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Industrial Development Board

Second Session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna
on Tuesday, 23 April 1968, at 10.20 a.m.

<u>President:</u>	Mr. STANDENAT	(Austria)
<u>Reporteur:</u>	Mr. AGHASSI	(Iran)

CONTENTS

<u>Agenda item</u>		<u>Paragraphs</u>
-	Organization of the work of the session (continued)	1 - 2
-	General debate (continued)	3 - 33

We regret that some of the pages in the microfiche copy of this report may not be up to the proper legibility standards, even though the best possible copy was used for preparing the master fiche.

ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SESSION (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT stated that in accordance with rule 75 of the Rules of Procedure, inter-governmental organizations designated by the Board might participate, without the right to vote, in its deliberations. Non-governmental organizations might under rule 76 of the Rules of Procedure claim to attend meetings of the Board as observers. As the representative of the Ivory Coast, supported by several delegations, had proposed, the inter-governmental organizations wishing to participate in the deliberations could therefore do so, subject to the Board's approval. It had also been agreed that Committee II would give priority to agenda items 11 and 14.

2. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. KAKITSUBO (Japan) noted with satisfaction that United Nations activities relating to industry had substantially increased in recent years. UNIDO was coming to the end of a transition period and should be able to begin to work normally and effectively. The Board's duty was to give it the means to do so by drawing up a well-balanced programme of work and laying down guiding principles.

4. The Board's work would be greatly facilitated by the creation of a small committee to examine the voluminous papers relating to the Programme of Work and prepare a concise digest for the Board. It might be an inter-sessional committee, as the Canadian representative, supported by the representative of the Netherlands, had proposed.

5. Since resources were limited, every effort should be made to use them as efficiently as possible. In drawing up the Programme of Work, preference should be given to projects likely to yield rapid results; and the Board should be kept informed of the results and of difficulties encountered in the execution of projects. UNIDO should also become a clearing-house for the collection and exchange of information on industrial development, so that some mistakes could be avoided and lessons learnt from experience. UNIDO and other specialized agencies should continue their dialogue so as better to demarcate their areas of competence and identify areas for joint action.

6. Japan was fully aware of the need to expand the operational activities of UNIDO from 1969 onwards, and had accordingly contributed the equivalent of US\$ 150,000 to the Special Industrial Services Fund. It also recognized the value of in-plant training courses for senior engineers and managers, and its Government had decided to hold such a course in Japan in October 1968. Although it was at present short of staff, it would continue to collaborate with UNIDO by providing consultants and experts and by participating in the Organization's research projects and studies.
7. Mr. ABDEL WAHAB (Sudan) observed that the report on the Organization's activities in 1967 and its Executive Director's speech augured well for its future. Sudan had been the first country to set up a national committee for UNIDO, and would do everything in its power to assist the new Organization, with whose help it had already established an industrial research institute and secured the services of experts and a number of fellowships. The problems facing its industrial development had also been discussed between the Executive Director of UNIDO and its Minister of Industry and Mining when they had exchanged visits in October and December 1967.
8. The Sudan Government's faith in UNIDO sprang from its firm belief that neither standards of living nor per capita income could be raised exclusively by agriculture. Industrialization not only brought both those targets within reach but also increased labour productivity and helped to modernize the economies of countries which chose that path of development. It was thus another word for prosperity and progress. The view had often been expressed that the developing countries should limit themselves to small-scale industries or handicrafts and avoid creating a heavy industry which, if some persons were to be believed, was done merely for the sake of prestige. It would be wise, however, to leave such countries to work out their industrial-development plans for themselves to suit their needs and opportunities. They were undoubtedly quite capable of maintaining the necessary balance between the various branches of industry, and that failure to do that had been due not so much to their inability to implement large-scale projects as to lack of adequate feasibility studies. UNIDO could be of considerable assistance to those countries in making reliable and unbiased feasibility studies. The Sudan delegation therefore hoped that it would strengthen its Industrial Policies and Programming Division, especially the Industrial Programming and

Industrial Survey sections. UNIDO should not, however, restrict itself to feasibility studies; it should also assist at every stage of the preparation and implementation of projects, from the drafting of detailed specifications to the start of production. The existing system of recruiting experts could not, of course, meet the requirements of such widely-varied assistance. To offset that defect UNIDO might perhaps set up a special advisory service to recruit teams of experts for individual projects or to appoint for that purpose specialist firms of international reputation.

9. Generally speaking, the procedures at present governing the recruitment of experts should be simplified and made more flexible. Assistance for industry, especially under SIC, demanded quick decision. Furthermore, UNIDO should be given larger funds to enable it to set up regional offices which would collaborate closely with the offices of the Resident Representatives of the UNDP. It could thus give developing countries assistance better geared to their real needs.

10. One of the main impediments encountered by Third World countries in industrial development was lack of foreign exchange. By granting developing countries credit facilities (which would mostly be suppliers' credits), the rich countries would find new outlets for their industrial products and a wider range of use for their technological know-how. That would be mutually advantageous co-operation, not mere philanthropy. The Sudan delegation therefore considered that the Board should adopt the recommendations made by the developing countries at the Athens Symposium. The rich countries should follow the example of the socialist countries in offering long-term loans and lowering their interest rates.

11. UNIDO had an important part to play in foreign development finance, and the Sudan delegation welcomed the establishment of the Industrial Policies Section, which would deal as part of its work with the financing of industrial development and fiscal incentives. The scope of the Industrial Promotion Service should be extended to take account of capital from the socialist countries.

12. If UNIDO were to perform such tasks efficiently, it must be given financial autonomy and more resources. He hoped that certain advanced countries would review their refusal to take part in a pledging conference for contributions to UNIDO. The example of the Soviet Union, which had succeeded in establishing its industry through the heroic efforts and sacrifices of its people, was not a valid

argument for denying the importance of international help and co-operation in a world which means of communication were daily making smaller and in which aspirations for increased well-being had become irresistible. He took the opportunity of thanking the Soviet Union for the generous assistance it extended to his country.

13. UNIDO, which could of course co-operate with other specialized agencies in the implementation of certain projects, must have a monopoly of United Nations activities for industrial development. The forty fellowships granted to Africa and the forty-two granted to Latin America in 1967 were clearly inadequate in relation to the 347 granted to European countries. His delegation fully supported the proposals formulated by the Executive Director in document ID/B/26/Add.3, and considered that the Board should ask the UNDP Governing Council to consider establishing a series of Special Fund projects. Nevertheless, it was resolutely opposed to the creation of a standing committee whose functions had in fact not yet been clearly defined. To allow an organ to overstep the exact limits of its competence was always disastrous, and any interference by the Board in the Executive Director's work or vice versa would only generate chaos and confusion. He hoped that wisdom would prevail and that, instead of attempting to paralyse the Executive Director in his work and reduce his authority to the minimum, the Board would allow the newborn Organization time to settle down and develop its working methods. Moreover, the Rules of Procedure authorized the Board to hold more than one session a year if it deemed that necessary in order to keep the Organization's work under closer review.

14. Miss JEFFREYS (International Atomic Energy Agency) remarked that the Agency had been pleased to assist UNIDO to settle down in Vienna by, for example, making available some of its technical services. With the building of the Agency's permanent headquarters, in the same complex as UNIDO, it was planned to develop common services. Apart from the major potential contribution of nuclear power to the industrialization of developing countries the Agency's activities directly relevant to industrial development were the use of radiation for food preserving and disinfection, and the industrial uses of radio-isotopes. The establishment of UNIDO at Vienna would certainly facilitate the preparation of joint projects for promoting the industrial uses of nuclear techniques in developing countries.

15. Mr. ANGER (Sweden) considered that the main duty of the Board was to make proposals for the future work and organization of UNIDO. Turning to field operations, for which the UNDP was the main source of finance, he noted that UNIDO had been instructed to carry out twenty-five Special Fund projects and that other projects still under study would perhaps swell that number, which was already satisfactory considering that UNIDO was only just beginning the second year of its existence. However, it should not take on more projects than it could execute, as quality was more important than quantity. UNIDO should also display moderation regarding in-plant training programmes, which the Executive Director contemplated making a permanent feature.

16. Sweden, one of the initiators of the Special Industrial Services programme, thought that it should continue; but since the activities of the SIS were essential it could not continue to depend solely on ad hoc contributions. For the same reason a solution would have to be found to the problem of recruiting experts, which was holding up the execution of projects. For that purpose it would perhaps be desirable to set up in Vienna a local office of the Technical Assistance Recruitment Service, which worked in New York. It would in fact be desirable for UNIDO itself to become a recruitment agency for industrial experts and consulting firms, so as always to have the necessary experts at its disposal when they were required.

17. Concerning research and other support activities undertaken by UNIDO, he remarked that at the Board's first session and in the General Assembly several members, including Sweden, had recommended that the Organization should endeavour to relate its research and other support activities to its field work. That suggestion seemed to have been taken into account in the new Programme of work. It was, however, difficult to form an overall picture of research activities from the mass of documents submitted to the Board. For that reason the Swedish delegation supported the idea of setting up a sessional committee to examine the Programme in more detail, particularly the way in which priorities had been decided, the aims of each project, the manner in which projects were to be implemented, and their financial implications. Evaluation of operations should also receive greater attention.

18. Since UNIDO must for the moment moderate its ambitions, the Swedish delegation suggested that it should concentrate its efforts on a few areas in which it seemed specially qualified to assist. It should be a clearing-house for industrial information, and establish close working relations with national and regional development banks, the International Finance Corporation and other national and international financial institutions in order to facilitate industrial investments. It should also concern itself with industrial development centres, industrial estates, and pilot plants.

19. UNIDO should also exercise caution in expanding its Secretariat. The Board first had to define the Organization's main functions, which must consist above all in directing the execution of field projects, providing the services of experts and consulting firms, supporting experts working in the field, undertaking action-orientated research and other support activities, and helping governments to define priorities and formulate their requests for assistance. A desirable and doubtless more economical method than any other would consist in the short-term engagement of a small group of highly-qualified experts to advise UNIDO on its organization.

20. He supported the suggestion of the representatives of Canada and the Netherlands for setting up a programme and budget committee, or at least an advisory committee on programme and financial matters, to meet under the Executive Director some weeks before the Board's session and thus facilitate its work. In conclusion, he emphasized that all his proposals expressed the desire to see UNIDO succeed.

21. Mr. STEDTFELD (Federal Republic of Germany) remarked that the Board had had at its first session only limited opportunities for taking concrete decisions, as the Programme of Work comprised projects that were already being implemented or were covered by the authority of other bodies. The situation was similar in regard to the 1968 Programme, but the Board had greater liberty of action in regard to the Programme for 1969. It was therefore all the more necessary to examine the Programme and shape it so that the developing countries derived the greatest possible benefit from it. Care must be taken to see that UNIDO concentrated on operational activities and concrete promotion measures which would yield practical and positive results as speedily as possible. No doubt some genuine indispensable research and studies should also be undertaken.

22. The Board should study the recommendations of the Athens International Symposium on Industrial Development and take appropriate action to execute them. He noted with satisfaction that the Programmes of Work for 1968 and 1969 already included projects based on them.

23. The SIS programme should enable UNIDO to meet unexpected shortcomings requiring emergency short-term measures which could not be taken under the less flexible procedures of other programmes. It was also a source of valuable experience for planning and implementing the other programmes. The Federal Republic of Germany was fully conscious of the great importance of this programme and had accordingly made a first contribution to its funds amounting to \$US2 million and had pledged a second contribution of \$US1 million.

24. He recognized the need to co-ordinate the several United Nations agencies' activities for industrial development, and therefore applauded the action taken by the Executive Director for that purpose. He hoped especially that the Executive Director of UNIDO and the Director General of FAO would reach agreement, because of the interdependence of agricultural production and industrial development. In general, he thought that those agreements should aim at entrusting the various functions of industrialization to those organizations which were best equipped to discharge them, though the possibility of joint or synchronized action in certain cases should not be ruled out. The quality rather than the quantity of those activities should determine the contribution of UNIDO to the global strategy of development.

25. Two factors were essential to any acceleration of development. Aid granted by developed countries must be used efficiently and without any waste; therefore the recipient countries must have healthy financial and economic policies. Secondly, ability to provide the aid required by developing countries or new outlets for their products depended on a high degree of economic growth in the developed countries. The national economies of most developing countries rested on too narrow a base: exports of raw materials were still their main source of foreign exchange. They had therefore to strive to diversify their production.

Moreover, it was important to realize that development was a problem not only of technology but also of social reform. The changes essential to development required the integration of developing countries into the system of international division of labour, since world competition was a permanent incentive to social change and innovation. That called for close international co-operation, and the Federal Republic of Germany was ready to participate in efforts to solve the problem of industrial development.

26. Mr. ANKADIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the President, in calling upon the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to speak, had used the expression "representative of Germany". He objected strongly to the expression in that situation, and pointed out the well-known fact that there were two German States - a Democratic Republic of Germany and a Federal Republic of Germany, though that was denied by the representative of the Federal Republic. The latter claimed, quite unjustifiably, that the Government he represented was the only legitimate one, and that he could speak on behalf of the whole German people. The German Democratic Republic, as well as the Federal Republic, had a legal right to form part of UNIDO.

27. Mr. STEDTFELD (Federal Republic of Germany) claimed that there existed no other government than that of the Federal Republic of Germany entitled to speak as representative of the German people in international affairs.

28. The PRESIDENT explained that he had merely made a slip of the tongue, and asked the Board to excuse him.

29. After an exchange of opinion between Mr. LOPEZ NUINO (Cuba), Mr. FORTHOUME (Belgium) and Mr. ANKADIEV (USSR), the PRESIDENT asked all speakers to refrain from political argument and to continue the general debate.

30. Mr. STIBRAVY (United States of America) felt that the Athens Symposium proved to be an especially appropriate project for UNIDO's first year. The United States welcomed the opportunity to include on its delegation a large group of representatives of industry who were thus able to become more familiar with the Organisation's problems and activities. He felt that the Athens discussions contributed to understanding the problems of industrialisation. Proposals

addressed to governments and international organizations were presumably receiving appropriate attention. Those addressed to the Board would receive evaluation during the Board's review of UNIDO's work programme. The industrial Promotion Service brought together industrialists from both developed and developing countries who thus had been able to examine jointly specific industrial possibilities.

31. In outlining the proposed Programme of Work for 1969, the Executive Director had suggested several different forms of activity of a promotional nature. The main emphasis should be placed on the broader aspects of industrial promotion; the more specialized form employed by the Athens IPS should be reserved for occasions when the "sideshow" device would be useful; and the developing countries should also be encouraged to establish their own industrial promotion services.

32. Although the General Assembly had entrusted UNIDO with the task of developing a truly co-operative effort by the UN family in the field of industrial development, the Organization should not on that account take over programmes being carried on by other United Nations agencies, nor substitute its own projects for their proven activities in their fields of competence. The task was so immense and complex that, as the Executive Director had made very clear, it required close and well-organized co-operation between all the United Nations agencies. Closer co-operation with FAO was particularly important, especially in the production of fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machinery and implements; joint projects of the kind mentioned by the Executive Director might be a good way to help the developing countries to solve their food problems.

33. He hoped the Executive Director would continue to press forward his bilateral discussions with the agencies and hoped that at least the first of the formal agreements to be negotiated would be submitted to the next Board session. UNIDO should also establish working relationships with the World Bank group, the regional development banks and the regional economic commissions. In doing so it should in particular look closely to the concordance of its programmes with those of the regional economic commissions; the use of industrial field and regional advisers for this purpose would doubtless be a great help in securing better co-ordination.

34. To secure efficiency the United States delegation had recommended that field personnel should be recruited for their qualifications without too strict an

insistence on the principle of geographical distribution. The Executive Director might submit to the Board at its third session his ideas on what special facilities he thought desirable to assist rapid recruitment of such personnel.

35. The success or failure of UNIDO in promoting the industrialization of developing countries obviously depended upon the content and execution of its work programme. It was not sufficient merely to identify the problems, most of which were in any case well known; it was also necessary to determine the sectors in which an organization such as UNIDO could act effectively. The Board had already, at its first session in 1967, given a first indication of the road to be followed and identified many objectives which the Organization should try to achieve. It should now as its principal task closely examine the work programme project by project so as to determine the order of priorities and establish a firmer direction of UNIDO's work particularly at Headquarters. The work programme approved by the Board would give the Executive Director the base on which to take the important administrative decisions necessary during the present formative year of the Organization's growth.

36. He welcomed the establishment of Committee I, which hopefully would concentrate its attention on the Headquarters programme, especially on projects that were to start in 1969. The Executive Director had furnished the Board in documents ID/B/20, ID/B/22 and ID/B/26 with information concerning the past activities of UNIDO and its work programme; but because of the diversity and volume of the projects Committee I would have to examine each of the fifteen groups of activities in detail in order, after consulting with the officers of the Secretariat, to evaluate their objectives, cost and expected benefits. He welcomed the Executive Director's offer to facilitate the work of Committee I by providing the Committee upon request with written statements on important individual projects in more detail than in the summary documents. Committee I should also explore the Organization's internal procedures for project review and, where appropriate, submit to the Board recommendations concerning procedure for the review of Secretariat proposals and for the Board's annual review of the Programme of Work.

37. In conclusion, he rejected the characterization by some delegations of American actions to assist the people of South Vietnam as "aggression" but since

the meeting of the Industrial Development Board was not an appropriate forum for discussion of the matter he would not pursue it further.

38. Mr. LOPEZ MUIÑO (Cuba) wondered, after listening to some of the speeches during the earlier meetings, whether the great developed countries were genuinely disposed to increase their aid to the developing countries for industrialization. The great Powers could not withdraw from the obligations they had incurred towards the peoples of the Third World by subjecting them to a long period of exploitation. That clearly did not apply to the advanced countries that had made their economic progress with their own resources. They were invited to help the less-favoured countries because their assistance was an essential contribution to the establishment of the lasting peace all humanity hoped for.

39. The exploitation to which he had just referred was a historical reality which governments and parliaments of the developed countries ought to take into account instead of attributing under-development to idleness, incapacity, natural inferiority or the population explosion in the developing countries. The already intolerable position of the under-developed countries was bound to deteriorate further, and per capita income in half the eighty under-developed countries members of the World Bank was only increasing at an annual rate of one per cent or less, so that by 1999 they might hope to achieve an annual per capita income of \$US 170 whereas in the United States of America that income would have reached \$US 4,500. In the Charter of Algiers the Group of Seventy-Seven had shown its awareness of that problem; it had again emphasized at the recent conference at New Delhi that the gap between the rich and the poor countries was continuously widening. The rich countries - those in which per capita income exceeded \$US 750 - had only one-quarter of the world's population but three-quarters of its wealth.

40. The solution for those who had adopted the Marxist theories was to go to the root of the problem and make a complete revolution. There was no political fanaticism at all in that; an American senator had himself admitted that the countries that had awaited just treatment for more than four hundred years could wait no longer and that a revolution was necessary. Pope Paul VI, in his encyclical Populorum progressio, had recognized the obligation of the rich countries to help the less-favoured.

41. The Executive Director had rightly emphasized that the aim of UNIDO should be to devote its resources and efforts to economic progress, and his report gave the Board's work valuable guidance.

42. Concerning problems of Finance the Cuban representative considered, like the representative of the Soviet Union, that UNIDO must not transform itself into an agency for the promotion of private investment but channel its aid solely into the public sector. It was common knowledge that the only aim of private investment was to extend and prolong neo-colonialism. The people of the developing countries had to make the main effort to achieve true independence, and in those countries the State must completely control all essential economic resources. Only later could it tackle other important tasks such as the eradication of illiteracy, the training of technical staff, the improvement of public health and the progress of agriculture, without which industrialisation would be merely a mirage.

43. A new organisation like UNIDO needed dynamic executive leadership, untrammelled by bureaucratic obstacles. Since to study the Programme of Work each year and control its execution was the Board's duty, he opposed the establishment of an inter-sessional committee.

44. Since the main objective of UNIDO was to contribute to the industrialisation of the developing countries and so enable them to raise their populations' level of living, he wondered whether it was possible to remain indifferent to activities that ran counter to that objective, meaning at the present time the monstrous enterprise of systematic destruction of which the Vietnamese people were the victims.

45. Mr. de CASTEL-FIORITE (Spain) explained that industrial development was generally considered the back-bone of economic progress and was the best means of raising the standard of living of populations. An international industrialization programme could, however, not be carried out effectively unless certain conditions were fulfilled: close co-operation between the participating countries; a constructive attitude in them, particularly in those benefiting from assistance with industrialization; intensification of assistance projects at the level of the regional commissions; and avoidance of disipation of effort and the fixing of contradictory objectives in industrial promotion.

46. As the President had rightly emphasized, UNIDO must be placed on a solid foundation and a spirit of co-operation and mutual confidence must be shown. It was also necessary, however, to avoid procedural debates that prevented concentration of all the necessary attention on really important decisions.

47. The Board should avoid as much as possible systematic classification of the members of the Organization into two groups, donating countries and petitioning countries. They were working at a joint task, and the "developing countries" actually represented most of the nations of the world. It was easy to speak of massive aid supplied by certain abundantly-endowed countries to others that were considered under-developed; but a country that wished to become industrialized must above all have an efficient public administration, show a spirit of dynamic enterprise, have technicians and competent specialists, and be able to rely on solid industrial projects.

48. Essentially the problem was one of co-ordination and information, because in its future technical assistance activities the Organization would inevitably come up against its financial limits. Moreover, in regard to financial problems it should not excessively reduce research activities, a source of immense possibilities for all countries, but rather establish a just financial balance between operational activities and research.

49. Whether a country was developed or not, the implementation of a project required substantial expenditure on feasibility studies, complementary projects, royalties for the use of patents, and the recruitment of experts or specialists. UNIDO must attempt to co-ordinate and standardize contracts concluded for those projects, supply necessary information to countries needing it, and make every effort to obtain partial financing by patentees and study bureaux. Otherwise it would have no influence in the vast territory of the transfer of technical know-how.

50. During the last twenty-five years Spain had acquired experience of industrialization and shared it with other countries in Europe or in other continents, just as it had itself profited by their experience. Although by hard work during the past six years it had increased its industrial output by 75 per cent and reduced its farm population by more than 10 per cent; it still could not call itself an industrialized country. It was prepared to assist the Organization's

activities in every possible way, and proposed to establish a national committee for UNIDO.


51. The PRESIDENT, under Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure, called upon the Observer for Poland.

52. Mr. RACHKOVSKY (Poland) believed that the increased international tension and the internal difficulties regarding organizational and personnel matters experienced by UNIDO in connexion with its transfer to Vienna had not helped the Organization in carrying out the duties conferred on it by the United Nations General Assembly. Poland, which in the past two decades had reached a medium stage of development, had accumulated considerable experience in industrialization strategy, in planning industrial development and in regional and sub-regional co-operation, was ready to share that experience with UNIDO and all developing countries. It persisted in the belief that UNIDO should be granted still larger resources from UNDP funds, on the understanding that they should be administered with all necessary efficiency. The Organization's Programme of Work could certainly be established, as the Programme for 1968 had apparently been, in relation to the requests submitted by the various countries. However, the Board would gain by concentrating the Organization's efforts and resources on a certain number of vitally important projects likely to accelerate to the utmost the industrialization of developing countries. UNIDO should collect and disseminate its member States' experience of industrial development. Poland therefore welcomed the Executive Director's proposal to create a system of institutes for the training of industrial cadres.

53. The PRESIDENT announced that the Bureau of the Board had examined the credentials submitted to it by the representatives and found them in good and proper form.

The meeting rose at 1.05 P.M.





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