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
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PROMOTION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN LEAG,

SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES^{1/}

by

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^{1/} The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the consultant and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretariat of UNIDO.

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We regret that some of the pages in the microfiche copy of this report may not be up to the proper legibility standards, even though the best possible copy was used for preparing the master fiche.



PART I

HISTORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP PROMOTION MEASURES IN IRAQ

No discussion on the subject of promotion of entrepreneurship in Iraq can ignore the legacy of the past five decades. Three periods can be identified by their differences in pattern of growth, evolution and attitudes of the State.

The first period

The date line starts from 1917, when Iraq first gained political recognition. It continued to 1949.

Crucial in this period were three innovations which gave entrepreneurship its first mobility. They were Electricity, Oil exploration and Railways. To a country with a marked desert economy, the value of these three reforms was incalculable. Together, they focused rural interest on the promise of a new concept of an "industry oriented economy" from what had hitherto merely added up to the bare processing of agricultural produce - dates, wool and grain.

State sympathies were clearly in the forefront. Two legislative measures for the first time gave a vague outline of the Government's attitude towards entrepreneurship. The Industrial Encouragement Law of 1929 authorized the Government to break away from the traditional expenditure on public and social work to financial participation in the speculations of private industry. This, together with loans from the Agricultural Industrial Bank set up in 1936, gave the entrepreneur a full measure of encouragement to broaden the industrial base with the Government remaining as a "sleeping partner". In 1940, the Industrial Bank was isolated to deal with this aspect of financial promotion more effectively.

In sixteen years, the number of industries had risen from its starting level of 8 in 1929 to 96 in 1945. A more vigorous growth rate would have been possible if world war had not intervened. Nine years later, the population of projects had risen to 22,460.

These figures are no cause for self congratulation. Statistically, they make impressive propaganda on the vitality of industrialization in that period. But if we take a closer look, we would find that in this formative period of Iraq's development, it was the pioneer, the private capitalist, who created wealth from opportunity, environment and the sympathetic attitude of the State to broaden out. The role of the State was to encourage this initiative with a patrimony of capital and loans, and leave the entrepreneur to provide the subject matter for new development instead of the State providing the guidelines.

The cold facts are that Iraq was at that time, far from being equipped to assume this responsible role of a planning agency. Finance and foreign exchange - two vital ingredients in an effective plan of development - were short. The small demands from private entrepreneurs for exchange could be accommodated within existing revenues.

Understandably, project selection at this time veered round to the mechanization of current handicraft industries, or the exploitation of natural resources which location and environment gave the entrepreneur. Many other openings suggested from natural resources, however, needed capital of a different order, which either needed the status of a major corporation or the entry of foreign capital. All the available evidence seemed to point to a natural reluctance towards enlargement. A very substantial part of the projects operating in the tail end of this period appear to have been small holdings of a few persons - more of the cottage industry class. We find supporting evidence of this under the official statistics from the next period.

The second period

This period, from 1950, had a short run till 1957. In 1950, its opening year, a major milestone in Iraq's economy was scored with the conclusion of a new oil agreement, which gave Iraq vastly increased revenues with which she could play a more constructive role in shaping the economic development of her country. The first step taken in this direction was the establishment of the Development Board in 1950, whose title provides the clue to its functions. Functionally, this body was pledged to investigate the country's potentialities, its productive capacity, and its natural resources. In the light of its studies, the Board was to draw up a general program of developing the country's resources aimed at increasing the level of national income and raising the living standard of its people. How meaningful were the words underlined? Whatever may have been the intentions of the State at the time these words were drafted, history shows that virtually the whole of the program contemplated was to centre on state development of industry, with insufficient attention to sustain the growth of small-scale industries which the early entrepreneurs had so ably built up from their maiden voyage in 1917.

This was the time to plan on more serious lines. The standard tool open at that time was to rely on foreign aid to carry out systematic surveys of the country's resources and economy, and recommend a line of action on the balance of opportunity, funds and the realities of the moment.

Three Plans were formulated by the Board which drew their material from recommendations from reports by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Lord Salter and Arthur D. Little Inc. in that order. There was a mixed bag in these recommendations - for both small-scale and large-scale industry. That industry was to play

a far more significant role is clear from the allocation made by the Board under each of these Plans.

I T E M .	FIRST PLAN		SECOND PLAN		THIRD PLAN	
	ID.mill	%	ID.mill	%	ID.mill	%
Administrative Research and Organization	3.2	2.0	5.5	1.8	7.4	1.4
Irrigation and Flood Control	53.4	34.5	107.5	35.9	153.8	30.7
Development: animal and vegetable wealth	12.7	8.1	6.5	2.1	14.3	2.8
Industry, mining and energy.	31.1	20.0	43.6	14.3	67.1	13.4
Communications	29.0	18.7	74.2	24.3	124.4	24.9
Housing	1.7	1.1	6.0	1.9	24.1	4.9
Main public buildings	19.2	12.4	22.6	7.6	39.8	8.0
Secondary public buildings	-	-	32.3	10.6	59.4	12.0
Miscellaneous	5.4	3.5	5.9	1.9	9.9	2.0

It was OIL that dominated Iraq's development policy from that date. OIL became the central theme of development plans, - with its endless chain of derivatives through petrochemicals, Supplementing OIL was natural gas with another chain of valuable derivatives, - fuel, sulphur, acid, fertilizers, Chemical industries through salt - caustic soda, chlorine, even DDT, were also open. Geological surveys had failed to penetrate into Iraqi's real wealth. These, and many others proposed in the Development Plans of the three bodies retained to suggest suitable projects, provided more than a full load of planning and development work for the Government for decades, without the need for saddling itself with a range of consumer lines, the normal prerogative of the private entrepreneur.

Possibly, it was this entry of the State in an area customarily reserved for private initiative which may have caused stagnation. The list of suitable openings for further development in the private sector was drying up. The State had too much money to be satisfied with concentrating on the larger issues of basic industry. Enthusiasm for giving a fuller outline to its Development Plans unwittingly made the State a second entrepreneur, running in a parallel stream with the private sector. Where was the justification for State capital in consumer range in the foodstuff industries, leather products, glass ware, ceramic ware, construction materials, paper hardboard, pharmaceuticals, animal feeds ?.

By 1954, the Census showed 22,460 industries in all classes (oil industries excluded). Truly, an impressive figure, compared with the 96 established up to 1945 ! But narrowed down, these statistics show mere consolidation in depth, - not in breadth which would at least assert the vitality of the spirit of entrepreneurship.

Total investment was ID.15.5 millions (1 ID. = US \$ 2.8). Total employment was 90,291. Average employment was only 4.4 . Average investment only ID.690 .

45% were employing only one person
25% were employing only two persons
12% were employing only three persons
1.3% were employing over 20 persons.

In what field did all this activity express itself ? Mainly inheritances from the pre-electricity days, but refined and mechanized, - in cigarettes, spinning and weaving, soap, gypsum and construction materials, with food industries also contributing.

These are not the statistics of entrepreneurship. They are the cumulative results of successful entrepreneurship over the decades, and are therefore, statistics of the current state of industrial development.

Evidence of large numbers practising the same calling would be conclusive that the spirit of adventure, - of pioneering has long since disappeared in those fields.

The entrepreneur went out to speculate on the commercial profitability of an untried, - and what was then, --- apparently, an unattractive project. Once this had survived all the speculations of business risk, others followed, to contribute a routine statistic of industrial activity, with little interest in its origin.

Entrepreneurship then, seemed to have run its course in the mid fifties and viewed the entry of the State in eminently private sector activities with disfavour. By 1957, a new mould shaped its direction.

The third period

This period, which run from 1958, and continues even today, - made sweeping changes to the entire economy. The motives for these structural changes are not relevant to the subject we are discussing. It is their impact on the pioneering movement (already showing evidence of stagnation, that we are concerned with.

The pre-1958 Plans gave no clear line of demarcation between State and private industry. But clearly, the State had taken over leadership.

The Industrial Census gives data on industries employing ten and more persons. Figures include government activities as well. The Monthly Industrial Statistics give figures of industries employing less than ten. Clearly, these would all be in the small industries class in which no government capital would be invested except through incidental capital participation and or loans. We examine statistics of the first class.

Statistics of industrial establishments employing 10 and more persons ^{a/}

ITEM		1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
1 Number of establishments	G	199	216	211	261	264
	P	963	970	919	935	979
	T	1162	1186	1130	1196	1243
2 Number of employees	G	26,142	28,103	28,733	41,986	44,490
	P	41,113	49,571	47,037	30,086	30,853
	T	73,255	77,674	75,770	80,072	83,343
3 Wages ID.Mill	G	7.6	8.4	8.9	6.6	14.8
	P	9.8	10.6	10.7	14.5	7.5
	T	17.4	19.0	19.6	21.1	22.3
4 Raw Materials ID.Mill	G	7.5	6.8	9.6	31.2	33.4
	P	40.0	40.8	40.9	25.8	24.2
	T	47.5	47.6	50.5	57.0	57.6
5 Revenue ID.Mill ^{b/}	G	27.1	30.8	96.4	81.2	87.7
	P	68.4	64.4	16.9	43.4	43.9
	T	95.5	95.2	103.3	124.6	131.6

Note ^{a/} Source Industrial Census Bureau of Statistics, Iraq. The figures given only relate to employment of 10 persons and over.

All employment less than this figure is presumed to be exclusively in the private sector.

Symbols G = government. P = private. T = Total of both

^{b/} Revenue related only to sale of products, and not other revenues unconnected with production.

Stagnation in numbers of establishment is clear in the private sector. In 1961 there were 963 such establishments; in 1965 the figure had risen by 16!

In 1961 the average number of employees in this same sector was 43.

In 1965 it had dropped to 40. Average wages in 1961 were ID238 per employee. In 1965, it had dropped to ID.193.

In 1961, the average value of raw material per industry was ID.41,536 per year. In 1965, the value had dropped to ID.24,719.

Worse still, average revenue per industry fell from ID.71,028 per year in 1961 to ID.44,041, in 1965.

If this was stagnation, what was the cause. The prime cause lay in a revolutionary concept of socialization which aimed at better distribution of incomes, and the correction of many of the consequences arising from localized pockets of wealth from industry, business and similar activity

Private initiative for industrial development seemed to fold up thereafter. Nationalization was the principal cause for this change of attitude. But no clear principles could be identified in the nationalization policy instituted at that time.

It could NOT have been the high scales of investment, for the smallest nationalized project had a paid up capital of only ID.20,000,-- a flour mill. The largest was a cement mill, paid up capital ID.2,845,000.

Nor could it have been for expropriating basic and strategic industries then in private ownership, for many of the nationalized projects were in the typical consumer class. For example, - leather goods, footwear, tanned hides and skins; soaps and detergents, edible oils, dairy produce, construction materials, woven products like textiles, and carpets, sugar, matches and so on.

Nor could the motive have been directed to foreign holdings exercising too great control on private industry and draining the country of exchange; for if this was so, legislation could have enforced their compulsory withdrawal without the need for nationalization, and thereby preserved the identity of Iraqi industry to continue, - free of foreign control.

Let's take a look at some of the nationalized industries. Of the 264 State industries in 1965, only 79 are listed by name in the Industrial Survey.

FOODSTUFFS: Canning, Sugar, Dates, Grain milling; Ice; Dairies; Bakeries account for 22.

TOBACCO accounts for 4. FURNITURE & OTHERS for 5.

TEXTILES accounts for 11. CLOTHING & FOOTWEAR for 10.

PRINTING for 3. HIDES AND PRODUCTS for 5. MINERAL INDUSTRIES for 8.

PETROLEUM for 5. OTHER INDUSTRIES for 1.

Short of nationalization, the State had another finger in private industry. The official agency for this purpose was the Industrial Bank of Iraq. Loans were but one incident in its business. It could also participate as a founder or shareholder in public joint stock companies. But far more important were its powers:-

"To offer technical assistance advice and information on economic, engineering and accounting affairs to owners of industrial enterprises.

"To carry out studies and researches necessary for the establishment and promotion of industrial enterprises or for their expansion or for changing their purpose directly or in co-operation with companies individuals officials, establishments or services etc.

"Ensure any administrative, vocational or other service to industrial enterprises by seeking the assistance of the technical staff of the Ministry of Industry, and also to assist the client in laying down a suitable plan for establishing the enterprises connected with the required loan. At the request of the client, the Bank may also carry out such studies against fees to be agreed upon"

(Extract from Article 3, 6, 7, 8, Industrial Bank Law, No. 62 of 1961)

Unfortunately, there is nothing in the official Report of this Bank's activities "Organization, Functional & Financial Status" published in 1967 to indicate that any of these valuable promotional pre-investment services were ever carried out. Indeed, all these functions would more correctly be the province of a department of the Government, and not left to be incidental to the business of financial loans.

It is this vacuum in the institutional facilities which have contributed to a policy of drift in entrepreneurship. If the Bank did not exercise these promotional functions, neither did the State.

What then has the State done for the promotion of entrepreneurship? This brings us back to the subject of this paper after having touched on some relevant factors in the past.

PART II

PREPARATION OF AREA, INDUSTRY, AND MARKET SURVEYS, AND MODEL SCHEMES

Though Iraq's resources could justifiably pass under the category of "underdeveloped" prevailing conditions do not correspond with the "underdeveloped" model of economists.

Iraq has in fact more favourable factors for rapid economic development than typically under developed countries. There is no land scarcity. Her 445,000 sq kms. of land support a mere 8.5 million people. 55% is still desert. From what has been developed so far has given her the means to boost up her development from one single asset, - Oil.

It is largely the Oil resources of Iraq which has enabled her to transform her desert economy of by-gone days to a healthy community with much promise of still greater gains under proper leadership.

Her resources are in fact largely unexplored. What has been so far explored are only partly exploited. And what have been exploited have unfortunately been trailed with misfortunes of delays, poor programming, and immature follow up from the political instability of the moment.

Iraq's Oil has a much heavier buying power than is appreciated. But the wealth which money brings cannot achieve the goals of the industrially advanced societies which secure better distribution of incomes, ensure social security, provide all the basic amenities of life for all sections of the people, provide a balanced program of agriculture, industry, community services, social benefits, full employment, ... and all the customary ingredients of a successful Economic Plan of Development. Something more is needed. First, there must be the right environment; there must also be good receptivity among the people. The Plan must succeed in convincing the people that there must always be two areas for parallel activity; one by the State in the larger areas of development with some incursions in industry on the old concept of basic and strategic industry, and the other by the people, in the limitless range of consumer goods even rising above this level to support the State in a partnership of major industrial activity.

It is leadership of a different type that is needed to rectify many of the problems of Iraq's own coinage from the sweeping social reforms from the 1958 regime.

If socialization was to be the ruling principle, what was missing was a clear definition of the lines of demarcation between State Industry and Private. The social changes admittedly did not veto private initiative though nationalization made it clear that some types of private activity on unspecified lines had to yield to State ownership.

The effect of nationalization was to arrest development in the entrepreneur who had contributed so much to Iraq's economy in the pre-1958 period. What the State failed to indicate clearly was the limit up to which private initiative could continue in team work with the State.

This was but one omission in policy at that time.

With the State taking over leadership in direction of industrial policy, Industrial Planning gained a new meaning. The private entrepreneur could legitimately expect clear definition of what he could invest in, what material was ready for him to pick up the threads to set the mechanics of industrialization into motion, and what heads of practical assistance he could expect under the new regime.

Obviously, one of the State's first tasks would be to survey the whole field of current industrialization and assess the achievements, analyse its shortcomings, and then institute remedial measures to give industry much needed mobility.

The 1958 reforms saw Industry emerge under a separate Ministerial portfolio with much promise of assistance to the private entrepreneur. A Directorate of Industrial Planning was created; another on the promotion of industry. Together, they could have contributed to a clear definition of the role which private initiative should play under the social policy of that time.

In what directions could these two departments help?

First There would have to be a survey. The State needed to know what its resources of men and materials were. What was the extent of the amenities, --- power, communications, education, markets, service facilities, and heads of tangible assistance which could be extended to private industry to harmonize with the State in a joint programme of action.

In the ten years that have elapsed since the reforms of 1958, the results do not present a favourable picture.

All the Plans of development of this regime, while recognizing the importance of Industry as a means for the usual goals of economic development failed to define where private industry was to begin. The current Plan allocated ID. 167 millions or 30% of the total Plan allocation for industry. But all this was directed to Public sector development, including ironically some of the customarily accepted private sector fields, like electric bulbs, glass and ceramic ware, rubber tyres, paper, rayon, cotton and wool spinning and weaving.

If the private entrepreneur was to be a member of the Development team something definite was needed to give him a status, what to do, where he should work, to whom he could look to for guidance, and what grooming he could get before he risks his capital,

The plan was therefore largely negative in this respect. It was not sufficient to point to the two government agencies for Industrial Planning and Industrial Promotion for guidance. The one had its sights focussed on public sector development, - or searching for new projects for the next Plan, and the other a mere agency to receive applications for new industry and through the mechanics of licensing to indicate eligibility on a skeleton of incentives.

All the pre-investment data needed from surveys, either of areas which held promise of industrial concentration through concentration of raw material, manpower, or of selected industries which environment suggested as appropriate, -- were not carried out.

The Industrial Survey carried out by the Soviet experts under the Iraqi Soviet agreement of 1959 never ran its full course. But it did indicate that phosphates, sulphur, raw material for ceramics and glass together with other minerals were available which were however leads, not for private industry but for public sector projects under Iraq's Development Plan.

PART III
MEASURES OF ASSISTANCE IN THE PRE-INVESTMENT STAGE

This is perhaps the most disappointing area of activity in so far as it concerns the private entrepreneur.

The Industrial Promotion Law No. 164 of 1964 remains as the principal instrument for this purpose.

It is basically a Licensing Law. All industrial Projects existing or proposed, whether for expansion, change of object, or location, are required to register. The only exemption were industries of the small industry class, arbitrarily defined to be those with a capital on machinery, equipment but not power, of less than 19,3000.

Licensing of those that are eligible gave them privileges, or in other words incentives through tax exemptions within certain limits, the right to buy government land originally leased out, exemption from stamp duties and estate tax for a specified period, and most important of all, exemption from customs duties on machinery, spares constructional materials, raw materials, packing materials.

These privileges were reserved for Iraqi dominated factories, where non Iraqi staff did not exceed 10% of the total, foreign technicians considered essential being excluded. In the matter of capital investment, at least 60% of nominal and paid up capital was to be Iraqi owned.

A Committee was set up to receive and service applications under this Promotion law, but the final decision lay with the Minister of Industry. Supplementing this, was the departmental laboratory for analysing material including finished products for clues to whether they comply with any standard specifications in force.

A Library of technical journals is available for reference. Research staff sometimes offer advice on special problems, but none of this is part of settled policy.

From another quarter, the entrepreneur could expect loans or equity capital participation from the Government's Industrial Bank. Applications for registration of new projects which touch on industries already saturated are refused, thereby ensuring a monopoly to the first comers. No effort is made to price control the products of license factories to ensure that the cost benefits of tax exemptions are at least passed over to the consumer.

No system of marketing is in existence. Competition finds a price level which is allowed to continue for want of staff to check or co-ordinate action under a centrally planned system of control.

Some semblance of follow up after a license is issued is practised, but these appear to be inadequate. Indeed, there is evidence that because of the cursory form of scrutiny of applications for duty free imports, abuses have shown up from over loaded invoices. Staff earmarked for the purpose of administering this law are inadequate.

In theory, the Directorate of Industrial Planning which is now responsible for administering this law is expected to guide the prospective investor where his capital can be more profitably spent if the first proposal has to be denied from saturation with existing factories. No consideration is given to encouraging production for export markets. Standard specifications if any serve little purpose for domestic consumption.

Industries which compete with imported goods or even substitutable ones could expect some quota of protection either by a tariff or a quantitative restriction. A Committee has been set up for this purpose, but no policy determines its recommendations. Applications are dealt with piecemeal, sometimes unrelated to the larger issues on economic policy.

PART IV
INTENSIVE PROMOTION CAMPAIGNS

Promotional campaigns, intensive or otherwise, would have a meaning if the subject matter of promotion is clearly defined.

Iraq has avoided defining what a small-scale industry is, and understandably therefore, promotional campaigns for an unrecognizable class of industry would be non-existent.

WHAT IS SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY ? Several attributes can be recognized. There could be limitations on the labour employed, the capital invested, or the sales turn-over, -- either singly or in various combinations. Whatever the choice, it would serve the purpose of distinguishing this class from the larger institution.

In Iraq, only obliquely can we find some attempt at division. There is a law whose title makes a large claim to the promotional aspect of industrialization which can hardly survive critical examination.

The Industrial Promotion Law (sometimes translated as the Industrial Development Law) No.164 of 1964 compelled registration of existing and new industries only where the cost component of machinery was ID 3,000 or more. A series of incentives were written into this Law as a passive means of inducing healthier capital formation. The principal incentives were:-

1. Duty-free imports of capital goods, construction materials raw materials, spares, etc., in perpetuity.
2. Tax exemption on profits within certain defined limits.
3. Exemption from stamp duties, in perpetuity.
4. Purchase of miri land, - or Government land for the project if it was initially leased out to the promoters.

This Law is the sole medium for industrial promotion; nothing more is contributed to give it a mobility and purpose in the overall plans for development.

Even State industry is obliged to register under this Law to claim the benefit of the several incentives listed; but the motive is more statistical. Inferentially, it is arguable that non-registrable industries (that is those with a machinery component less than ID 3,000) would all be small-scale irrespective of the labour employed. Admittedly however, labour is a function of capital, so that a negative definition of what a small-scale industry is by excluding an ID 3,000 machinery investment from registration, implies some ceiling too on labour.

The denial of registration to this class of industry is also a denial of all those promotional incentives offered under the Industrial Promotion Law. The entrepreneur in this class is under-privileged, in fact penalized by selecting a machinery investment under ID 3,000. He is not even covered by official statistics, and is virtually voiceless, with no agency, official or otherwise, to plead his cause.

Somewhat anomalously statistics are maintained of "small-scale industries" using labour employment as the sole dividing line.

The monthly Industrial Statistics gives the following data of establishments employing less than ten persons.

ITEM	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
1. Number of establishments.	20,768	19,925	21,526	22,168	22,569
2. Employment	42,701	40,515	45,526	47,930	46,124
3. Annual wages (ID 000)	241	248	283	354	310
4. Cost of materials (ID mill.)	1.7	2.2	2.3	3.1	3.6
5. Annual Receipts (ID mill.)	2.6	2.9	3.1	4.2	4.6

Quite obviously, these Statistics are inadequate; they do not cover small-scale industries with over 10 employees, but under ID 3,000 invested in machinery.

Whether defined by reference to machinery-investment or by labour employed, the entrepreneur of small-scale industry appears to have been left to follow an uncharted course of existence, deprived of incentives, and unrecognized in his contribution to economic development.

Reforms for correcting such national attitudes towards small-scale industry need the weightage of an independent Commission of United Nations Experts to probe into all matters. Recommendations in a paper of this type tend to be lost sight of in the routine of Government business.

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