoUs between the PLC and the farmer’s primary cooperatives/ cooperative unions, change the fundamentals of sector cooperation. The MoUs are a particularly strong indicator of future directions for development of the sector.  The JP’s emphasis has been on linkages within the value chain, and on strengthening the market relationships therein, as opposed to finding and developing markets outside.
No linkages, no cooperation with oil seed suppliers.	The JP has been particularly effective in demonstrating the value and effectiveness of networking, and of joint activities by growers, grower cooperatives and processors.

## 5 Beneficiaries

The project document is silent on planned beneficiaries. However, the Joint Programme has reported regularly on targets in four separate categories.

Oil Producers:

- Targeted – 4 large processing plants (see 2.3 & 2.4).
- Reached – 92 SMEs – oil processors.

Small holder farmers of oil seed (men):

- Targeted – 8,800.
- Reached – 1467.

Small holder farmers of oil seeds (women):

- Targeted – 4,600.
- Reached – 68.

Farmers Unions:

- Targeted – 4.
- Reached – 4.

## 6 Presentation of Findings

### 6.1 Design level

#### 6.1.1 Relevance - The extent to which the objectives of the JP were consistent with the needs and interests of the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals.

##### Key Findings

The Joint Programme:

- Has been a very important intervention, and pilots clear directions forward for the edible oil seed sector.
- Has demonstrated clear and specific responses to the oil seed production and oil seed processing problems described in the design.
- Has provided very practical ways forward for the edible oil value chain in how to substitute imported oil with domestic production.
- Has shown the significance of taking a value chain approach.

##### UNDAF Ethiopia

The JP was framed within the UNDAF as defined for Ethiopia<sup>3</sup>. At the outset it is worth noting that this document specifically states that the priorities of the UNDAF are ‘in alignment with areas are included in the PILLARS of the Governments Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) (2011-2015)’, providing a further linkage between Government priorities and UN/ JP directions. The JP specifically responded to the priority on Sustainable Economic Growth and Risk Reduction, which has four components:

- Natural resource management (including water resources, biodiversity, land productivity), Climate Change, community capacity to manage.

The JP does not respond to this component.

- Food security/ DRM.

The JP responds to this component indirectly.

- Private sector development – access to markets and financial services, legal and institutional enabling environment.

The JP responds directly to this component. It makes a strong contribution to important developments in this area, and pilots approaches and policies that can be significant contributors to sustainable economic growth if scaled up.

- Extension to services and research – scaling-up best practices.

The JP responds indirectly to this component. The role of the Universities and other technical agencies in the implementation of the JP, and particularly in their roles in regional technical and steering committees, contribute to extension service and research development, and to the scaling-up of good and best practice.

##### National Priorities

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<sup>3</sup>March 2011; Ethiopia United Nations Development Assistance Framework - 2012 to 2015; United Nations Country Team.

The JP demonstrated a significant correlation with national priorities, which created the partnership framework with Government, notably the Ministry of Industry, that provided serious impetus to implementation nationally and regionally. The State Minister for Industry was a key figure in JP governance, with the NSC and PMC each demonstrating a high level of knowledge about and commitment to the JP's intent and detailed design. The JP fit specifically and directly within the AIMP, with design closely aligned to Volume III, the Oil seeds Sub-sector strategy. This alignment was important in that it linked the content and process of the JP to Government strategy, and the close correlation added to Government commitment to the JP. It also created a strong foundation of cooperation, so that national and regional partners contributed in a number of ways to addressing design and implementation challenges as they appeared. At both regional and national level, governance and technical support from stakeholders was of a high quality. The PMC kept itself well-informed on JP developments, met regularly and provided leadership to the project team. The Bureaus, the Universities and other committee members, regionally, within the technical and steering committee framework, assisted in improving implementation outputs. As will be seen below, the economics of the JP are compelling for farmers and processors – their participation levels were high because they could see the immediate impact participation had on their incomes. At the partner level, Bureaus, Universities, Ministries, the economics were just as compelling, if not so directly important – all stakeholders readily saw the value to Ethiopia, and Ethiopia's economy, of improvements in domestic production and processing, and marketing of edible oil seeds. This readily visible link to economic change was strongly relevant to stakeholder participation in the JP.

### **Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)**

The MDGs themselves were not a core component of JP design, nor in the reporting; ie, they are not specifically visible in these documents. The JP does, however, respond directly to two MDGs.

#### **Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty And Hunger**

- Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1.25 a day.

The JP has a direct focus on the improvement in incomes for farmers and processors. It also is directed at improvements in Ethiopia's imports of edible oil, which impact negatively on the overall national economy.

- Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people.

The JP responds to this target as it aims to improve employment and work prospects in the farming community and with processors. Processors in particular note increases in employment in their enterprises.

#### **Goal 8: Develop A Global Partnership For Development**

- Target 8.B: Address the special needs of least developed countries.

The JP is addressing the specific economic needs and issues of a sub-sector of the Ethiopian economy – directly addressing this target.

- Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States.

The JP is addressing the specific economic needs and issues of a sub-sector of the Ethiopian economy – directly addressing this target.

The JP was, ultimately, a pilot. Current edible oil imports to Ethiopia exceed \$400 million annually – the JP indicates a direction to address a large percentage of this total, but in itself it cannot be judged to have been the solution. In indicating a direction, however, the JP is of significant relevance to the Government, and to its policies and programmes within the sub-sector. The JP has piloted an approach, a way forward, and with further development the changes which have begun at the farm and processor level, and within the chain in addressing market linkages, can be significant for the Ethiopian economy.

Joint programming was particularly well suited to the value chain approach of the JP, although the role and insistence of the Government of Ethiopia in discussions about the actual make-up of the JP were also of significance. Of particular relevance to the role of joint programming in the success of the JP was the tight correlation between output areas and UN Agency responsibilities/ capacities, coupled with the tight correlation between output areas and the edible oil value chain. The significance of these two factors in the success of JP design and implementation is, primarily, that there was nothing superfluous in either design or implementation. Every activity and output area contributed directly to anticipated results, and, generally, contributed ‘forward and backwards’ in the value chain. The Government insisted on a smaller group of UN Agencies than was initially discussed – and the correlation between implementing Agencies, Government ministries and outputs/ outcomes has, in the end, been an important success factor. This approach should be given strong consideration in the design of other joint programmes, as the tight correlation can be of real benefit to programme stakeholders – far from being a complex, and difficult to manage intervention, the different aspects contributed to each other’s, and to overall success.

The JP had a clear results logic, ie a clear theory of change. This clarity of logic, together with the tight correlation described above, was also an important success factor. At the activity level, a not insignificant number of changes were made early in implementation, not least as the result of the diagnostic studies undertaken as part of the cluster approach. These changes did not impact however further ‘up’ the logic, but enable the JP’s activities to better deliver on intended outputs and outcomes. As a result of this group of factors (tight correlation of output areas, value chain, Agency and Ministry responsibilities and capacities, theory of change) all being relatively strong, the JP has been able to deliver replicable results. Each of these factors contributed to the relevance of design, and to the effectiveness of delivery.

The JP has been monitored and evaluated jointly, and as is discussed in more detail below, the mid-term evaluation in particular was important to the success of the JP as it provided impetus to implementation changes that, had they not happened, would have left the JP with many less tangible results – indeed, while the JP has shown good results, as a pilot, they could have been stronger with more effective implementation from inception – a point also discussed further, below. The mid-term evaluation saw this and commented, and appropriate changes were made. However, it cannot be said that the JP’s M and E strategy contributed to the measurement of results. This is not, specifically, a criticism of the JP, or its M and E strategy, but of the far too short length of the intervention. The baseline study work is a good example of this – it is impossible within the timeframe of the JP to prepare and implement a baseline study, and to then do a follow-up study with any hope of measuring development results. It is hoped that the baseline study will provide a key aspect of the M and E strategy of a second phase of the JP. It is also hoped, and discussed further, below, that a much more detailed M and E strategy will be a key component of Phase 2 design and implementation. Measuring change, for farmers, processors and the sub-sector, as a result of the project, is a critical component of any follow-up intervention.

The mid-term evaluation also highlighted communication as a gap in JP design and implementation. As a result, the JP prepared a list of tools<sup>4</sup> to use in communicating the activities and results of the JP, and developed a plan for where to share these tools. The plan was followed, to a large extent, and its implementation was tracked. Communication had largely been done by the Regional Coordinator's Office (RCO), although this was somewhat ad hoc; ie there was no communication and advocacy resources within the JP's design and resourcing budget. Following the mid-term evaluation it was a responsibility picked up by the lead agency, although, again, without specific resources assigned. Within this context, it can be said that the JP's staff are of the view that they 'reached an audience that gained interest in the JP through our use of these tools.'<sup>5</sup>

### **Cross-cutting Issues**

The JP's project document referenced three cross-cutting issues of relevance in JP design: the environment, HIV/ AIDS and gender.

- Environment – the JP included, on the production side, sustainable land use in oil seed production within its work, including the provision of training on sustainable land management and soil conservation. The focus was on the related economic and environmental benefits for farmers.
- HIV/AIDS -the JP did not in fact have any focus or intent in relation to HIV/AIDS.
- Gender – the focus of the JP was on oil seed farmers and processors – men and women. No specific focus was placed on women farmers or processors, but on the sub-sector as a whole.

## **6.2 Process level**

### **6.2.1 Efficiency - Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results.**

#### **Key Findings**

The Joint Programme:

- Has reached an important level of implementation, and can be described as having been efficient in delivering planned outputs and outcomes.
- Benefited from Government leadership, and its insistence on a limited number of Agencies, and from the related close correlation between output/ outcome areas, Agency mandates and experience, and the related correlation with the value chain.
- Was hampered to a certain extent by the short timeframe, and by slow delivery of some critical aspects of the programme, notably on the oil seed production side.
- Successfully addressed the critical aspects of the slow delivery following the mid-term evaluation and delivered visible change in production and processing practice, and in market linkages.

#### **Government Ownership, and NSC and PMC**

The commitment and leadership of the Government has been noted, as has its insistence on a relatively small number of Agencies to work on the JP. This insistence was important to the

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<sup>4</sup> Two videos – one general and one for the JP; photo database; photo essay to be published on the MDGF website; posters; brochure; websites where we shared success stories; lessons learned briefings; created a 'cluster methodology' sheet for distribution; booklet that supports the video; newspaper stories on a number of occasions; trade fairs, including oil packaging and labels.

<sup>5</sup> JP staff during field interviews.



efficient implementation of the JP, for the reasons described above, ie the tight correlation of activities and outputs within the project’s logic and the close correlation with Government priorities. Further, the commitment of the Ministry of Industry to the detail of JP design and implementation processes brought with it a high level of commitment in the National Steering Committee (NSC) and the Programme Management Committee (PMC), which also flowed out to the regions – ‘directions from the Ministry went directly to the Bureaus’.<sup>6</sup>

There were issues with timeliness of implementation, particularly with relation to the production aspect and FAO’s area of responsibility, early in the JP. However, the mid-term evaluation effectively raised this issue, and allowed implementation approaches to be changed with enough time remaining for effective outcomes to be reached. As a result of the mid-term evaluation, FAO engaged facilitators in the field, as UNIDO had done on the processing side from inception. The engaged facilitators had a significant positive effect on implementation – qualitatively and quantitatively. More could have been achieved with this approach from JP start-up, but with this change the intended outputs have been delivered. ILO also had no local staffing, which impacted as well on their outputs and outcomes – marketing aspects of the JP, while not unimportant nor insignificant, are the least well-developed/ least visible of JP outputs and outcomes.

### **Delivering As One**

Delivering As One (DAO) worked conceptually, but in the end ‘each Agency had its own policies, own procedures and own implementation approaches. This needs to be addressed – it is not really DAO the way it is now. It has to be a single budget, a single administration, a single policy framework. If there are different policies, how can you be delivering as one?’<sup>7</sup> There was a real sense among JP staff that ‘the relationship was good’, but that this was mostly as a result of the fact that each was working on their own implementation. It can be argued that DAO worked well on the JP for the same reason that the JP overall was a success – the close correlation in Agency mandates and output/ outcome areas and the close correlation with the JP and the oil seed sector value chain; ie, not because of a DAO approach per se, but because of the tight logic in the JP’s design.

### **Financial Efficiency**

Committed expenditure against budget by Agency is as follows:

	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Committed</b>
<b>UNIDO</b>	\$1,156,724	\$1,142,846.61
<b>FAO</b>	\$1,061,062	\$881,163
<b>ILO</b>	\$782,170	\$759,076.54
<b>Total</b>	\$2,999,956 US	2,783,086.15

### **Joint Programme Approach**

A JP approach to this intervention was particularly appropriate, and of much greater efficiency and effectiveness than could have been achieved by a single Agency. The reasoning is as has been detailed above – the close correlation of project outputs/ outcomes with Agency mandates, the tight project logic and the value chain approach. A single Agency could not have delivered the JP, in its current form, and the JP’s outputs and outcomes could not have been achieved without the value chain approach.

### **Mid-term Evaluation**

<sup>6</sup>Bureau staff during field interviews.

<sup>7</sup>JP staff during field work.



The mid-term evaluation was of particular value to the JP team, and to the ultimate success of the JP. There were a number of specific contributions from evaluation that were important, but the most significant was the clear commentary on the slowness of delivery of some aspects, coupled with specific recommendations for resolving these issues. Implementation approaches were changed as a result of the mid-term evaluation, and the JP demonstrated more effective results as a direct result of these changes. The second most important change, as a result of the mid-term evaluation, was with regards to the communication and advocacy strategy/ plan. A specific focus was placed on communication as a result of the evaluation, and it has proved to be an effective component of implementation since that time. It is discussed in more detail below. Finally, and possibly most important from the perspective of outcomes, the mid-term evaluation occasioned a greater specific contribution from Government – the land for the joint processing facilities. This had not happened prior, and will likely bring significant long-term strength to JP outcomes.

An improvement plan was developed from the mid-term evaluation, and was implemented by the JP team.

### **6.2.2 Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's national/local partners in development interventions**

The strength of ownership and leadership from the Ministry of Industry is apparent throughout this report. The Minister of Industry was the owner of the project, and they demonstrated this ownership in a variety of ways, all of which contributed to outputs and outcomes. They were not, however, the only good example of leadership and ownership. The Ethiopian Quality Standards Authority also demonstrated strong partnership. At the regional level, Bureaus – particularly but not solely the Bureaus of Industry – also provided strong partnership involvement. The Universities in Adama and in Bahir Dar were strong local contributors to implementation, and to the successes of the JP.

Moreover, farmers, cooperatives, cooperative unions, processors, associations of processors and the PLCs all demonstrate a strong commitment to the activities, outputs and future directions of the JP, and to the changes that are becoming visible in the sector. It has been noted that there is a strong economic benefit for these groups in this engagement – and they have demonstrated their understanding of this benefit, and of their responsibilities in ensuring that change takes place.

## **6.3 Results level**

Detailed discussion on the specific activities and outputs of the JP are found above, at 0 – Review Of Implementation. The following discussion summarises the key results – outputs and outcomes – of the JP.

### **6.3.1 Effectiveness - Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved.**

#### **Key Findings**

The Joint Programme:

- Has achieved specific results, as planned, within the constrained timeframe and budget.
  - Attitudinal change developed among farmers and processors in the sector, and between different stakeholders (notably these same farmers and processors).
  - Common purchasing and joint sales by cluster members.

- Joint investments initiated – joint refining facility, procurement, marketing.
- Increased investment by different stakeholders – notably processors, but also farmers and farmer cooperatives.
- Improved skills levels demonstrated in cultivation of oil seeds.
- Improved production efficiency in the processing of oil seeds.
- Improved linkages (forward and backwards) demonstrated in the value chain.
- Improved negotiation and advocacy capacity visible in processor associations.
- Demonstrable improvements in marketing, throughout the value chain, and notable in improvement for farmers and improvements by processors of the quality and packaging of their product.
- Technical capacity of government, processors, association leadership and financial institutions increased in various areas of business development services, including access to finance.
- Stakeholder relationships developing, through the cluster approach, including not just direct stakeholders in the value chain but relevant government, agency and support stakeholders as well.
- Food safety improved.
- Occupational health and safety improved.
- New processing technologies demonstrated and introduced.
- Certified, bottled and labelled product visible in the marketplace.
- Has delivered visible change in production and processing practice, and in market linkages. Particularly noted are:
  - The improved confidence among processors related to their future in the industry, and in the industry itself.
  - The improved processing practice, visible in a wide range of plants.
  - The improved quality of product, notable particularly with certified production.
- Has demonstrated a clear path forward for the achievement of development results in the sector. Two approaches/ methodologies were key:
  - The cluster methodology.
  - A value chain approach.
- Has demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of the involvement of national, regional and local government, as well as private sector actors in addressing the needs and future directions of the sector.
- Has demonstrated significant synergies between UN Agencies and Government Ministries which have assisted in the delivery of the JP's development results.
- Requires a much more significant time frame and budget to consolidate the achieved results, and to ensure the on-going nature of change in the sector.
  - A scaling-up within the existing two regions is critical to the consolidation of results for existing clusters (farmers, processors, cooperatives, supportive agencies).
  - A scaling-up to more regions is critical to entrenching the change demonstrated by the JP.
- Achieved, almost completely, the intended outputs from the programme design, and has made significant contributions to the achievement of the JP's intended outcomes. With specific reference to the JP's outcome statements (enhanced productivity private sector led agricultural production of oil seeds; enhanced capacity and competitiveness of the stakeholders for processing of edible oil seeds; improved market access), the JP has contributed in significant ways to achieving these outcomes across the sector. What is now required is a strategic programme that moves well beyond a pilot

approach, and uses the approaches and methodologies of the JP to deliver these outcomes at the level of the whole sector, nationwide.

- Contributed to achievement of Millennium Development Goals in Ethiopia, and particularly in relation to poverty eradication, by demonstrating improvements in the oil seed sector that can contribute to improved economics in production, processing and marketing of oil seeds.
- Contributed significantly to the goals set out in the private sector and development thematic window of the MDG-F: the work and results of the JP bolster an economic sector where the poor are strongly represented, open markets to improved access and support small and medium enterprises. Future possibilities through a scaling-up can have significant impact in all of these areas.
- Demonstrated particular strength in fulfilling the intent of the Paris Declaration, in particular the principle of national ownership. The JP fulfils national strategies, public policy directions and the Ethiopia UNDAF. Within the structure of the JP, the UN concept of *delivering as one* was demonstrated effectively.
- Was particularly effective with the specific targets of farmers, farmer cooperatives and processors. The demand from farmers for a widening/ strengthening of JP practice in cultivation is strongly expressed. The clear view of processors is that the JP has given them renewed confidence in their industry, and a clear path for their involvement. Marketing linkages have been strengthened, but more specific focus is required in this area during a scale-up.
- Demonstrates the effectiveness of a cluster approach, with specific reference here to the value of involvement of the national Ministries, local Bureaus, Universities and Municipalities. The regional technical and steering committees were specific and effective contributors to success.

### 6.3.2 Sustainability – The probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the longer term.

#### Key Findings

The Joint Programme:

- Has demonstrated an effective and sustainable approach to development of the oil seed sector. Delivered institutional development (notably, but not solely within processor associations and the PLCs) increases the possibilities for/ likelihood of longer term success. However, as the implementation currently stands there is no guarantee that results will be sustained.
- Cluster stakeholders from government and the private sector demonstrate a strong commitment to the initiated change. However, this change is still fragile.
- A second phase of the JP is required to consolidate the change that has been demonstrated by the JP. A second phase has the potential to be a significant initiative for the sector, and for Ethiopia as a whole.

There is some doubt about the potential sustainability of the demonstrated benefits and results of the JP. While there is a good sense from participant farmers, cooperatives and processors that the changes they have experienced, and occasioned, will carry forward in the future, the reality is that this change has not matured. It is the view of the evaluator that JP results are fragile, for all their significance. They point in the right direction; they demonstrate clear directions for the sector, but without further support that enables their spread, and their consolidation, doubts must remain as to the sustainability of the change.

On the positive side, the cluster participants have a real sense of the value of their joint work, and its importance to the sector. The same is true of the farmers who have changed their cultivation practices and the processors who have participated in technological and knowledge changes in their processing plants. The engagement of municipalities, the provision of land for the joint facilities and the contributions in finance to the joint facilities from individual processors are all strong indicators of the potential for sustainability. However, until the facilities are actually constructed, and are operating (physically, and in the sense of a functioning joint organisation), it is not certain that they will succeed.

There are two keys to sustainability, both of which are linked very strongly to a potential Phase 2:

- A wider implementation is critical. This wider implementation needs to take place within the current two regions and also needs to involve other regions.
- Government involvement needs to be much more strongly developed, particularly at the local/ Bureau level, and specifically in bringing on ‘drivers’, within government, who will lead the change process going forward. Key government aspects are also two-fold:
  - Support (financial, policy, structural) at the national and local levels.
  - Leadership – the drivers.

The view of the evaluator is that implementing partners, both UN Agencies and the Government of Ethiopia, have performed well in building a framework for the work of the JP that is sustainable. However, as a pilot project, it was not, and cannot, be expected to have reached a level of leadership and participation across all relevant national actors that ensures its sustainability. The sector is significant in size, and the JP addressed only a small component. While the JP has demonstrated effective approaches, these approaches are not embedded in policy or practice.

Not enough work has been done to ensure funding for a Phase 2. All partners ‘support’ the JP, and the concept of a Phase 2, but there is no work being done to ensure more tangible support in the form of funding for the scale-up. It is the view of the evaluator that without a scale-up, the JP will not be able to achieve the long-term, sustainable impact in the sector that is clearly possible, based on the activities and outputs achieved to date.

The JP is eminently replicable. It can be argued that the JP *demonstrates* scaling-up, given that clearly effective approach it demonstrates, and the potentially significant results for the sector, and Ethiopia generally, from a successful programme to implement JP approaches across the country. Not securing funding for a Phase 2 of the JP would be a significant missed opportunity for Ethiopia, and for the implementing partners. Few interventions can demonstrate so clearly, during a pilot phase, the importance they can have to national development. The JP has done exactly this – demonstrated its potential significance to national economic development.

## 7 Conclusions

### 7.1 General

The importance and potential of a Phase 2 are discussed in more detail in the Recommendations section below. It is worth noting here, as a general conclusion, that the JP was a significant intervention, with very strong potential to occasion lasting change in Ethiopia, for the country generally, but also for the poor (particularly farmers and employees of processors). More emphasis is required in this area if fundamental change is to be achieved

in the sector, however it is the view of the evaluator that focus should only be on local and regional markets – the intent of the structural change should not be on international markets, but on replacing imported oil with domestic production.

There was no real focus on gender in the JP, neither in design nor in implementation. The project document did not include any disaggregation of intended beneficiaries, although numbers were reported on subsequently during implementation. The evaluator met no women beneficiaries, neither farmers, cooperative representatives nor processors, in interviews and in focus group meetings, and could see no intent, in design or implementation, to address gender-based issues within the sector. The project document is silent on gender issues, and with regards any strategies for addressing gender-based issues.

## 7.2 Lessons learned and good practices

The following summarises the key lessons which have been learned through the JP:

- The strong leadership on the government’s side ensured a more strongly correlated design (related to the value chain), a tighter logic to the results framework and a drive to the programme throughout implementation.
- This close correlation between the priorities, skills and experience of Agencies, and Agency staff, and the requirements of the different components of the value chain added clear strength of direction to implementation.
- The number of Agencies was limited, strictly, to critical, core components of the JP. There were no ‘add-ons’ – the design logic was tight, within the JP and within the value chain and the Agencies each had clear, and specific result areas within component – and in linking components.
- The cluster methodology has been an effective approach to a ‘whole of value chain’ implementation.
- The ‘inception period’ allowed some redefinition of activities (based on the diagnostic studies) while retaining the output/ outcome framework within the value chain structure.
- The contribution of the Universities has added particular technical and social/ ethical value to implementation approaches.
- Implementation was much more effective where specific resources, trained resources, were assigned to delivery – the cluster development specialists added value throughout implementation of the work with processors; the agronomist specialists engaged following the mid-term evaluation to address weaknesses on the production side had a significant positive impact, both on implementation activities and on results.

The JP drew on a number of lessons learned from other initiatives in agro-processing in the oil seeds sector. They are worth mentioning here:

- From SNV: An ‘intervention in the sub-sector needs to focus on the whole value chain. Intervention either at processing, production or marketing would not help much’.<sup>8</sup>
- Also from SNV: To ‘enhance coordination and dialogue among various stakeholders in the value chain in the Oromia and Amhara Regions at local level in order to catalyse improvement of productivity and competitiveness for sustainable growth’, ie it would *not focus at the national level but locally*.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>From the JP’s project document.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

- JP design included ‘development of policies and strategies as required under the framework of the existing government strategies’, to strengthen and ensure an appropriate policy framework.
- As an effective way of promoting the rights, responsibilities and entitlements of marginalised groups, JP design incorporated the involvement of small and medium enterprises in the value chain.

The following summarises the key good practices which have contributed to JP success:

- The cluster methodology added value to JP implementation – the effectiveness of coordination, communication and ‘whole of value chain’ engagement contributed specifically to the JP’s success. All members of the cluster comment on the positive impact the cluster approach had on activities and outputs.
- The value chain approach was a key success factor in JP design and implementation. Joint programming was particularly well suited to the value chain approach of the JP, although the role and insistence of the Government of Ethiopia in discussions about the actual make-up of the JP were also of significance. Of particular relevance to the role of joint programming in the success of the JP was the tight correlation between output areas and UN Agency responsibilities/ capacities, coupled with the tight correlation between output areas and the edible oil value chain. The significance of these two factors in the success of JP design and implementation is, primarily, that there was nothing superfluous in either design or implementation. Every activity and output area contributed directly to anticipated results, and, generally, contributed ‘forward and backwards’ in the value chain. The Government insisted on a smaller group of UN Agencies than was initially discussed – and the correlation between implementing Agencies, Government ministries and outputs/ outcomes has, in the end, been an important success factor.

Ministry/ Bureau-Agency synergies, as well as the related producer-processor-marketer relationships provided a much more significant design and implementation context than would have been possible with a focus on a single component. The evolving relationships between farmers, cooperatives and processors (associations and PLCs) was in no way forced – the response in the field to evaluation enquiry was very strong in awareness of the economic benefits of this change in practice.

- The real need in the sector, and the fact it is ‘ripe’ to move forward, was a strong contributor to JP success. The economics are compelling for the nation, for farmers and for processors.

## 7.3 Recommendations

### 7.3.1 Phase 2

The importance of a Phase 2 of the JP cannot be overstated. The JP has been a particularly important and successful initiative, and it is critical that it is scaled-up and consolidated. The JP team has prepared a project document for Phase 2, a programme that would last 5 years and have a budget of some \$7,000,000. A Phase 2 would, for good reason, closely align with the current JP, and aims to improve the function and outcomes of the whole of the edible oil value chain. Four outputs are planned:

- Improved production of oil seeds and productivity in the oil seed sector.
- Improved processing and packaging of edible oils.
- Improved access to finance for processors – through their associations.



- Establishment of a national value chain coordination body.

Three key actions are required, and should be implemented immediately:

- A donor strategy must be developed and implemented. The sector strategy, JP reports and this evaluation report all provide strong arguments for how and why contributing to a Phase 2 will be effective, and extremely important in Ethiopia's economic development.
- Phase 2 development needs a driver, a organisation or agency responsible for the preparations and negotiations necessary to complete documentation and to find and engage a donor. As well as an organisation or agency, a specific individual should be nominated as the driver, on behalf of the partner organisations of the Phase 2.
- Through Phase 2 there should be a shift toward a more significant Government of Ethiopia governance and management model.
  - Sector developments are ready for this.
  - The donor strategy will be strengthened in this context.
  - The critical area *may* be the *ownership and direction at the regional/ local levels*. From the beginning of the second phase, drivers at Bureau level will be important, and Government leadership is simply of greatest importance.

### 7.3.2 Marketing

As discussed in the body of the report, the marketing component was the least visible aspect of the JP. While there were strong marketing outputs, notable the value chain linkages and the work on packaging and labelling, Phase 2 needs to incorporate a more well-developed marketing approach and strategy, across all components of the scale-up.

### 7.3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

The implementation of a Phase 2 requires a significant focus on monitoring and evaluation approaches. Specifically, the implementation needs to be able to quantify the work and results of the intervention; numbers of farmers (disaggregated by gender and age), number of hectares of production, start data on seed production per hectare compared to end data on seed production, number of processors, processor production changes (quantity), quantified changes in quality (certification etc), etc. A fully developed plan to measure, quantitatively and qualitatively, the change brought about by the programme is required, and should be developed as part of inception processes to ensure it is an effective tool throughout implementation.

## 8 Annexes



## **8.1 List of Interviewees/ Participants in Focus Groups**

Some individuals were interviewed more than once, or participated in more than one meeting. The list below does not show this as it is intended as a listing of the people who were spoken with as part of field work – not as detail of the events themselves.

### **8.1.1 Government of Ethiopia Representatives**

Yonas Yazachew – Ministry of Agriculture - JP focal point.

Dandena Chemedo – Ministry of Industry, Director, Agro-Processing Industry Development – JP focal point.

Fitsum Gebremichael – Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Team Leader, Labour and Special Service – JP focal point.

### **8.1.2 Other Agencies**

Eduardo Reneses de la Fuente, Senior Programme Manager, AECID Technical Cooperation Office, Embassy of Spain In Ethiopia.

Eleni Abraham. Value Chain Advisor, SNV. (SNV provided sub-contract services to FAO in delivery of the JP in the field).

### **8.1.3 Agency Representatives (including JP team)**

George Okutho, Director, Country Office For Ethiopia and Somalia, ILO.

Olijira Kuma, National Expert on Cluster Development. Oromia Regional Office, UNIDO.

Muluneh Woldekidan, Joint Programme Coordinator.

Amare Negash, Finance, ILO.

Assegid Adane, National Programme Officer UNIDO.

Aresawum Mengesha, National Project Coordinator, FAO.

Kidist Chala, ILO.

Tsegabu Teka, National Expert on Cluster Development. Amhara Regional Office, UNIDO.

Ines Mazarrasa, Coordination Specialist, Regional Coordinator's Office (Julie Lillejord, replacing Ines Mazarrasa in the near future, attended the meeting as well).

Elisa Benedetta Sabbion, UNIDO. Elisa oversaw, among other things, the communication and advocacy strategy and plan.

Shumet Chanie; National Project Coordinator, ILO.

### **8.1.4 Bahir Dar Regional Steering Committee and Regional Technical Committee**

Mastewal Bewketu , Bureau of Industry and Urban Development.

Gebaneh Haile , Cooperative Promotion Agency.

Tesfaye Haileselassie , Bureau of Industry and Urban Development.

Ayalew Tadele, Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs.

Yeshiwas Alemnew, Bureau of Agriculture.

Abebe Belay, Bureau of Trade and Transport.

Tadesse Chekol, Micro and Small Business Development Agency.

#### **8.1.5 Bahir Dar Edible Oil Producers Association and the Nile Edible Oil Manufacturing Industry PLC**

Getenet Asres, Chairperson of the PLC.

Meseret Takele, Chairperson of the Sectorial Association.

Gashawtena Asfaw, Manager of the PLC.

Adane Yetayew, Board member.

Esmail Ahmed, Board member.

Mulualem Tessema, Board member.

Moges Wasie, member.

Nigussie Assefa, Board member.

#### **8.1.6 AmedBer Farmers Primary Cooperative Association, AlemBer**

Abat Yirdaw, Manager of the Association.

Keleb Ayele, Chairperson of the Association.

Aschil Chekol, Cooperative extension worker.

Tsehay Mengistu, Board member.

Melkam Maria, Farmer.

Mengesha Alene, Agriculture extension worker.

Jemal Hamid, Agriculture extension worker.

Berhanu Chania, Agriculture extension worker.

Anteneh Wondimu, Cooperative extension worker.

#### **8.1.7 Bahir Dar University**

Ashenafi Hailu Berta, Lecturer, Chemical Engineering Programme (previously Director of the School of Chemical Engineering). JP focal person.

Admasu Fanta, Food Quality, Safety and Nutrition Chair Holder. JP focal person.

#### **8.1.8 Merkeb Farmers Cooperative Union, Bahir Dar**

Geremew Muchie, Representative of Manager and Marketing Chief.

Yaregal Hasabie, Chairman of the Board.

Yirga Yitayew, Secretary of the Board.

Sitotaw Abay, Project Officer.

#### **8.1.9 Regional Technical and Steering Committees – Adama**

Meseret Assefa – Cooperative Promotion Agency.

Debelo Dugasa – Oromia Labour and Social Affairs.

Beyene Mammo – Bureau of Agriculture Oromia.

Temesgen Shone – Bureau of Industry, Oromia.

Gari Duguma – FAO Agri-business Facilitator Oromia Region.

#### **8.1.10 Adama Edible Oil Producers Association and the Right Edible Oil Producers PLC**

Endalikachew Nigatu – from Endalk Edible Oil –Chairperson of the Association and Vice-chair of the PLC.

Tezera Sahile Ameneshewa, Board Secretary of the Association and of the PLC.

Tamirat Ketsela G/Mariyam – Association member and Chairperson of PLC.

#### **8.1.11 Adama University**

Dr Addisu Bekele, Asst. Dean, Research and Asst. Professor, Mechanical and Vehicle Engineering – JP Focal Person.

#### **8.1.12 Aleko village linseed producers – Arsi Zone, Lode Hitosa Woreda**

Dembelash Sehalu– Farmer.

Abet Weko - Farmer.

Abdulkerim Edo - Farmer.

Ahmed Hifto - Farmer.

Alemayehu Tekl - Farmer.

Ahmed Fayisa - Farmer.

Nure Dugo - Farmer.

#### **8.1.13 Aleko Primary Cooperative - Arsi Zone, Lode Hitosa Woreda**

Gobe Kunbi–Manager.

Aman Haji – Accountant.

Abdalla Hamde -Vice Manager.

Abdulkadir Adam – Treasurer.

NuraKadir – Member.

Bone Shibiru – Member.

Abbas Eda'o - Member.

#### **8.1.14 Hitosa Farmers Cooperative Union, Iteya**

Eshetu Wakene, Deputy General Manager.

Tadesse Shumi, Deputy Chairman of the Board.

Jemaal Chirkana, Board Member.

Sultan Ahmed, Chairman of the Board.

Seid Hajitolo, Treasurer.

## 8.2 Document Review List

Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement JP Project Document.

Improving the Performance of the Ethiopian Edible Oil Value Chain - Phase II Project Document.

November 2009. Ethiopian Agro-industries Master Plan – Oilseeds Sub-sector.

May 2011. Beyene Tedesse. Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement. Baseline Study in Oromia and Amhara Regional States, Ethiopia.

December 2010. Tsegabu Teka. Draft Report Of Diagnostic Study of the Bahir Dar Edible Oil Cluster.

December 2010. Adama Cluster Diagnostic Study. UNIDO.

March 2012. Vincent Lefebvre. Mid-Term Review of the Joint Programme Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement.

Ethiopia - Private Sector Development: Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme Improvement Plan. JP Document.

Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme - Sustainability Strategy. JP Document.

January 2012. Market Assessment and Development of a Marketing Strategy for the Edible Oil Sector of Ethiopia. EEA.

NSC Minutes. JP Document.

PMC Minutes. JP Document.

Project Management Team Minutes. JP Document.

JP Quarterly Reports. JP Document.

JP Semi-annual Reports. JP Document.

### 8.3 Evaluation Matrix

The following table *summarises the key findings* of the evaluation, based on the evaluation questions (as described in the Terms of Reference and confirmed in the Inception Report). This is a summary – the table provides indications of where, in the main body of the report, the full analysis can be found.

Key question	Specific sub-question	Data sources	Data collection method	Summary analysis	Location in main body of the report of a more detailed analysis.
<b>Design - Relevance</b>	To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to the MDGs, UNDAF and national priorities?	JP documentation; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP was framed within the UNDAF as defined for Ethiopia. The priorities of the UNDAF are ‘in alignment with areas are included in the PILLARS of the Governments Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) (2011-2015)’, providing a further linkage between Government priorities and UN/ JP directions. The JP demonstrated a significant correlation with national priorities, which created the partnership framework with Government, notably the Ministry of Industry, that provided serious impetus to implementation nationally and regionally. The MDGs themselves were not a core component of JP design, nor in the reporting; ie, they are not specifically visible in these documents. The JP does, however, respond directly to two MDGs: Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty And Hunger; Goal 8: Develop A Global Partnership For Development.	Pages 20-23.
	To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to the development of stakeholder participation?	JP documentation; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP created a strong foundation of cooperation, so that national and regional partners contributed in a number of ways to addressing design and implementation challenges as they appeared.	Pages 20-23.
	To what extent did implementing partners participating in the JP add value to solving the	JP documentation; Progress/	Desk study; interviews.	At both regional and national level, governance and technical support from stakeholders was of	Pages 20-23.

	development challenges described in the programme document?	monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.		a high quality.	
	To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to engagement of national ownership?	JP documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP demonstrated a significant correlation with national priorities, which created the partnership framework with Government, notably the Ministry of Industry, that provided serious impetus to implementation nationally and regionally. The State Minister for Industry was a key figure in JP governance, with the NSC and PMC each demonstrating a high level of knowledge about and commitment to the JP's intent and detailed design. The JP fit specifically and directly within the AIMP, with design closely aligned to Volume III, the Oil seeds Sub-sector strategy.	Pages 20-23.
	In which ways, and to what extent, did the JP contribute to solving the socio-economic needs and problems described in the programme document?	JP documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP was, ultimately, a pilot. Current edible oil imports to Ethiopia exceed \$400 million annually – the JP indicates a direction to address a large percentage of this total, but in itself it cannot be judged to have been the solution. In indicating a direction, however, the JP is of significant relevance to the Government, and to its policies and programmes within the sub-sector.	Pages 20-23.
	To what extent was joint programming the best option to respond to development challenges stated in the programme document? Did the inclusion of Government and the integrated response with the private sector demonstrate an appropriate design? Is it replicable with other donors or within other sectors? Did it add value, or, against each of these questions did the process complicate approaches for the MDG-F and others?	JP documentation; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Joint programming was particularly well suited to the value chain approach of the JP, although the role and insistence of the Government of Ethiopia in discussions about the actual make-up of the JP were also of significance. Of particular relevance to the role of joint programming in the success of the JP was the tight correlation between output areas and UN Agency responsibilities/ capacities, coupled with the tight correlation between output areas and the edible oil value chain.	Pages 20-23.
	To what extent was the JP designed,	JP documentation;	Desk study;	The JP has been monitored and evaluated	Pages 20-23.

	implemented, monitored and evaluated jointly? To what extent did the JP have a useful and reliable M&E strategy that contributed to the measurement of development results?	Programme reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	interviews.	jointly, and the mid-term evaluation in particular was important to the success of the JP. However, it cannot be said that the JP's M and E strategy contributed to the measurement of results, given the short period of the intervention.	
	Did the programme design follow a theory of change? If so, is it possible to assess results against it? Comment on the effectiveness of the development and use of indicators and their use in monitoring processes.	JP documentation; Programme reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP had a clear results logic, ie a clear theory of change. This clarity of logic, together with the tight correlation in design to the value chain was an important success factor.	Pages 20-23.
	To what extent did the JP have a useful and reliable Communication and Advocacy strategy?	JP documentation; Programme reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP prepared a list of tools to use in communicating the activities and results of the JP, and developed a plan for where to share these tools. The plan was followed, to a large extent, and its implementation was tracked.	Pages 20-23.
<b>Process - Efficiency</b>	To what extent was the JP's management model efficient against the development results attained? What type of work methodologies, financial instruments, and business practices did implementing partners use to <i>increase efficiency in delivering as one</i> ? What type of administrative, financial and managerial obstacles did the JP face and to what extent did these affect efficiency?	Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The commitment and leadership of the Government and the relatively small number of Agencies to work on the JP were important to the efficient implementation of the JP. The commitment of the Ministry of Industry to the detail of JP design and implementation processes brought with it a high level of commitment in the NSC and the PMC, which also flowed out to the regions.	Pages 23-25.
	What was the progress of the JP in financial terms. Detail amounts committed and disbursed (total amounts and as a percentage of the total) on an Agency-by-Agency basis. Provide analysis of significant discrepancies.	Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	See the Joint Programme Fact Sheet.	JP Fact Sheet. Pages 23-25.
	Was implementation as a JP more efficient in comparison to a single agency's intervention? To what extent and in what ways did the JP increase or reduce efficiency in delivering outputs and attaining outcomes?	Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme	Desk study; interviews.	A JP approach to this intervention was particularly appropriate, and of much greater efficiency and effectiveness than could have been achieved by a single Agency. The the close correlation of project outputs/ outcomes with	Pages 23-25.

		Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.		Agency mandates, the tight project logic and the value chain approach. A single Agency could not have delivered the JP, in its current form, and the JP's outputs and outcomes could not have been achieved without the value chain approach.	
	To what extent did governance of the fund at programme level (PMC) and at national level (NSC) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP? To what extent were governance structures useful for development purposes? For national ownership? For working together as one? Did governance structures enable the management and delivery of outputs and results? Were there issues with specific Agencies or partners in the delivery of the JP, and its outputs/ outcomes? If so, were these issues addressed effectively by the governance structures and systems of the JP, ie, did the timeliness and effectiveness of delivery improve?	Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The commitment and leadership of the Government was important to the efficient implementation of the JP, particularly the tight correlation of activities and outputs within the project's logic and the close correlation with Government priorities. The commitment of the Ministry of Industry to the detail of JP design and implementation processes brought with it a high level of commitment in the NSC and the PMC.  There were issues with timeliness of implementation, particularly with relation to the production aspect and FAO's area of responsibility, early in the JP. However, FAO engaged facilitators in the field, as UNIDO had done on the processing side from inception. The engaged facilitators had a significant positive effect on implementation – qualitatively and quantitatively. ILO also had no local staffing, which impacted as well on their outputs and outcomes.	Pages 23-25.
	To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation have an impact on the joint programme? To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation contribute to achievement of results? Was the JP design revised? Did revisions reflect the changes that were needed? Did the JP follow the mid-term evaluation recommendations related to programme design, ie did the JP implement the improvement plan?	Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	There were a number of specific contributions from evaluation that were important, but the most significant was the clear commentary on the slowness of delivery of some aspects, coupled with specific recommendations for resolving these issues. Implementation approaches were changed as a result of the mid-term evaluation, and the JP demonstrated more effective results as a direct result of these changes. The second most important change, as a result of the mid-term evaluation, was with	Pages 23-25.



				regards to the communication and advocacy strategy/ plan. A specific focus was placed on communication as a result of the evaluation, and it has proved to be an effective component of implementation since that time. Finally, the mid-term evaluation occasioned a greater specific contribution from Government – the land for the joint processing facilities. This had not happened prior, and will likely bring significant long-term strength to JP outcomes.	
<b>Process - Ownership</b>	To what extent did the targeted population, citizens, participants, local and national authorities make the JP their own? Did these groups take an active role in the JP? What modes of participation drove the process? What modes and approaches of national leadership were notable?  To what extent and in what ways did ownership, or the lack of it, impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP?	Programme documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The Minister of Industry was the owner of the project, and they demonstrated this ownership in a variety of ways, all of which contributed to outputs and outcomes. They were not, however, the only good example of leadership and ownership. The Ethiopian Quality Standards Authority also demonstrated strong partnership. At the regional level, Bureaus – particularly but not solely the Bureaus of Industry – also provided strong partnership involvement. The Universities in Adama and in Bahir Dar were strong local contributors to implementation, and to the successes of the JP.	Pages 23-25.
<b>Results - Effectiveness</b>	To what extent did the JP contribute to the attainment of the development outputs and outcomes described in the programme document? To what extent were the JP's outputs and outcomes synergistic and coherent in producing development results? The evaluation will specifically address how far the JP went compared to what was planned, including a detailed analysis of planned activities, intended outputs and achievement of outcomes.	Programme documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP, specifically as a pilot project, has demonstrated real success in achieving the designed activities and outputs, and in contributing to higher level outcomes.	Pages 25-27.
	To what extent, and in what ways, did the JP contribute to: Millennium Development Goals at the local and national level? The goals set in the thematic window? The Paris Declaration, in particular the principle of national ownership –	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP, specifically as a pilot project, has demonstrated real success in contributing to intended MDGs, and goals of the PSD thematic window. The JP was particularly strong in demonstrating Paris Declaration goals, and in its	Pages 25-27.

	to what extent did the JP contribute to the advancement and the progress of national ownership processes and outcomes, such as the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF, etc? Analysis will specifically consider JP policy, budgets, design, and implementation. The goal of delivering as one at country level?			contribution to national priorities.	
	To what extent did the JP have an impact on targeted citizens? Was the JP successful in attracting the interest and involvement of producers? Of processors? Of marketing agencies? How successful was the JP in attracting government participation, locally, as well as at the national level? To what extent did the JP contribute to an increase in stakeholder/ citizen dialogue and/ or engagement on development issues and policies?	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP, specifically as a pilot project, has demonstrated real success in engaging intended beneficiaries, particularly farmers, cooperatives, processors and associations/ PLC, along the whole of the sub-sector value chain.	Pages 25-27.
	The evaluation will analyse the JP for good practice, success stories, lessons learned and transferable examples, and will describe each. Specific reference will be given to each aspect of the value chain, as well as to Government and/ or private sector initiatives that exemplify the intent of the JP.	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Lessons learned: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The strong leadership on the government's side ensured a strongly correlated design.</li> <li>• This close correlation added clear strength of direction to implementation.</li> <li>• The number of Agencies was limited, strictly, to critical, core components of the JP.</li> <li>• There were no 'add-ons' – the design logic was tight, within the JP and within the value chain.</li> <li>• The cluster methodology was effective to a 'whole of value chain' implementation.</li> <li>• Implementation was much more effective where specific resources, trained resources, were assigned to</li> </ul>	Pages 29 and 30.

				<p>delivery; egthe cluster development specialists added value throughout implementation.</p> <p>Good practice:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cluster methodology added value to JP implementation – the effectiveness of coordination, communication and ‘whole of value chain’ engagement contributed specifically to the JP’s success.</li> <li>• The value chain approach was a key success factor in JP design and implementation. Joint programming was particularly well suited to the value chain approach of the JP, although the role and insistence of the Government of Ethiopia in discussions about the actual make-up of the JP were also of significance.</li> </ul>	
	The evaluation will, to the extent possible, describe the differentiated results of the JP according to gender, ethnic, rural and urban descriptions, where such have been documented by the JP.	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	The JP did not disaggregate results according to gender, ethnic, rural and urban descriptions.	

<b>Results - Sustainability</b>	<p>To what extent have JP decision-making bodies and implementing partners undertaken the necessary decisions and actions to ensure the sustainability of the approaches and/ or results of the JP?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the JP?</li> <li>• Did these institutions show the technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the JP or to scale it up?</li> <li>• Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national partners?</li> <li>• Do partners have sufficient financial capacity to maintain the benefits produced by the JP?</li> </ul>	<p>Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.</p>	<p>Desk study; interviews.</p>	<p>Government involvement needs to be much more strongly developed, particularly at the local/ Bureau level, and specifically in bringing on ‘drivers’, within government, who will lead the change process going forward. Key government aspects are also two-fold:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support (financial, policy, structural) at the national and local levels.</li> <li>• Leadership – the drivers.</li> </ul> <p>Implementing partners, both UN Agencies and the Government of Ethiopia, have performed well in building a framework for the work of the JP that is sustainable. However, as a pilot project, it was not, and cannot, be expected to have reached a level of leadership and participation across all relevant national actors that ensures its sustainability. While the JP has demonstrated effective approaches, these approaches are not embedded in policy or practice.</p>	<p>Pages 27-28.</p>
	<p>To what extent will the joint programme be replicable or scaled up at national or local levels? Is further government investment in the industry visible or planned, in the target regions or elsewhere? Can potential involvement of other donors be detected, in terms of an interest in or willingness to extend or broaden the JP’s approaches/ results?</p>	<p>Programme documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.</p>	<p>Desk study; interviews.</p>	<p>The JP is eminently replicable. It can be argued that the JP <i>demands</i> scaling-up, given that clearly effective approach it demonstrates, and the potentially significant results for the sector, and Ethiopia generally, from a successful programme to implement JP approaches across the country. Not securing funding for a Phase 2 of the JP would be a significant missed opportunity for Ethiopia, and for the implementing partners. Few interventions can demonstrate so clearly, during a pilot phase, the importance they can have to national development. The JP has done exactly this – demonstrated its potential significance to national economic development.</p>	<p>Pages 27-28.</p>

## 8.4 Evaluation Terms Of Reference

### TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR FINAL EVALUATION OF MDG-F - PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT THEMATIC WINDOW EDIBLE OIL VALUE CHAIN ENHANCEMENT JOINT PROGRAMME

#### 1. GENERAL CONTEXT: MDG ACHIEVEMENT FUND (MDG-F)

In December 2006, the UNDP and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of €528 million with the aim of contributing to progress on the MDGs and other development goals through the United Nations System. In addition, on 24 September 2008 Spain pledged €90 million towards the launch of a thematic window on Childhood and Nutrition. The MDG-F supports joint programmes that seek replication of successful pilot experiences and impact in shaping public policies and improving peoples' life in 50 countries by accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other key development goals.

#### 2. The Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme (JP)

##### a. Background/Context of the Joint Programme

As one of the centers of origins in the world for several oil crop plants grown in diverse agro-ecological surroundings and soil types, Ethiopia holds several advantages for scaling up its production of oilseeds. The country has favorable agroclimatic conditions for cultivation; the nature of the sub-sector is labor intensive; the prevailing business environment conducive; and the substantial local demand provides sufficient room for crushers to work at full capacity. Despite this potential, however, both oilseeds commodity production and edible oil processing industry in Ethiopia remain to a large extent underdeveloped. The main constraints for such a state of affairs are low production and quality of oilseeds, inadequate trading infrastructure and facilities (storage, transportation, post harvest handling and packaging), poor edible oil processing facilities and weak business development services. Weak linkage among the chain's actors and lack of finance also constitute major constraints.

In the Agro-Industry Sector Master Plan of the Ministry of Industry, edible oil is clearly earmarked as a priority sector for development. Thus in 2008, the government and the UN Agencies agreed to formulate a MDG-F joint programme with the objective to enhance the edible oil sector in the country by improving the supply system of raw materials, improving the oil seeds processing efficiency and access to markets of relevant stakeholders. The **"Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme (JP)"** is designed as a pilot project to address the issues of the oilseeds sector indicated in the master Plan. The JP has three outcomes, namely:

- 1. Productivity & competitiveness of private sector led agricultural production of oilseed is enhanced**
- 2. Capacity utilisation and quality of the end product in the targeted oil seed processing plants is enhanced**
- 3. Access to local and international markets for edible oil producers is improved**

The Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme (JP) tries to showcase efficient oilseeds value chain development that promotes entrepreneurship, provides capital and services to farmers, raises demand for agricultural products and connects farmers with markets through the production, handling, processing, marketing and distribution of oilseeds. As a result, it is expected that employment and income will be generated; the productivity and quality of oil seeds and edible oil production will be enhanced. This will lead to increased food security and innovation throughout the

value chain thus increasing the incomes of the farmers, processors and traders and directly contributing to the relevant MDGs (Goal 1 – poverty reduction, Goal 3 – gender equity improvement, Goal 7 - sustainable development).

The JP was initiated in January 2010 for duration of 3 years'. By late 2011, a mid-term review of the JP was undertaken followed by the preparation and implementation of an improvement plan based upon the MTE recommendations. According to the first design, the three years of the JP were to expire at the end of December 2012. However, the JP has requested and was granted No-cost extension of six months until 30 June, 2013.

The JP is being implemented by UNIDO as the lead agency, FAO and ILO together with the respective national counterparts which include the Ministry of Industry (Mol) as the lead governmental institution, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs (MoLSA) as well as their regional and woreda level representatives governed according to the MDG-F governance structure that is the National Steering Committee (NSC), Programme Management Committee (PMC), Regional Level Steering & Technical Committees (RLSC & RLTC).

The JP is being conducted in two regions, Amhara & Oromia in selected Woredas and towns by UN Agencies FAO, UNIDO & ILO in their respective areas of competence in collaboration with 3 implementing federal ministries Mol, MoA, MoLSA and their respective Regional Bureaus and other supportive public bodies and private sector counterparts.

#### **b. Major achievements and results of the Joint Programme**

Some of the major progresses & results achieved by the JP are:

Technical support given to unions, cooperatives, farmers, agricultural field officers; supply of inputs, multiplication of seeds; studies conducted on contract farming, input voucher, warehouse receipt; Seed cleaning equipment provided to Unions.

In both Oromia & Amhara Regions, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Oil Processors have formed 2 Sectoral Associations and 2 Private Limited Companies (PLCs) with the objective of investing on common facilities, such as, refineries, relocation of their existing facilities from residential areas to industrial zones, etc. Currently the 2 PLCs have received the land requested for the establishment of Industrial zones from both Regional Governments.

The installation of locally manufactured semi-refining equipment, certification by quality authorities and packing of edible oils of the processors and participation in trade fairs and exhibitions which has resulted in increase in sales of edible oils and higher market outreach & more revenue and income for the processors.

Edible oil processing enterprises have made remarkable improvements in the production processes and adaptation of better technologies & machinery (both imported & local) and also significant improvements in relation to implementing workplace Occupational Safety and Health practices.

Capacity building, hardware support and various trainings for unions, associations, processors, public and private institutions, stakeholders, Business Development Services (BDS) providers, etc. Various consultancies and studies such as strategic plans, feasibility and diagnostic studies conducted. Study tours conducted for policy makers and stakeholders to India to learn relevant experiences from both private and public sectors.

Backward and forward linkages established, processors with unions and farmers; processors with bigger refiners and markets. Many stakeholders are brought closer together, such as Universities, the

financial sector, Regional Bureaus and Administrative organs, etc., for addressing the issues of edible oil sector.

In order to assess the impact of the MDG\_F Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme and also with aim of consolidating the achievements of programme so far, UNIDO, on behalf of the Joint Programme implementing partners, is seeking a high-qualified international consultant to conduct the final evaluation of this joint programme.

### 3. OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

The nature of this final evaluation is **summative** in nature and seeks to:

1. Measure to what extent the **Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme** has fully implemented the activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes and specifically measuring development results.
2. Generate substantive evidence based knowledge by identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be useful to other development interventions at national (scale up) and international level (replicability).

As a result, the findings, conclusions and recommendations generated by this evaluation will be part of the thematic window Meta evaluation, the Secretariat is undertaking to synthesize the overall impact of the fund at national and international level.

### 4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The final evaluation will focus on measuring development results and potential impacts generated by the **joint programme**, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed.

**The unit of analysis or object of study for this evaluation is the joint programme**, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

This final **evaluation** has the following **specific objectives**:

- a) Measure to what extent the joint programme has contributed to solve the needs and problems identified in the design phase.
- b) Measure the joint programme's degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised.
- c) Measure to what extent the joint programme has attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants whether individuals, communities, institutions, etc.
- d) Identify and document substantive lessons learned and good practices on the specific topics of the thematic window, MDGs, Paris Declaration, Accra Principles and UN reform with the aim to support the sustainability of the joint programme or some of its components.

### 5. EVALUATION QUESTIONS, LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

The evaluation questions define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme.

**Design level:**

**Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention (JP) are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals.**

- a) To what extent was the design and strategy of the development intervention relevant (assess including link to MDGs, UNDAF and national priorities, stakeholder participation, national ownership design process)?
- b) How much and in what ways did the joint programme contribute to solve the (socioeconomical) needs and problems identified in the design phase?
- c) To what extent was this programme designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated jointly? (see MDG-F joint programme guidelines.)
- d) To what extent was joint programming the best option to respond to development challenges stated in the programme document?
- e) To what extent the implementing partners participating in the joint programme had an added value to solve the development challenges stated in the programme document?
- f) To what extent did the joint programme have a useful and reliable M&E strategy that contributed to measure development results?
- g) To what extent did the joint programme have a useful and reliable Communication & Advocacy strategy?
- h) If the programme was revised, did it reflect the changes that were needed? Did the JP follow the mid-term evaluation recommendations on the programme design?
- i) Did the programme design follow a theory of change? If so, is it possible to assess the results against it?

#### **Process level**

**Efficiency: Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results.**

- a) To what extent was the joint programme's management model (i.e. instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision-making in management) efficient against the development results attained?
- b) To what extent was the implementation of a joint programme intervention (group of agencies) more efficient in comparison to what could have been through a single agency's intervention?
- c) To what extent the governance of the fund at programme level (PMC) and at national level (NSC) contributed to efficiency and effectiveness of the joint programme? To what extent these governance structures were useful for development purposes, ownership, for working together as one? Did they enable management and delivery of outputs and results?
- d) To what extent and in what ways did the joint programme increase or reduce efficiency in delivering outputs and attaining outcomes?
- e) What type of work methodologies, financial instruments, and business practices have the implementing partners used to increase efficiency in delivering as one?
- f) What was the progress of the JP in financial terms, indicating amounts committed and disbursed (total amounts & as percentage of total) by agency? Where there are large discrepancies between agencies, these should be analyzed.
- g) What type of (administrative, financial and managerial) obstacles did the joint programme face and to what extent have these affected its efficiency?
- h) To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation have an impact on the joint programme? Did the joint programme implement the improvement plan?

**Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's national/local partners in development interventions**

- a) To what extent did the targeted population, citizens, participants, local and national authorities made the programme their own, taking an active role in it? What modes of participation (leadership) have



driven the process?

b) To what extent and in what ways has ownership or the lack of it, impacted in the efficiency and effectiveness of the joint programme?

### **Results level**

#### **Effectiveness: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved.**

a) To what extent did the joint programme contribute to the attainment of the development outputs and outcomes initially expected /stipulated in the programme document? (detailed analysis of: 1) planned activities and outputs, 2) achievement of results).

b) To what extent and in what ways did the joint programme contribute:

1. To the Millennium Development Goals at the local and national levels?

2. To the goals set in the thematic window?

3. To the Paris Declaration, in particular the principle of national ownership? (consider JP's policy, budgets, design, and implementation)

4. To the goals of delivering as one at country level?

c) To what extent were joint programme's outputs and outcomes synergistic and coherent to produce development results? What kinds of results were reached?

d) To what extent did the joint programme had an impact on the targeted citizens?

e) Have any good practices, success stories, lessons learned or transferable examples been identified? Please describe and document them.

f) What type of differentiated effects are resulting from the joint programme in accordance with the sex, race, ethnic group, rural or urban setting of the beneficiary population, and to what extent?

g) To what extent has the joint programme contributed to the advancement and the progress of fostering national ownership processes and outcomes (the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF, etc.)

h) To what extent did the joint programme help to increase stakeholder/citizen dialogue and or engagement on development issues and policies?

i) To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation recommendations contribute to the JP's achievement of development results?

#### **Sustainability: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.**

a) To what extent have the joint programme decision making bodies and implementing partners undertaken the necessary decisions and course of actions to ensure the sustainability of the effects of the joint programme?

b) At local and national level:

1. To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the joint programme?

2. Did these institutions show technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the programme or to scale it up?

3. Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national partners?

4. Do the partners have sufficient financial capacity to keep up the benefits produced by the programme?

c) To what extent will the joint programme be replicable or scaled up at national or local levels?

d) To what extent did the joint programme align itself with the National Development Strategies and/or

the UNDAF?

## 6. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This final evaluation will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the TORs and the availability of resources and the priorities of stakeholders. In all cases, consultants are expected to analyze all relevant information sources, such as reports, programme documents, internal review reports, programme files, strategic country development documents, mid-term evaluations and any other documents that may provide evidence on which to form judgements. Consultants are also expected to use interviews, surveys or any other relevant quantitative and/or qualitative tool as a means to collect relevant data for the final evaluation. The evaluation team will make sure that the voices, opinions and information of targeted citizens/participants of the joint programme are taken into account.

The methodology and techniques to be used in the evaluation should be described in detail in the inception report (to be discussed at the beginning of the assignment) and in the final evaluation report. The methodology should contain, at minimum, information on the instruments used for data collection and analysis, whether these be documents, interviews, field visits, questionnaires and/or participatory techniques.

## 7. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the commissioner and the manager of the evaluation:

**Inception Report** (to be submitted within 7 days of the submission of all programme documentation to the evaluation team).

This report will be 10 to 15 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The desk study report will propose initial lines of inquiry about the joint programme. This report will be used as a preliminary point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the evaluation managers. **The report will follow the outline stated in Annex 1.**

**Draft Final Report** (to be submitted within 14 days after the completion of the field visit)

The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive summary of no more than 2 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The draft final report will be shared with the evaluation reference group and the MDG-F Secretariat to seek their comments and suggestions. This report will contain the same sections as the final report, described below.

**Final Evaluation Report** (to be submitted within 10 days after reception of the draft final report with comments)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive summary of no more than 2 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be sent to the evaluation reference group and the MDG-F Secretariat. **This report will contain the sections established in Annex 2.** 10

## 8. EVALUATION REPORT QUALITY STANDARDS

The following UNEG standards should be taken into account when writing all evaluation reports<sup>10</sup>:

1. The final report should be logically structured, **containing evidence-based findings**, conclusions, lessons and recommendations and should be free of information that is not relevant to the overall analysis (S-3.16).

**NOTE: Using evidence implies making a statement based on valid and reliable facts, documents, surveys, triangulation of informants' views or any other appropriate means or techniques that contribute to create the internal validity of the evaluation. It is not enough to just state an informed opinion or reproduce an informant's take on a specific issue.**

2. **A reader of an evaluation report must be able to understand:** the purpose of the evaluation; exactly what was evaluated; how the evaluation was designed and conducted; what evidence was found; what conclusions were drawn; what recommendations were made; what lessons were distilled. (S-3.16)

3. In all cases, evaluators should strive to **present results as clearly and simply as possible** so that clients and other stakeholders can easily understand the evaluation process and results.(S-3.16)

4. **The level of participation of stakeholders in the evaluation** should be described, including the rationale for selecting that particular level. (S-4.10)

5. **The Executive Summary should "stand alone"**, providing a synopsis of the substantive elements of the evaluation. The level of information should provide the uninitiated reader with a clear understanding of what was found and recommended and what was learned from the evaluation. (see Outline in Annex 2 for more details). (S-4.2)

6. **The joint programme being evaluated should be clearly described** (as short as possible while ensuring that all pertinent information is provided). It should include the purpose, logic model, expected results chain and intended impact, its implementation strategy and key assumptions. Additional important elements include: the importance, scope and scale of the joint programme; a description of the recipients/ intended beneficiaries and stakeholders; and budget figures. (S-4.3)

7. The **role and contributions of the UN organizations and other stakeholders** to the joint programme being evaluated should be clearly described (who is involved, roles and contributions, participation, leadership). (S-4.4)

8. **In presenting the findings, inputs, outputs, and outcomes/ impacts should be measured to the extent possible (or an appropriate rationale given as to why not).** The report should make a logical distinction in the **findings, showing the progression from implementation to results with an appropriate measurement** (use benchmarks when available) and analysis of the results chain (and unintended effects), or a rationale as to why an analysis of results was not provided. Findings regarding inputs for the completion of activities or process achievements should be distinguished clearly from outputs, outcomes. (S-4.12)

9. Additionally, reports should **not segregate findings by data source.** (S-4.12)

10. **Conclusions need to be substantiated by findings** consistent with data collected and methodology, and represent insights into identification and/ or solutions of important problems or issues. (S-4.15)

11. **Recommendations should be firmly based on evidence and analysis**, be relevant and realistic, with priorities for action made clear. (S-4.16)

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<sup>10</sup> See UNEG Guidance Document "Standards for Evaluation in the UN System", UNEG/FN/Standards(2005). [http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc\\_id=22](http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=22)

12. **Lessons, when presented, should be generalized beyond the immediate subject being evaluated** to indicate what wider relevance they might have. (S-4.17)

## 9. KEY ROLES AND RESPONSABILITIES IN THE EVALUATION PROCESS

There will be 3 main actors involved in the implementation of MDG-F final evaluations:

1. The **Resident Coordinator Office** as **commissioner** of the final evaluation will have the following functions:

Lead the evaluation process throughout the 3 main phases of a final evaluation (design, implementation and dissemination);

Convene the evaluation reference group;

Lead the finalization of the evaluation ToR;

Coordinate the selection and recruitment of the evaluation team by making sure the lead agency undertakes the necessary procurement processes and contractual arrangements required to hire the evaluation team;

Ensure the evaluation products meet quality standards (in collaboration with the MDG-F Secretariat);

Provide clear specific advice and support to the evaluation manager and the evaluation team throughout the whole evaluation process;

Connect the evaluation team with the wider programme unit, senior management and key evaluation stakeholders, and ensure a fully inclusive and transparent approach to the evaluation;

Take responsibility for disseminating and learning across evaluations on the various joint programme areas as well as the liaison with the National Steering Committee;

Safeguard the independence of the exercise, including the selection of the evaluation team.

2. The **programme coordinator** as **evaluation manager** will have the following functions:

Contribute to the finalization of the evaluation TOR;

Provide executive and coordination support to the reference group;

Provide the evaluators with administrative support and required data;

Liaise with and respond to the commissioners of evaluation;

Connect the evaluation team with the wider programme unit, senior management and key evaluation stakeholders, and ensure a fully inclusive and transparent approach to the evaluation;

Review the inception report and the draft evaluation report(s);

Ensure that adequate funding and human resources are allocated for the evaluation.

3. The **Programme Management Committee** will function as the **evaluation reference group**.

This group will comprise the representatives of the major stakeholders in the joint programme and will:

Review the draft evaluation report and ensure final draft meets the required quality standards;

Facilitating the participation of those involved in the evaluation design;

Identifying information needs, defining objectives and delimiting the scope of the evaluation;

Providing input and participating in finalizing the evaluation Terms of Reference;

Facilitating the evaluation team's access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods;

Oversee progress and conduct of the evaluation the quality of the process and the products;

Disseminating the results of the evaluation.

4. The **MDG-F Secretariat** will function as a **quality assurance member** of the evaluation, in cooperation with the commissioner of the evaluation, and will have the following functions:

Review and provide advice on the quality the evaluation process as well as on the evaluation products

(comments and suggestions on the adapted TOR, draft reports, final report of the evaluation) and options for improvement.

5. **The evaluation team** will conduct the evaluation study by:

Fulfilling the contractual arrangements in line with the TOR, UNEG/OECD norms and standards and ethical guidelines; this includes developing an evaluation matrix as part of the inception report, drafting reports, and briefing the commissioner and stakeholders on the progress and key findings and recommendations, as needed

## 10. EVALUATION PROCESS: TIMELINE

<b>Evaluation Phase</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Who</b>	<b>When (calendar days)</b>
<b>Design</b>	Establish the evaluation reference group	CE*	3 months before the end of the programme
<b>Design</b>	General final evaluation TOR adapted	ERG**	
<b>Implementation</b>	Procurement and hiring the evaluation team	EM***	
<b>Implementation</b>	Provide the evaluation team with inputs (documents, access to reports and archives); Briefing on joint programme	EM, ERG	5 days
<b>Implementation</b>	Delivery of inception report to the commissioner, the evaluation manager and the evaluation reference group	ET****	7 days
<b>Implementation</b>	Feedback of evaluation stakeholders to the evaluation team. Agenda drafted and agreed with evaluation team	CE, EM, ERG	7 days
<b>Implementation</b>	In country mission	ET, EM, CE, ERG	15 days
<b>Implementation</b>	Delivery of the draft report	ET	14 days
<b>Implementation</b>	Review of the evaluation draft report, feedback to evaluation team. Fact-checking revision by MDG-FS, to be done at the same time as the ERG (5 business days)	EM, CE, ERG MDG-FS*****	10 days
<b>Implementation</b>	Delivery of the final report	EM, CE, ERG, MDGFS, NSC	10 days
<b>Dissemination/ Improvement</b>	Dissemination and use plan for the evaluation report designed and under implementation	EM, CE, ERG, NSC	10 days

# **Final Evaluation Of The Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme**

## **Ethiopia**

### **Inception Report**

MDG Achievement Fund  
Date: 13 June 2013

Prepared by: James A Newkirk ([jimnewkirk53@gmail.com](mailto:jimnewkirk53@gmail.com))

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# Final Evaluation Of The Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme

## Ethiopia

### Inception Report

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## 1 Introduction

The following provides an introduction to the sector framework in which the *Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme* (JP) fits, as well as introducing the JP itself. The material below draws heavily on the JP's project document. The JP was designed as a pilot project to address the issues of the oilseeds sector indicated in the Master Plan<sup>11</sup>. The JP worked to showcase development of an efficient oilseed value chain that would promote entrepreneurship, provide capital and services to farmers, raise demand for agricultural products and connect farmers with markets, addressing the production, handling, processing, marketing and distribution of oilseeds. Through the JP it was anticipated that employment and income would be generated, and that the productivity and quality of oil seeds and edible oil production would be enhanced. The process was intended to lead to increased food security and innovation throughout the value chain, increasing the income of farmers, processors and traders, and in so doing, addressing three MDGs: Goal 1 – poverty reduction, Goal 3 – gender equity improvement, Goal 7 - sustainable development.

The JP was initiated in January 2010, with a project period of 3 years. By late 2011, the mid-term evaluation was undertaken, followed by the preparation and implementation of an improvement plan based upon the mid-term evaluation's recommendations. Per this process, the JP requested and was granted a no-cost extension of six months, through 30 June, 2013. The JP was conducted in two regions, Amhara and Oromia.

The JP was implemented by UNIDO as the lead agency, with FAO and the ILO, together with national counterparts which include the Ministry of Industry (MoI) as the lead governmental institution, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs (MoLSA) as well as their regional and woreda<sup>12</sup> level representatives. The JP was governed according to the MDG-F governance structure which includes a National Steering Committee (NSC), Programme Management Committee (PMC), Regional Level Steering Committee (RLSC) and Regional Level Technical Committee (RLTC).

### 1.1 Situational Background in the Oil Seed Sector

The issues and priorities critical to achieving the potential of the oilseeds sector in Ethiopia are varied. They include the general level of growth of the country, requiring long-term solutions, to those that are specific to the sector. Issues and priorities of immediate and particular concern to the sector include:

- The transfer and adoption of suitable production technologies and farm practices.

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<sup>11</sup>Master Plan – this refers to the Agro-Industries Master Plan worked on by collaborating UN agencies, in cooperation with and on behalf of the Ethiopian Government. The Master Plan is a national strategy document to guide the development of agro-processing in Ethiopia.

<sup>12</sup> Woreda – 'Districts' – third level administrative divisions of Ethiopia, administered by local government.



- Input supply and planting material at close proximity.
- Appropriate post-harvest treatment and storage.
- Availability of finance to farmers for commodity production and on-farm activities.
- Diversification of production into non-traditional commodities.
- Institutional and human capacity to meet challenges.

*Production.* Oil seeds are the third most important commodity in terms of production and export in Ethiopia. According to the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA), oil crops are currently (2008/09) cultivated in about 0.86 million hectares, involving close to four million smallholder producers in the main production areas. The main oil seed crops include sesame, niger seed and linseed. Though this production contributes to household income, it is constrained due to too small-scale and fragmented land holdings. In this regard, it is revealing to note that eighty-six per cent of the sizes of holdings under oilseeds production fall in the range of less than five hectares. Holdings of greater than five and less than ten hectares account for twelve per cent. Holdings of greater than ten hectares account for less than two per cent the total estimated area under oilseeds. A low use of agro-inputs and poor farm management, and a lack of market-oriented production such as contract farming, together with the high cost and limited availability of inputs (improved seeds, fertilizer and chemicals) add to overall low productivity.

*Processing.* Most domestic oil processing is undertaken by an estimated 850 small-scale and micro oil processing plants, accounting for ninety-five per cent of the manufacturing base of the edible oil industry. Capacity utilization in the industrial branch is seriously constrained both by the quantity and quality of oilseeds available. Many of these small and medium enterprises use obsolete equipment and technology. Working conditions and the level of sanitary and hygienic standards is far below acceptable levels. Edible oil refining capacities are limited to some twenty-six medium and large industries, utilizing about thirty per cent of capacity. Considering import-intensity (a technical coefficient that measures the share or magnitude of imported intermediate goods to produce a unit of final demand) the edible oil industry, at less than two per cent, provides an opportunity/ potential to be competitive both domestically and internationally given the domestic base of the raw material, oilseeds, and integration with the local economy. The edible oil sub-sector, however, does not perform well in all aspects of its operational parameters. Capacity utilization of the edible oil sub-sector is by far the lowest among the food manufacturing sector industries and the average of the Ethiopian manufacturing industries over the past few years. The sub-sector has diverse and significant constraints.

*Marketing.* Marketing and distribution of oil seeds is mainly done by small and medium scale traders with poor marketing facilities, especially for collection, storage and transportation, which cause high post-harvest losses. The marketing chain is long, with many intermediaries adding little value to the final product, with high transaction costs being incurred. Lack of access to packaging services, poor access to financial services, and poor vertical and horizontal collaboration within, as well as external to the chain, all negatively impact on the industry.

The JP involved itself in this framework. Its stated objective was to ‘enhance the sustainable supply system of raw material at desired quantity and quality, promote efficient processing capacity and improve access to markets by the effective *integration and lead role of the private sector* in the entire value chain’. The JP did not intend to provide producer-oriented support for production – it intended to integrate the private sector in all aspects of the value

chain, from production to processing to marketing and business support services. The JP was mainly targeted at small farmers, and small and medium enterprises in the Oromiya and Amhara Regions, as well as their supportive public bodies and private sector counterparts. The JP intended to pioneer a ‘private sector led supply of raw material, capacity building for enhanced processing technologies and linkage promotion for access to finance and local and international markets’.

The JP has drawn on a number of lessons learned from other initiatives in agro-processing in general and in the oilseeds sub-sector in particular. One such lesson, as stated in JP documentation, comes from the SNV supported project on the oilseed value chain. It is that ‘intervention in the sub-sector needs to focus on the whole value chain. Intervention either at processing, production or marketing would not help much’. Moreover, from the SNV experience it was also decided that the JP would ‘enhance coordination and dialogues among various stakeholders in the value chain in the Oromiya and Amhara Regions at local level in order to catalyse improvement of productivity and competitiveness for sustainable growth’, ie it would not focus at the national level but locally.

A further lesson that has been applied in design was the need to focus on policy level linkages. The JP design included ‘development of policies and strategies as required under the framework of the existing government strategies’, to strengthen and ensure an appropriate policy framework. Finally, based on the work of the ILO with member-based associations, as an effective way of promoting the rights, responsibilities and entitlements of marginalised groups, the JP design incorporated the involvement of small and medium enterprises in the value chain.

## **1.2 Results Structure of the JP**

### **1.2.1 Outcome 1. "Productivity and competitiveness of private sector led agricultural production of oilseeds is enhanced".**

#### **1.1 The supply of farm inputs (seeds, fertilizers and chemicals) is improved.**

- 1.1.1 Technical support given to seed producers/farmer associations to enhance quality/quantity in oil seed production.
- 1.1.2 Capacity building on entrepreneurship, business planning production and marketing provided to seed producers.
- 1.1.3 Access to fertilizers facilitated by a government and private sector facility.
- 1.1.4 Support and incentives to enhance cooperatives and private sector participation in input supplies for oil seed producers.

#### **1.2 Access to credit is facilitated for the small holder and commercial farms to enable easier procurement of inputs.**

- 1.2.1 Credit facilities supported through financial intermediaries for procurement of farm inputs. (linked to 1.1.3).

#### **1.3 Market-oriented farming is enhanced**

- 1.3.1 Contract farming procedures between producers and agro-processors/ exporters are developed and implemented –linked to cluster zones approach (see 3.1).
- 1.3.2 Capacity building and institutional support provided to cooperatives, small traders and other SMEs to improve their management skills and capabilities, to enhance their competitiveness and profitability.

1.3.3 Pilot system in warehouse receipts linked to ECEX set up.

#### **1.4 Enhanced investment in the production of oilseeds**

1.4.1 Investment enhancing strategy is developed verified.

#### **1.2.2 Outcome 2 The capacity and competitiveness of the stakeholders for processing of edible oil seeds is enhanced.**

#### **2.1 Storage, cleaning and grading of the oil seeds improved.**

2.1.1 Cleaning and grading facilities (including storage) established in four market oriented cooperatives on a pilot basis.

2.1.2 Results of the pilot effectively disseminated among other market-oriented cooperatives and processor.

#### **2.2 Improved processing efficiency in the targeted oilseed processing industries**

2.2.1 Oil extraction technology modernized in targeted processing plants.

#### **2.3 Product safety and quality improved**

2.3.1 Selected processing plants upgraded to improve overall quality and food safety.

2.3.2 Selected processing plants HACCP certified (ISO 22000).

#### **2.4 The packaging of the final product is made more attractive for the market**

2.4.1 Packaging lines of selected processing plants in Oromiya and Amhara Regions upgraded.

#### **2.5 Edible oil producers capacity and competitiveness enhanced through PPP**

2.5.1 Working group on edible oil with in PPP structure established and capacity to dialogue strengthened.

2.5.2 Knowledge and best experience gained from other countries on edible oil sub sector.

2.5.3 Agro-industry master plan promoted through PPP.

#### **2.6 Access to finance for the processors including processors cooperatives improved**

2.6.1 Barriers to access financial services lifted.

2.6.2 Processors are linked to financial service providers.

2.6.3 Capacity of processors and financial institutions enhanced.

#### **2.7 Capacity of Business Development Service (BDS) providers enhanced to deliver relevant and effective services to the processors including processors cooperatives**

2.7.1 BDS providers linked to the processors.

2.7.2 BDS providers avail BDS that is demand driven and responds to the needs of SMEs and larger processors.

#### **2.8 The occupational safety and Health (OSH) practice of the large processors and cooperatives strengthened.**

2.8.1 The state of OSH practices and gaps in the processing industry identified.

2.8.2 Enterprise level OSH programmes in place.

#### **2.9 Processors organized to get economic of scale, representation and voice.**

2.9.1 Association and/ or entrepreneurs’ cooperatives formed which provides relevant and effective services to the processors (linked to 2.5 and 3.1).

**2.10 Processors in the informal economy upgraded to graduate into the formal economy**

2.10.1 Key drivers of informality among the processors identified.

2.10.2 Enabling capacity, system and infrastructure in place to facilitate the transformation. (Linked to 2.6 and 2.7).

**1.2.3 Outcome 3. Access to local and international markets for edible oil producers is improved.**

**3.1 Vertical linkages between oil seed producers, traders and processors are improved through clustering.**

3.1.1 SME Networks formed and joint actions undertaken.

3.1.2 Business Development Service (BDS) upgraded to offer services to SME oil processors.

**3.2 Linkages between the processors and marketing agents are enhanced.**

3.2.1. Joint marketing actions facilitated to networks of processors.

**3.3 Access to finance for the marketing agents and marketing cooperatives improved to enable bulk orders and bulk purchasing**

3.3.1 Marketing agents and cooperatives are linked to financial service providers.

3.3.2 Savings and credit cooperatives established.

**3.4 Marketing agents are enabled to access local, regional and international markets**

3.4.1 Capacity of marketing agents strengthened to access new markets (linked to 2.3 and 2.4).

<b>1.3 Budget for the JP by category and participating UN Agency</b>			
<b>Item</b>	<b>Participating UN Agency</b>		
	<b>FAO</b>	<b>UNIDO</b>	<b>ILO</b>
Supplies, commodities, equipment and transport	258,000	360,000	162,000
Personnel (staff, consultants, travel and training)	301,000	284,200	154,000
Training of counterparts	237,600	275,000	390,000
Contracts	170,000	95,000	0
Other Direct Costs	25,000	66,850	25,000
<b>Total Direct Costs</b>	<b>991,600</b>	<b>1,081,050</b>	<b>731,000</b>
UN Agency Indirect Cost	69,412	75,674	51,170
<b>Total per Agency</b>	<b>1,061,012</b>	<b>1,136,340</b>	<b>782,170</b>
		<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2,999,956</b>

**2 Background to the evaluation: objectives and overall approach**

Per the Terms of Reference, the final evaluation is **summative** in nature and seeks to:

- Measure to what extent the *Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement Joint Programme* has fully implemented the activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes and specifically measuring development results.
- Generate substantive evidence based knowledge by identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be useful to other development interventions at national (scale up) and international level (replicability).

The evaluation has the following specific objectives:

- Measure to what extent the JP contributed to solve the needs and problems identified in the design phase.
- Measure the JP's degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised.
- Measure to what extent the JP has attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants whether individuals, communities, institutions, etc.
- Identify and document substantive lessons learned and good practices on the specific topics of the thematic window, MDGs, Paris Declaration, Accra Principles and UN reform with the aim of supporting the sustainability of the JP or some of its components.

The findings, conclusions and recommendations generated by the evaluation will be part of a thematic window Meta evaluation which the MDG-F Secretariat is undertaking to synthesize the overall impact of the MDG-F at national and international levels. Within the Private Sector Development thematic area, JPs have operated in five areas, which will form a component of the evaluation's analysis:

- Innovation: adapting products and processes to win new markets.
- Investment: removing market constraints and upgrading equipment.
- Capacity building: leveraging the strengths of the poor as producers and consumers.
- Partnership: combining resources, knowledge and capabilities with others.
- Advocacy: engaging in policy dialogue with government.

### **3 Identification of main units and dimensions for analysis and possible areas for research**

The following narrative describes the structure of the analysis. The narrative is formed by the evaluation questions provided in the Terms of Reference, although these have been revised and refined somewhat. Some additional enquiry has been added following inception period discussions with the JP and the MDG-F Secretariat. The evaluation questions define the information that will be generated as a result of the evaluation process. Per the Terms of Reference, the questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn, grouped according to the three levels of the programme (design, process and results).

Further discussion/ analysis of the evaluation approach can be found at chapter 7 – Evaluation Matrix.

## 3.1 Design level

### 3.1.1 Relevance - The extent to which the objectives of the JP were consistent with the needs and interests of the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals.

- To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to the MDGs, UNDAF and national priorities?
- To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to the development of stakeholder participation?
- To what extent did implementing partners participating in the JP add value to solving the development challenges described in the programme document?
- To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to engagement of national ownership?
- In which ways, and to what extent, did the JP contribute to solving the socio-economic needs and problems described in the programme document?
- To what extent was joint programming the best option to respond to development challenges stated in the programme document? Did the inclusion of Government and the integrated response with the private sector demonstrate an appropriate design? Is it replicable with other donors or within other sectors? Did it add value, or, against each of these questions did the process complicate approaches for the MDG-F and others?
- To what extent was the JP designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated jointly? To what extent did the JP have a useful and reliable M&E strategy that contributed to the measurement of development results?
- Did the programme design follow a theory of change? If so, is it possible to assess results against it? Comment on the effectiveness of the development and use of indicators and their use in monitoring processes.
- To what extent did the JP have a useful and reliable Communication and Advocacy strategy?

## 3.2 Process level

### 3.2.1 Efficiency - Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results.

- To what extent was the JP's management model (instruments; economic, human and technical resources; organizational structure; information flows; decision-making in management) efficient against the development results attained? What type of work methodologies, financial instruments, and business practices did implementing partners use to *increase efficiency in delivering as one*? What type of administrative, financial and managerial obstacles did the JP face and to what extent did these affect efficiency?
- What was the progress of the JP in financial terms. Detail amounts committed and disbursed (total amounts and as a percentage of the total) on an Agency-by-Agency basis. Provide analysis of significant discrepancies.

- Was implementation as a JP more efficient in comparison to a single agency's intervention? To what extent and in what ways did the JP increase or reduce efficiency in delivering outputs and attaining outcomes?
- To what extent did governance of the fund at programme level (PMC) and at national level (NSC) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP? To what extent were governance structures useful for development purposes? For national ownership? For working together as one? Did governance structures enable the management and delivery of outputs and results? Were there issues with specific Agencies or partners in the delivery of the JP, and its outputs/ outcomes? If so, were these issues addressed effectively by the governance structures and systems of the JP, ie, did the timeliness and effectiveness of delivery improve?
- To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation have an impact on the joint programme? To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation contribute to achievement of results? Was the JP design revised? Did revisions reflect the changes that were needed? Did the JP follow the mid-term evaluation recommendations related to programme design, ie did the JP implement the improvement plan?

### **3.2.2 Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country's national/local partners in development interventions**

- To what extent did the targeted population, citizens, participants, local and national authorities make the JP their own? Did these groups take an active role in the JP? What modes of participation drove the process? What modes and approaches of national leadership were notable?
- To what extent and in what ways did ownership, or the lack of it, impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP?

## **3.3 Results level**

### **3.3.1 Effectiveness - Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved.**

- To what extent did the JP contribute to the attainment of the development outputs and outcomes described in the programme document? To what extent were the JP's outputs and outcomes synergistic and coherent in producing development results? The evaluation will specifically address how far the JP went compared to what was planned, including a detailed analysis of planned activities, intended outputs and achievement of outcomes.
- To what extent, and in what ways, did the JP contribute to:
  - Millennium Development Goals at the local and national level?
  - The goals set in the thematic window?
  - The Paris Declaration, in particular the principle of national ownership – to what extent did the JP contribute to the advancement and the progress of national ownership processes and outcomes, such as the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF, etc? Analysis will specifically consider JP policy, budgets, design, and implementation.



- The goal of *delivering as one* at country level?
- To what extent did the JP have an impact on targeted citizens? Was the JP successful in attracting the interest and involvement of producers? Of processors? Of marketing agencies? How successful was the JP in attracting government participation, locally, as well as at the national level? To what extent did the JP contribute to an increase in stakeholder/ citizen dialogue and/ or engagement on development issues and policies?
- The evaluation will analyse the JP for good practice, success stories, lessons learned and transferable examples, and will describe each. Specific reference will be given to each aspect of the value chain, as well as to Government and/ or private sector initiatives that exemplify the intent and results of the JP.
- The evaluation will, to the extent possible, describe the differentiated results of the JP according to gender, ethnic, rural and urban descriptions, where such have been documented by the JP.

### 3.3.2 Sustainability – The probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the longer term.

- To what extent have JP decision-making bodies and implementing partners undertaken the necessary decisions and actions to ensure the sustainability of the approaches and/ or results of the JP?
- At local and national level:
  - To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the JP?
  - Did these institutions show the technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the JP or to scale it up?
  - Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national partners?
  - Do partners have sufficient financial capacity to maintain the benefits produced by the JP?
- To what extent will the joint programme be replicable or scaled up at national or local levels? Is further government investment in the industry visible or planned, in the target regions or elsewhere? Can potential involvement of other donors be detected, in terms of an interest in or willingness to extend or broaden the JP's approaches/ results?

## 4 Methodology for the compilation and analysis of the information

The intent of the evaluation is to understand in detail what the JP undertook *to do* and what it undertook *to accomplish*, and to use the experience and knowledge of key JP stakeholders to analyse JP activities and results against the JP's design. The evaluator will use project documentation to provide the indicators of success against which analysis is undertaken. These indicators, together with the specific requirements of the evaluation ToR, provide the framework in which the project will be evaluated. The evaluation methodology will incorporate three key components to provide the information and reflection required to understand JP implementation and results. The three are:

- Review of project documentation. The desk-top study will provide the opportunity for the evaluator to assess actual project activities, outputs and outcomes against the JP



plan. This analytical process will allow the key evaluation questions, outlined above, to be developed further and in more detail. Reports will indicate the appropriateness of design, and where further questions on design issues are necessary. The documentation itself will give insights into project management processes and approaches that will be useful in assessing project efficiency. Quality of activity implementation and of outputs and outcomes will be apparent in the reports, or the reports will indicate where further enquiries are required.

- **Field work.** Interviews and/ or focus group conversations with JP personnel and other JP stakeholders will be undertaken at national and local levels. Interview questionnaires will be developed along the lines of the questions described above, although they will be refined based on the desk-top analysis of project documentation and in relation to the specific role and background of the interviewee. The intent of these interviews/ focus group discussions is to draw out further information and analysis regarding the design, process and results of the project. The discussions are a qualitative process, and the evaluator will make use of Technology of Participation conversation methodologies to enhance the process.
- **Analytical processes.** The evaluator will use the material from the desk-top study and the field work (interviews and focus group discussions) as the basis for an analysis of the JP in the context of the defined evaluation questions. The evaluation report will provide this analysis, and will address each of the evaluation questions. The process is heavily qualitative, drawing on the experience of participants, stakeholders and the evaluator in understanding and commenting on JP design and implementation.

## **5 Criteria to define the mission agenda, including field visits**

### **5.1 Inception Report**

The inception report will be completed and submitted by 14 June 2013.

### **5.2 Desk-top Study**

The desk-top study will be completed by 18 June 2013. As part of this process, field instruments (staff and stakeholder interview questions/ formats and focus group conversation questions/ formats) will be prepared.

### **5.3 Field Visit**

The field visit is scheduled for the period 18-30 June 2013. The proposed schedule for the field work, developed by the JP, is below. Some changes are likely, including the probable inclusion of discussions with representatives of non-stakeholder organisations (such as SNV) to provide a non-stakeholder perspective on the JP. These arrangements have not yet been made.

## 6 Criteria to define the mission agenda, including “field visits”

Following is the proposed time frame for field work.

Date	Day	Time		Activity	Participants / Responsibility
19/06/2013	Wednesday	Morning	09:30 - 11:30	Briefing with RCO & UN Focal Persons and agree on Final Evaluation Schedule	RCO, UN Agency Focal Persons
			11:30 – 12:30	RCO Office	RCO
		Afternoon	14:00 - 17:00	1st round of interviews: FAO	FAO
20/06/2013	Thursday	Morning	09:00 - 12:00	1st round of interviews: UNIDO	UNIDO
		Afternoon	13:30 - 16:30	1st round of interviews: ILO	ILO
		Evening	19:00 – 20:00	Travel to Bahir Dar	UN Agency Focal Persons
21/06/2013	Friday	Morning	09:00 – 10:30	Regional Technical & Steering Committees	Focal persons / CDA
			10:30 – 12:30	Bahir Dar Edible Oil Producers Association (Cluster)	Leaders of Association / CDA
			10:30 – 12:30	Nile Edible Oil Manufacturing Industry PLC	Leaders of PLC / CDA
		Afternoon	14:00 – 15:30	Visit to Oil Producers (1/2)	Oil Processors / CDA
			15:30 – 17:00	Bahir Dar University	Focal persons / CDA
22/06/2013	Saturday	Morning	07:00 - 16:00	Visit to Noug farmers & Primary Cooperatives in Amhara	FAO / BoA
		Afternoon	16:00 – 17:30	Merkeb Farmers Cooperative Union, Bahir Dar	Leaders of the Union
23/06/2013	Sunday			Travel back to Addis Ababa	UN Agency Focal Persons

24/06/2013	Monday	Morning		Travel to Adama & Arsi Zone	UN Agency Focal Persons
24/06/2013	Monday	Morning	09:00 – 11:00	Regional Technical & Steering Committees	Focal persons / CDA
			11:00 – 13:00	Adama Edible Oil Producers Association (Cluster)	Leaders of Association / CDA
			11:00 – 13:00	Right Edible Oil Producers PLC	Leaders of PLC / CDA
		Afternoon	14:30 - 16:00	Visit to Oil Producers (1/2)	Oil Processors / CDA
			16:00 – 17:30	Adama University	Focal persons / CDA
25/06/2013	Tuesday	Morning	08:00 - 11:00	Hitosa Farmers Cooperative Union, Eteya	Leaders of Union
		Afternoon	11:00 – 17:00	Visit to Linseed farmers & Primary Cooperatives in Arsi	FAO / BoA
26/06/2013	Wednesday	Morning		Travel back to Addis Ababa	UN Agency Focal Persons
26/06/2013	Wednesday	Morning	10:00 - 11:30	Ministry of Industry	Focal persons
			11:30 - 13:00	Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs	Focal persons
		Afternoon	14:00 - 15:00	Ministry of Agriculture	Focal persons
			15:30 - 16:30	AECID / Spanish embassy (better at the end)	Office Representatives
27/06/2013	Thursday	Morning	09:00 - 12:30	2nd round of interviews: FAO, ILO, UNIDO	Focal persons
		Afternoon	13:00 - 16:00	2nd round / additional of interviews	
			16:00 – 17:00	RCO Office	RCO
28/06/2013	Friday	Morning		Debriefing preparation	Consultant
		Afternoon		Wrap up of Final Evaluation and findings	RCO, UN Agency Focal Persons

## 6.1 Draft Evaluation Report

The draft final evaluation report will be submitted by 15 July 2013.

The JP team, MDG-F Secretariat and ERG will respond to the draft final evaluation report by close of business on 25 July 2013.

## 6.2 Final Evaluation Report

The evaluator will take on board the comments of the Secretariat, the ERG and JP team, and will finalise and submit the final report by 31 July 2013.

## 6.3 UNEG Ethical Principles

The evaluator's approach will follow the ethical principles and standards of the UNEG:

- Anonymity and confidentiality. The evaluator will respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.
- Responsibility. The report will mention any dispute or difference of opinion that arises between the evaluator and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/ or recommendations. The evaluator will corroborate all assertions, and will note disagreements.
- Integrity. The evaluator will highlight issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is required to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.
- Independence. The evaluator confirms their independence from the JP, and that they are not involved in its management or any element of the JP.
- Incidents. The evaluator undertakes to advise the MDG-F Secretariat immediately if problems arise during the fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, and acknowledges that any failure to notify such problems immediately means they cannot be used to justify any failure to complete the activities and achieve the outcomes anticipated in the evaluation ToR.
- Validation of information. The evaluator is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected and for the information presented in the evaluation report.
- Intellectual property. In handling information sources, the evaluator will respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities under review.
- Delivery of reports. If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than agreed, the penalties stipulated in the ToR will be applicable.

## 7 Evaluation Matrix

Key question	Specific sub-question	Data sources	Data collection method	Indicators/ success standards	Methods for data analysis
<b>Design - Relevance</b>	To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to the MDGs, UNDAF and national priorities?	JP documentation; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Clarity of objectives. Quality of strategic planning documentation. Quality of project documentation; logframe. Availability of needs assessment. Alignment of programme activity to real needs.	Qualitative analysis of data
	To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to the development of stakeholder participation?	JP documentation; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Quality of strategic planning documentation. Alignment of programme activity to real needs. Any important area not covered by the programme that should have been included.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	To what extent did implementing partners participating in the JP add value to solving the development challenges described in the programme document?	JP documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Quality of strategic planning documentation. Alignment of programme activity to real needs.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	To what extent was the design and strategy of the JP relevant to engagement of national ownership?	JP documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Quality of strategic planning documentation. Alignment of programme activity to real needs. Any important area not covered by the programme that should have been included.	Qualitative analysis of data
	In which ways, and to what extent, did the JP contribute to solving the socio-economic needs and problems described in the programme document?	JP documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Visibility of change in production, processing and marketing approaches and systems.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	To what extent was joint programming the best option to respond to development challenges	JP documentation; Stakeholder	Desk study; interviews.	Quality of strategic planning documentation. Alignment of programme activity to real needs.	Qualitative analysis of data.

	stated in the programme document? Did the inclusion of Government and the integrated response with the private sector demonstrate an appropriate design? Is it replicable with other donors or within other sectors? Did it add value, or, against each of these questions did the process complicate approaches for the MDG-F and others?	opinion.		Effectiveness of activities/ outputs/ outcomes.	Interpretation of interviews and observations
	To what extent was the JP designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated jointly? To what extent did the JP have a useful and reliable M&E strategy that contributed to the measurement of development results?	JP documentation; Programme reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Clarity of objectives. Clarity of SMART Output statements. Quality of strategic planning documentation. Quality and use of M&E documentation/ approaches.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	Did the programme design follow a theory of change? If so, is it possible to assess results against it? Comment on the effectiveness of the development and use of indicators and their use in monitoring processes.	JP documentation; Programme reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Clarity of objectives. Quality of strategic planning documentation. Quality of indicator development approaches/ sustainable knowledge within the JP team. Quality and use of M&E documentation/ approaches.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	To what extent did the JP have a useful and reliable Communication and Advocacy strategy?	JP documentation; Programme reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Demonstrated communication/ advocacy activities. Demonstrated outputs and outcomes of the strategy.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
<b>Process - Efficiency</b>	To what extent was the JP's management model efficient against the development results attained? What type of work methodologies, financial instruments, and business practices did implementing partners use to <i>increase efficiency in delivering as one</i> ? What type of administrative, financial and managerial obstacles did the JP face and to what extent did these affect efficiency?	Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Managerial and administrative capacities. Quality of management/ monitoring process. Availability of procedures and guidelines. Quality of structured coordination process. Clear allocation of the roles and responsibilities within and between agencies. Clarity and definition of actions/ decisions. Demonstrated actions in response to expressed issues. Models, methodologies and instruments described and detailed.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations

	<p>What was the progress of the JP in financial terms. Detail amounts committed and disbursed (total amounts and as a percentage of the total) on an Agency-by-Agency basis. Provide analysis of significant discrepancies.</p>	<p>Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.</p>	<p>Desk study; interviews.</p>	<p>Effectiveness of expenditure against budget. Timeliness of delivery of activities and expenditures.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations</p>
	<p>Was implementation as a JP more efficient in comparison to a single agency's intervention? To what extent and in what ways did the JP increase or reduce efficiency in delivering outputs and attaining outcomes?</p>	<p>Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.</p>	<p>Desk study; interviews.</p>	<p>Demonstrated effectiveness of expenditure against budget. Timeliness of delivery of activities and expenditures.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations</p>
	<p>To what extent did governance of the fund at programme level (PMC) and at national level (NSC) contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP? To what extent were governance structures useful for development purposes? For national ownership? For working together as one? Did governance structures enable the management and delivery of outputs and results? Were there issues with specific Agencies or partners in the delivery of the JP, and its outputs/ outcomes? If so, were these issues addressed effectively by the governance structures and systems of the JP, ie, did the timeliness and effectiveness of delivery improve?</p>	<p>Programme documentation; PMC and NSC Minutes; Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.</p>	<p>Desk study; interviews.</p>	<p>Clarity and definition of actions/ decisions. Demonstrated actions in response to expressed issues. Extensiveness of thinking, planning, decision-making. Decisions on remedial actions as appropriate. Timeliness of delivery of JP activities.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations</p>
	<p>To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation have an impact on the joint programme? To what extent and in what ways did the mid-term evaluation contribute to achievement of results? Was the JP design revised? Did revisions reflect the changes that were needed? Did the JP follow the mid-term</p>	<p>Programme Reporting; Stakeholder opinion.</p>	<p>Desk study; interviews.</p>	<p>Quality of M and E documentation. Demonstrated use of the recommended changes. Demonstrated change in approach – delivery of outputs and outcomes. Revisions to programming based on the mid-term review.</p>	<p>Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations</p>

	evaluation recommendations related to programme design, ie did the JP implement the improvement plan?			Changes in management or reporting processes. Implementation of the improvement plan.	
<b>Process - Ownership</b>	To what extent did the targeted population, citizens, participants, local and national authorities make the JP their own? Did these groups take an active role in the JP? What modes of participation drove the process? What modes and approaches of national leadership were notable?	Programme documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Demonstrated active presence at NSCs etc. Demonstrated decision-making at the strategic and/ or activity levels. Demonstration of effective modes and approaches of leadership. Actual involvement of beneficiaries and stakeholders in implementation. Identification of resources and counterparts engaged in implementation.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	To what extent and in what ways did ownership, or the lack of it, impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the JP?	Stakeholder opinion.	Interviews.	Demonstrated active presence at NSCs etc. Demonstrated decision-making at the strategic and/ or activity levels. Effective modes and approaches of leadership.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
<b>Results - Effectiveness</b>	To what extent did the JP contribute to the attainment of the development outputs and outcomes described in the programme document? To what extent were the JP's outputs and outcomes synergistic and coherent in producing development results? The evaluation will specifically address how far the JP went compared to what was planned, including a detailed analysis of planned activities, intended outputs and achievement of outcomes.	Programme documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Timeliness of outputs produced. Quality of outputs produced. Identification of planned/ realized follow up mechanisms. Extent of beneficiary coverage.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	To what extent, and in what ways, did the JP contribute to: Millennium Development Goals at the local and national level? The goals set in the thematic window? The Paris Declaration, in particular the principle of national ownership – to what extent did the JP contribute to the advancement and the progress of national ownership processes and outcomes, such as the design and implementation of National Development Plans, Public Policies, UNDAF,	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Timeliness of outputs produced. Quality of outputs produced. Identification of planned/ realized follow up mechanisms. Extent of beneficiary coverage.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations



	etc? Analysis will specifically consider JP policy, budgets, design, and implementation. The goal of delivering as one at country level?				
	To what extent did the JP have an impact on targeted citizens? Was the JP successful in attracting the interest and involvement of producers? Of processors? Of marketing agencies? How successful was the JP in attracting government participation, locally, as well as at the national level? To what extent did the JP contribute to an increase in stakeholder/ citizen dialogue and/ or engagement on development issues and policies?	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Timeliness of outputs produced. Quality of outputs produced. Identification of planned/ realized follow up mechanisms. Extent of beneficiary coverage.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	The evaluation will analyse the JP for good practice, success stories, lessons learned and transferable examples, and will describe each. Specific reference will be given to each aspect of the value chain, as well as to Government and/ or private sector initiatives that exemplify the intent of the JP.	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Identification of good practice; Identification of lessons learned.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	The evaluation will, to the extent possible, describe the differentiated results of the JP according to gender, ethnic, rural and urban descriptions, where such have been documented by the JP.	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Disaggregated results visible in documentation/ reporting.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
<b>Results - Sustainability</b>	To what extent have JP decision-making bodies and implementing partners undertaken the necessary decisions and actions to ensure the sustainability of the approaches and/ or results of the JP?	Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Identification of planned/ realized follow up mechanisms. Availability of plans, processes, procedures. Extent of beneficiary policy and procedural ownership.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations
	At local and national level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent did national and/or local institutions support the JP?</li> <li>Did these institutions show the technical capacity and leadership commitment to keep working with the JP or to scale it up?</li> </ul>	Programme documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Extent of beneficiary coverage. Availability of improved procedures, guidelines and strategies. Availability of suitably qualified skilled staff and adequate financial resources. Availability of government policy/ budget frameworks for the longer term.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced in national partners?</li> <li>• Do partners have sufficient financial capacity to maintain the benefits produced by the JP?</li> </ul>				
	To what extent will the joint programme be replicable or scaled up at national or local levels? Is further government investment in the industry visible or planned, in the target regions or elsewhere? Can potential involvement of other donors be detected, in terms of an interest in or willingness to extend or broaden the JP's approaches/ results?	Programme documentation; Progress/ monitoring reports; Stakeholder opinion.	Desk study; interviews.	Availability of suitably qualified skilled staff and adequate financial resources. Availability of government policy/ budget frameworks for the longer term.	Qualitative analysis of data. Interpretation of interviews and observations