



**TOGETHER**  
*for a sustainable future*

## OCCASION

This publication has been made available to the public on the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation.



**TOGETHER**  
*for a sustainable future*

## DISCLAIMER

This document has been produced without formal United Nations editing. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries, or its economic system or degree of development. Designations such as "developed", "industrialized" and "developing" are intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process. Mention of firm names or commercial products does not constitute an endorsement by UNIDO.


## FAIR USE POLICY

Any part of this publication may be quoted and referenced for educational and research purposes without additional permission from UNIDO. However, those who make use of quoting and referencing this publication are requested to follow the Fair Use Policy of giving due credit to UNIDO.

## CONTACT

Please contact [publications@unido.org](mailto:publications@unido.org) for further information concerning UNIDO publications.

For more information about UNIDO, please visit us at [www.unido.org](http://www.unido.org)



DO2965



Distribution  
LIMITED

14/MC. 49/102  
26 November 1971

Original: ENGLISH

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

Second International Fertilizer Symposium

Kiev, USSR, 21 September - 1 October 1971  
New Delhi, India, 2 - 11 October 1971


Agenda item 11/1

RECOMMENDATION OF SYMPOSIUM

Don A. Brown  
Secretary

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author  
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretariat of UNIDO.  
This document has been prepared by editing formal editing.

**It is recommended that some of the pages be also checked  
as copy of this report may not be up to the proper  
length by commands, even though the total number  
of pages used for preparing the master file.**



## INTRODUCTION

Agriculture is the bulwark of Nigerian economy. It accounts for about 60 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic Product and provides employment for about 70 per cent of the working population. Nigeria has a wide scope for agriculture based industries such as veneer and plywood production, leather tanning and processing, coffee and tea growing and processing, textile spinning, weaving and finishing, alcohol distillation, yeast, cordage, rope and twine manufacture, sugar refining and rubber fabrications. Through careful planning and development citrus, pineapple, maize, cassava, tomato, cotton, sugar cane, cassava, anchow and wheat can be cultivated to support large processing industries.

This impressive position and outlook for Nigerian agriculture depend upon a wealth of agricultural resources. There is a vast area of arable land on which almost all tropical crops could be raised on account of the varied climatic conditions. Statistics shows that out of the country's total land area of about 231 million acres, about 80 million acres, constitute arable land and land under permanent crops. With about 9 per cent of the country's area not presently used for any specific purpose, the percentage of land which can be available for agricultural purposes is about 40. Thus about 92 million acres of land in Nigeria can be used for agricultural purposes.

Before independence in 1960, Nigerian agriculture suffered from a general position of low productivity. Poor production techniques and lack of marketing facilities. Infrastructure, marketing, storage,

and some protective we can inadequate. The unique characteristics of  
the cash crops were not properly articulated to provide  
guidelines for developing definitive policy measures.

Following the attainment of independence and the introduction of  
the First National Development Plan 1962-1968, governmental interest  
in agriculture increased steadily. During this period,  
~~522 million~~ were allocated to primary production. About 34 per cent  
of this amount went to government directed projects such as farm  
settlements, plantations, irrigation schemes and research projects in  
the fields of forestry, fisheries, livestock, soil fertility and plant  
breeding. The former Regional Governments participated in this program  
of assistance to agriculture through allocations for inputs such  
as extension services, fertilizer subsidy, hiring of machinery,  
rehabilitation and replanting of cash crops.

Now, with Government's interest in increased agricultural yields  
and the desire to create sufficient incentives to producers. To achieve  
~~this~~, a ~~Nigerian~~ Produce Marketing Company Ltd., was incorporated in  
~~Nigeria~~ in 1956 to take over the functions of the Nigerian Produce  
Marketing Company incorporated in England in 1947. In 1949 four  
~~Marketing Boards~~ - the Nigeria Cocoa, Oil Palm, Groundnut and Cotton  
~~Marketing Boards~~ - were organized as monopoly buying agents in Nigeria  
with the Nigeria Produce Marketing Company, Ltd. functioning as sole  
~~agent~~ + the agent. But with the reorganization of the Nigeria  
Produce Marketing Company, Ltd. in 1958, the Produce Marketing Boards  
~~were~~ forced to re-organize Board to purchase the principal cash  
crops. The plan of operation follows:-

Nigeria Produce Marketing Company Limited

Incorporated in Nigeria, 1958

Western Region Marketing Board	Eastern Region Marketing Board	Northern Region Marketing Board	Southern Cameroon Marketing Board
(b)	Cocoa Palm Kernel Palm oil Lemons	Crops Palm Oil Palm Kernel Cocoa Benniseed Soya Beans Groundnuts Copra.	Crops Groundnuts Seed Cotton Palm Kernel Palm Oil Benniseed Soya Beans Copra. Any derivative of the above.
Mid-Western Region Marketing Board (1953)	Any derivative of the above.	Any derivative of the above.	Any derivative of the above.

(a) When the Southern Cameroons became part of the Cameroon Republic in 1962, the Southern Cameroons Marketing Board severed its connections with the Nigeria Produce Marketing Company, Limited.

(b) With the formation of the Mid-Western Region in 1953, a Mid-Western Marketing Board evolved.

The four regional Marketing Boards have since their incorporation provided a guaranteed market for Nigerian produce. They have also provided guaranteed prices for crops. These prices change from time to time according to world prices for the crops. The significant role of the Nigeria Marketing Board system lies in the provision it makes

for trading savings for the country's economic development plus an orderly marketing channel for export crops. There is still room for an equitable pricing policy which would ensure that primary producers receive fair prices for their produce. Each of the Regional Marketing Board made funds available to the Regional Government for economic development schemes. Regional Development Corporations were formed to spearhead developments primarily aimed at increased capital formation. Because of difficulties in recovering loans made to the primary agricultural sector the Development Corporations became lukewarm towards issuing loans to this sector. The Regional Governments then undertook to provide agricultural credits to farmers through fertiliser subsidy, hiring of machinery or extension service societies. For the past five years, Government subsidy to fertiliser users has been about 50% of delivered cost. This subsidy has helped to promote fertiliser consumption in Nigeria as shown in the following table.

Table L

Fertiliser Consumption in Malaya

1960 - 1970 (Long Run)

Year	Phosphatic Fertiliser	Ammmonium Sulphate	Potassic Fertiliser	MES	TOTAL
1960	1,055	n.a.	1,784	6,123	10,962
1961	1,807	n.a.	1,401	1,001	4,209
1962	11,026	2,153	12,701	23,257	49,997
1963	7,369	3,040	695	3,426	19,890
1964	13,022	8,221	355	5,281	27,559
1965	10,492	14,621	3,222	6,915	34,230
1966	16,023	10,988	1,728	1,286	39,217
1967	21,370	20,216	2,145	3,279	44,830
1968	23,263	12,710	195	1,925	36,971
1969	26,020	608	457	11,791	39,188
1970	14,145	7,119	1,314	9,300	37,578

The fluctuations in fertiliser consumption between 1960 and 1970 can be best appreciated by considering the possible effects of the civil and political situations in the country during this period. From 1964 to 1967 there was a steady increase in fertiliser consumption. During the civil war period the local troops increased and changed. The phosphatic fertiliser imports fell from 26,020 tons in 1967 to about 24,000 tons in 1968 - a drop of about 8 per cent. Nitrogenous fertiliser imports for the same period fell from 29,817 tons

to about 13,000 tons - a drop of about 55 per cent. In the case of potassium and other fertilizers the drop was rather drastic. In 1970 the six Northern States imported fertilizers on the basis of individual state fertilizer requirements. The need to tailor orders according to available funds in each state and possible late orders greatly affected the level of fertilizer imports in 1970. Agriculture in the Eastern States and parts of the Midwestern State was not sufficiently rehabilitated to justify high importation of fertilizers into those areas in 1970.

Assuming that the pattern of fertilizer consumption for the period 1964-1969 will be resumed especially with renewed Government interest in providing more agricultural credits to the farmers it is logical to expect fertilizer demand to increase in the next few years. The Federal Government intends to spend about £27 million during the Second National Development Plan 1970 - 1974, on agricultural grants to priority areas such as improved extension services, provision of fertilizers and agricultural publicity information.

#### Development of Fertilizer Projects in Nigeria

The feasibility of mineral fertilizer manufacture in Nigeria has been studied since 1963 - one of the major studies again-

1. Bell Management and Partners, Ltd. "Report on the Feasibility of Fertilizer and Insecticide Industries in Nigeria",

Report to the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industries, September 1963. The conclusions of this report were:

- (a) Ammonium Sulphate and superphosphate could be economically produced and used in Nigeria.

(b) The industry should be programmed in two phases with complexes at Port Harcourt and Kaduna as indicated below:

<u>Port Harcourt</u>	<u>Production Capacity - tons/yr.</u>	
	<u>Phase I</u>	<u>Phase II</u>
Ammonium Sulphate	1967-68 50,000	1972-73 120,000
Single Superphosphate	30,000	80,000
<u>Kaduna</u>		
Single Superphosphate	50,000	120,000

Estimated capital expenditures were £4,020,000 for phase I and £5,160,000 for phase II.

It recommended continued importation of fertilisers to promote domestic demand to the projected production capacity.

2. Arthur D. Little, Inc. "An Evaluation of Mineral Fertiliser manufacturing Possibilities in Eastern Nigeria", Report to the Government of Eastern Nigeria, December 1963. This report concluded that ammonium sulphate and normal superphosphate were fertilizer materials best suited for manufacture in Nigeria. It warned, however, that market demand for ammonium sulphate then could not justify the establishment of a plant for it. Although it felt that a plant to manufacture 50,000 tons of normal superphosphate could be economical at a later date it recommended the establishment of a dry-mixed fertilizer plant of 10,000 tons a year capacity as being economically justifiable.

3. Tennessee Valley Authority, "Survey of Fertilizer Use in Nigeria" An Evaluation of Potential Demand and Methods of Supply. Report to U.S.A.I.D., June 1965.

This was an exploratory survey of fertilizer use, research, extension and demonstration programme, distribution methods and facilities and other factors affecting fertilizer use. Its projected fertilizer demand of 200,000 tons for 1970 was too optimistic. Total imports for 1969 were 39,181 tons. In the case of phosphatic fertilizer imports were 26,093 tons in 1969 and 14,103 tons for 1970.

It concluded in the opinions of other reports that demand for ammonium sulphate did not justify the establishment of an ammonium sulphate manufacturing plant.

Feeling that fertilizer use was related to prices received for their produce by the farmer it recommended that research be conducted to determine the effect of commodity prices on fertilizer consumption.

It called for a feasibility study on the economics of constructing and operating a bulk fertilizer mixing plant at Port Harcourt.

4. Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Report on the Feasibility of a fertilizer industry in Nigeria" Federal Ministry of Industries July 1968. This was an extensive feasibility study on fertilizer industry in Nigeria. Its projected phosphatic fertilizer demand by 1973 of 97,000 tons of single

superphosphate appears now to have been very optimistic.  
Demand for this fertiliser has been below estimated  
consumption for 1969 and 1970.

The report recommended the establishment of a 50,000  
tons per year phosphatic fertiliser plant at an estimated  
capital expenditure of £1,120,000. It concluded that calcium  
ammonium nitrate industry could not be economically  
established until demand for it had reached the 50,000 tons  
a year level. Such complex would cost £2,725,400 to  
establish. Apart from its shoddy mathematical errors this  
was the most serious of all the reports.

5. The Japan Consulting Institute. "Report on the  
Industrial Survey for Fertiliser, Petroleum, and Petro-  
chemical Industries in Nigeria" June 1969. The report  
recommended the establishment of a phosphatic fertiliser  
plant with a production capacity of 100,000 tons a year at  
Kaduna. The plant would require a fixed capital investment  
of £1,790,000. Two cases were studied for nitrogenous  
fertiliser production. Case I would produce 57,750 tons of  
urea and would require a fixed investment of £2,950,000.  
Case II would produce 359,900 tons of urea and would require  
a fixed investment of £10,130,000. Setting up Case II would  
depend upon ability to locate foreign markets for part the  
product.

## AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL IN U.S.A.

Only four countries have as yet potential fertiliser market in Africa which is large enough to justify the establishment of a local fertiliser industry. The Institute for Agricultural Research at Accra, Ghana, has predicted potential fertiliser demand for the Northeastern States alone at 910,000 tons for Ammonium Sulphate (191,000 tons as nutrient) and 615,000 tons for single superphosphate (191,000 tons as nutrient). Table 2 shows the potential demand in the Northern States.

**Table 2**

### POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR PHOSPHATE IN THE NORTHERN STATES

Crop	Acreage	Application Rate lb/acre			Tons	
		N	P <sub>2</sub> O <sub>5</sub>	Y	P <sub>2</sub> O <sub>5</sub>	
Soybean	6,674,000	24	20	95,000	79,000	
Millet	6,033,000	12	9	47,000	36,000	
Maize	981,000	55	35	24,000	15,000	
Cotton	1,327,000	24	20	14,000	12,000	
Groundnuts	2,500,000	-	15	-	17,000	
Yams	1,052,000	24	-	11,000	-	
				191,000	155,000	

If the available surface were fully utilized for agricultural production for the five crops requiring phosphatic fertilizers - sorghum, millet, maize, cassava and groundnuts - a total of 193,000 tons of P<sub>2</sub>O<sub>5</sub> materials could be consumed. This is equivalent to 643,010 tons of single superphosphate. The envisaged capacity for the SDF plant is just about  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the potential demand in the Northern States alone. In the case of crops requiring nitrogen, the quantity of fertiliser capable of being consumed is about  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the envisaged plant capacity.

Crops like maize, rice, yams, cassava, cotton and groundnuts grow well in the Southern part of the country which was not considered in the estimations of the Institute. Thus the fertiliser requirements for the whole country are by far greater than those estimated by the Institute. The basic reaction in Nigeria today, is that fertiliser consumption has never followed these indications. In my Report titled "The Phosphatic Fertiliser Industry in Nigeria", made in December 1970, I made the following projections on the basis of the average annual consumption for the years 1964 - 1969 and also assuming that annual consumption growth rate could be maintained at 25%.

#### PHOSPHATIC FERTILISER DEMAND PROJECTIONS 1970 - 1976

1970	-	25,000 tons
1971	-	31,000 "
1972	-	39,000 "
1973	-	48,000 "
1974	-	60,000 "
1975	-	75,000 "
1976	-	94,000 "

- 
- The total fertilizer consumption in 1959 was 10,100 metric tons for 1959 (as follows) the marketed figure of 10,100 tons. The price of fertilizer was set at 10/- per metric ton, or 1/- per kilogram. This is a very low price. The cost of the crop is likely to increase and credit should not be given out so low to favor a producer. A minimum of 15/- the marketed figure, or 15/- the marketing cost of basal fertilizers, should be adopted. Several factors have contributed influence on the growth of fertilizer consumption in Nigeria. The major factors are:
1. There seems to be probably small and scattered units and are still relatively primitive. Little cash is available for fertilizer purchases and in any case, additional profits resulting from fertilizer use are not readily apparent to the farmer.
  2. Simple or wholly procedures which reduce the cost of fertilizer to the farmer, the low value of many crops limit the financial advantages of fertilizer use.
  3. Inadequate and unreliable data on the present rates of fertilizer application for different crops on various soils, especially in the Southern part of the country, is evident.
  4. The number of effective agricultural extension workers relative to the large number of farms involved is inadequate.
  5. Although there have been credit facilities to the farmer they have not been mainly to increase primary agricultural production.
    - (1) Commercial banks which offer agricultural credit services do so for profit. They do no extend credit to farmers.

- 19 -

because of the great risks involved. The village farmers cannot afford savings and other assets are so unimportant that the terms of a trifling commercial bank loans are negligible.

- (ii) The case with the money lender, licensed buying a contractor and merchant buyers and he can overrule their credit conditions and such conditions that place the farmer at a disadvantage.
- (iii) The co-operative societies which operate agricultural credit systems are effective in making money available to farmers in India. But most of the credit obtained from co-operatives is borrowed thus leaving very little money for farm investments and fertiliser purchases.

The delivery and distribution function of fertilisers is now handled by government agencies. This method of getting fertilisers to the farmer was necessary during the initial period of fertiliser introduction. It has never been possible for the system to make fertilisers generally available to farmers. At first the value of fertiliser supply has increased and with this came the supply which a local fertiliser dealer will receive at all times necessary to hand over ownership of distribution of fertilisers to commercial dealers.

9. The inadequacy of agricultural extension services personnel and the attitude of government workers towards fertilizer production campaigns have produced difficulties on attempts to overcome the wild and harmful rumours of farmers against the use of fertilizers. Even where such campaigns have succeeded as was the case in the Eastern Region in the 1950s insufficient funds for subsidization caused the campaigns to fail.

The Government of the Federation are aware of those limiting factors. While Government does not intend to cause a drastic disruption of the communal system of land tenure, progressive efforts are being made to encourage co-operative farming activities. Farm Settlements have been established. Villages have been helped to embark upon large plantation farms for cash crops. The long term advantage of this orientation will be the disappearance of tiny individual farm holdings and the emergence of large communal farms. The objective is to direct the peasant from his subsistence farming to modern commercial farms. All the State Governments are making it possible for farmers to hire farm machinery at low subsidized cost. Thus Nigeria's enormous land for farm which now scattered and spread out by traditional land tenure will be made available for large farms in the near future through education.

### PHOSPHATIC FERTILISER PLANT

Based upon the findings and recommendations of the studies by Japan Consulting Institute and Arthur D. Little, the Federal Government has decided to establish a phosphatic fertilizer plant in Kaduna. The plant capacity will be 100,000 tons a year while production scale will depend upon a number of factors such as local demand and government support through subsidisation, granting of pioneer status and tariff protection. The project is estimated to cost about £2.5 million made up as follows:

Machinery/Equipment cost	-	£1,210,000
Building cost	-	£250,000
Training and Start-up costs	-	66,000
Working Capital	-	<u>959,100</u>
Total	-	<u>£2,425,100</u>

The Federal Government has awarded a contract to Japan Consulting Institute to undertake a detailed project study to reassess fertiliser demand patterns, determine cost estimates and recommend production scales. The study will be completed and report submitted by June 1972. It is planned to complete construction by the end of 1974.

Unless some export market is located by the time the plant goes into production it will be almost impossible to operate it at full capacity. From market projections it would appear that Nigeria will be able to consume fertilizer from the plant at the levels indicated below:

Table I

Plant Subsidy in Rs. Lakh

1st year	39,00	Rs.
2nd year	45,000	*
3rd year	60,000	*
4th year	75,000	*
5th year	90,000	*

In my Report of December 1970, I recommended that Government should be ready to subsidise fertiliser manufactured in India at the rate of 25 per ton DAP produced. If production series are maintained at the levels projected above, the subsidy required will be as follows:

1st year	Rs 51,000
2nd year	6132,000
3rd year	6340,000
4th year	6575,000
5th year	6816,000

Thus for the first five years of operation the subsidy programme will cost Rs. 34,000. This, however, will be much more than the subsidy cost on imported phosphate fertilisers for the period 1966-1970. During this period, phosphate fertiliser subsidy amounted to Rs. 1,402,900, an average of Rs. 5,300 per year. Thus the Federal and State Governments have all along recognised the need to assist the farmer to realize high agricultural yields through fertiliser use. It has been shown quite clearly that the fertiliser plant in India

would bring back also 75% of the return on investment. This place  
must be selected as a center of national policy; this <sup>can</sup> be a project  
based solely on profit maximization. The Japan Committee for the  
Arctic in 1970 studies concluded there are losses of as much as  
2% per cent. This may reasonably estimate or return on investment  
and upon such financial projections which may be conservative as  
how to build around 2-3% to expand rapidly on the one. If the land  
market is not sufficient, additional resources at least \$2,000,000  
will a year, these favorable return on investment will not be attained.  
If the plant operates at capacity lands alone to do so, it will run  
at a loss during the first 3 years and will pick up only marginal profits  
in the second and third years. Substantial profits will be attained  
as from the fourth year.

The primary objective is to develop a viable propane distribution  
industry in Alaska and elsewhere. The potential demand for propane  
will be proportional to capacity. It is certain that by the time  
the anticipated project is fully developed national policies and programs  
will be as well defined - to create favorable climate and conditions  
for a sound and establishment of LPG industry.

The position of the existing new territories safety development  
is quite different from the one on propane distribution elsewhere  
now. The average annual consumption of propane distribution for  
the period 1970-1975 was 4,230 tons. The average annual  
consumption for propane distribution for the new period was 15,000 tons.

It should be noted that the long-term use may potentially demand for all the same type of phosphate fertilizer as the sets II, because more phosphate is fixed in soils.

Another problem is the development of a large-scale fertilizer industry to supply the demand of the type of fertilizer best suited for Algerian soils. Ammonium sulphate has to be imported for some time, but it is difficult to say nothing about the effect of quality on its continued application of this fertilizer. Ones which contain more plant nutrient than ammonium sulphate have not yet been successfully tested and approved for Algerian soils. A decision to establish a large-scale fertilizer industry will have to be based on the recommendation of field workers as to the type required by the largest area of land. Another factor may be the availability of export outlets to market the products.

A major drawback on the development of local nitrogenous fertilizer industry is the trend towards large production capacities by the international factories. The fertilizer manufacturers in the industrial nations are reluctant to go into investing on fertilizer projects such as is planned in Algeria. While a 600 tons-a-day ammonia plant capable of producing about 340,000 tons of urea a year in Algeria may be considered small the fact remains that over 100,000 tons of the product must be sold outside Algeria. The cost will be low if such a plant is to be built only by a single company; the latter in 1959 are shown below:

Capacity of plant	330,950 tons/year (urea)
Total Capital Requirements	£13,000,000
Production cost per ton	£11.67
Ex-factory Price per ton	£18.00

The Arthur D. Little Group in their study of 1968 considered that the establishment of a plant to produce 150 tons/day ammonia equivalent to producing 152,400 tons/year of Calcium ammonium nitrate would require total capital investments of about £6,852,000. Production cost per ton would be £10.63. At an ex-factory price of £11 per ton a return on investment of 20.5% would be obtained if based upon 100% equity investment with normal tax. With 50/50 debt/equity ratio and with plough back status a return on investment of 42.5% could be obtained.

These favourable estimates are based upon the assumption that it would be possible to locate markets for the products. So far no definite proposals have been received from foreign investors or machine and process consults. Foreign investors consider the Nigerian opportunity though viable on paper to be less so in practice. With their gigantic nitrogenous fertiliser complexes now producing or which are being planned they are in a position to depress world fertiliser prices to their advantage thereby making it difficult for small plants such as is envisaged for Nigeria to be competitive. The one ready and eager advice given to Nigeria by experts from fertiliser producing countries is to continue to import fertilisers until local demand can justify establishment of local manufacture.

I consider such advice to be most selfish since the time may never come when Nigeria can catch up with the giant manufacturers. As in the case of phosphatic fertilizer, Nigeria may well decide to establish a nitrogenous fertilizer industry as a matter of national policy.





**22.3. 74**