Independent UNIDO Country Evaluation
IRAQ
UNIDO EVALUATION GROUP

Independent Country Evaluation
IRAQ
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The evaluation team is responsible for any errors or omissions in the report. The views expressed are those of the team members, and do not necessarily reflect the position of UNIDO.
### Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Basic Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDIP</td>
<td>Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion</td>
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<td>EDICT</td>
<td>Enterprise Development through Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>EVA</td>
<td>UNIDO Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>ExCom</td>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<td>ICI</td>
<td>International Compact for Iraq</td>
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<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRFFI</td>
<td>International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>Investment Promotion for Iraq</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>[United Nations Development Group] Iraq Trust Fund</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MISP</td>
<td>Micro-Industry Support Programme</td>
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<td>MoEnv</td>
<td>Iraq Ministry of Environment</td>
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<td>MoP</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTPF</td>
<td>Medium-term Programme Framework</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODS</td>
<td>Ozone depleting substances</td>
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<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD-I</td>
<td>Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIEI</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Specialized Institute for Engineering Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State Owned Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>TARGET</td>
<td>Technology Acquisition to Restart and Generate Economic Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCB</td>
<td>Technical Capacity Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq</td>
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<td>UNAS</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Strategy for Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Vocational Training Centre</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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## Glossary of Evaluation Related Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>The situation prior to an intervention, against which progress can be assessed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to an intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention were or are expected to be achieved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>A measure of how economically inputs (through activities) are converted into outputs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Positive or negative, intended or non-intended, directly and indirectly, long term effects produced by a development intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Quantitative or qualitative factors that provide a means to measure the changes caused by an intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>An external action to assist a national effort to achieve specific development goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lessons learned</td>
<td>Generalizations based on evaluation experiences that abstract from specific to broader circumstances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logframe (logical framework approach)</td>
<td>Management tool used to guide the planning, implementation and evaluation of an intervention. System based on (Management by Objectives) also called Results-based Management principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>The achieved or likely effects of an intervention’s outputs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>The products in terms of physical and human capacities that result from an intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners and donor’s policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risks</td>
<td>Factors, normally outside the scope of an intervention, which may affect the achievement of an intervention’s objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>The continuation of benefits from an intervention, after the development assistance has been completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target groups</td>
<td>The specific individuals or organizations for whose benefit an intervention is undertaken</td>
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MAP OF IRAQ
Executive summary

UNIDO in Iraq

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) implemented a portfolio of 29 projects in Iraq between 2004 and 2012, working with counterparts in Government and society. The portfolio covered six thematic areas with a total value of almost USD 70 million; at its peak UNIDO’s largest country portfolio. UNIDO worked over a broad geographic area, focused in state institutions and ten Governorates with high levels of poverty and low access to public services. UNIDO’s peak year of operation in Iraq was 2009, when new project starts reached over USD 20 million. The size of the portfolio was reduced after 2010. There were no new project approvals in 2012 and only one project was scheduled to extend beyond 2013. The decline in activity reflected an overall reduction of international development assistance to Iraq, and UNIDO’s difficulty adapting to the changing conditions.

Iraqi Country Evaluation methodology

UNIDO commissioned an Independent Country Evaluation of its activities and involvement in Iraq, during the period 2004 to 2012. The objective of the Iraq Country Evaluation was to assess the achievements of UNIDO’s interventions against their key objectives. The evaluation was designed as a systematic review of the UNIDO portfolio using standard evaluation criteria; the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness (achievement of outputs and outcomes), impact and sustainability of UNIDO’s activities in Iraq (UNIDO, 2006). Members of the Evaluation Team included Mr. David Gairdner (Team Leader), Ms. Ginger Cruz (International Evaluation Specialist), and Ms. Michaela Fleischer (UNIDO Evaluation Consultant). The team was supported by Mr. Peter Loewe, from UNIDO’s independent Evaluation Group. Mr. Riadh Al-Allaf assisted with the Arabic translation of the Executive Summary.

The Iraq Country Evaluation focused at the portfolio level, and the extent to which individual projects contributed to achieving the strategic objectives of UNIDO and its Iraqi counterparts. However, UNIDO did not have an approved country strategy or plan for Iraq, with objectives and indicators at the portfolio level. Further, there was no Basic Cooperation Agreement to define the mutual objectives and commitments between Government and UNIDO. The evaluation, therefore, lacked a unifying statement of UNIDO’s strategic objectives for Iraq and results matrix against which portfolio outcomes could be assessed. Instead, the focus was placed on UNIDO’s six thematic programme areas.
The scope of work included the full range of UNIDO’s involvement in Iraq between 2004 and 2012. The evaluation team: i) reviewed programme documentation and data covering the full portfolio of UNIDO activities in Iraq, and; ii) interviewed UNIDO programme personnel (Vienna and Amman), some counterpart officials in Government of Iraq and other United Nations and Donor officials. Security and budgetary constraints meant that it was not possible to conduct field work inside Iraq, with either national or international evaluators.

**Iraq country context**

UNIDO’s activities in Iraq (2004-2012) were implemented during a period of volatility and transition. Iraq went through three distinct phases during the evaluation period: i) an international intervention followed by multiple and interacting forms of violent conflict (2003-2008); ii) transition to Iraqi authority and improvement in the security situation (2006-2010), and; iii) shifting focus to consolidation of state institutions and their capacity to deliver public goods and services, and strengthening Iraq’s economy (2010-2012). The overall trend after 2007 was towards improved security conditions.

With an improvement in conditions, the Government of Iraq and its international development partners shifted their focus from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development. Issues at the core of UNIDO’s mandate and global competence moved to the centre of Government’s priorities as UNDG ITF funding expanded. For recovery, UNIDO developed a portfolio of livelihood and agro-industrial projects. Focusing on the longer term, UNIDO worked with reforms of Iraq’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), industrial rehabilitation, private sector development and helping Iraq comply with its Montreal Protocol commitments. UNIDO’s relevance was reinforced by the emergence of international good practice in fragile states and conflict-affected situations, which emphasise strengthening state institutions and legitimacy, access to livelihood opportunities, public service delivery and economic development.

Regardless, the Iraq context through to 2012 was characterised by political instability and violence at a level sufficient to obstruct “normal” development activity. A main cause of violence was competition between Iraqi’s ethno-sectarian political leadership and the lack of an agreed constitutional/institutional framework to mediate that competition. Taking advantage of the political tensions, extremist groups have renewed mass causality attacks. Instability combined with the nascent state of Iraqi democratic institutions has contributed to slow progress in diversifying Iraq’s economy, creating opportunity in the private sector or strengthening Iraq’s policy and regulatory regime.

Improved overall conditions and the strengthened relevance of UNIDO’s services to the Iraq context, therefore, coincide with on-going political and physical insecurity, restrictions on movement of international personnel and a reduction of
international development assistance. These posed a significant challenge to UNIDO’s positioning in Iraq by the end of the evaluation period. Most international organisations appeared to face similar challenges.

Compounding the difficulty, and despite high funding levels between 2006 and 2010, UNIDO did not formalise its relationship with the Government in a Basic Cooperation Agreement. The agency also did not develop a country strategy or plan aligned with such a bilateral agreement. Rather, UNIDO relied on external planning framework, primarily the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UNDG ITF to align its project with Iraqi priorities. As a result, UNIDO showed difficulty adapting to changing conditions after 2010. Difficulties also reflected limited progress at the corporate-level with defining UNIDO’s policy framework for post-crisis situations and developing the required systems and procedures.

UNIDO’s portfolio of activities in Iraq

Effectiveness and results

UNIDO delivered a large body of programme activities in Iraq between 2004 and 2013, across a large geographic space and under difficult conditions. The prevailing Government view was that UNIDO delivered relevant and good quality serves, in key priority areas established within Government frameworks. Collaboration with UNIDO, project outputs and UNIDO’s willingness to work in underserved areas of Iraq were valued by Iraqi counterparts, with some project-specific exceptions. Most projects demonstrated concrete results of tangible benefit to the Government and Iraqi society.

MISP and Private Sector projects showed good effectiveness, and generally met their output and outcome targets. The MISP projects emerge as the strongest performer in the portfolio, with an average ranking of “B”, in an A to D scale where A represented the highest ranking. MISP projects were recovery-oriented. Six project iterations generally met or exceeded their output targets, implementation delays notwithstanding. Material assistance to the rehabilitation of training facilities, the provision of training equipment, curriculum development and training of vocational instructors were generally assessed as being of good quality.

MISP training activities showed positive results, enabling beneficiaries to move into the labour market. Varying by project, 18 and 69 per cent of the number of beneficiaries found new opportunities and/or increased their incomes. Women beneficiaries showed the lowest performance, with both finding opportunities and increasing their incomes. MISP projects made a positive contribution strengthening Iraqi institutions involved in vocational training, at different levels of Government. However, the MISP project model did not evolve past its recovery
orientation, from a project-orientation to a more system-wide support to vocational training or labour market development.

Support to strengthening existing SME’s was an area of good performance within the portfolio, often exceeding output targets and contributing to economic diversification. Support to 24 SMEs under MISP V resulted in improved business performance, and a 167 per cent employment increase among the survey cohort. The TARGET project contributed to a 40 per cent increase in full time positions among participating SMEs. In contrast, support to the formation of new SMEs and micro-enterprises was less successful, as was micro-enterprise and production group development were less successful, including through tool kit distribution. An important factor was lack of enabling support for business development, which were beyond the scope of MISP project design. There were also no apparent synergies between UNIDO’s support to SMEs under MISP and TARGET other private sector activities aimed at business development.

Private Sector Development emerged as a good performing area, also with an average rating of “B”. Projects had both a recovery and development orientation, noting the more recent projects were development focused. EDICT and IPI advanced the Government’s National Development Strategy priority of private sector growth, and UNIDO’s objective of enabling a transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term economic-development initiatives. Outputs in Private Sector Development joint programme supported the reform agenda for SOEs, although Government has made limited overall progress given political sensitivities.

The institutional change brought about as a result of these projects has a good probability of contributing to the growth of Iraq’s emerging private sector. In general, programme participants showed good support for the continued operation of UNIDO-supported Enterprise Development Centres. Service-providers also expressed satisfaction, with 78 per cent of trainers and counsellors approving of its achievements. Computer-based portions of the training initiatives were not as effective as more traditional one-on-one mentoring, as Iraq still lacks familiarity with online tools. The programme’s efforts to build networking between entrepreneurs and tie them to the global business environment also produced mixed results in the short-term.

The Agro-Industrial projects received the lowest rating in the Iraq portfolio, with a C+. The performance of the projects was split, reflecting the different approaches and implementation arrangements used. The Food Safety project showed good performance and met its output targets. Good performance here lifted the overall ranking of UNIDO’s activity in the agro-industrial sector. The project was evaluated as contributing to improvements to Iraq’s food safety system, which was out of date and not functioning. UNIDO focused on the food industry, and capacity development for quality control.
The three remaining projects did not meet activity and output targets. Performance was mixed; unsatisfactory delivery of some outputs affected the performance of other dependent outputs within an integrated project design. Outputs were further undermined by extensive implementation delays, with the *Pilot Project for the Rehabilitation of the Dairy Sector* showing a 60 month implementation duration against the 16 months originally planned. Tight UNDG ITF implementation criteria and realism in project design were contributing factors.

The Agro-Industrial projects showed a consistent pattern of performance deficiencies: i) *Output targets related to training were delivered, and were generally of good quality*; ii) *targets related to rehabilitation of equipment were partially met*, and characterised by significant implementation delays; iii) *the relationship between project components was incomplete*, either as the result of either partial delivery of UNIDO outputs, or poor output performance by the FAO within the joint programme modality. As a result, project objectives were only partially met and of limited productive use to Iraqi stakeholders.

The seven Montreal Protocol projects made limited progress towards their objectives. No standard evaluations of the projects will be conducted, given their special status within UNIDO. With available monitoring data, the projects were affected by weakness in design, resulting from either a limited understanding of the country context and/or difficulty adapting project design to country conditions. Tight protocol deadlines for adherence to global elimination targets were a contributing factor, as was the absence of a cooperation agreement with the Government of Iraq that might have eased customs delays. Regardless, projects lack adequate adjustment for difficult country conditions, and could have benefitted more from the experience of other UNIDO programme streams.

**Efficiency**

UNIDO worked for nine years in a highly challenging environment without any significant security incidents while keeping overall operations and security costs relatively low. Effective use of programme mechanisms adapted for Iraqi (increased national level representation, use of joint steering committees and in-kind contributions of facilities, personnel and support from the GOI) all contributed to the positive overall portfolio outcomes.

MISP project evaluations showed the highest efficiency ratings, while the Agro-industrial projects were given the lowest ratings. Efficiency was enabled by good relevance and ownership throughout the portfolio. However, all projects experienced some combination of delays, change in the scope of outputs delivered and quality concerns. Changes reflect both the lack of realism in the original project design, as well as UNIDO’s efforts to be flexible under difficult conditions. Contextual factors were a significant challenge, with security cited as
the main constraint. Funding criteria also were an important factor influencing design, as they required 18 to 24 month timelines. Regardless, project design tended to be ambitious given the context. UNIDO had limited success learning lessons and adapting the designs to make them more realistic. Joint Programmes generally had weak management, coordination and monitoring structures, with the exception of the Private Sector Development programme.

An important factor influencing project efficiency was UNIDO’s institutional arrangements in Iraq. UNIDO did not formalise its relationship with the Government through a Basic Cooperation Agreement (BCA), or develop a strategic framework or country programme plan aligned with priorities in such an agreement. Discussion on a BCA began with the Government of Iraq during 2009, but was not concluded at the time of the evaluation. Rather, the six programmes functioned as stand-alone initiatives, negotiated separately with individual Iraqi counterpart institutions and lacking a unifying strategic and programme framework. Compensating arrangements at the project-level, such as working through joint Steering Committees, mitigated the effects and provided a mechanism for UNIDO-government cooperation.

UNIDO’s work in Iraq, therefore, was not anchored in a standard country programme arrangement. This occurred despite the fact that Iraq was UNIDO’s largest project portfolio, and that conditions in Iraq required a greater investment in country-level management, planning and institutional support than “normal” contexts. At the project level, the absence of a formalised structure introduced important inefficiencies into implementation. At the portfolio level, UNIDO was able to function well within United Nations Country Team planning frameworks while large scale funding was available from the UNDG ITF. However, UNIDO had limited means to re-position itself as trust funds closed and Iraqi context changed, despite the growing relevance of its services. Individual programme stream continue separate dialogues with Government and donors.

**Relevance**

UNIDO projects showed good overall relevance, to the Iraqi context and priorities of Government, Donors and beneficiaries. However, relevance shifted over time. It strengthened early in the evaluation period, as the consolidation of UN and Government planning frameworks enabled UNIDO to focus its contribution. Relevance likely peaked between 2008 and 2011, as Donors and Iraqi counterparts focused on recovery-oriented priorities and began the shift to a development orientation. The potential relevance of UNIDO’s institutional competence remained strong at the end of the evaluation period. However, the lack of country strategy left UNIDO with limited capacity to adapt its Iraq portfolio to changing conditions after 2010. The agency, therefore, had difficulty translating potential relevance into opportunity.
National ownership

Government ownership was consistently good, over time and throughout the, with the exception of two projects. The most important mechanism for reinforcing ownership was the project-level governance structure. Implementation with counterpart institutions and communications through Iraqi personnel were contributing factors. National ownership would have been further strengthened by a Basic Cooperation Agreement. UNIDO’s internal ownership of the Iraq portfolio was less clear, given its limited investment in developing the management and programme structures necessary to sustain a portfolio in Iraq after the decline in international assistance.

Cross-cutting issues: Gender

UNIDO’s performance on gender was mixed to weak. The MISP projects and TARGET were the only projects with specific gender targets, ranging between 30 and 50 per cent of beneficiaries. These tended to either met or exceed their activity targets related to gender, and resulted in some improvement for both income and livelihood opportunities. They represent, therefore, an important institutional investment, on the part of UNIDO and its counterparts.

Regardless, UNIDO did not make an institutional investment in conducting a gender assessment to look at expanding training options, including for the private sector projects. Project design in this regard also responded to Government priorities and the requirements of Iraqi institutions. Regardless, UNIDO did not act on recommendations from some evaluations and the training/livelihood options for women were limited. Other programme streams either did not have clearly developed gender objectives or activities, nor did they allocate resources against those objectives. Gender considerations, therefore, were not mainstreamed into the portfolio beyond the MISP projects.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: UNIDO must take the appropriate steps to ensure the agency is “fit for purpose” in post-crisis situations. UNIDO shows limited progress developing its policy framework, corporate strategy and systems and procedures for working in post-crisis situations, ten years after the General Conference (2003) expanded the agency’s mandate. These are system-wide issues beyond the scope of an individual project to address, and must be addressed at the corporate level.

Recommendation 2: UNIDO should formalize its relationship with the Government of Iraq through signing of a Basic Cooperation Agreement and appointing of a representative with official accreditation. A BCA would include priorities mutually agreed between the Government of Iraq and UNIDO, and serve as the basis for UNIDO’s strategic framework and country plan for Iraq.
Such an also reinforces UNIDO’s contribution to UN Country Team planning, principally through the UNDAF.

**Recommendation 3:** Building on the rights and privileges outlined in the BCA, UNIDO’s future country programme in Iraq should be based on a coherent country strategy, plan and programme infrastructure structure. UNIDO should avoid a situation where it continues to work without a defined strategy and plan. The evaluation does not recommend a heavy structure given uncertain conditions, but rather one that is efficient given requirements and benefits from BCA and UNIDO country programme standard provisions. Effective use of regional coordination structures should also be made.

**Recommendation 4:** UNIDO’s global mandate and service offering remains highly relevant to Iraq. In dialogue with Government through the BCA provisions, UNIDO should focus on its strengths; industrial sector expertise and technical assistance provided by Arabic speaking experts, particularly to private sector development and SOE restructuring. Programme development with Government should occur on an institutional basis and in the context of country strategy development.

**Recommendation 5:** UNIDO has not fully developed its contribution in gender-based programming. As one measure for future programming, may incorporate the Ministry of Women’s Affairs into early programme design, to address gender strategy and opportunities that are consistent with Government’s priorities.

**Recommendation 6:** UNIDO should ensure that all Joint UN Programmes are designed with arrangements for coordination, monitoring and evaluation and mutual accountability, and with the UNDG Joint Programme norms and procedures as the minimum standard.

**طريقة التقييم العامة للمشاريع العراقية:**

باشرت يونيدو بتقديم مشروع مستقل لتقديم مشاريع واعمالها في العراق بين الأعوام 2004-2012. المهام الرئيسية لهذا المشروع هو تقييم المنجزات التي حققها هذه المشاريع مقابل الأهداف الأساسية التي قام عليها يونيدو في العراق. تم تصميم التقييم بطريقة نظامية مستخدمة وهي طريقه متعارف عليها ذات مستوى نظامي على الاستراتيجية: التكامل، العادية، التأثير (المنجزات والنفاذ) واستراتيجية يونيدو في العراق ونماذج تأثيرها على المجتمع في الأعوام القديمة (يونيدو 2006).

ركز "التقييم الذي قامت به يونيدو للمشاريع في العراق" للنظر في مستوى برنامج المشاريع العراقية والتي ي مدى ساهمت المشاريع الفردية في تحقيق الأهداف الاستراتيجية لليونيدو ونظرها العراقية. على كل حال لم يكن ليونيدو إطار استراتيجي مبديء متفق عليه أو خطة عمل في العراق تمثل على الأهداف ومؤشرات على مستوى المشروع. إضافة لم يكن هناك تقييم أساسي بين الحكومة العراقية ويونيدو لتعاليم المشروع لتوضيح الأهداف الأساسية المشتركة والالتزام بها. وعلى فإن التقييم اقتصر على وجود استراتيجي موحدة للاهداف الرئيسية للمشاريع وجدول الدورات النهائية للمشاريع يمكن استخدامها لمقارنة وكأن التركيز فقط على المساحات السماحة لعناوين برنامج يونيدو.

شرك التقييم كل المشاريع التي قامت بها يونيدو بين الأعوام 2004-2012. قام فريق التقييم ب:

1: تحقق كل المستندات والوثائق والمعلومات لكافة المشاريع يونيدو.
2: مقابل موظفي برنامج يونيدو (عمان وفينا) وكذلك الموظفين المسؤولين عن هذه المشاريع في الحكومة العراقية وبعض الموظفين في الامم المتحدة والجهات المفيدة الأخرى.

كانت الإحوال الأمنية وقله الأموال المخصصة لهذه التقييم هي السبب في عدم قيمتها الفريدة بأعمال التقييم المحلي الموطن لهذه المشاريع من قبل أعضاء عراقيين أو دوليين.

**خلفية المشاريع في العراق:**

تم تنفيذ برنامج يونيدو في العراق بين الأعوام 2004-2012 خلال فترة التنقيبات وعدم الاستقرار. من العراق ثلاث مراحل متميزة خلال فترة التقييم هذه:
(1) : الانقلاب على الحكم العراقي وتحسين في الوضع الأمني (2008 – 2010).
(2) : تقوية المؤسسات الحكومية ومقدرته على تقديم الخدمات العامة ونمو الاقتصاد العراقي (2008 – 2010).
(3) : الإدارة العامة في العراق بعد عام 2007 هو تحسن الوضع الأمني مع تحسين الأحوال العامة ومع التحسن في الوضع العالمي في العراق انقلب تركز الحكومة وشركائها الدوليين من ذلك حقوق الإنسان إلى التطور والتعاون والسيطرة على الوضع المتعلق بمحور أعمال يونيدو والأحوال العالمية انقلبت إلى أولويات العراق الحالية مع زيادة التمويل لمشاريع الأمن المتحدة. من أجل التعايش والعودة إلى الأحوال الطبيعية. قامت يونيدو بتطوير برامجها الخاصة بمشاريع التنمية الاقتصادية والزراعية الصناعية. وتركيز على المشاريع الطويلة الأجل. عملت يونيدو مع الحكومات العراقية ومشاريع الحكومة التعليم والخدمات الحكومية واعدة تأهيل المصانع ومساعدة العراق بالانفصال عن عمله الشمالي. تتمثل أهمية يونيدو في تطوير جيداً للاستراتيجية التنفيذية لبرامجها في الدول ذات الوضع الهشة والدول التي تعاني من الصراعات، والتي تؤكد على تقوية المؤسسات الحكومية وتوفر فرص العمل وزيادة في توفير الخدمات العامة والاقتصاد.

بالرغم من كل هذا بقيت أحوال العراق خلال الأعوام الماضية وحتى عام 2012 متاثرة بعد تدفق الاستقرار السياسي. أن أي تطور في أعمال العنف كافٍ لوقف تطور الفعاليات والمشاريع الطبيعية. السبب الرئيسي لأعمال العنف هو التنافس بين القوى السياسية العراقية وعدم توفر اتفاقية قانونية للعمل تسبيطر على هذا التنافس. قامت المجموعات المتطرفة مستقلة للشلل السياسي الموجود والتشنج في الاعمال وعنف وقتل جماعي. ساعد عدم الاستقرار مع وجود الوضع الدولي الدهشة اليمنى على إعطاء نمو الاقتصاد العراقي وعدم توفير فرص في القطاع الخاص أو تقوية السياسة العراقية والاقتصاد. يعتبر التقدم ضروري جداً لعملية كفاءة ونجاحات، والزيادة في العملية الاقتصادية.

وذلك لتوفير فرص العمل في المستقبل نتيجة للتعاون بين الأطراف.

أن تحسن الأحوال بصورة عامة زيادة أهمية مشاعر يونيدو الحالية في العراق قد جاء متزامناً مع استقراراً عمد توفر الأمن السياسي والاقتصادي والهدوء من حركة الممثليين الدوليين وتفاهم في المساعدات الدولية، كل هذا أدأ إلى تحدي لمحور في وضع يونيدو في العراق وجعله حساس مع نهاية فترة تقديم المشروع. إن من الظاهر أن معظم المساندات الدولية قد عانت من مثل هذه الظروف وواجهت نفس التحديات.

أخذت بالاعتبار المذكورة أعلاه وتوفير الأرادة الم إليه بين 2006-2010 لم تتمكنت يونيدو من اتخاذ برنامج قطري محدد، كما لم تتم تبديل علاقاتها بشكل مع الحديثة العراقية بشكل اتفاقية قانونية أو الاعتراف أو الاستقرار اداب، وتبديل من أجل استمرار مشروعها وقضاياها. بالإشارة إلى أن يونيدو على نظام تتخطيط خارجي. يعتمد أساساً على (نظام مساعدات الأمم المتحدة للتطوير وبرنامج مساعدات العراق UNDAF & UNDG ITF) من أجل تطوير أعمالها بالعراق نتيجة لذلك اظهرت يونيدو بعض الصعوبات للتفاهم مع المتغيرات والتحديات. بعد عام 2010، هذه الصعوبات انخفضت على التقدم المحدود في مستوى التعاون وتحديد أطار سياسة يونيدو لحالات بعد الامارات وتطوير النظام والإجراءات المطلوبة واستخدامها بشكل فعال.
برنامج فعاليات يونيدو في العراق:
فعالية برنامج يونيدو: في العراق ما بين العامين 2004-2013 على مساحة جغرافية واسعة وتحت ضروف صعبة. أبدت الحكومة العراقية راحة في برنامج يونيدو باستقباله، فقد قامت بتلبية خدمات جيدة ومبهرة في مجالات مهمة وحساسة ذات أولوية ونتيجة تعاون مع الأطراف العام للحكومة. أظهرت الحكومة العراقية على برنامج عمل يونيدو ونتائجه ورغبتها بالعمل في مناطق تتحلى عالياً بتنظيم عامة في العراق في الشأن اليمني. أصبحت قوة ضخمة للحكومة العراقية والمجتمع العراقي.

أظهر برنامج تطوير الصناعات الصغيرة في العراق (Micro Industries Support Program, MISP) تأثير فعال وصورة تطوير الصناعات الخفيفة (MISP) من مستوى تقييم من A. وتزايد هذه المشاريع تمت تبادل تقييماتها A/D. التأهيل ستة من هذا المشاريع بصورة عامة حظي الأهداف وزادت عليها. تميز برنامج تطوير الصناعات الخفيفة في العراق كونه يعتمد على اتباع تلك هذه الصناعات وليس التسلسل في انجاز مشاريع متاحة (MISP) في العراق في أهدافاً وفاقت هذه المشاريع الأهداف المرسومة لها في بعض الأحيان. كان التقدير العام لتحسين المواد الصناعية والأنشطة والمعدات المجهزة للمشروع جيد بصورة عامة كما كان تدريب وبرنامج المداريين ذو نوعية جيدة أيضاً.

نتائج إيجابية جيدة لما ساعد المستفيدين من النفاذ إلى الأسواق. كانت نسبة المستفيدين من هذا البرنامج تتراوح بين 18% - 69% من الذين وجدوا فرص عمل وحازوا دخلهم الشهري. أظهرت نتائج النساء بأن نسبة النساء المستفيدين من ايجاد فرص عمل وتحسين وضعهم المادي أقل من غيرهم من المستفيدين الرجال. كما أظهرت نتائج في كافة المناطق لهذا المشروع بشكل واضح تقوية المؤسسات الحكومية وللأنشطة الاقتصادية، وان مراكز التدريب وتحسين أدائها بصورة عامة ودля كافة المستويات الحكومية أو الوزارية. ولكن بالرغم من نجاح البرامج إذا انها لم تتمكن من توسيع نظام التدريب أو تطوير سوق العمل العراقي.

كان اداء برنامج مساعدة ودعم المشاريع الصغيرة والمتوسطة في السوق (SME) جيد جداً وضمن المنهاج العام وتفوق على الأهداف المرسومة له وقد صاغ في النمو الاقتصادي. ادى هذا المشروع إلى مساهمة ودعم 24 من المشاريع الصغيرة والمتوسطة ضمن مشروع (MISP V) قد أظهر تحسن ملحوظ في الأداء والانجاز، وقد صاغ في زيادة عدد الموظفين في برنامج الضمان V (TARGET) بنسبة 167%. أما برنامج الضمان V فقد صاغ في زيادة عدد العمالة في المجالات التي شملها المشروع بنسبة 40%. تبين في المقارنة أن نجاح المشروع ومساعدات تأسيس المشاريع الصغيرة الجديدة أدى إلى نجاح من مشاريع المشروع الموجودة في السوق وكذلك كان نجاح مجموعة تطوير مشروع اقتصادي أدى نجاحاً بما ضمنها توزيع عدد العمل بالمستفيدين النموذجي تعم النجاح بصورة جيدة هو عدد توفر المساعدات في تطوير هذه المشروعات والتي كانت خارج تصميم الاداء العام لهذا
أظهر اداء مشروع مساندة وتطوير القطاع الخاص نتائج جيدة وواضحة من حيث التقييم العام، إلا أن المشروع الآخر كان يركز على التطور أكثر. ساهم مشروع EDICT & IPI في استراتيجية التطوير الوطنية الحكومية والتي تركز على تطوير ونمو القطاع الخاص، كما ساعدت هذه البرامج مؤسسة يونيدو على تحقيق الأهداف بالإضافة إلى المساعدات الإنسانية إلى المصالح طويلة الأمد الخاصة بتقديم المساعدات والأفكار لتطوير الاقتصاد وتحسين أدائه. ساهمت النتائج الخاصة بتطوير وتحسين أداء القطاع الخاص على إعادة تأهيل بعض المنظمات الحكومية من أجل تحسين أدائها وأن كان أداء القطاع الحكومي كان محدوداً لإستراتيجية تحسسية.

التغييرات الدستورية التي حصلت نتيجة لهذه المشاريع من المحتفل جداً أن يكون لها تأثير إيجابي على نمو وانتشار القطاع الخاص في العراق. بصورة عامة أدى المشاركون في البرنامج بالرغبة في الاستمرار بالعمل في هذا البرنامج المحافظة على استمرارية العمل في مراكز تطوير الشركات ومؤسسات الذي استمر ودعمت يونيدو. كما أبدت الجهات المرؤية المصاحبة لهذا البرنامج بالرضى عن 78% من المدربيين والمستشارين ويونيدو من منجزاتهم في المشروع. الجزء الذي يعد على الكومنبورتر في التدريب من هذا المشروع لم يحتوي نفس النسبة من النجاح وبسبب التأثير الذي حظى به التدريب الاجتماعي المعتدل على التدريب والأنشطة الشخصية فردًا لرئف حضور العمل غير متعدد على استعمال الأجهزة التي تعتمد على الإنترنت في الأعمال焼き. كان جهد البرنامج لبناء شبكة اتصالات بين المستفيدين من هذا البرنامج وعالم الأعمال العالمي قد أعطى نتيجة متواضعة على المدى القصير من عمر البرنامج.

حصلت المشاريع الزراعية الصناعية على تقديرات أقل من غيرها في مملد المشاريع في برنامج العراق وكان التقييم + سلامة الغذاء نتائج جيدة وحق اهتمامه وغايته. تم تقييم المشروع بأنه قد استمته في تحسين نظام سلامة الغذاء في العراق والذي كان قد لا يتفهم بالحالة المطلوبة. وقبل التطبيق. ساهمت يونيدو بإعداد العمل بنظام عملي لتسهيل وتفعيل التقارير وتحقيق تأسيس نظام لسلامة الأطعمة على المستوى الوطني وإعادة النظر في التعريفات الحكومية والقرارات الإدارية كأساس للاستناد إلى تحسين وسلامة الغذاء.

الсаهم المشاريع الثلاثة الأولوية لم تستوفي الانتهاء المرسوم أو العملية لها. تقييم أداء هذه المشاريع تكون مختلف بين الأهداف مع بعضها البعض. أداء الغير مرضي لبعض منجزات وآليات مشروعات أخرى بشكل سلبي على أداء الأهداف الأخرى للمشروع الذي يعتمد على هذه الأهداف ذات النتائج غير المرضية. تم تقليل من قيمة الأهداف بالتأثير الكبير في تحقيقها حيث تم تنفيذ بائورة مشاريع الآلام पर पूरा एक शतयुग औरators لاعادة التقييم والسلامة الغذاء.

المشاريع الثلاثة الأولوية لم تستوفي الانتهاء المرسوم أو العملية لها. تقييم أداء هذه المشاريع تكون مختلف بين الأهداف مع بعضها البعض. أداء الغير مرضي لبعض منجزات وآليات مشروعات أخرى بشكل سلبي على أداء الأهداف الأخرى للمشروع الذي يعتمد على هذه الأهداف ذات النتائج غير المرضية. تم تقليل من قيمة الأهداف بالتأثير الكبير في تحقيقها حيث تم تنفيذ بائورة مشاريع الآلام پار पूरा एक शतयुग औरators لاعادة التقييم والسلامة الغذاء.

1: تم تحقيق أهداف التدريب العملية وكانت ذات مستويات جيدة.
2: الأهداف الموجهة من إعادة تأهيل الأجهزة والمعدات قد تم تحقيقها جزئياً مع ملاحظة التأثير الكبير الذي صاحبه التنفيذ.
3: العلاقة بين أجزاء المشروع لم تكن متكاملة ما كتبة كنتيجة لنتائج يونيدو غير متكاملة أو نتائج التنفيذ السيء لمنظمة الغذاء العالمي FAO من خلال البرنامج المشترك. كنتيجة تم خلص من الوضعية المحددة.
تحقيق بعض الأهداف الجزئية للمشروع ولم تكن ذات استعمالات عملية للمساهمين العراقيين.

مشاريع بروتوكول مونتريال السبعية قد حققت تقدم محدود تجاه الأهداف المرسومة لها. لا يوجد أي تقدم عام للمشاريع السبعية. وذلك عند الاختصار بنظر الأعichten ووضعهم الخاص في يونيدو. لدى ملاحظة النتائج النهائية تبين أن هذه المشاريع قد تتأثر من الضفف في تصميم المشروع والنتائج من عدم فهم واستيعاب أوضاع البلد وتصويت تمديد تصميم المشروع في العراق. الوقت المحدد الضيق لتنفيذ المراقبة كان ضريبيًا للهادة.

عندما كان أحد العوامل المتساوية النظامية ناتجاً ونافذة اتفاقية مع الحكومة العراقية والتي قد تخفف من التأخير المركزي لدخول البضائع، بعض النظر ينتظر المشروع إلى التزام مع الصعوبات التي يعاني منها العراق. وكان من الممكن الاستفادة من مشروع يونيدو الرئيسي في العراق للتعلم على بعض المشكلات.

ألفاءة:

عملت يونيدو لمدة تسع سنوات في ضروف وتحديات صعبة للغاية ولم يتفرج في هذه السنين أي حادث إنساني يذكر من الاحتفاظ بكلفة كبيرة لهذا المشروع وخصوصيته الأمنية. الاستعمال العام ومباشرة البرامج والمنشآت من قبل العراقيين (زيادة في مستوى الحضور الوطني استخدم للجنة قيادة مشتركة وتقدم تدقيق التسهيلات النوعية ومساندة الحكومة العراقية في القوى العامة والمساندة الفعلية) كل ذلك في النتائج الحديدة العامة للمشروع.

أظهرت المشاريع MISP أظهرت المزيد من المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما أظهرت المشاريع الزراعية DEADduct حسب الظروف المتطلبة لل качفة، بينما 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في مستوى المشروع مثل وجود لجنة إدارية مشتركة قد خففت من التأثير ووفرت ميكانيكية جديدة لطريقة عمل مشتركة بين الحكومة العراقية ويونيتو.
وعليه لم يكن عمل يونيتو في العراق قد أسس على أسس عمل مشتركة وطنية. حدث بذلك في برنامج يونيتو في العراق يعتبر أكبر برنامج مستمر ل يونيتو، وأن الوضع الرسمي للمؤسسات على الصعيد الوطني. على مستوى المشاريع. كان لغياب وجود استراتيجية رسمية أثر في إعطاء تدفق لتنفيذ هذه المشاريع، على مستوى هذه المشاريع، تمكنت يونيتو من العمل جيداً داخل إطار تخطيط عمل فريق الأمم المتحدة وبعده وجود إنساقيات بين المنظمة الوكيل للめるدود من نحو الحالة للعمال التي تقوم بها. هناك بعض البرامج المنفردة تقوم بالاتصال المستمر بين الحكومة والمبترين.

الأهمية
اظهرت مشاريع يونيتو أهمية جيدة بشكل عام للسياسات العراقية وأولويات الحكومة العراقية والدول المتلائمة والمستفيدين وقد حصل بعض التغيير في هذه الأهمية عبر السنين. تم تقديرها في بداية فترة التغيير وذلك بعد نحو سنوات قرب بين الام المتحدة والمجلس والذي كان يونيتو من التركيز على ضمنها. إزادت الأهمية على مستوى عام ضخم للمشاريع من UNDG ITF إلا أن لدى يونيتو القليل من الطرق لقاعدة تطبيق تمويل ضخم للمشاريع من أحوالها عند انتهاء الأمور المتنوعة وتفعيل سياسات العمل العراقية بالرغم من نمو الحالة للأعمال التي تقوم بها. هناك بعض البرامج المنفردة تقوم بالاتصال المستمر بين الحكومة والمبترين.

الملكية الوطنية
المملكة العراقية أو عالدة المشروع للاحتياجات الحكومية كانت دائماً وخلال فترة المشروع، تكشف ما دعا مشروعين فقط، أفضل وطريقة تقوية عادية هذه المشاريع هو التركيب الإداري على مستوى المشروع. كما أن العمل مع المؤسسات العراقية المختلفة وطرق الإتصالات مع العراقيين قد وظلت على هذه الأدوار. عالمية التنمية المشاريع كان من الممكن تقويتها بشكل إضافي بواسطة "التفاهمية العامل المشترك الأساسية Basic Cooperation Agreement" كان عائدة يونيتو الداخلية لبرنامج المشاريع العراقية أقل، وضمنها مع الأخبار بنظر الاعتبار محدودية استثمار يونيتو في تحويل أداة وضع البرامج الضرورية لاستقرار برنامج العراق بعد انحصار المساعدات الخارجية.

القضايا المتقاطعة: فرص العمل والمساواة بين الجنسين:
كان إداء يونيتو بالنسبة للقضايا الجنسية من متوسط إلى ضعيف. كان مشاريع MISP وTARGET الوحيدة التي تركزت على مواضيع الجنس وحقوق النساء بنسبة 30% - 50% بالنسبة للمستفيدين. هذه المشاريع كان من المفروض أن تحقق نتائجها أو تزيد عنها بالنسبة للقضايا الجنسية وحقوق النساء وزيادة في الدخل وتوفر فرص العمل للنساء. وبالتالي، هذا يمثل استثمار مسؤوليٍّ قوي ومهم من ناحية يونيتو وشركاه العملاء معًا.
بغض النظر، يومنيدو لم تساهم في استثمار مؤسساتي لتنظيم تقييم خاص للجنس في المشاريع التي فتقها للنظر في احتمالات زيادة التدريب وخاصة في مشاريع القطاع الخاص تنظيم البرنامج في هذا الجانب تناسب وتعاطي مع مطلبات وأولويات الحكومة العراقية ومتطلبات المؤسسات العراقية.

على كل حال لم يتفاعل يومنيدو مع بعض التوصيات الخاصة بتقارير التقييم الخاصة بهذه المشاريع ويعتبر فرص التدريب للنساء محدودة. أما بالنسبة للمشاريع الأخرى فلم يكن لدى يومنيدو سياسة خاصة أو طريقة خاصة للتعامل مع قضايا جنس المستفيدين من هذه المشاريع أو فعالياتهم ولم يتم تخصيص اموال لهذا الهدف.

وعليه فإن معالجة قضايا جنس المتطوعين في هذه المشاريع عدا لم يؤخذ في الحساب.

خليصة التوصيات

tوصية رقم (1): على يومنيدو أن تتخذ الخطوات اللازمة للتأكد من أن الوكالة "صالحة للعمل وتحقيق الهدف" في حالات ما بعد الازمات. أظهرت يومنيدو تقدم محدود في تطوير إطار عمل سياساتها وبنية تراتبية تعاون وانجاز ووضع تعليمات للعمل في حالات العمل ما بعد الازمات بالرغم من مرور عشر سنوات على الاجتماع العام سنة 2003 والذي وسع بموجبه مسؤوليات وأهداف يومنيدو. هذه نقاط عامة تخص نظام عمل المنظمة وخارطة نظام تدخل الافراد ويجب معالجته على مستوى التعاون العام.

tوصية رقم (2): على يومنيدو اعتماد وتنظيم ومتاحة علاقاتها مع الحكومة العراقية للمواقة على توقيع وتعيين مندوب لها مع إعطائه (BCA) إتفاقية التعاون الأساسية مع الحكومة العراقية. هذه الاتفاقية تتضمن اساسا ارتباط قانوني بين المنظمة والحكومة العراقية وتشمل على الأولويات العليا المتوقف عليها مع الحكومة العراقية وتكون أساس لوضع استراتيجية عمل للمنظمة وخط التفاوض وتشمل فيها مساهمة يومنيدو بشكل أساسي. 

tوصية رقم (3): استنادا إلى الحقوق والمزايا التي يتمتع بها يومنيدو في الاتفاقية بين الحكومة العراقية والمنظمة فإن مستقبل يومنيدو في العراق سيعتمد على تبني استراتيجيات أقليمية وبرنامج خاص يمكن اعتراضه بين يومنيدو واتفاق مع الحكومة العراقية. على يومنيدو تبني العمل في العراق بدون تخطيط أو برنامج خاص ويجب الإبعد عن تنفيذ برامج ومشاريع غير متوقع عليها مسبقا. لا يوصي هذا التقييم على تقديم برنامج قوي جدير في ضرر غير واضحة بل تقديم برنامج قوة مبني على المبتكرين والآبدة المرجوة من اتفاقية التعاون المشترك بين يومنيدو والحكومة العراقية وخصائص برنامج يومنيدو الثابت كما ينبغي الاستخدام الفعال لمعايير التنسيق الإقليمي.

tوصية رقم (4): لا زال التفويض العالمي والخدمات المقدمة من قبل يومنيدو ذات فائدة كبيرة للعراق. ومن خلال التبادل مع الحكومة العراقية ضمن اتفاقية العمل المشتركة، يومنيدو التركيز على قوتها وخبراتها التي تقدمها للعراق في مجال تطوير القطاع الصناعي بواسطة خبراء يتكلمون اللغة العربية وخصوصا في تطوير القطاع الخاص وإعادة هيئة الوسائط الحكومية. إن برنامج التعاون مع الحكومة العراقية يجب أن ينطلق تحت سفاس مؤسساتية ومهليات التنمية الاستراتيجية القطرية.
التوصية رقم (5):
لم تتمكن يونيدو كليا من تطوير برنامج خاص لها لمعالجة المشاكل بين الجنسين في العمل وكخطوة أولى في البرنامج المستقبلية على يونيدو ان تحاول اقحام وزارة شؤون المرأة في المراحل الأولى لتصميم المشروع ووضع استراتيجية لمعالجة الفوارق بين الجنسين وفرص العمل التي تتفق مع أولويات الحكومة.
التوصية رقم (6):
على يونيدو ان تكشف بان كافة البرامج المشتركة للامم المتحدة قد صممت اخذه بنظر الاعتبار الترتيبات اللازمة للتعاون، التدقيق، الفحص، التقييم، والمساءلة المتبادلة وبالتعاون كحد ادنى مع البرنامج المشترك لمنظمة الأمم المتحدة الإنمائية UNDG والإجراءات.
1. Introduction and background

1.1 Introduction and background

1. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s (UNIDO) implemented a portfolio of 29 projects in Iraq between 2004 and 2012, working with counterparts in Government and society under difficult conditions. The portfolio covered six thematic areas and had a total value of almost USD 70 million; UNIDO’s largest country portfolio at its peak. UNIDO worked over a broad geographic area, focused in ten Governorates and in locations with high levels of poverty and low access to public services. Counterparts generally showed a high level of satisfaction with UNIDO’s contribution, including the agency’s willingness to work under difficult field conditions in under-served areas.

2. UNIDO’s portfolio of activities in Iraq was implemented during a period of volatility and transition. Security conditions have improved significantly since the height of civil conflict, between 2005 and 2007. The Government of Iraq and its international development partners shifted their focus from humanitarian interventions to recovery and development. With this changing context, the themes of industrial reform, private sector development and job/livelihood creation emerged as key Government priorities. While security and political conditions remained volatile at the end of the evaluation period, there are important opportunities for UNIDO to contribute to Iraq’s on-going transition.

3. UNIDO’s work in Iraq was funded by two primary sources. Eighty-three per cent of total project funding came from the United Nations Development Group-managed Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) while a Montreal Protocol trust fund accounted for an additional nine per cent. There was no direct financial contribution from Government. However, most projects included important in-kind support and/or counterpart investments that were integrated into the overall project design.

4. Overall activity followed the rhythm of UNDG ITF, which ceased new funding in 2010. There was limited new funding for UNIDO activities in Iraq after that date. At the end of the evaluation period, only a Trade Capacity Building (TCB) project had been approved in 2011 for implementation in mid-2012. Further, UNIDO did not develop a country strategy to guide its transition away from UNDG ITF funding, and into the changing Iraq context.
5. UNIDO’s project activity in Iraq, therefore, declined after 2012. The peak year of operation in Iraq was 2009, when new project starts reached over USD 20 million. The scope and value of the portfolio declined after 2010, as UNDG ITF funding came to an end and overall international assistance to Iraq was reduced. Discussions with Government, Donors and the private sector were on-going at the end of the evaluation period. However, there were no new project starts in 2012, no confirmed projects in the pipeline and only one project was scheduled to extend beyond 2013.

6. UNIDO’s programme in Iraq, therefore, was at a crossroads by 2012. Relative improvements to conditions and the continuing relevance of UNIDO’s service offering did not translated into new opportunities. UNIDO did not use high funding levels between 2006 and 2010 to develop a coherent country strategy, or the formal relationship with Government and the management and programme structures needed to sustain its activities. UNIDO’s difficulty making a transition beyond the UNDG ITF period reflected limited progress made at the corporate-level in defining UNIDO’s policy framework for post-crisis situations and developing the systems and procedures needed to work effectively.

1.2 Purpose, scope and methodology for the Iraq country evaluation

Purpose of the independent evaluation

7. The Independent country evaluation of the activities and involvement of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Iraq, was requested by the UNIDO Executive Board as part of the bi-annual work programme of the UNIDO Evaluation Group (EVA) for 2012/2013 (UNIDO, 2012). The objective of the country evaluation was to assess the achievements of UNIDO’s interventions in Iraq against their key objectives, including an examination of the relevance of the objectives and the appropriateness of the design. The evaluation was further to identify factors that have facilitated or impeded the achievement of objectives. Emphasis was place at the portfolio level, and the extent to which individual projects have contributed to achieving the overall objectives of UNIDO and its counterparts in Iraq.

8. Within this framework, the Terms of Reference (2012) defined the objectives of the Iraq Country Evaluation as to assess:

   a. The progress and achievements of Technical Cooperation projects towards the expected outcomes.
b. The *progress and achievements of UNIDO’s non-Technical Cooperation interventions* (“Global Forum”).

c. The overall UNIDO portfolio of interventions in Iraq for *coherence and synergies*.

d. The *integration of the UNIDO portfolio into the activities of the UN system and the UNAMI Fund*.

e. The extent to which UNIDO has made *contributions to achieving the MDGs*.

f. The *performance of the UNIDO Country Office for Iraq* in carrying out its functions and in relation to the delivery of the Results Based Management work plan.\(^1\)

9. The scope of work included the full range of UNIDO’s support to Iraq implemented between 2003 and 2012, including Technical Cooperation, Global Forum activities and projects implemented under the Montreal Protocol.\(^2\) The evaluation was to go beyond documentation of results by identifying success factors of projects and programmes. The evaluation will also identify how these successes and failures can be used to improve future UNIDO projects in the country.\(^3\)

10. The *Iraq Country Evaluation* was also to assess the performance of UNIDO with the cross-cutting issues, as these appeared in the portfolio. The results of Gender-based programme objectives are particularly important, taking into account UNIDO’s gender policy and UNIDO’s significant project-level investment on gender-related objectives in Iraq. Accordingly, the *Terms of Reference* identified as cross-cutting issues UNIDO’s contributions to: the empowerment of Iraqi women and gender equality; environmental sustainability, and; fostering of South-South cooperation.

**Methodology**

11. The *Iraq Country Evaluation* was designed as a systematic review of the UNIDO portfolio in using standard evaluation criteria; the *relevance, efficiency, effectiveness* (achievement of outputs and outcomes), *impact* and *sustainability* of UNIDO’s interventions in Iraq (UNIDO 2006). The methodology included a review of programme documentation and data, augmented by interviews with UNIDO programme personnel (Vienna and

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\(^1\) Emphasis added. The complete *Terms of Reference for the Independent Country Evaluation of UNIDO Activities in Iraq* are included as Annex A to the Evaluation Report.

\(^2\) The Terms of Reference cite 2011 as the limit of the evaluation scope.

\(^3\) The final evaluation scope included activities implemented between 2004 (start date of the first UNIDO project) and 2012 (delivery of final evaluations for seven projects).
Amman) and with some officials in counterpart ministries of the government of Iraq. The methodology did not include field work in Iraq.

12. The Terms of Reference situated the evaluation at the outcome level, focusing on the performance of the overall UNIDO portfolio in Iraq, and the contribution made by each individual project to overall achievements. This statement is made while noting the challenges of attributing UNIDO’s contribution to overall trends in Iraq. At the project level, the evaluation considered the synergies and complementarities between individual UNIDO projects and activities.

13. The evaluation was further directed to assess the design and implementation of the country portfolio with regards to: UNIDO’s strategic objectives in Iraq, as well as those of its Iraqi counterparts and international donors; geographic priority by allocation of resources and activities; subsector focus; collaboration with and role of counterpart institutions, and; programme management and coordination.

14. The methodology was based on six primary inputs:

a. **At the country level, the evaluation produced a Situation Analysis identifying the main trends in Iraq between 2003 and 2012**, focusing on areas of primary relevance to UNIDO’s mandate and the project portfolio. The analysis was based on UNIDO and United Nations documentation and a review of broader analysis and reporting. The purpose of the Situation Analysis was to support: findings on the relevance of the UNIDO portfolio; identify factors that may affect performance, and recommendations on the future positioning of UNIDO in Iraq.

b. **To develop an overview of UNIDO’s strategic position in Iraq, the evaluation reviewed UNIDO and United Nations documentation, as these related to UNIDO’s: broader policy and resource allocation to post-crisis situations; programme strategy and resource allocation decisions that defined the composition of UNIDO’s portfolio in Iraq.** The evaluation also reviewed UNIDO’s policy framework for work in post-crisis situations, and the institutional arrangements for working in high risk environments.

c. **The evaluation built a profile of UNIDO’s project portfolio in Iraq**, using data on the sources of funding, and resource allocation by programme sector, geography distribution and beneficiary group, among other criteria.

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4 The Iraq Situation Analysis 2003-2012 is included as Part Two to this report.

5 A complete list of the documentation consulted is included as annex.
d. At the output level, the evaluation developed a profile of UNIDO’s portfolio performance based on the findings of project evaluations conducted between 2004 and 2012. The evaluation did not conduct its own project-level evaluations, relying instead on existing information. The main findings from the assessment at the project-level are presented in the Project Summary Annex.\(^6\) As a methodology for summarising portfolio performance, individual projects were given a rating for each of the evaluation criteria.

e. Findings from the document review were augmented with stakeholder interviews. The evaluation team held two rounds of interviews with programme personnel in Vienna (May and September 2012), interviews with UNIDO personnel in Amman (September 2012) and interviews with select Iraqi stakeholders (from September through November 2012). In addition, the evaluation team met with officials from Iraq’s Permanent Mission to United Nations organisations in Vienna.

f. Initial findings of the evaluation were presented to UNIDO personnel and representatives of the Iraqi delegation in Vienna, at UNIDO Headquarters on 08 January 2013. To purpose of the presentation was to verify the factual accuracy of the evaluation findings, and to receive further information and commentary. The occasion was also used to conduct final interviews and complementary data.

1.3 Limits of the Iraq country evaluation

Resources and methodology

15. UNIDO did not have a country strategy or programme for Iraq, with defined outcome objectives or indicators at the portfolio level. The Iraq country evaluation methodology was originally placed at the Outcome level. However, UNIDO did not have an approved Iraq country strategy or programme at any point during the evaluation period, with objectives and indicators at the portfolio level. Further, there was no Basic Cooperation Agreement to define the mutual objectives and commitments between Government and UNIDO. The evaluation, therefore, lacked a unifying statement of UNIDO’s strategic objectives for Iraq and results matrix against which portfolio outcomes could be assessed. Instead, the evaluation focused largely on outcomes at the project and sector levels.

16. The evaluation team did not conduct field work in Iraq. United Nations security restrictions combined with budget limitations meant members of the

\(^{6}\) The Project Summary is included as section four in this report.
evaluation team were not able to: i) conduct interviews inside of Iraq, or; ii) visit project sites and verify or update the findings of earlier evaluations. Interviews with Iraqi officials were conducted by telephone or outside of the country. The evaluation would have benefited from greater opportunity to meet with counterparts and conduct site verification in person in Iraq.

17. The country evaluation did not have the resources to retain an Iraqi evaluation specialist, for the purpose of: i) field interviews with counterparts at the Governorate level, and; ii) verification of project outputs and outcomes for evaluations conducted earlier in the review period. As a result, the evaluation had limited capacity to confirm or augment earlier reporting. Some verification was done by phone with Iraqi officials. This would have been beneficial, as earlier evaluations were generally completed prior to project closure, when the projects where still active and Outcome level findings were limited.

Limits on the evaluation of Joint programmes with the Food and Agriculture Organisation

18. There were eight Joint Programmes within the UNIDO portfolio, in three thematic sectors (MISP, Private Sector and Agro Industry). UNIDO collaborated with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on implementation of seven of these programmes. Of these, the FAO was UNIDO’s sole Joint Programme counterpart on six. Discounting the Montreal Protocol projects, these are over 30 per cent of the Iraq portfolio.

19. Joint programmes with the FAO were not subject to a joint evaluation, with the exception of the food safety project (WHO, FAO and UNIDO). The Iraq country evaluation, therefore, did not have previous evaluation findings to contextualise UNIDO’s contribution. Programme design generally did not include a system for monitoring and evaluation and, therefore, was not in compliance with standard UNDG Guidelines for the management of Joint Programmes. The guidelines require a joint monitoring and evaluation structure and results matrix to measure overall progress towards programme objectives, taking into account the outputs of all participating agencies.

20. The Evaluation Unit of the FAO advised that it made a policy decision to not conduct evaluations of the FAO’s projects in Iraq. The FAO’s decision was made in light of difficult conditions in Iraq. UNIDO took the initiative to evaluate its own contribution to the Joint Programmes. However,

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7 There was insufficient budget to retain an Iraqi team member
8 http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=237
there was insufficient information to assess the collaboration between UNIDO and the FAO, or the impact of the FAO’s performance on either the UNIDO project components or the overall achievements of the Joint Programmes.

21. The absence of joint evaluations and FAO evaluation was a significant information gap. UNIDO’s evaluations were not in a position to assess the overall Joint Programme outcomes, only stand-alone UNIDO’s outputs. Results could not be an accurate reflection of whether Joint Programme objectives were met or the overall achievements of UNIDO’s contribution. Further, UNIDO and the FAO collaborated within an integrated programme concept. There was evidence in at least four Joint Programmes that weak performance by the FAO undermined overall programme implementation.
2. Iraq situation analysis

22. UNIDO’s Country Programme in Iraq (2003-2012) was implemented during a period of volatility and transition. Security conditions have improved since the height of the violence in Iraq, between 2005 and 2007. The Government of Iraq and its international development partners have since shifted their focus from humanitarian interventions to recovery and development. This transition continues in 2013, with characteristics influenced by both national and regional security and political dynamics, and particularly by the Syrian conflict.

23. With evolution of the country context, the industrial rehabilitation, private sector development and livelihood creation core to UNIDO mandate also emerged as key Government of Iraq priorities. These issues have also emerged as part of international best practice in fragile states and conflict-affected situations, reinforcing the relevance of some aspects of UNIDO’s core mandate.

24. Regardless, the Iraq programme environment through to 2012 remained characterised by political instability, generating a level of violence sufficient to obstruct “normal” development activity, including for UNIDO projects. There has also been limited progress diversifying Iraq’s economy, creating opportunity in the private sector or strengthening Iraq’s policy, regulatory regime or standards. UNIDO’s contribution to Government recovery and development priorities must be assessed in this context.

Iraq’s political system underwent an important transition during the evaluation period, with an overall trend to improved conditions. However, the characteristics of Iraqi politics are still being defined and the situation remains volatile enough to affect “normal” programme operations. The overall situation in the region is also having a destabilising effect, with spill over of the conflict in Syria being a particular concern.

25. There are three distinct phases to Iraq’s post-2003 transition; intervention and multiple and interacting forms of violent conflict (2003-2008); transition to Iraqi authority and improvement in the security situation (2008-2010), and; consolidation and gradual improvement, to Iraq’s economy and the ability of the Iraqi state to deliver core governance functions, goods and service (2010-to 2012). Most of projects were delivered in the first and second phases, and affected by insecurity and weakness in state institutions, policies and
programmes. The recent trend to improved country conditions did not always result in a corresponding improvement to UNIDO’s operational environment.

26. Iraq embodies post-conflict transition.\(^9\) Wracked by decades of wars, sanctions and mismanagement, the last 10 years have been defined by a difficult shift in the country’s direction. Prior to 2003, Iraq had a highly centralised government. Then, in the space of only two years, a new constitution, a first democratic election and the complete restructuring of governance and security structures was underway, while under occupation and with support from the international community. In the midst of this dramatic shift, Iraq experienced a period of resistance and insurgency against foreign occupation, civil war along sectarian fault lines and terrorism with regional linkages, which further complicated efforts to reshape the country. Longstanding challenges such as corruption, poverty, unemployment and lack of essential services stood out as unresolved problems against this rapidly changing environment.

27. From 2004 through 2010, billions of dollars of international assistance poured into the country while its oil sector began to recover and production slowly increased. In 2012, Iraq stood at the edge of rapid economic growth based on oil revenues, inspired by historical memory that still recalls the golden age of Iraq as regional economic and political powerhouse. However, significant problems stand between promise and reality.

28. As an important Arab Shia majority country, Iraq carefully balances significant Sunni and Kurdish minorities within its borders. The parliamentary system chosen in the days after the 2003 war to replace dictatorship, has heightened political tensions. Years of Sunni minority government gave way to Shia majority rule, resulting in uneasy alliances in a country that is not predisposed to compromise. Nearly everyone in power has had to make hard decisions whose consequences, both intended and unintended continue to spawn new disagreements.

29. Most political parties, required to form quickly after 2003, consolidated their base within ethic and religious groups and have yet to build broader political constituencies. Iraq’s political parties remain identity-based and no party can claim that it has broad national and multi-sectarian representation. Elections have so far demonstrated the strong will of a people to change the old and try new elected leaders, albeit with very limited success.

\(^9\) An extended Iraq situation analysis is included as Part Two to this report.
30. Newly found press freedoms have given birth to numerous outlets, some good, but others lacking developed ethical bounds, and so the war of words spins truth and lies into storms that can get just as fierce as the violence in the streets. Despite these challenges, democracy and political pluralism are flourishing in their own way. Political alliances sometimes vary based on the topic, something that is hard to find in the political parties of more mature systems. Trends have yet to consolidate into a clear direction for the future.

The security situation has improved since the peak of violence in 2007. The dynamics of violence have changed, and political tensions are now the main source of violence. The number of violent incidents is now less than many countries in Latin America and Africa. However, negative perceptions, the lack of predictability and continued mass casualty incidents place restrictions on international originations and private investors operating inside of Iraq, and their response to Iraq’s changing conditions.

31. The overall security situation in Iraq has improved since peak violence in 2006/7. 2011 was the least violent year since the occupation, with an estimated 2645 Iraqi’s killed compared to over 18,000 during peak violence in 2007. Iraq is currently not in a state of civil war, and many areas of the country are relatively calm. However, political tensions fuel security problems that continue to flare across the country, especially in mixed areas of Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Anbar. Data also shows a shift in the pattern of violence rather than stabilisation of the security situation. Spikes in violence closely correspond with important political events; major political actors retain the capacity for acts of violence and use it to reinforce their political positions.

32. There are two primary threats in the post-2010 environment. The first is from extremist violence, with internal and external support, that takes advantage of the political paralysis to pursue its own objectives. These organisations have been responsible for mass recent mass casualty events, such as car bombs, which appear designed to stir sectarian division and undermine the credibility of Government and the Security Forces.

33. The second threat is the failure of governance and political leadership. From the multiple and interacting forms of violence between 2005 and 2008, a main cause of violence is competition between Iraqi’s ethno-sectarian political leadership and the lack of an agreed constitutional/institutional framework to mediate that competition. The gradual withdrawal of US forces since 2009 has reduced the US role as an actor in Iraqi’s security dynamic, and shifted to

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10 There is less reliable data on violence in Iraq, with departure of US forces and reduction of the overall international presence.
national and regional influences. The political system has shown resilience and there are improvements in some areas, such as the oil and electricity sectors.

34. In this context, there has been:

a. *Spikes in the violence coinciding with the 2010 elections, and the subsequent weak performance of the unity government in late 2011.* The number of violent incidents increased 70 per cent during the first six months of 2012 over the same period in 2011.

b. *A return to mass casualty events during 2011 and 2012,* in coordinated country-wide campaigns. These attacks to not approach the levels of 2006/7, but are significant enough to generally destabilise the situation and undermine State credibility.

c. *A marked increase in targeted attacks against political figures, government officials, public servants or members of the Iraqi Security Forces.*[^1] The pattern changed somewhat during the first half of 2012, with growth in the number of high casualty bombings. The attacks appear targeted to produce a new round of violence along ethno-sectarian lines, between Sunni, Shia and Kurds.

d. *Growth in organised criminal activity (kidnapping, extortion and smuggling, among other activities),* which have an effect on overall citizen security. Related attacks have increased since major fighting declined.[^2]

35. Security problems are now as much a public relations conundrum as they are reality. Iraq has a murder rate that is more than one half of that of the United States, and well below much of Central America and most of Africa. It has a lower murder rate than countries like Malaysia, Turkey or Finland. However, western media outlets, having spent most of the decade putting Iraq on the front page for its security problems, continue to focus on mass casualty events. Iraq’s security apparatus, still labouring to build intelligence and technical capabilities, is not yet able to firmly take control, instead resorting to the installation of a maze of cement barriers and checkpoints throughout the country and doing as much to impede commerce and daily life as they do to protect a vulnerable public.

[^1]: An estimated 40 per cent of persons killed during 2011 were members of the security forces, and an additional 25 per cent were affiliated with Awakening Councils that allied themselves with the Government and MNF-I during the 2008 “surge” (Khazai 2012; IAU 2012).

36. Regional pressures also tugging at the fragile seams of Iraq as neighbouring countries either fear Iraq’s resurgence or quietly support various entities involved in violence. Other countries are pushing their way into Iraq’s resurgent economy. Neighbourhood alliances also weigh heavily on internal politics, most notably the support of Iran, which hosts the largest Shia population in the Middle East, and Syria, long-time ally to the governing coalition now melting down on Iraq’s borders further stoking internal tension.

Iraqi’s economy shows signs of recovery and in recent years. However, significant challenges remain to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure, improve access to technology and revitalise Iraq’s private sector. Dependence on the oil sector crowds out the private sector, and concentrates wealth in Iraq’s centralised state. Reforms to State Owned Enterprises show limited progress.

37. Iraqi’s economy shows signs of recovery in recent years. Rising on a tide of oil, Iraq has experienced GDP growth that is three times that of Qatar, the next fastest growing economy in the region. Iraq is again classified as a low middle income country, and recent IMF and World Bank reporting indicates that the country has sufficient natural and human resources to make development gains. By 2004, Iraq’s GDP was estimated at USD 800, down from USD 2,300 in 1990 and gradually deteriorating after the First Gulf War and as the result of sanctions. During this period, Iraq’s economic infrastructure was seriously degraded and the country suffered under a crippling debt burden. By 2011, GDP had recovered beyond 1990 levels, over USD 2,900 with GDP growth of 11 to 12 per cent estimated for 2012.

38. Iraq’s infrastructure mirage was one of the best-kept secrets of the Saddam Era. The aging systems, jury-rigged to cough up their last outputs, finally gave way under the pressures of war in 2003. By 2004, most of the electrical, water, sewage and transportation systems finally succumbed to age, mismanagement and destruction. Much of Iraq’s essential public service infrastructure remains inadequate despite significant investments over the past decade, as is the electrical power grid. As a result, the government faces public pressure for improvements to infrastructure, and the delivery of public goods and services.

39. Perhaps the most important lingering cost of international sanctions is the isolation that kept Iraq from joining the information technology era. Lack of hi-tech infrastructure, limited basic training opportunities, prohibitive cost and simple unfamiliarity with computers have Iraqis struggling to catch up with the rest of the world. Educational institutions are trying to get back to the standards steadily worn away since the 1980s, and Iraq’s vocational training system is adjusting to the demands of a rapidly changing labour market.
40. High economic growth rates are driven by the oil sector. However, growth is not shared in non-oil sectors where the large majority of Iraqi’s earn their livelihood, making economic diversification a core public policy issue. Oil generates about 90 per cent of state revenues in 2012, making Iraq one of the most oil dependent countries in the world. In turn, the State generates approximately 87 per cent of the total domestic investment into the economy and over 30 per cent of all jobs.

41. The overall effect is to crowd out non-petroleum sectors, and limit the role of the private sector in Iraqi’s development. The private sector had a few false starts in the 1990’s under Saddam when small businesses were coerced into supporting massive inefficient State Owned Enterprises. Now the sector is struggling to survive and grow. There are isolated cases of strong performance – particularly in the petrochemical and communications fields. The biggest initial public offering of stock that the Middle East has seen in five years was a huge success in early 2013, as USD 1.4 billion in shares in an Iraqi mobile phone operator sold out in a day, mostly to overseas investors. Oil production has reached record highs with renewed exploration by international companies putting Iraq in second place as a world oil producer.

42. Economic gains have not translated into poverty reduction, since they are occurring in disciplines that produce some of the lowest numbers of jobs. Efforts to reform state owned enterprises limited progress, and international investors are staying away to avoid risk. All the while, small- and medium-sized enterprises have been swamped by unregulated imports of cheap foreign goods. Compounding the challenges is a financial environment that keeps most Iraqis in the cash economy, unable to secure financing for homes or businesses. Further inhibiting progress is pervasive corruption that is present at just about every level of the economy and political system.

43. Against this challenging backdrop, massive international trust funds were pulled together in 2003 to help Iraq transition into a functioning, democratic middle-income country. The United Nations and the World Bank administered two very large funds that had aggressive timelines and ambitious goals. Bilateral donations also flooded in, USD 60 billion from the U.S. and another USD 5 billion from Japan. Then, despite known capacity limitations and pervasive security problems, thousands of projects were carried out across the country. In this situation, UNIDO found itself moving in to deliver over USD 70 million worth of assistance – putting Iraq at the top of UNIDO’s list in overall portfolio size despite the lack of an accredited office or permanent presence in country.
44. In 2013, however, UNIDO finds itself in a very different position. The period of generous funding through the Iraqi Trust Fund for recovery-oriented projects ended in 2011. There has been an overall decline in the flow of international assistance to Iraq, as former donors shift to focus on trade and investment. The most promising opportunities to find funds to continue much needed programs in Iraq come partially from the Iraqis themselves. However, the taking advantage of the shift requires a field presence and capacity to build relationships at the right level with the Government of Iraq.

45. The Iraq of today is characterized by a managing class that if it has learned anything, has figured out how it wants to deal with donors. They have quickly moved to build Paris Declaration modelled processes and push hard for on-budget support and national management of assistance programs in the coming years. Many government leaders will say Iraq has money. However, Iraq doesn’t need money; what it needs is technical expertise, delivered in their territory and in their language. They want help getting their people trained to do the job themselves, and they want to measure results. International organizations looking to play a role will have to adjust their operational procedures, which continue to be mired in heavy security requirements that take almost no risk, and send most of their money to high paid international consultants. These are key messages that have been delivered to all UN organizations, including UNIDO.
3. Strategic framework for UNIDO’s activities in Iraq

3.1 UNIDO and post-crisis situations

UNIDO’s presence in Iraq was enabled by the combination of: i) movement of fragile states and conflict-affected situations to the centre of the international development and security agenda; ii) an accompanying shift in UNIDO’s strategic framework and expansion of activity in post-conflict situations; iii) the allocation of significant international assistance to Iraq after 2003 invasion, including through the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF), and; iv) the emergence of private sector development and reform to State Owned Enterprises as Government priorities. These are part of global trends that challenge UNIDO to remain relevant by adapting its institutional structures, procedures and programme concepts.

46. “Fragility” is generally defined as the inability “of States to develop mutually constructive relationships with society and often have weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions (OECD 2012: 11).” Fragile states and conflict-affected situations matter to the international security and development agenda; they are home to an increasing concentration of violent conflict and poverty, often generating insecurity at the regional and even global level. The approach places emphasis on strengthening both the capacity and legitimacy of the State, with “legitimacy” derived from the social contract between state and society. It also recognises the importance of building strong institutions in society, and of restoring economic systems and livelihoods.

47. UNIDO’s involvement in post-crisis situations has increased significantly since 2003. The growth UNIDO’s global post-conflict portfolio has been driven by two external factors. First, fragile states and conflict-affected situations have become a central focus of the international development and security agenda, beginning in the immediate post-cold war years but escalating after 2001. Second, the growing focus on conflict and fragility has resulted in shifts to the allocation patterns of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Among the trends:

a. The approach to assistance has shifted, to strengthening the legitimacy of governance and State institutions, and their capacity to provide basic public goods and services; citizen security, rule of law, health and
education and economic recovery, and specifically including measures to restore economic systems and infrastructure, and to restore livelihoods. Some measures related to the delivery of public goods and services and economic recovery central to UNIDO’s mandate are also seen as crucial to breaking the cycle of violence (World Bank 2011: 1-6; OECD 2012: 25-29).

b. The total allocation of ODA to fragile states tripled over the past decade, as a percentage of total aid flows. From approximately 10-12 per cent of ODA in 2001, the 47 countries classified as “fragile” received 38 per cent of total ODA in 2010, or approximately USD 50 billion (OECD DAC 2012: 43). The rate of growth in allocation of ODA to fragile states has occurred significantly faster than the rate to non-fragile states. The shift creates both an opportunity to explore UNIDO’s contributions in fragile state and conflict situations.

c. Over 50 per cent of ODA allocations during the past decade went to seven countries of the total of 47, identified by Donors as central to their national security interests. Iraq was one of the primary recipients after 2003, as the international community supported post-occupation stabilisation and recovery. Within this context, almost USD 1.5 billion was channelled through the UNDG ITF, in part with the strategic purpose of enabling United Nations agencies to significantly expand their presence.

48. UNIDO has revised its strategic positioning over the past decade, in response to growing international engagement. These coincided with evolution of activities in Iraq. Discussions began in 2003; the Secretariat developed an issues paper on UNIDO’s potential role and contribution in post-crisis situations that was discussed at the General Conference.13 The conference adopted the main elements of paper and encouraged UNIDO to strengthen its contribution in post-crisis situations, although specific actions were not identified. Note was made of possible of funding opportunities given shifting aid allocation patterns.14

49. The 2003 General Conference resolution provided an institutional basis for expansion of UNIDO’s role in post-crisis situations. UNIDO has since embedded related work into its strategic, policy and planning frameworks. Overtime, actions expand UNIDO’s institutional framework, from a focus on industrial rehabilitation into human security and post-crisis livelihoods activity. Among the changes:

a. In 2005, the General Conference adopted UNIDO’s strategic long-term vision statement, which included assistance to rehabilitation and reconstruction of industrial infrastructure in countries emerging from crisis situations.

b. Human security and post-crisis rehabilitation were included as a specific thematic programme component into the Medium-term Programme Framework (MTPF) 2008 to 2013.  

c. In December 2009, the General Conference approved the UNIDO programme and budgets for human security and post-crisis rehabilitation components for the biennium 2010 to 2011.

d. Within the framework of Poverty Reduction through Productive Activity, UNIDO includes productive activity and livelihoods as part of its repertoire of services for post-conflict states, in addition to industrial rehabilitation.

e. UNIDO commissioned a thematic evaluation of its post-crisis programmes in 2010. The evaluation concluded that “an official UNIDO Strategy for post-crisis projects does not yet exist”, and made recommendations to strengthen both UNIDO’s strategic framework and its systems and procedures for working in such contexts (UNIDO 2010; pp. ix- xii).

50. There is no comprehensive or current programme document that outlines UNIDO’s approach in post-conflict situations. The evaluation team was not aware of an action plan to address the findings and recommendations of the 2010 thematic report. Regardless, UNIDO’s strategic shift has been accompanied by some development of programme concepts and tools; among them UNIDO’s policy on human security (2009) and opening in new programme areas (productive activities and livelihood development). Policy and conceptual development in the larger United Nations’ system has also contributed to the framework. Of particular note, the UN Policy for Post-conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration is relevant to UNIDO’s livelihoods programming, although UNIDO did not participate drafting the guidance.

15 UNIDO’s contribution to post-conflict recovery was conceptualized as part of its poverty reduction programme stream (UNIDO 2008; para 69). The MTPF 2008-2013 “offers five interrelated programme components under its priority theme of Poverty Reduction through productive activities. These comprise industrial strategy and business environment; investment and technology promotion; SME cluster and agro-value chain development; rural, women and youth entrepreneurship development, and human security and post-crisis rehabilitation” (emphasis added).

16 Under the human security and post-crisis rehabilitation heading, UNIDO’s web site states “Within the framework of a special UNIDO initiative targeting countries and regions emerging from a crisis situation, special needs for the empowerment of these communities are addressed to promote their participation in post-crisis productive rehabilitation and reconstruction through building sustainable livelihoods.” http://www.unido.org/what-we-do/poverty-reduction-through-productive-activities/human-security-and-post-crisis-rehabilitation.html

51. Emerging from the combination of external and internal trends, Iraq was UNIDO’s first large scale programme in a post-conflict situation. Iraq was a major recipient of international assistance between 2003 and 2010, providing UNIDO with an opportunity to be present and contribute. It was part of a larger trend of scaling up UNIDO activities in these contexts, as outlined in the 2010 report.18

52. During the evaluation period Iraq was the seventh largest recipients of ODA, and among the world’s most aid dependent countries. In 2005, Iraq accounted for slightly more the 40 per cent of total ODA flows to fragile states, making it the single largest recipient during that year (OECD DAC 2012: 54). While almost 50 per cent was channelled through State institutions, approximately 25 per cent of ODA went through multilateral agencies, including the USD 2 billion through the two Iraq Trust Funds.

53. In turn, large ODA flows to Iraq, therefore, enabled UNIDO to programme in Iraq. Creation of the UNDG ITF provided UN agencies with access to a significant pool of funding between 2004 (inception of the UNDG ITF) and 2010 (last UNDG ITF funding allocations).19 UNIDO programmes in Iraq also integrated some aspects of the emerging policy discussion into their design, including as these related to recovery activities, human security, the creation of livelihoods and strengthening state institutions and capacity.

3.2 UNIDO’s framework for Iraq activities

UNIDO did not have a Basic Cooperation Agreement (BCA) with the Government of Iraq. A BCA would have provided the basis for a country strategy and programme, on which UNIDO’s project portfolio would be aligned. It would also have provided UNIDO with official status in Iraq and the basis for establishing a country programme structure within UNIDO’s own institutional arrangement. These would normally include official representation, a country office with core resources, and an approved country strategy and plan.

In the absence of a Basic Cooperation Agreement, UNIDO relied exclusively on external planning frameworks to align its activities in Iraq with Government priorities. UNIDO worked primarily through the United Nations Country Team.

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18 The 2010 report on UNIDO’s work in post-crisis situations cited 40 post-crisis programmes and projects in 17 countries by 2008. UNIDO did not have a more current overview of its post-crisis activities.

19 Total commitments to the IRFFI were USD 1.85 billion, from 25 donors. The facility was comprised of two funds, the World Bank ITF and the UNDG ITF. Of this amount, USD 1.4 billion was channelled through the UNDG ITF, http://www.irffi.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/IRFFI/0,,menuPK:64168276-pagePK:64168245-piPK:64168275-theSitePK:491458,00.html
processes and the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund. The frameworks allowed UNIDO to work within successive Iraqi Development Strategies and the priorities of bilateral donors. UNIDO also maintained close collaboration with relevant Iraqi institutions, at different levels of Government and society.

Working with external planning frameworks and with Iraqi counterparts was an effective means of aligning individual projects with the Iraqi context. However, it did not build the internal UNIDO structures needed for a country-level management and programme structures, or a coherent country programme. Rather, the six different programme streams developed independently, in response to demand and with limited synergies between them. The absence of a UNIDO country strategy was an important factor as UNIDO adapted to changing conditions after 2010, including the reduction in international assistance shifting Iraqi priorities.

UNIDO’s status in Iraq between 2003 and 2012

54. A Basic Cooperation Agreement was still under negotiation between UNIDO and the Government of Iraq, as of March 2013. Discussions have been ongoing since 2009, when UNIDO first presented draft BCA language to the Government. Both UNIDO and Iraqi officials advised they expect to sign the agreement during the first half of 2013.20

55. The purpose of Basic Cooperation Agreement is to formalise the relationship between UNIDO and a counterpart Government, and to identify mutually agreed areas for collaboration. A BCA can provide a strategic framework for UNIDO’s country programme. It also affords UNIDO certain rights, privileges and immunities, in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. These include the right to have accredited representation before the host Government.21

56. An agreement and accreditation are usually required to formalise membership in the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), and the rights,

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20 The evaluation reviewed a draft of the BCA under discussion for Iraq, the standard BCA template and the signed agreements for other countries in the Middle East, as provided by UNIDO.

21 Provisions of a standard BCA include: A general agreement of cooperation between the counterpart Government and the scope of that cooperation; the forms of assistance to be provided; the right to appoint an accredited representative to counterpart Government, as the principal channel of communication between that Government and UNIDO; delineation of responsibilities for project implementation, including the respective roles and responsibilities of UNIDO and the counterpart Government and for implementation arrangements; arrangements for information sharing related to project and programmes; Contribution by the Government in respect of other Items payable in local currency; Privileges and immunities, which are the provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and; the facilities for implementation of UNIDO assistance, include prompt clearance of visas for UNIDO personnel, issuance of visas and licenses without costs and exemption from taxes and customs duties, among other issues.
privileges and obligations that accompany UNCT membership. Within UNIDO’s institutional procedures the existence of an agreement triggers, among other things: i) the right to have an accredited representative to the country; ii) a Country Office with core institutional resources from UNIDO, and; iii) a Country Programme that coordinates different programme stream.

57. These procedures delegate some programme coordination and management responsibility to the Country Office and the Representative. In its programming, UNIDO activities are also enabled by the privileges, immunities and exemptions embedded in the agreement, such as prompt visa clearance and exemption from certain taxes and customs fees.

58. UNIDO did not have a Basic Cooperation Agreement in place with the Government of Iraq during the evaluation period, current negotiations notwithstanding. Consequently, UNIDO did not:


b. Have an accredited Representative to the Government of Iraq, for much of the evaluation period. UNIDO did have a Special Representative based in Amman between 2008 and 2010, at the D-2 level and assigned by the former Director General of UNIDO. The appointment of the Special Representative was agreed by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs through a Note Verbale of the Iraqi Permanent Mission in Vienna dated 25 June 2008. However, this arrangement was not permanent and informants noted the difficulties that lack of representation presented, including on practical issues such as tax exemptions.

c. Have a Country Office supported with core resources, the exception being the Special Representative, or an Iraq Country Strategy or Iraq Country Programme. There was a UNIDO project office for Iraq, temporarily located in Amman, operating with funding from each of the programme streams and providing support and administration. The office had limited programme management, development or coordination authority and no stable core funding allocation.

d. Decentralized authority for programming. Authority was centralized at UNIDO Headquarters in Vienna, but defused within the different programme streams and lacking a unifying programme framework or management structure. Limited authority was delegated to the field, the important representation functions of the Special Representative notwithstanding. There was limited consultation at the regional programme level.

59. UNIDO, therefore, did not have in place the normal institutional arrangements necessary to develop and manage a country programme strategy. Iraq was among UNIDO’s largest programmes during the evaluation period, and one of the agency’s first large scale interventions after its 2003 strategic shift to work in conflict-affected situations. It was a dynamic and high risk programme environment requiring close supervision and oversight. Regardless, UNIDO made an institutional choice to not put in place its standard programme framework.

60. In 2008, UNIDO developed a Framework Strategy for Iraq, 2009-2012; based on livelihood recovery and support for the revitalization of the agro-industrial sector. The strategy focused around UNIDO’s assessment that the country context was shifting, from a humanitarian and recovery setting into post-conflict situation where Government’s orientation is increasingly developmental.

61. The Framework Strategy for Iraq correctly described some aspects of the changes in Iraq, and was based on extensive consultations with Government counterparts. However, the 2008 framework was a “discussion paper”. It did not have official institutional status within UNIDO, or binding effect on programme management, planning or development. The document was limited in scope, incorporated only three of the six programme streams. The private sector, an emerging Government priority, was not included. Also, the framework was not tied to larger BCA negotiations.

62. Prior to 2009/2010, UNIDO shared this situation with many other international organisations. There was no UNDAF until 2010, with agencies working under a series of interim strategies before that date. The volatile situation in Iraq meant it was not possible to prepare a full-fledged United Nations or UNIDO Country Strategy Framework, consistent with UNIDO corporate practice. The UNIDO AGRO Branch took the initiative in 2008 to prepare a Strategy Framework, although the framework focused mainly on the agro-industrial sector. However, the framework was limited in scope and UNIDO did not follow up with a plan.

63. UNIDO informants advised that the primary objective of the strategic framework was to improve resource mobilisation. In this regard, the strategy had USD 133 million in total proposed projects, of which one of 11 proposed projects was eventually funded. Although a timely planning effort, therefore, it did not meet the minimum standards of a country strategy or plan, and had limited success guiding resource mobilisation.

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23 Among the Arab states, UNIDO has Country Offices in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, [http://www.unido.org/where-we-work/offices.html](http://www.unido.org/where-we-work/offices.html)
64. The evaluation did not find a clear institutional decision point, where UNIDO concluded it would not develop an Iraq country programme. Informants could not identify such a document or a specific occasion when the possibility of an Iraq country programme was formally discussed by Senior Management, UNIDO’s General Conference or other relevant forum. Rather, multiple informants advised there was an implicit decision by UNIDO senior management not to develop a country programme for Iraq, or to put such a possibility forward for discussion. It was described as a decision taken through an explicit choice not to act. A contributing factor was that discussion within UNIDO on the most effective programme structure for post-crisis situations did not evolve sufficiently to influence activities in Iraq.

UNIDO’s strategic framework in Iraq was based on, and aligned with, the priorities of external programme and funding mechanisms. These were the Government of Iraq’s development strategies, UN assistance strategies and the UNDAF, and the UNDG ITF priorities and procedures.

65. UNIDO’s positioning in Iraq was defined by the combination of its institutional competence, and external strategic frameworks and funding opportunities. UNIDO’s Iraq-level planning occurred primarily through the United Nations Country Team processes; the United Nations’ Iraq Assistance Strategy (2005-2007; 2008-2010) and later the United Nations’ Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF; 2011-2014) for Iraq. In turn, UN planning was strongly influenced by successive Iraqi national development plans and donor funding priorities.

66. In each case, UNIDO’s potential contribution was outlined the results matrix of the respective UN plans:

a. For the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2005-2007, UNIDO was identified in nine of the ten programme clusters, against 32 possible programme outputs.

b. The United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy 2008–2010 was organised into eight sector groups. UNIDO was identified as a potential contributing agency in three of the groups (Health, Economic Reform and Agriculture), against ten possible plan outputs.

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24 The evaluation made requests for documentation outlining on discussion and decision-making related to high-level discussions on an Iraq country programme. No such documents were identified or received. As well, the evaluation did not have an opportunity to interview senior officials that might have been involved in related decisions.

25 Numerous potential explanations were provided by informants. These were either based on personal experiences or speculation. In either case, they could not be substantiated by the evaluation.
c. For the UNDAF 2011-2014, UNIDO is identified as a contributing agency to three of the five priority areas (Inclusive Economic Growth, Environment and Quality Essential Services) with unfunded programme commitments of USD 59 million. Together with UNDP, UNIDO served as the Lead Agency for the Inclusive Economic Growth priority area.

67. In turn, UNCT planning was shaped by:

a. *Iraqi development priorities*, as outlined in three successive national development planning documents produced during the evaluation period.

b. Priorities agreed between the Government of Iraq and the donor community, including multilateral organisations, in the *International Compact for Iraq* (ICI 2007).

c. *The priorities of international donors*, as defined through the UNDG ITF. UNIDO’s acceptance of resources channelled through the UNDG ITF bound the agency to follow the Fund’s governance, decision-making, programme development and reporting processes, and its criteria for project approval.26

d. *Iraqi review and approval*. All projects required Iraq approval, through the Government’s review process, although the government had limited capacity for robust review prior to 2008-2009.27

Table 1: UNIDO Strategic Framework for Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic instrument</th>
<th>Strategic priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fragile and States and conflict-affected situations move to the centre of the international development agenda, with a significant shift in global funding allocations.</td>
<td>UNIDO adopts post-conflict programming at the corporate level, in its strategic positioning, and the agencies policy, planning and programmes. Iraq is the first large scale programme as UNIDO makes the shift.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic instrument</th>
<th>Strategic priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• National Development Strategy, 2007-2010 (2007)</td>
<td>• Expanding delivery and access of public goods and services, including vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Iraq National Development Plan for the Years 2010-2014 (2009)</td>
<td>• Economic diversification and private sector development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revitalisation of Iraq’s agriculture sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Employment creation and livelihood development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reforms to Iraq’s State Owned Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reform to Iraq’s legislative, regulatory and policy framework in the area of economic development, and strengthening institutional capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promotion of the rights and opportunity for women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on these issues increases over time, as Government’s focus shifts to a “development” orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (2004, IRFFI, comprised of the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund and the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund)</td>
<td>The IRFFI was created in 2003 by Iraqi authorities, donors, World Bank and the United Nations, as a mechanism to enable donors to channel their resources and coordinate their support for reconstruction and development activities in Iraq. In accepting UNDG ITF funding, UNIDO was bound by the Fund’s priorities and operational procedures, and the organisational arrangements established to coordinate the participation of United Nations agencies (project development and approval processes). These included the UN Joint Programme modality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The International Compact for Iraq (ICI 2007)</td>
<td>Iraqi lead framework establishing development priorities and for the coordination and targeting of assistance and investment. The ICI established benchmarks and mutual commitments for Iraq and the international community regarding normalizing the security environment, reconciling the political environment, and revitalizing the economy. Some influence on Iraqi development planning, and allocation of international assistance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| 28 The programme coordination arrangements within the UNCT were changed on three occasions, with the final arrangement focusing on Sector Working Groups. The groups included Governance and Human Rights, Inclusive Economic Growth; Environment; Water and Sanitation; Education; Health and Nutrition; Housing, and; Food Security. Of these, UNIDO’s primary contribution related to inclusive economic growth. Reporting is posted at <a href="http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/ITF00">http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/ITF00</a> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic instrument</th>
<th>Strategic priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations planning frameworks for Iraq:</td>
<td>UNCT joint planning instruments for Iraq, with UNDG ITF as the principle funding instrument for the period 2004 to 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNIDO Framework Strategy for Iraq</strong>, discussion paper (2008)</td>
<td>UNIDOs programming objectives for Iraq in the areas of: i) strengthening the foundations of economic growth; ii) revitalization of the private sector, and; iii) improving the quality of life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq review processes, for assessing international cooperation against Iraqi development priorities:</td>
<td>Review and approval of all proposals against Iraqi recovery and development priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <em>Iraq Strategic Review Board</em> (IRFFI period)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <em>International Partnership Committee</em> (replaced the ISRB)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68. There are two trends in the planning frameworks. First, UNIDO strengthened its alignment with Government and UN planning frameworks. These frameworks themselves became more effective and comprehensive with time. UNIDOs commitments in the first UN *Iraq Assistance Strategy* exceeded both its country capacity, and its areas of institutional competence. The majority of the possible commitment also remained unfunded. Overtime, commitments in the external frameworks appear to be more realistically aligned with UNIDO’s capacity and competence.

69. Second, was the shift in country context, away from humanitarian assistance, to recovery and then to development. The changes were not linear or sequential, but often overlapping or occurring in parallel. With the shift, “inclusive economic growth” (livelihoods, private sector development, and reform to State Owned Enterprises, among other themes) emerged as a core priority for Government and its international development partners. These were areas where UNIDO had more clearly defined institutional competence, and where reflected in the *Strategic Framework* (2008). UNIDO’s own movement into post-conflict and recovery situations opening the possibility of contributing, regardless of the weakness of its institutional arrangements in Iraq.
3.3 Composition and funding of UNIDO’s Iraq portfolio

Between 2004 and 2012, UNIDO implemented a portfolio of 29 projects in six thematic areas, with a total value of almost USD 70 million. Three projects are on-going after 2012, up to 2016. The portfolio was implemented over a broad geographic area, and focused in state institutions and Governorates with high levels of poverty and low access to public services. UNIDO was dependent on two trust funds for 93 per cent of its resource mobilisation. The size of the portfolio declined after 2010 as UNDG ITF allocations came to an end. There was only one project with new funding at the end of the evaluation period.

70. UNIDO’s project portfolio in Iraq between 2004 and 2012 has been comprised of 29 projects in six thematic areas. The total value of the portfolio was almost USD 70 million, making Iraq one of the largest UNIDO country portfolios during the evaluation period. The programme streams and resources allocated are presented in Table 2. The detailed list of projects and their classification by categories is provided in Annex B.

Table 2: UNIDO Iraq country portfolio 2004-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project sector/theme</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Total project value (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Industry</td>
<td>Five projects, implemented between 2005 and 2012</td>
<td>14,357,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Capacity Building (TCB)</td>
<td>Two projects implemented since 2009 and on-going to 2016</td>
<td>13,960,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Development (PSD)</td>
<td>Five projects implemented between 2009 and on-going to 2013</td>
<td>14,104,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advice</td>
<td>Four projects implemented since 2008 and on-going to 2013</td>
<td>4,494,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Protocol Projects</td>
<td>Seven projects implemented since 2008 and on-going to 2013</td>
<td>7,411,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29 projects in the portfolio</td>
<td>69,548,073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
71. Graph 1 identifies important milestones during the evaluation period. The first project was approved with UNDG ITF resources in late 2004 (MISP), and the latest project in the portfolio was approved in 2011 (TCB). The portfolio was implemented during the escalation and peak of violence, and the period of relative improvement that followed after 2008. While the portfolio was originally recovery oriented, it diversifies after 2007/8 to include projects related to economic diversification and structural change of the economy. The most active years of the portfolio occurred in 2008 to 2010. This period coincides with peak allocations from the UNDG ITF. Also, UNIDO had a Special Representative in Iraq (2008 to 2010) who was actively engaged in representation and resource mobilisation.

Graph 1: Highlights from the Iraq portfolio

72. The Iraq portfolio was almost exclusively funded from two Trust Funds and from bilateral assistance. UNIDO received approximately USD 60 million in approved budgets from the UNDG ITF, equivalent to 86% of the entire Iraq budget 2004 to 2012. Much of these funds were earmarked from three donors; Italy, Germany and South Korea. An additional seven to eight million was mobilised for Montreal Protocol projects through the Montreal Protocol Trust Fund (MPTF). Combined, the UNDG ITF and the MPTF account for
USD 67 million, or 93% of the entire program budget 2004 and 2012. Direct bilateral funding accounted for seven per cent of project funding.

73. UNIDO, therefore, was 93 per cent dependent on two existing funding instruments. UNIDO had limited success diversifying its resource mobilisation. In the absence of a strategic framework, there was also no agency-wide strategy for mobilisation. The UNDG ITF was closed for allocations in 2010 and bilateral assistance to Iraq has been drawing down since 2009, as donors shift from assistance to normalising commercial relations and investment in Iraq’s growing economy. UNIDO has not received direct Government of Iraq funding, but projects benefited from significant in-kind and parallel funding as the Government contribution to projects. The focus is now on possible funding arrangements with the Government. Accordingly, programme resources fell off dramatically after 2010/11.

**Composition of the portfolio**

Graph 2: Expenditure by thematic area in USD

![Graph 2: Expenditure by thematic area in USD](image)
74. As selected statistics on the composition of the portfolio:

a. Graph 2 shows the evolution of the composition of the portfolio over time. The graph does not include projects from the Montreal Protocol category because, for this category, the exact project start and end dates were not available. Moreover, the graph shows approximate values as, for each of the projects, expenditures were assumed to be equally distributed over the duration of the project.

b. Of the six programme streams, the largest was the Micro-Industry Support Programme. This stream was clearly oriented towards post-crisis recovery and poverty reduction.

c. Agro-industry comes out second largest. This strand includes rehabilitation of dairy, date and other agro-industries.

d. Private Sector Development comes out as the third stream. It includes enterprise development, investment promotion, rehabilitation of SMEs and, more recently, vocational training development in a public-private-partnership with multinational companies.

e. The single project with the highest budget was the Trade Capacity Building project funded by Sweden starting in 2011 at USD 10 million. This project is a new generation of UNIDO projects reflecting a shift in approach, including longer execution timelines (4.5 years) and increased engagement with Iraqi counterparts.

f. The year with most project starts was 2009, with the value of starts in that year reaching USD 20.3 million, corresponding to the peak funding year of the UNDG ITF. There were no project starts in 2005 and in 2012. Again, these years coincide with UNDG ITF allocation patterns.

75. As of the end of 2012, there were no new approved projects in the pipeline. The Trade Capacity Building project, approved in late 2011, was the only approved activity scheduled to beyond 2013.
76. The portfolio was volatile, with activity of the programme streams peaking at different times. Only the MISP stream and some agro-industrial projects had repeat project iterations. Dependence has created a challenge for UNIDO’s programming in Iraq beyond the evaluation period. As shown in Graph 3, the Iraq portfolio was effectively expended by 2012, with some activities on-going into 2013/14. Programme lines generally did not extend or adapt into Iraq’s “post-recovery” phase. Other initiatives were under discussion with Government as of the end of 2012. However, there were no other projects in the pipeline, advanced in their development with Government and with a confirmed funding source. From the 2009 peak of six programme active streams, UNIDO’s post-2012 portfolio has been reduced to just one project. Contraction of the portfolio is further demonstrated by Graph 4.\(^29\)

\(^{29}\) Graph 4 does not include TCB resources projected to 2018.
77. The UNIDO portfolio was implemented in ten of Iraq’s eighteen Governorates, showing broad geographic coverage. This included Governorates with high levels of poverty and low public service coverage (for example, Thi Qar and Al-Anbar). Province with most projects by value were: Erbil – USD 7.5 million; Baghdad – USD 7.4 million; Qadissiyah – USD 6.9 million, and; Thi Qar – USD 6.5 million. From past evaluation findings, UNIDO took the coverage at the request of Government, and to fill service gaps in deprived areas where public service delivery did not reach.
78. The focus on Governorates with high levels of poverty and low access to public services is underscored by the per-capita breakdown of resource allocations. The national per capita average was USD 2.25 per person. At the Governorate level, the highest allocations were: Qadissiyah – USD 7.00; Erbil - USD 4.87; Thi Qar – USD 4.02, and; Anbar – USD 3.96.
4. Summary of portfolio performance

4.1 Overview of available evaluation data

79. The Iraq Country Evaluation built a performance profile of the UNIDO Iraq portfolio, using project-level evaluations conducted between 2004 and 2013. As noted, the Country Evaluation did not conduct any additional evaluation work at the project level, although it did verify some findings through interviews and supplemental documentation.

80. The existing evaluation reporting covered four of the six programme streams:

a. Of the 29 projects, the seven Montreal Protocol projects have not been evaluated. These account for approximately 10 per cent of the portfolio’s value and 24 per cent of the projects by number.\(^\text{30}\) The evaluation relied on interviews and the limited monitoring data available.

b. No evaluation will be conducted for the Joint Programme, Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq (PSDP-I). The programme was implemented between 2009 and 2013, with a total budget of USD 32.9 million.\(^\text{31}\)

c. The final evaluation report of the TCB project entitled Rehabilitation of the Specialized Institute for Engineering Services (SIEI) was pending.

81. Fifteen evaluations were completed for the remaining 19 projects in the Iraq portfolio. These comprised the core of data available to the Country Evaluation. The coverage was complete for the MISP series of projects, and spread across four categories; MISP, Agro-Industry, Private Sector Development and Policy Advice. There was a significant gap in the coverage for Joint Programmes, in the absence of monitoring and evaluation information from the FAO or any joint evaluations of the programmes.

\(^{30}\) Montreal Protocol activities have a separate reporting line direct to the funder. They are not subject to UNIDO’s standard monitoring and evaluation procedures. No UNIDO evaluation of the Montreal Protocol Iraq portfolio is planned.

\(^{31}\) Eight UN agencies participated in this programme, which included the UNIDO projects 16 and 27 listed in Annex 1 under the categories of Policy Advice and Agro-Industry, respectively. The programme was significant, representing a forward-looking intervention for economic diversification. UNDP conducted a mid-term evaluation of its own contribution to this programme in 2012 (UNDP 2013) but this evaluation was not available to the country evaluation team. However, UNDP advised that no evaluation of the overall PSD-I Joint Programme is planned and UNIDO will not evaluate its contribution separately. In the absence of either a UNIDO or comprehensive Joint Programme evaluation, there is no means to assess the two UNIDO projects mentioned above.
4.2 Rating scheme for the evaluation criteria

82. Table 3 presents the rating scheme used by the country evaluation team, to provide a consistent rating framework across all projects in the portfolio.

Table 3: Project rating scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Letter</th>
<th>Rating Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (4)</td>
<td>Highly satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (3)</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (2)</td>
<td>Not fully satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D (1)</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U (no rating assigned)</td>
<td>Insufficient information to rate performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 Overview of UNIDO Iraq portfolio performance

83. Table 4 presents the project ratings prepared by the country evaluation team on the basis of the project evaluation reports (see part 2 of this evaluation report for details).

Table 4: Summary of project ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Cross-cutting issues</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISP Ia</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP II</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP III</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP Ib</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP IV</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP V</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agro-Industrial Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dairy Sector Rehabilitation (Thi Qar)</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>C+</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Safety</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Sector Rehabilitation</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Project management noted the Date Rehabilitation project was designed and led by the FAO.
84. The *Iraq Country Evaluation* noted that that each project was implemented under different circumstances, with earlier projects affected by more volatile field conditions. Also, the quality and scope of the individual project evaluations varied. Direct comparisons, therefore, may be misleading. That acknowledgement notwithstanding:

a. *The average ranking for the entire portfolio was a “B-” (59 out of the possible 102 points), noting significant variation in the rankings between the six programme streams.*

b. *The MISP projects emerge as a strong performer in the portfolio.* The five projects had an average score of “B” (average 23 points out of a potential maximum score of 32). MISP projects had a recovery orientation.

c. *Private Sector Development also emerged as a good performing area,* with an average rating of “B” as well. Projects had both a recovery and development orientation, noting the more recent projects were development focused.

d. *Agro-industrial was the weakest performer in the portfolio,* with an average rating of C (average 18 points out of a potential maximum score of 32). The UNIDO component of the *Food Safety and Mosul Dairy Rehabilitation* project performed relatively better than the two previous Agro-industrial projects, and brought up the rating.

e. *MISP II, TARGET and EDIP were evaluated as the strongest performing individual projects in UNIDO’s Iraq portfolio,* while *Rehabilitation of the Dairy Sector (Thi Qar)* was the weakest single performer.

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33 The average score was generated by: i) calculating the total numerical value of projects in each programme stream, and; ii) then dividing by the number of projects in that programme stream.
4.4 Relevance of UNIDO’s portfolio in Iraq

Relevance is “the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.” UNIDO projects showed good overall relevance, to the Iraqi context and priorities of Government, Donors and beneficiaries. Individual projects tended to be well aligned with Iraqi development priorities, through UN Country team processes and UNIDO’s direct collaboration with Government institutions.

Relevance shifted over time. It strengthened early in the evaluation period, as the consolidation of UN and Government planning frameworks enabled UNIDO to focus its own contribution. Relevance peaked in 2008 to 2011, as UNIDO’s funders and counterparts focused on recovery-oriented priorities and began the shift to a development orientation.

The relevance of UNIDO’s institutional competence remained strong at the end of the evaluation period. However, UNIDO faces challenges adapting to changing conditions and priorities. This was reflected in the difficulty extending project activities beyond 2011.

85. The overall relevance of UNIDO’s Iraq portfolio was good. However, the strength of UNIDO’s relevance shifted over time. UNIDO’s contribution to the original UN assistance strategy for Iraq was fragmented, and likely exceeded what the organisation could reasonably deliver. Relevance strengthened between 2004 and 2006, as external planning frameworks consolidated and allowed UNIDO to focus its contribution. It peaked during the period 2008 to 2010 when the priorities of Government and Donors focused on recovery and transition to a more secure “development” situation. The relevance of UNIDO’s global competence remained strong at the end of the evaluation. However, UNIDO was not able to translate good relevance into extension of its Iraq portfolio past 2013.

86. Relevance was good across the entire UNIDO Iraq portfolio, and in all programme streams. It emerged from the project evaluations and interviews as the area of best performance against the evaluation criteria. No programme streams or project development objectives were assessed as lacking relevance to the Iraq context, the objectives of Government, Donors or UNIDO’s global mandate and areas of institutional competence. Some evaluations note questionable relevance for some outputs to beneficiary needs in some projects, primarily in the Agro-Industrial and Private Sector

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34 OECD DAC, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, 2010
projects. However, these were concerns on specific activities, and related to design.

87. From interviews and documentation, Iraqi officials expressed satisfaction with the relevance of UNIDO’s project portfolio in Iraq, and relevance of the agency’s mandate and service offering to future requirements.

88. Relevance to external planning frameworks for Iraq appeared good. UNIDO’s contributions after 2006 became more clearly focused into UN assistance strategy and UNDG ITF planning and results matrixes. In part, alignment was required for resource mobilisation. Relevance to UNIDO’s institutional objectives in post-crisis situations cannot be measured.

89. Good relevance resulted from the combination of four factors:

   a. Good relevance of UNIDO’s global mandate and programme offering to the Iraqi context, supported by UNIDO’s institutional migration into post-crisis situations and recovery-oriented programming. Even if not developed, these did provide some conceptual basis for work.

   b. UNIDO’s integration into external planning frameworks for Iraq, particularly for the UN Country Team and the UNDG ITF. Relevance was strengthened by the need to meet the priority and design requirements of those frameworks as a condition of accessing funding. External frameworks, therefore, provided a point of contact between UNIDO and the priorities of other stakeholders, and to sources of information and analysis. Frameworks also imposed a formal of external process (review and approval processes within the UNCT, and before Government processes) from which the UNIDO portfolio benefited.

   c. The Governance structure of UNIDO projects, and the integration of national stakeholders into project decision-making. Most projects involved national stakeholders at multiple levels of Government and society, and allowed their participation in strategic and resource allocation decisions. Relevance, therefore, benefitted from the on-going involvement of Government.

   d. The assessment and planning done during project design phase, which played a determining role on the relevance of specific project outputs to beneficiaries, in Government and society. This included adapting project models taken from UNIDO’s global service offering to the Iraq context.

90. Relevance tended to weaken in projects where (c) or (d) did not perform well. The project evaluations note:

   a. MISP projects showed good relevance to recovery and economic priorities. While some project elements were taken from global models, overall design appeared original and unique to the Iraq context.
Relevance was strengthened by good consultation and participation from stakeholders, at three levels of government (National, Governorate and Municipal) and participating institutions (Vocational Training Centres and others). Ownership ensured projects were adjusted to meet needs at each level, and avoided top down implementation. From the evaluations, only one of the five projects MISP showed some weakness in this regard.

b. **Agro-industrial projects showed good relevance of recovery priorities, and reform to the SOE sector.** However, evaluations note some weaknesses of the relevance of the two early Agro-industrial projects. While relevant to Government priorities was strong, appropriate consultation and participation of local institutions and stakeholders did not occur, and the projects were subsequently less relevant to their priorities. Volatile conditions (insecurity and weakness in Government institutions) were contributing factors. Strong relevance of the *Mosul Dairy Rehabilitation* project was credited, in part, to robust ownership of plant officials in Mosul. Relevance of these projects was also undermined by weak ex-ante assessment and design.

c. **The Private Sector Development Projects showed good relevance to changing conditions in Iraq, and movement to focus on economic development.** However, in some cases relevance was undermined by limited involvement of the private sector, in governance and at the beneficiary level. Also, UNIDO faced challenges adapting the EDIP, EDICT and IPI project offerings, from the global design to the Iraq context.

91. UNIDO’s positioning shows some fragmentation during early development of the portfolio, as external planning frameworks and UNIDO’s potential contribution were both being clarified. In the second *United Nations’ Assistance Strategy for Iraq* (UNAS: 2005), UNIDO positioned itself in 10 of the plan’s 11 programme clusters, with 36 unfunded responsibilities. Many potential commitments appeared to be outside the scope of UNIDO’s institutional priorities, its operational capacity for Iraq and driven by resource mobilisation opportunity. The relevance of UNIDO’s positioning during this period, therefore, was undermined by the agency’s internal lack of strategic focus in Iraq.

92. The scope of UNIDO’s contribution was better focused, with Government, Donors and UNCT moving their priorities towards economic development during the period between 2005 and 2008. The theme of economic recovery and development emerged as a core Government priority in three successive National Development Plans and Strategies. The “recovery” orientation of UNIDO programmes was closely aligned with both the Iraqi context and the priorities of the UNDG ITF, and it consolidated core programme streams in these areas by 2008/9; livelihoods recovery (strengthening the Vocational
Training Centre system, labour market development and Small and Medium Business development), Private Sector Development and the reform and rehabilitation of State Owned Enterprises (SOE).

93. The relevance of the portfolio declined after 2010/11, with prospectively only one active project after 2013. This decline resulted from: UNIDO’s difficulties to adapt to changes in the programme context; the transition in Iraq from a “recovery” to a “development” orientation, with growing strength in the oil sector and withdrawal of US forces, and; the reduction of international assistance to Iraq after 2009, including the operational closure of the UNDG ITF after 2011.35

94. Declining relevance was not a matter of relevance per se, but a consequence of UNIDO’s lack of investment in strategic planning. Government priorities continue to focus on issues related to economic development and diversification. These remain at the core of UNIDO’s global mandate and competence. However, relevance was undermined by the absence of an agency-level strategy or plan, to guide UNIDO’s transition into a changing Iraqi context and beyond closure of the UNDG ITF.

95. Relevance, therefore, could be sustained while UNIDO was integrated into well-financed external frameworks, principally the UNDG ITF. However, UNIDO did not take advantage of relative stability during this period to develop a country strategy for contextual change and closure of the UNDG ITF. Specifically, UNIDO made no institutional investment to formalise its relationship with Government,36 adapt its programme offering or to build on the agency’s relative success prior to 2012.37 As a result, UNIDO had a difficult time adapting to the changing environment. Key UNIDO staff helped to overcome some of these weaknesses, but the well-placed efforts of individuals cannot compensate for weakness in the overall system, or the absence of coherent institutional support.

96. Portfolio relevance to UNIDO’s strategic priorities cannot be assessed, either for Iraq or at the corporate level. UNIDO does not have an overarching institutional strategy to guide its work in fragile state or conflict-affected situations. As such, there is no corporate framework to measure the Iraq programme against, other than to note it was consistent with the directions set by the General Conference in 2003. The issue was picked up in UNIDO’s 2010 thematic evaluation, UNIDO Post-crisis Projects, but does not appear to have been followed up at the corporate level. At the country level, UNIDO

35 The UNDG ITF did not accept new donor contributions after 30 June 2009.
36 BCA not scheduled for signing until 2013.
37 The evaluation was aware of discussions between the Government and at least one of the programme areas. However, as in the past, this discussion was based on a single programme area, project focused and didn’t to reflect an institutional effort to develop an Iraq programme.
also did not have an agency-specific country strategy or plan for Iraq, which the internal relevance of the Iraq portfolio could be measured.\textsuperscript{38}

4.5 Ownership

Government ownership was consistently good throughout the portfolio, with the exception of two projects. The most important mechanism for reinforcing ownership was the project governance structure. Implementation with counterpart institutions and communications through Iraqi personnel were contributing factors. UNIDO’s institutional ownership of the Iraq portfolio was less clear. The significant efforts within the six programme streams notwithstanding, UNIDO did not make an institutional investment in developing a sustainable Iraq programme beyond the 2008 strategic framework.

97. Iraqi Ownership tended to be strong throughout the portfolio. Only two of the 14 evaluations gave ownership a low rating. Ownership was enabled and reinforced through the project governance system and the participation of Iraq counterparts in project Steering Committees. Ownership also occurred through implementation processes that involved the participation of Government institutions in the design and delivery of projects, and where Government was a primary beneficiary. It tended to be sustained with ongoing communication between UNIDO field personnel, Government counterparts and beneficiaries. Ownership, therefore, appeared to be sustained from approval through to design and delivery.

98. The evaluations identify ownership as a key performance variable. The two projects that did not have good ownership also received a low overall rating. These projects were described as “UNIDO driven”, lacking in clear Iraqi involvement and/or institutional relationships with counterparts. An additional factor, some projects had mixed levels of ownership between different levels of Government and/or counterpart institutions; a project with support at one level of Government but that was not a priority for the implementing Iraqi counterpart.

99. Reliance on institutional collaboration as a core element of project design had an influence on overall performance. While good ownership generally strengthened design and performance, it also meant that projects depended on Iraqi counterparts; they could not out-perform the capacity of counterpart

\textsuperscript{38} Informants noted that the Special Representative drafted a brief framework document; “UNIDO in Iraq – major lines of coherent assistance for the next three years Rev 0 – Aug 2008 and Rev 1 – Sept 2009”. The document served as the guidance for project approval after 2008.
institutions to deliver on their own project elements. In a low capacity environment, dependence and integration with government systems, therefore, added an additional risk element over which UNIDO had limited control.

100. UNIDO’s institutional ownership of the Iraq portfolio was less clear. UNIDO’s engagement with Iraq was enabled by the mobilisation of resources through two existing Trust Funds. Notwithstanding the significant effort made implementing the portfolio, UNIDO made limited institutional investment in developing an Iraq country programme that could be sustained beyond the UNDG ITF; arriving at a BCA with Government, establishing a country office with accredited representation and core resources and developing a country strategy, among other points.

4.6 Project and portfolio design

Design assesses the quality of the design of the individual projects, their compliance with the principles of results based management and good project planning practices, and whether the project objectives are realistic. UNIDO projects generally reflected emerging good practice for post-conflict situations, in strengthening government institutions and the delivery of essential public goods and services and generating economic opportunity. All projects show complex design and some consistency with emerging good practices at the operational level.

However, the overall quality of project design was mixed, between both individual projects and programme streams. Inconsistent design quality suggests weakness with internal management and review across the portfolio, and at the country level. There were few programme-level synergies within the portfolio, and Joint Programmes did not follow established UNDG guidelines or procedures.

Project Design

101. The design of UNIDO projects was influenced by UNDG ITF requirements.\(^3\) The ITF supported recovery-oriented projects only, and imposed an 18 to 24 month implementation deadline. Across the full ITF portfolio, the combination of pressure to deliver quick results and restrictive deadlines was assessed as contributing to unrealistic project design. This was an implementation parameter over which UNIDO had no influence, although it did have the option of developing less complex and/or more realistic design. All participating UN agencies faced the same technical

\(^3\) The Country Evaluation did not assess constraints imposed by Montreal Protocol funding arrangements.
constraint (UNDG 2013; Scanteam 2010). Regardless, UNIDO appeared to have limited success over the life of the portfolio improving the realism of project design, despite the benefit of experience.

102. All projects in the Iraq portfolio were designed as “complex”, with multiple and interdependent elements. In this regard, projects tended to be ambitious for the context, particularly given security conditions and limited state institutional capacity and coherence in the early part of the evaluation period. Most projects took an integrated approach that combined:

a. **Sequential or integrated delivery of outputs**, either in a “value chain” structure or with inter-dependent outputs (for example, physical rehabilitation of VTCs and equipment delivery, to support vocational training).

b. **Nationally led governance systems** that depended on the coherence and political commitment of counterpart Iraqi institutions. While critical to relevance and ownership (and, therefore, overall performance), Governance systems involved a significant commitment of staff time.

c. **Various forms of technical assistance provided by UNIDO** combined with the material delivery of good and equipment, through UNIDO procurement systems. Often being imported into Iraq, materials were subject to important and customs controls and had to be transported over large distances.

d. **Capacity development for counterpart institutions**. Some projects were often delivered across large geographic areas, with related security and transport challenges.

103. *In addition, seven UNIDO projects were Joint Programme, implemented with other UN agencies* and requiring an additional investment in coordination. The design of most projects, therefore, was ambitious and based on an integrated a set of contextual, logistical and technical elements.

104. Projects displayed some conceptual use of good practice for project design in post-crisis situations. As common elements, projects:

a. **Content was situated at delivering outputs for livelihoods and economic diversification and development**, identified as a critical element of stabilising post-conflict situations. Focus was on restoring economic systems and livelihoods, where these had previously collapsed and/or were in need of reform (World Bank 2011; OCED 2011).

b. **Integrated delivery of outputs with measures to strengthen Iraqi institutions**, at different levels of Government and sometimes in civil society and the private sector. These measures conceptually included strengthening both institutional frameworks (policy, legislation, regulations and institutional systems) and building the capacity of individuals.
c. *Worked closely with Iraqi institutions*, providing those institutions with primary credit and visibility for deliverables before the beneficiaries. UNIDO could not work “through” Government systems, but functioned in close collaboration with them.

105. Recalling the definition of “fragility” (OECD 2012: 11), project design had the potential to address beneficiary needs and strengthen the capacity of Government to carry out its basic functions related to the delivery of public goods and services. There was also a potential to improve the visibility and legitimacy of Government before society, in an otherwise polarised and sectarian context.\(^{40}\) These design elements were consistent with emerging good practice in post-conflict situations, which focuses on strengthening “legitimate state institutions and governance, providing citizen security and [economic opportunity]” (World Bank 2011; 2).

106. Project design was uneven across the portfolio. By programme area, design was evaluated as:

a. *Strongest and most consistent in the MISP programme area*, with all six projects assessed with a B rating. The primary concern emerging from past evaluations was that ambition and complexity of projects (multiple and interdependent project components delivered in a low capacity environment) contributed to delays and adjustment in project scope. Also, the evaluations cite weakness sharing lessons learned between the five project iterations.

b. *Weakest with the Agro Industrial projects* (D), noting some design improvement with the *Mosul Dairy Rehabilitation* as the exception. The first remaining projects were assessed as having significant deficiencies in project design, with problems in how the project intervened in the supply chain and the effectiveness of implementation arrangements between UNIDO and the FAO.

c. *Of mixed but adequate quality in the area of Private Sector Development*, with ratings mostly at a B. Design of these projects were optimistic and forward leaning, pushing private sector business development, networking and use of technologies that have yet to mature in Iraq.

107. Most UNIDO projects in Iraq were evaluated as having ambitious design; objectives and activities that were difficult to achieve within the approved time and budget frameworks, given significant difficulties (nascent and complex bureaucratic structures and challenging security) in the programme environment. Ambitious design had a direct impact on efficiency and the

\(^{40}\) UNIDO does not appear to have internal guidance for project development in post-crisis situations. From interviews, sources appeared to be interaction with external planning frameworks, the experience of UNIDO field staff and use of standard UNIDO projects models.
scope of outputs delivered. All projects in the portfolio experienced some combination of deadline extensions and re-scoping of outputs (usually a reduction in the scope of activities or outputs delivered).

108. Projects did not have a coherent *Theory of Change* supporting design; a statement of assumptions about the process through which change would occur, and produce the development impact desired. Statement of a theory does not appear to be part of the standard UNIDO project development template, nor was it a UNDG ITF requirement. Rather, design tended to be based on a limited contextual analysis, usually drawn from secondary sources and used as a project justification for funding rather than to support design. Projects, therefore, tended to show limited rigour for both supporting analysis and articulation of how interventions would produce the development objective desired. The evaluation noted that UNDG ITF allocated limited resources for related activities, which contributed to the constraints.

109. The most important factor determining design quality was the assessment work during the planning phase. The high risk Iraqi environment programme environment required an investment contextual analysis and design assessment. The UNDG ITF funding arrangements placed some limitation on the resources available for related work. Notwithstanding, the quality of assessment was mixed across the portfolio, and not subject to a uniform standard:

a. *MISP projects were generally assessed as having good supporting assessments, noting some weakness in contextual analysis.* Projects particularly benefitted from assessments of opportunities in the labour market, which allowed the projects to focus target training opportunities. MISP developed an assessment model that was shared across different project iterations. Evaluations made a direct attribution between positive outcomes to the good quality of assessment work, albeit showing weakness with gender-based assessment.

b. Assessment work for *Agro Industrial* projects was considered deficient, in particular noting the lack of contextual understanding and poor technical assessment supporting the design for an integrated concept within the project. One factor appeared to be poor FAO delivery on assessment within its areas of responsibility.

c. The four private sector projects with evaluations tended to rely on the application of UNIDO global programme models, with limited adaptation for the context. Assessments were limited, with the projects instead building upon foundations laid in prior related projects. More traditional training and mentoring elements of the project had a greater immediate impact than the more technological elements.
Risk assessment

110. Risk analysis and mitigation tends to be limited across the portfolio, with measures for mitigation not embedded into project design. Projects were generally not supported with robust risk assessment. Rather, assessments appeared superficial, not following an effective methodology and lacking effective mitigation strategies. The available findings on risk and strategy for its mitigation were generally not embedded into project design. Rather, broad statements of Iraq’s security situation were incorporated and then later cited as a reason for underperformance. Even when risks were identified as substantial, many projects continued with overall ambitious development objectives and design that accentuated risk rather than mitigating it, including through complex design. A factor affecting risk assessment was the limited resources available to project design.

111. Risk assessment, therefore, was not effective or internalised into project design. Every project identified insecurity as the primary risk, followed by issues related to weak counterpart institutions, the potential for cost increases and the difficulties with the transport of material. Regardless, risk did not match ambition, and design often appeared too complex for the context. For example, spreading multiple activities and movement of materials across large and insecure geographic areas within tight timeframe frames, or incorrect assumptions about the strength of counterpart. Performance in this regard does not improve significantly over the life of the portfolio. There are no apparent design innovations to reduce the vulnerability to security concerns.

Synergies within the portfolio and with other UN agencies

112. Operational synergy was achieved through UNIDO’s project office in Amman Jordan. Projects collaborated to fund support common infrastructure and security costs for the Iraq operations. The office was used by most programme streams to support their country operations and as a platform for sharing programme, operational and contextual knowledge. All available information indicates that the Iraq project office provided high quality serves and was essential to the operational performance of projects. Information sharing on programmes also occurred at the Headquarters level and between some but not all programme streams and generally on an ad hoc basis. The Arab regional programme played a coordinating and information sharing role, although the Arab Bureau was not used to it full potential in this regard.

113. The exception was Montreal Protocol projects. There was no evidence that projects made use of the Iraq project office or the knowledge and support available there. Managers of the Montreal Protocol instead relied on ad-hoc
individual exchanges with various other Vienna-based program managers for some Iraq insight, while the programme was generally isolated. Interviews also revealed the programme did not leverage the systems created by the other programmes to reduce their logistics burden. This occurred despite the fact that protocol projects experienced significant delays related to procurement and logistics.

114. There was limited evidence that programme synergies were developed between the six thematic areas. This was particularly the case between the MISP, Private Sector and Agro-industrial projects, where there are important complementarities between UNIDO programme and competence. The different programmes most often functioned in isolation of each other, with limited evidence of:

a. Formal collaboration between two or more programme streams, at the level of sharing or combining resources at the project level.

b. A strategic, management or coordination structure with responsibility for promoting synergies, and for putting in place the incentives, rationale and structures to nurture them.

c. A formal structure at the higher institutional level to promote synergies, (noting there were regular exchanges between programme managers).

**Joint Programme design**

115. *Joint Programmes* were not an effective modality to develop synergies with other UN agencies. As noted, UNIDO participated in seven *Joint Programmes* with other UN agencies, with the FAO being UNIDO’s primary counterpart. These were set within UN Country Team planning, the UNDG ITF criteria for funding approval and within UNDG guidance.

116. From available information, the PSD-I appeared to be the most effective *Joint Programme* initiative, with good coordination from the lead agency through established joint planning and coordination structures (UNDP 2013). Effective inter-agency coordination was not developed in the remaining *Joint Programmes*. They were characterised by weak or non-existent coordination, the absence of unifying results framework and monitoring systems, and lack of mutual accountability. UNIDO and FAO collaborations were characterised by broken value chains, reducing the effectiveness of UNIDO outputs. UNIDO bears primary responsibility, for the projects in which it served as the lead agency.

117. The eight Joint Programmes did not function according to standard practice for the modality (UNDG 2005 and 2008). The evaluation did not conduct a comprehensive design review, but noted the following elements to either be absent, or ineffective. Joint Programme standard procedure:
a. *Is based on robust coordination*, to ensure effectiveness within an integrated programme design concept. Interagency coordination mechanism appeared to either not exist, or to be ineffective.

b. *Have systems for mutual accountability, between participating agencies and with Government and other stakeholders*. This is accomplished through governance structures, and monitoring and evaluation systems. Joint Programmes with FAO did not have effective accountability. In particular, no joint monitoring systems were established and information sharing between agencies was limited, at best.

c. *Calls for final joint evaluation of programmes*. Except for the earliest MISP projects, there is no instance where this occurred, and the FAO did not evaluate any of its contributions.

### 4.7 Efficiency

*Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs*. Evaluations assessed project-level efficiency as mixed. The MISP projects received highest efficiency ratings, while the Agro-industrial projects were assessed as showing the most difficulty. Efficiency was enabled by good relevance and ownership throughout the Iraq portfolio. However, all projects experienced some combination of delays, change in the scope of outputs delivered and quality concerns. These influenced their overall effectiveness and progress towards expected outcomes.

Contextual factors and the requirements of funding mechanisms were important factors. At the same time, project design was often ambitious and/or not realistic to the field conditions. Some aspects of UNIDO’s institutional arrangements supporting activities in Iraq also undermined effectiveness.

*In the absence of a BCA, UNIDO relied exclusively on external planning frameworks to align individual projects with Government priorities. As a result, the six programme streams developed independently, in response to demand and with limited synergies between them. The absence of a UNIDO country strategy was an important factor as UNIDO adapted to changing conditions after 2010, including the reduction in international assistance shifting Iraqi priorities.*

**Main factors affecting the efficiency of UNIDO’s portfolio and projects**

118. The efficiency of UNIDO’s projects in Iraq must be assessed in their context. Six main factors emerged from the evaluations as influencing the
degree to which resources were converted into results. These were encountered in some combination by all projects:

a. *The unique security conditions present in Iraq during the evaluation period.* The high levels of violence and insecurity improved at the mid-point of the evaluation period. However, an improvement in security did not necessarily translate into a more permissive operating environment for UNIDO. Furthermore, UN regulations, costs and procedures instituted in reaction to the security conditions further affected UNIDO projects.

b. *External constraints imposed by funding (UNDG ITF funding criteria and procedures) and United Nations security protocols,* which increased the cost of operations and imposed restrictions on the movement of international personnel. An additional factor was inefficient use of the Joint Programme modality.

c. *The capacity of UNIDO’s counterpart institutions* in Government, the private sector and civil society. Iraq was considered a low capacity environment for much of the evaluation period.

d. *UNIDO’s institutional arrangements and the extent to which these were “fit for purpose” in the Iraqi context.* These include the full range of systems and procedures that UNIDO uses for working in fragile state and post-conflict situations; UNIDO’s country strategy and ability to adapt to changing conditions, portfolio and project management, human resource management, resource mobilization, financial management procedures, procurement, and ability to sustain relations with stakeholders, among other factors.

e. *Other enabling conditions in the programme environment at the operational level,* such as the availability of goods and services for local procurement, transport infrastructure and logistics for moving material goods, among others.

119. Each project encountered some combination of these factors differently, depending on the implementation period, counterparts and location and project elements. However, most were clearly identified early in the portfolio. The last factor determining efficiency, therefore, was the extent to which UNIDO accurately identified the constraints on efficiency over successive project iterations and between the six programme areas, learned lessons and developed risk mitigation measures, and then integrated these into project design and operations. This was particularly the case for UNIDO’s ability to adapt projects for security risks and the capacity of Iraqi counterpart institutions.
Efficiency, relations with counterparts and managing the Iraqi context

120. Project performance was influenced by the efficiency of UNIDO’s counterparts. By design, UNIDO projects depended on the participation of counterpart institutions, for elements of implementation and in-kind or counterpart resources. Throughout the evaluation period, Government institutions had a limited capacity and an opaque policy framework. Their ability to engage projects also depended on internal decision-making, and the extent to which larger political dynamics reached down into institutions. Institutional capacity improved over time. However, complex political dynamics often remained. Further compounding challenges were language and geographic boundaries. With a primarily English speaking staff located in Jordan and Vienna, and Arabic speaking beneficiaries and counterparts in Iraq reduced communication had an impact on project performance.

121. Institutional conditions were generally understood by programme managers. This was particularly the case for projects that had multiple iterations (MISP) and/or international personnel with previous Iraq experience and strong Iraqi national personnel. The Iraq project office in Amman made an important contribution in this regard. Experience contributed to efficiency at the operational level, as managers adapted to challenges as they emerged. The project governance structure was also an important mechanism for dialogue, and resolving institutional issues. Regardless, UNIDO had difficulties describing institutional conditions in Project Papers, and integrating measures for risk mitigating into design. Experience, therefore, did not always improve design and inception processes, particularly in terms of information sharing between the different programme streams. The MISP stream was an exception, where improvement was demonstrated over time, and there was evidence also in the private sector stream.

122. There was a similar difficulty adapting to contextual factors; mainly security conditions but also the operational challenges of importing, transporting and installing and material goods. Again, many of these issues were identified early in the evaluation period. However, appropriate measures were generally not integrated into project design over time. Most important, UNIDO did not reduce the ambition and complexity of projects to better reflect conditions; for example, timelines that reflected the complexity of tendering, then importing materials into Iraq without exemptions and transporting through insecure areas. Unrealistic UNDG ITF implementation timeframes were a contributing factor.

123. While MISP projects had a good transfer of learning and experience, contextual constraints appeared to particularly affect the newer generation of private sector projects, implemented during the second half of the evaluation
period. UNIDO used standard project models that were challenging to adapt to Iraq. Also, Montreal Protocol projects were implemented in isolation of other project streams, and with little internal consultation. The projects, therefore, did not fully leverage the experience in the UNIDO system or UNIDO arrangements for importing materials into Iraq using UNDP systems.

124. As a result, project design remained ambitious and overly complex for conditions in the context. Contextual factors were cited as the main cause of implementation delays in every evaluation. UNIDO’s difficulty integrating experience into design is shown most clearly in the on-going implementation delays.

Efficiency and joint programmes

125. Efficiency was affected by the performance of the UN Joint Programme modality. Discounting the Private Sector Development project, the FAO was the most important agency in seven UN Joint Programmes. A review of those projects showed limited or no monitoring information. Furthermore, FAO did not conduct evaluations of their Iraq interventions, and FAO monitoring information was not available. Based on available information, the FAO systematically under-delivered across the portfolio. In most cases, the FAO’s performance had a direct and negative impact on efficiency on UNIDO’s contributions. This was a primary concern for in the Agro-Industry area, but MIDP projects were also affected.

Efficiency and security

126. Unique to the case of Iraq was the high cost to secure a limited United Nations presence in country and operations in Amman, which were then covered on a pro-rated basis by various U.N. entities operating in Iraq. While the methods varied over time, the general concept required UNIDO projects to set aside a portion of project funds to cover its share of security costs. Security regulations also had a heavy impact on training budgets, with most of the training for Iraqi trainers occurring outside of Iraq. These were factors contributing UNIDO’s limited presence in Iraq.

127. While security conditions have improved in the last few years, the operating constraints have remained constant, limiting efficient use of resources and perhaps not fully recognizing the realities on the ground. With GOI efforts to increase the number of in-country trainings and looking for heightened presence from UN agencies, security continues to play an

41 The finding does not apply to the PSDI project, which benefitted from both UNIDO experience and that of other UN agencies.
important role in limiting efficiency. Restrictions are the result of UN corporate protocols, and beyond the ability of UNIDO to influence.

128. Security too was often used as a catch-all to explain project delays. Project design should have evolved with time to internalize risk mitigation for security conditions. However, a more deliberate analysis of the difference between planned and actual project duration reveals more a conflict between donor expectations, and reality on the ground. Most projects were planned for 18-month to two-year duration, often to meet UNDG ITF funding criteria. Nearly all projects required three to four years for full execution. The disconnection between planned budgets and actual execution necessarily impacted efficiency in most cases. Issues relate to UNIDO’s project design and management of risk, and not to the context alone.

129. A comparatively small portion of the programme budget was allocated to security. UNIDO is required to pay a quota for use of UN facilities in Iraq or reconsider its operations. The costs are prohibitive and limited number of UNIDO international personnel travelling in country. However, implementation of the Iraq portfolio relied mainly on national personnel, hired on a contract basis. UNIDO Iraqi personnel took constant security measures to ensure their safety, and had agency’s full support in this regard. UNIDO had limited financial liability and did not incur significant security-related costs for their movement.

Efficiency and UNIDO institutional arrangements

130. The extent to which UNIDO institutional arrangements and systems were fit for purpose in Iraqi was the most important factor influencing efficiency. These arrangements are determined at the institutional level, and beyond the ability of any single country programme to influence. The Iraq Country programme concluded that:

a. UNIDO does not have any unique institutional arrangements for working in fragile state or conflict-affected situations. Further, UNIDO did not use in Iraq the systems for programme management and support that are available in “normal” contexts.

b. UNIDO’s arrangements and systems were generally not fit for purpose in Iraqi. They were the most important contributor to inefficiencies within the portfolio.

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42 UNIDO informants stressed that concerns about unrealistic UNDG ITF timelines were raised with the fund on numerous occasions. UNDG ITF officials advised most UN agencies had a similar experience, and UNIDO was not unique in this regard. Regardless, UNIDO did not appear to adapt the design of its projects to align activities with what could be realistically achieved within UNDG ITF timelines.
c. Over the evaluation period of eight years, there was no apparent advance at the institutional level to the performance of UNIDO’s systems and procedures in fragile state and conflict-affected situations.

d. Institutional arrangements contributed to UNIDO’s difficulty adapting to the post-UNDG-ITF period, and the dramatic reduction in its Iraq portfolio. This occurred despite the continuing relevance of UNIDO mandate and competence to the evolving situation in Iraq.

e. It also indicates that UNIDO’s presence in Iraq was largely supply driven, and based on access to UNDG-ITF funding. It was not the product of an institutional investment to establish a sustainable presence in Iraq. This position was taken by numerous high level UNIDO managers, during the interview process.

131. UNIDO systems and procedures are, therefore, were not well adapted to work in the Iraqi context. Further, UNIDO did not make effective use of its existing programme tools to improve the efficiency of its Iraq operations. Rather, individual programme streams developed in response to the availability of funding, and used *ad hoc* implementation arrangements creatively promoted by dedicated UNIDO managers and staff who worked directly on the Iraq program. This occurred in a high risk environment, where the strength of field presence and flexibility in systems and procedures has been identified as critical to performance.

132. All projects and personnel function within an institutional setting. The arrangements, systems and procedures in this larger framework have a decisive impact on how well projects and individuals work; they are enabled or hindered by these arrangements and cannot outperform them on a sustained basis.

133. As noted, UNIDO did not have a *Basic Cooperation Agreement* or an established Country Programme in Iraq. UNIDO’s Iraq portfolio, therefore, functioned without the rights and immunities that derive from a formal relationship with the host government, or the core management, financial and operational resources that come with country programme status. The project office in Amman made a significant contribution. However, it was an informal structure dependent on contributions from individual projects. UNIDO, therefore, used an *ad hoc* and low cost programme model in the highest risk environment. The model was under-resourced compared to other programmes, elsewhere in the region and being implemented in lower risk environments.
Table 5: Comparison of established UNIDO Country Programme provisions and Iraq programme arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established UNIDO provisions for Country Programmes</th>
<th>Iraq Programme</th>
</tr>
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| UNIDO has official accreditation with Government, under signed bilateral agreement (BCA). The agreement defines the broad lines of cooperation, and rights and exceptions, such as from taxation. | No accreditation with Government. Therefore, no privileges, immunities and exceptions (tax and customs). UNIDO relies on the systems of other UN agencies and the initiative of field personnel.  
43 UNIDO advised that standard procedure for countries with no BCA is that UNIDO works through an agreement with the UNDP. The agreement affords UNIDO limited access to the same rights and privileges. However, UNIDO personnel at the Amman project office emphasized that reliance on UNDP systems added an additional layer of administration, and often contributed to delays. |
| Accreditation gives UNIDO official status as a member of the UN Country Team, including right to representation within the UNCT. | No right to representation within the UNCT. UNIDO allowed participating on a “collegial” basis. UNIDO able to play a leadership role in two UNCT clusters (Agriculture and Economy). However, also comes with some reputation risk, as UNIDO perceived as not making an institutional investment in Iraq. |
| Accreditation is the trigger to send a Representative (with status before Government) and core UNIDO personnel. CTA is usually posted to country. | No accredited Representative to Iraq, with the exception of the period 2008 to 2010 when UNIDO had a Special Representative accredited by a *Note Verbale* of the Iraqi Permanent Mission in Vienna dated 25 June 2008.  
44 UNIDO had a Special Representative based in Amman between 2008 and 2010, at the D-2 level and assigned by the former Director General of UNIDO. The appointment of the Special Representative was agreed by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs through a *Note Verbale* of the Iraqi Permanent Mission in Vienna, dated 25 June 2008. |
| Representative has the right to an office budget, and possibility for predictable financing for programme infrastructure. | No core office budget. Financing comes from project budgets, is project dependent and funding levels are unpredictable. Representative has no discretionary or representation budget, to seed new initiatives or promote UNIDO. |
| Some authority for management, coordination and oversight responsibilities for country programming held in the country office. Enhanced capacity to develop an integrated country strategy and programme, and to sustain relationships with external stakeholders. | No mandate for management, coordination and oversight based in the Iraq project office, and no budget to sustain such activities.  
No entity with mandated responsibility to develop an Iraq country programme or coordinate the six programme streams.  
No entity responsible to institutional learning, and integration of knowledge and experience into project design, across the six programme areas. |
134. Without a proper country presence, projects adopted a multi-layered management structure that involved primary oversight being led out of Vienna, combined with the placement of international consultants primarily in Amman, Jordan. In addition, national and local coordinators were hired to carry out work on the ground in Iraq with extra emphasis placed on local staff to compensate for the inability of UNIDO personnel to get to Iraq or move freely to project sites. The added layer of coordination and extra costs involved necessarily limited overall efficiency.

135. Management of projects out of the Vienna headquarters had its limitations, as resource mobilization took less account of realities in the field, and introduced inefficiencies. Several independent project evaluations pointed to long delays in project execution due to complicated international procurement processes or lack of sufficient coordination on the ground in Iraq to move project deliverables out of ports and through complex customs procedures. With key decision-makers thousands of miles away and communication and language barriers adding to the difficulty, this arrangement impacted overall efficiency.

136. In addition, the Country Evaluation noted that issues related to customs and import procedures were a significant factor contributing to delays. These were not directly attributable to procurement procedures, but to the fact that UNIDO did not have customs or tax exemptions, in the absence of the BCA. An accredited office would have had better access to immunities, tax and customs exemptions and privileges that could have vastly improved project efficiency. UNIDO’s voice on the country team was a matter of collegial inclusion rather than formal status, and it had no formal representation with the GOI, limiting the ability of UNIDO to work through tough logistic and policy issues.

137. The linear management structures tying project staff to specific program managers in Vienna also created a stove-piped effect that impacted cross-project collaboration. And while collaboration generally serves to improve efficiency, in Iraq this was an even more critical factor, given the uniquely complicated set of procedures that had to be met on everything from visas to taxes to customs clearances to government approvals. For example, dozens of letters were sometimes required to accomplish relatively straightforward tasks. A request to a ministry might produce a letter, which would go back to...
that ministry for it to sign a second letter attesting to the authenticity of the first letter.46

138. Significant individual effort was made on the part of some UNIDO managers and contractors to overcome the stovepipes and share valuable lessons learned between projects, especially in the Amman office, the basic structure of the Iraq program placed the final responsibility for decisions with Vienna Project Managers. The effect was to limit the amount of leveraging between projects that could have improved results.

139. Furthermore, with the inability of Vienna Program Managers to travel to Iraq, and no accredited presence in Baghdad, coordination was limited with key Iraqi stakeholders. In some cases, projects changed direction late in the process, or were held up because of GOI input, but due to the limited communication between the parties, time was often lost. This was seen especially in the Montreal Protocol projects. No UNIDO personnel from the Montreal Protocol programme have been into Iraq to move these projects forward, despite significant challenges arising from situations such as year-long delays in customs approvals or months-long delays as UNIDO awaited sign-off from GOI counterparts.

140. Efficient response to challenging logistics or coordination with Government of Iraq counterparts was impeded by the distributed management structure. For projects with a sequenced design, the impacts were more severely felt as completion necessarily relied on prior decisions and actions to occur; and the distributed management and limitation on exchange with decision makers in the GOI affected progress.

141. Efficiency on the part of national and local program managers was more difficult to assess, as the security situation limited the amount of oversight that occurred. Reliance on local staff meant that UNIDO had to choose carefully. Where good staff was selected, efficiencies were gained. Likewise, weaker staff choices had a negative impact. Lack of sufficient data makes it hard to ascertain how efficient the local staff structure was.

142. Efficiency gains were found in programs that utilized an approach that embedded programs within local structures, both government and private. Joint use of facilities and staff in project execution not only improved ownership, but also achieved important efficiencies. In cases, for example, where full time trainers were not needed, UNIDO teamed with GOI entities that lent experienced staff to the project. The staff was given specialized training and then functioned for several hours per month to meet the needs of

46 The evaluation noted that the Iraq Country Office played a critical role in resolving many of these logistical and administrative issues.
the project. This was seen in the MISP projects, the Mosul Dairy Project as well as the Private Sector Development projects that were undertaken later in the programme.

Human resources

143. UNIDO ran its largest country programme with no core staff in the field. Without an office budget, predictable financing for programme infrastructure was lacking. Due to the variations in start, duration and sources of the project funds, a majority of the staff were hired on temporary contracts. These were sometimes as short as a few months, without any assurance that the next period would be funded. The complete reliance on contract personnel for essential functions in the field created a degree of unpredictability within the staffing structure, and a significant amount of administrative churn within the agency.

144. As short term contractors, key field personnel did not have access to regular career development opportunities. The evaluation was advised of numerous cases when contracts were confirmed or issued late, or payments also received late. The lack of predictability was the most important source of frustration and anxiety emerging from the interview process.

145. Contract staff also was not eligible for key training in systems required for the efficient operation of a UNIDO office. The constant turnover of contracts had many secondary effects ranging from impacts on the morale of hardworking staff to challenges in keeping highly qualified personnel. The paperwork involved in maintaining a patchwork of temporary contracts absorbed additional energy that could have been put to better use.

47 The UNIDO Special Representative was a core staff member, and exception to this statement. During his assignment in 2008 to July, the representative had a small core budget, which included a temporary driver and secretary. From available information, the budget had limited or no provision for representation or programme development.
No full time UNIDO personnel were assigned to the field, with the exception of the Special Representative who a member of the UNIDO permanent staff. All projects and the Amman office relied on a large number of short terms contracts, ranging as short as a couple months and dependent on project revenues. Human resource data was available for 17 projects out of the 28 total, or 60 per cent of the projects by number. From this sample, UNIDO issued 638 short-term contracts for Iraq between 2004 and 2011.49

46 Refer to footnote 44.

49 This number is considered a minimum, as the evaluation did not have access to information. Four projects had incomplete data and were not included, and no data was available for the Montreal protocol projects. As such, the data covers only 17 projects or a 60 per cent sampling of the portfolio. In addition, the available data does not cover the full evaluation period, but only to 2011. In this regard, the data is illustrative but not complete. From interviews, the actual numbers for all categories is significantly higher.
International and national project staff and local administration staff had the highest number of contracts per person. Contracting, therefore, generated a significant amount of administrative “churn” in the UNIDO system, in addition to an uncertain employment situation for critical field personnel. From interviews, uncertainty and administrative delays emerge as a source of frustration and personal uncertainty for personnel, who expressed being demotivated and a perception that their contribution was not valued by UNIDO.

147. Graph 8 provides an overview of the number of contracts per project, for the 17 projects where complete data was available.

Graph 8: Number of contracts per project

148. Finally, a full analysis of efficiency is hampered by the insufficient amount of monitoring and evaluation data collected and analyzed for the UNIDO portfolio in general.
Country strategy and planning for the future

149. The lack of a country office also meant a limited focus on a country strategy or country plan. Without planning capacity at the portfolio level, and no formal country coordination structure in place, UNIDO’s USD 70 million programme instead relied on information planning and coordination, primarily out of Amman. Effective control rested with the project managers inside the programme streams and in Vienna.  

150. The limits of the arrangements were seen in the absence of an institutional strategy once the “supply” of funding reduced, and the Iraqi context itself changed. UNIDO’s core service offering and competence remained relevant to Iraq needs, post-2012. However, there was no agency process for positioning UNIDO. Rather, some project streams continued to search for funding, on an ad hoc basis. As a result, the portfolio was effectively exhausted by the end of 2012, with only three active projects. Several concepts were under discussion, but there were no confirmed projects in the pipeline.

4.8 Effectiveness and main achievements

Effectiveness is the “extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” (OECD DAC 2010). The overall effectiveness of the Iraq portfolio was mixed, and heavily influenced by design and effectiveness considerations. MISP projects showed good effectiveness, and generally reached output and outcome targets.

Agro-industrial generally showed poor effectiveness. Montreal Protocol projects were significantly delayed and not yet showing results. A determination on results, therefore, was not possible. The Private Sector development projects showed good effectiveness, noting that several projects were still under implementation with a final evaluation pending.

The other four evaluated projects showed mixed effectiveness; TARGET, IPI and EDICT were assessed as generally meeting targets, although the design of the project was such that effectiveness will more accurately be determined in the long run and the design of evaluation efforts in UNIDO do not allow for sufficient post-intervention evaluation.

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50 Informants noted that the Special Representative played coordination and planning roles between programmes during his tenure, albeit with limited resources and management authority.
Effectiveness of MISP projects

151. The overall effectiveness of MISP projects was assessed as good, with a rating between B and C+. MISP projects were designed with an integrated set of objectives: i) building the capacity of the vocational training system and related institutions in State and society, while, ii) providing forms of assistance to improve livelihood and income generating opportunities at the community level. Performance was consistent over the full duration of the portfolio, in part based on the application of accumulated knowledge and experience over successive iterations of the project.

152. MISP projects contributed to strengthening of the Vocational Training system, at the local level. All six iterations of the MISP project met generally met their activity and output targets, implementation delays notwithstanding. Material assistance to the rehabilitation of training facilities, the provision of training equipment, curriculum development and training of vocational instructors were generally assessed as being of good quality. The evaluations identified some punctual concerns for implementation delays, reduction in the scope of some activities and quality issues related to equipment and instructor training. Regardless, the overall evaluation finding was that MISP projects expanded the institutional capacity of vocational training centres, and their ability to deliver high quality training activities. Stakeholder satisfaction with UNIDO’s contribution in this regard was high and consistently expressed across all iterations of the project.

153. Two specific outputs related to strengthened institutional capacity emerge from the project evaluations. First, the MISP programme left installed institutional capacity, available to most training centres after closure of the project.\(^{51}\) Again, evaluations identify punctual concerns at the project level, such as high turn-over for instructors and loss of investment in training. However, the general findings made an attribution between MISP projects and a sustainable increase in institutional capacity. The key performance variable was robust participation of the training institutions, as both the beneficiaries of the support and had sole responsibility for the delivery of training.

154. The limitation identified in several evaluations was the localised nature of individual projects. MISP worked with the Central Government (Ministry of Planning and Economic Development) and Governorate and Municipal institutions, as required on a project basis. However, projects were implemented through individual training centres. UNIDO did not use the MISP

\(^{51}\) As an example, the evaluation of MISP 1b found that project assets and personnel from MSIP 1a were still in place and work.
model to migrate into larger systems development for vocational training. Accordingly, results were also localised. This may have been a missed opportunity, to adapt the programme model for changing conditions and build on an area of proven competence.

155. **Second, the vocational training activities delivered by VTCs in collaboration with MISP projects were generally rated as being of good quality.** The primary source of data for the rating was beneficiary and instructor surveys. The ratings for quality of facilities, instruction and curriculum were good, albeit with concern for the market relevance of some courses. Positive contributing factors were the combination of labour market assessments and institutional strengthening (improved training facilities, curriculum development and instructor training). The main concern was for the short duration of courses. As an emergency or recovery initiative, courses were usually one to two months in duration. They provided only basic skills intended for market entry, while more formal qualification would have taken significantly longer.

156. The MISP programme showed positive, but more mixed performance related to its livelihood and income generation objectives. Four of the six project iterations met or exceeded training targets, for the number of course iterations delivered and beneficiaries.\(^\text{52}\) MISP collaborated with national systems to effectively target appropriate beneficiary groups, using defined selection criteria. The targeting element appears particularly strong, and evaluations do raise concern for either ineffective selection or significant numbers of unqualified beneficiaries.

157. The project evaluations all note difficult economic conditions in Iraq, with limited employment opportunities and variations between locations and social groups. In this context, MISP’s combination of training and support to formation of micro and small enterprises and production groups produced:

   a. A *more positive beneficiary perception of their situation* and possibility of finding opportunity that they attributed to the training.

   b. *Positive results for the beneficiaries of training activities* that were able to move directly into the labour market. With available data from individual projects, increases in the number of beneficiaries finding new income generating opportunities ranged between 18 and 69 per cent. Beneficiaries generally reported some combination of improvement in employment or livelihood opportunity and household incomes that they attribute to the training. Importantly, several evaluations reported more

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\(^\text{52}\) MISP 1a had the most difficulty in this regard, providing training for only one quarter of the original beneficiary target. Some specific target may have been missed, but performance was acceptable given difficult conditions. The targets themselves may not have been realistic.
predictable and better paying opportunities after training. Where this occurred beneficiaries also reported an increase in household income and their ability to afford basic necessities.

Regardless, many beneficiaries continued to face difficulties entering the labour market after course completion. In part, these reflected the limited employment and livelihood opportunities available in Iraq. However, MISP projects generally did not provide support for market entry. This reflects not only the design and resource limitations of UNDG ITF-funded projects, but also the institutional limitations of the VTC and labour market systems.

c. **Women beneficiaries showed the poorest performance, in terms of both finding income opportunities and increasing incomes.** The MISP portfolio made significant progress towards achieving or exceeding gender-based training targets, and investments in developing training opportunities for women. The evaluations note significant obstacles that result in Iraq having one of the lowest women’s labour force participation in the Middle East and North Africa region. Also, some investment was made with innovations, such as production groups and new vocational areas. Notwithstanding, UNIDO did not conduct a gender-based assessment of labour market opportunities and the majority of women received training in sewing/tailoring, which is considered a culturally acceptable occupation. In this regard, UNIDO and its counterpart institutions did not innovate to expand training and market entry options for women.

d. **Outputs related to formation of micro and small enterprises and production groups were less successful.** Achievement in the formation of production groups was generally below target, and the groups often did not appear sustainable. The evaluations did not draw a correlation between tool kits and formation of micro-enterprises, with the exception of MISP V, and MISP support generally did not translate into formation of new SMEs. The primary reason given was lack of enabling support beyond that delivered by MISP.

158. SME’s supported by MISP V (and the TARGET project within the Private Sector Development programme stream) exceeded output targets, and contributed to both economic diversification and employment. Support to 24 SMEs under MISP V resulted in improved business performance, and a 167 per cent employment increase in the survey cohort. The TARGET project contributed to a 40 per cent increase in full time positions among participating SMEs. Support to strengthening existing SME’s, therefore, was an area of

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53 By project, women’s participation ranged between approximately 35 and 50 per cent of the total beneficiaries. Evaluations note this represents a significant investment in women’s programming, and effort to achieve gender-based targets.
good performance within the portfolio, while support to formation of new SMEs was less successful. Overall, support to SMEs tended to produce relatively better results generating employment than training activities.

Effectiveness of agro-industrial projects

159. With an aggregate rating of “C+”, the effectiveness of the Agro-Industrial projects received the lowest rating in the Iraq portfolio. The performance of the projects was split; while the Food Safety project showed relatively good performance, the three remaining projects generally did not meet activity and output targets, with many targets either partially or not achieved. Actual output performance was mixed within an integrated project concept, with unsatisfactory performance of some outputs affecting the performance of other dependent output. Outputs were further undermined by extensive implementation delays, with the Pilot Project for the Rehabilitation of the Dairy Sector showing a 60 month implementation duration against the 16 months originally planned.

160. The Food Safety project generally met its output targets. The project had a complex design that was not realistic to the context, resulting in significant implementation delays. Regardless, the project was evaluated as contributing to improvements to Iraq’s food safety system, which was out of date and dysfunctional. Among the achieved outputs, UNIDO contributed to building capacity for quality control in the food industry sector. Training events were delivered and assessed as being of good quality, and there was partial achievement of outputs related to improving food inspection facilities. From the evaluation, stakeholder satisfaction with the outputs appeared good.

161. The remaining three projects showed a similar performance profile:

a. Output targets related to training were delivered, and assessed by beneficiaries as of being of good quality. Targets were exceeded in two of the three projects, and evaluated as improving the human resource capacity of the participating institutions. Other elements of building institutional capacity appeared less successful. For example, support was provided to business planning at the Mosul Dairy Plant. However, the plan was written by an international consultant without appropriate experience and hence not realistic and never used.

b. Targets related to rehabilitation of equipment were partially met, albeit with implementation delays. For the first dairy rehabilitation project, equipment was installed approximately 24 months into the project, but after 60 months was still not operational.\textsuperscript{54} For the Date Palm project,

\textsuperscript{54} The evaluation could not confirm whether the equipment is now operational and being sustained.
equipment was rehabilitated and ISO standards implemented. However, marketing activities did not occur and there is no evidence whether the project resulted in an increase in sales or employment. At the Mosul Dairy plant, rehabilitation works were completed and of good quality, with 141 jobs reported as being sustained. However, downstream milk production did not occur as planned and the plant had an inadequate supply of milk. It depended, therefore, on milk products imported into Mosul, and did not stimulate local production.

c. In all of these cases, the relationship between project components was incomplete, either as the result of either partial delivery of UNIDO outputs, or poor output performance by the FAO. Where they existed, well performing outputs could not function as intended. The larger outcomes of Joint Programmes, therefore, do not appear to have been met.

### Effectiveness of private sector development projects

162. With an aggregate rating of “B”, the effectiveness of the Private Sector Development projects was good. EDICT and IPI advanced both the GOI’s National Development Strategy, which emphasizes growing the private sector, as well as UNIDO’s expressed desire to transition its Iraq efforts from short-term, humanitarian assistance to long-term, sustainable economic-development initiatives.

163. The institutional change brought about as a result of these projects has a good likelihood of continuing to contribute to the growth of Iraq’s nascent private sector. In general, program participants were supportive of the continued operation of the EDCs. For example, more than 90% of the beneficiaries of EDC services reported that they were very satisfied with the training and counselling aspects of the program. Service-providers, too, expressed satisfaction with the program, with 78% of trainers and counsellors approving of its achievements.

164. Despite these achievements, computer-based portions of the training initiatives were not as effective as more traditional one-on-one mentoring because Iraq in general is still lacking familiarity with online tools. The program’s efforts to build networking between entrepreneurs and tie them to the global business environment also produced mixed results in the short term. A key website component was not fully operational as of this evaluation, thus it is difficult to forecast outcome.
4.9 Cross-cutting issues: Gender

165. UNIDO’s performance on gender was mixed to weak. The MISP projects and TARGET were the only ones with specific gender targets, ranging between 30 and 50 per cent of beneficiaries. These projects tended to either meet or exceed their output targets related to gender, and resulted in some improvement for both income and livelihood opportunities. They represent, therefore, an important institutional investment, on the part of UNIDO and its counterparts.

166. However, evaluations consistently note that UNIDO projects presented a limited number of training and livelihood options for women, the largest beneficiary group were women that took sewing/tailoring courses, which appeared to be the default training option. The evaluations acknowledged cultural conditions, which place some restriction on what is considered “acceptable” work for women. They also commend UNIDO for the personal initiative and creativity of some field personnel, and the possibility of constraints posed by counterpart institutions.

167. In the field of private sector development, an alternative view was taken focusing on participant commitment to the program rather than gender quotas. Efforts to include more women in training programs were also constrained by the make-up of the candidates put forward by the Government of Iraq, which included fewer women than some programs originally targeted.

168. Regardless, the evaluations consistently note that UNIDO did not make an institutional investment in conducting a gender assessment to look at expanding training options. UNIDO did not act on recommendations in this regard, and the training/livelihood options for women were limited. Other programme streams either did not have clearly developed gender objectives or activities, nor did they allocate resources against those objectives. Gender considerations, therefore, were not mainstreamed into much of the portfolio outside of two of the six programme streams.

4.10 Observations on the Montreal Protocol projects

169. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) was adopted in 1987 as an international treaty to eliminate the production and consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals, and thereby protect the Earth’s fragile ozone layer. The Protocol, and its associated amendments has been credited with enabling reductions of over 97% of all global consumption of controlled ozone depleting substances.

170. In 1991, a Multilateral Fund was established to help 145 developing countries meet their Montreal Protocol Commitments. The fund has been
financed to date with over USD 2.9 billion from developed countries. Annual
global expenditures for the projects are approximately USD 150 million.

171. Iraq signed on to the Montreal Protocol in June 2008, less than two years
before key phase-out dates were to be in place. Adherence came late in the
process, particularly given the situation in Iraq. By May 2009, through the
assistance of UNEP and UNIDO, Iraq had published a Country Programme
and National Phase-Out Plan. With no prior history of regulations,
compliance, or even the barest baseline data, Iraq committed in that report to
aggressive and unrealistic targets for compliance. For example, the country
report committed Iraq to a "complete phase-out in the consumption of ozone
depleting substances (ODS) by 2010," although the report also
acknowledged that Iraq would face difficulties achieving those goals.

172. In this context, UNIDO, as Coordinating Agency behind the lead of UNEP,
has overseen seven projects initiated between 2008 and 2012 and funded by
the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol. The total budget for Iraq is
USD 7.4 million. Projects cover a wide range of areas including:

a. Preparation of phase-out plans;

b. Assistance in developing legislation and regulations to control and monitor
   ODS;

c. Institutional strengthening at the Iraq Ministry of Environment (MoEnv)
   and the establishment of a National Ozone Committee and National
   Ozone Unit within the MoEnv;

d. Direct assistance to selected enterprises using ODS including training,
   purchase and installation of equipment upgrades.

173. By October of 2012, problems in achieving the goals set by Iraq were fully
evident, with the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the Multilateral Fund
officially recognizing the on-going challenges posed by the security situation
and the political, economic and social difficulties accumulated over the past
two decades. In reaction, the ExCom continued to support Iraq by
commending the following:

a. To urge all exporting countries to liaise with the Government of Iraq, as
   feasible, prior to the export of any ozone-depleting substances to Iraq in
   order to support the local authorities in controlling the import of ozone-
   depleting substances and combating illegal trade;

b. To note the need for extra security and attention to logistical difficulties in
   the implementation of phase-out projects in Iraq, including resources

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adequate to enable implementing agency personnel to operate in the country;

c. To request the implementing agencies to continue to take into account Iraq’s special situation and to provide it with appropriate assistance.

174. Iraq projects were reportedly showing “some progress” but required “continued monitoring.” A review of the few available project reporting documents indicates that the absence of historical institutional establishments in Iraq to deal with identification and phase out activities has forced the assistance agencies to split their focus between urgent needs to build a complete regulatory framework for Iraq, and simultaneously work to phase-out ODS substances under punishing deadlines and limited funds. Further impeding progress is the lack of any baseline data, as international experts needed to help develop the baselines, are hampered by security concerns and high costs.

175. Montreal Protocol projects are encountering unusually severe problems in the areas of procurement, contracting and logistics that can sometimes delay implementation for one to two years. For example, one report notes Iraq’s “institutional instability where change of government and local administrative difficulties delayed opening of special project accounts.” From interviews, it appeared that projects did not benefit from UNIDO’s experience in the other Iraq programme areas.

a. Available monitoring documentation details long, costly delays encountered when procured equipment sits at the port of entry in one case waiting over nine months for customs clearances. The cause of the customs delays includes convoluted and delayed approvals from multiple levels of the Government of Iraq, and lack of dedicated staff in country to follow-up. Additional costs are also incurred as equipment requires secure storage waiting for installation and training components. Senior program staff noted that these types of problems are normally handled at much lower levels, but the severity and magnitude of the problems in Iraq often tie up senior officials’ time.

b. Training is burdened by security concerns which affect attempts to bring experts into Iraq. These difficulties often force the program to conduct training outside of Iraq, which also results in high costs. In one case,

57 CP & NPP
58 Back to Office Mission Report, Bahrain, October 2012
59 Interview with Senior MP Officials, Vienna, Austria, September 2012
alternative training in the Netherlands was so expensive that only half of the Iraqi nominees were able to receive training\textsuperscript{60};

c. Information from staff interviews in Vienna and project documentation further details difficulties with identifying contractors that are willing to provide equipment and training in Iraq, given its poor security conditions. Some requests for bid go unanswered, while others end up being cancelled as contractors fail to find the technical staff willing or able to go into Iraq to do the work. In almost all cases, Iraq is an outlier, requiring much more time and effort for project implementation.

Concluding observations on the Montreal Protocol portfolio

176. The indirect benefits of the MP programs, which are not measured, could be significant. These benefits include enhanced technical capabilities at enterprises receiving assistance under this programme. In addition to building compliance, many of these industries (both private and government) are learning new production skills and gaining exposure to technologies that will potentially improve overall production outcomes. UNIDO’s has made an important contribution in this regard.

177. However, Montreal Protocol projects have made limited progress towards their objectives. The projects were affected by weakness in design, resulting from either a limited understanding of the country context and/or difficulty adapting project design to country conditions. Tight protocol deadlines for adherence to global elimination targets were a contributing factor, as was the absence of a BCA that might have eased customs delays. Regardless, projects were not based on a realistic assessment of country conditions, and did not appear to benefit from the experience of other UNIDO programme streams. Both of these should have come with effective management at the portfolio level.

178. Looking to the future:

a. Lack of reliable baseline data will persist, with no apparent solution in the near-term. Ability to track Iraq’s compliance with MP targets will continue to challenge the programme, but may also provide necessary opacity of outcomes which could buy time for Iraq to achieve meaningful progress in the long-term.

b. Security issues, both real and perceived, will continue to hinder the ability of project management to directly manage results. To date, no programme management staff from UNIDO has been to Iraq\textsuperscript{61}. Instead,
the program relies on national staff, Iraqi counterparts, and contractors to work through issues. Stringent UN security regulations and unfavourable perceptions on the part of implementing contractors will continue to impair progress toward highly ambitious goals.

c. Iraq’s institutional complexity will continue to impede even the most genuine intentions at achieving MP targets. It will likely be many years before the basic underpinnings of the government, from customs and border enforcement to regulatory reform and verifiable data collection will bring Iraq into full compliance with the MP targets. Further, available funding may not be sufficient to tackle the many challenges faced by Iraq as it strives to achieve MP compliance.
5. Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** UNIDO must take the appropriate steps to ensure the agency is “fit for purpose” in post-crisis situations. UNIDO shows limited progress developing its policy framework, corporate strategy and systems and procedures for working in post-crisis situations, ten years after the General Conference (2003) expanded the agency’s mandate. These are system-wide issues beyond the scope of an individual project to address, and must be addressed at the corporate level.

**Recommendation 2:** UNIDO should formalize its relationship with the Government of Iraq through signing of a *Basic Cooperation Agreement* and appointing of a representative with official accreditation. A BCA would include priorities mutually agreed between the Government of Iraq and UNIDO, and serve as the basis for UNIDO’s strategic framework and country plan for Iraq. Such an also reinforces UNIDO’s contribution to UN Country Team planning, principally through the UNDAF.

**Recommendation 3:** Building on the rights and privileges outlined in the BCA, UNIDO’s future country programme in Iraq should be based on a coherent country strategy, plan and programme infrastructure structure. UNIDO should avoid a situation where it continues to work without a defined strategy and plan. The evaluation does not recommend a heavy structure given uncertain conditions, but rather one that is efficient given requirements and benefits from BCA and UNIDO country programme standard provisions. Effective use of regional coordination structures should also be made.

**Recommendation 4:** UNIDO’s global mandate and service offering remains highly relevant to Iraq. In dialogue with Government through the BCA provisions, UNIDO should focus on its strengths; industrial sector expertise and technical assistance provided by Arabic speaking experts, particularly to private sector development and SOE restructuring. Programme development with Government should occur on an institutional basis and in the context of country strategy development.

**Recommendation 5:** UNIDO has not fully developed its contribution in gender-based programming. As one measure for future programming, may incorporate the Ministry of Women’s Affairs into early programme design, to address gender strategy and opportunities that are consistent with Government’s priorities.

**Recommendation 6:** UNIDO should ensure that all *Joint UN Programmes* are designed with arrangements for coordination, monitoring and evaluation and mutual accountability, and with the *UNDG Joint Programme* norms and procedures as the minimum standard.
Annex A: Terms of Reference

UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
THE INDEPENDENT COUNTRY EVALUATION OF
UNIDO ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ

Table of Content

I. Evaluation background
II. Evolving country context and UN presence in Iraq
III. UNIDO presence in Iraq
IV. Evaluation purpose
V. Evaluation methodology
VI. Time schedule
VII. Evaluation Team
VIII. Quality Assurance

Annex A: Job Descriptions for evaluation team members
Annex B: Tentative evaluation report outline
Annex A: Terms of Reference

I. Evaluation background

The present TORs cover the Independent Country Evaluation (ICE) of the activities and involvement of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Iraq, which was requested by the UNIDO Executive Board as part of the biannual work programme of the UNIDO Evaluation Group (EVA) for 2012/2013.

In addition to assessing the implementation and results of country program mechanisms, this independent country evaluation will also include an assessment of stand-alone projects, including Montreal Protocol (MP) projects, the performance of the Country Office, Global Forum activities and contributions of the country program to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Findings from past and on-going relevant evaluations will be considered.

The ICE will cover the period between 2003 and 2011.

II. Evolving country context and UN presence in Iraq

During the period under evaluation Iraq went through phases of war and immediate emergency (2003-2004) and periods of continuous and peak violence (2006-2007) before slowly entering into a transition phase since 2008.

The period between 2003 and 2007 could be characterized by:

- High levels of violence (international occupation and resistance, regional interventions, national level ethno-sectarian conflict and growing concern for criminal activity).
- High level of trauma in society, after years of conflict and sanctions.
- Effective State collapse in 2003 (Government, institutions and delivery of goods and services).
- Delivery of a National Development Strategy, but priority on emergency issues.
- State in survival mode during much of the period; government had limited resources and capacity; unable to provide policy guidance to assistance or coordinate and quality assure.
- Significant amount of international emergency and recovery assistance available to Iraq, including through the UNDP ITF. Demand from donors and Government for UN agencies to play broad implementation roles, often outside of core agency mandates, in absence of other capacities.
- Tendency of assistance programs to be supply/interest driven, by donors and multilaterals. Weak state counterparts for engaging and ensuring integration into government priorities/capacity.
- Most international assistance focused on emergency and recovery. Upstream work limited and of limited success, given political instability and weak state capacity.
- UN Country Team working in the context of an integrated mission, and with an emergency/recovery framework.
- Limited UN strategic framework and UN coordination focused in the UNDG ITF, where peer review of programs is weak.

The recovery and transition phase from 2008 to the final withdrawal of US forces in 2011 could be characterized as follows:

- The security situation improved since peak violence in 2006/7, although new patterns of violence are emerging.
- The political situation in Iraq remains volatile. Highly partisan political behaviour has focused on the narrow interest of the different political blocs, rather than the greater public good.
- Grid-lock in the policy and legislative systems. Among them, the resolution of issues critical to the future of the Iraqi State; the nature of Iraqi federalism, the division of powers with the system and interpretation of the constitution on issues such as regional autonomy, and the status of the disputed areas along the northern border with the Kurdish governorates.
- Some improvement in the institutional capacity of the State to develop policy and deliver basic goods and services. State a better counterpart to international entities, within the National Development Plan.
- The Iraqi economy is gradually recovering, although concerns remain for slow private sector development and concentration of economic activity in the petroleum sector.
- Some improvements in Iraq’s human development indicators.
- As conditions improve, there is growing public focus on the economy. Even as conditions remain volatile, data shows an important and positive shift, as existential concerns over security give way to more normal material worries, such as those concerning jobs, basic services, and corruption.
- Significant decline in international assistance to Iraq, as western countries withdraw, shift to commercial focus and government revenues improve.
- UN agencies reducing presence, with some agencies withdrawing. Less demand and resources; requires that the UN take a more strategic approach through the UNDAF, with upstream and technical assistance focus.
- Emergency projects and implementation roles coming to an end.

III. UNIDO presence in Iraq

UNIDO’s current project portfolio in Iraq is relatively large (see Table 1 below). Figure 1 shows the budgets of new project launches between 2004 and 2011 by thematic area.
### Table 1: Overview of UNIDO portfolio in Iraq (Projects launched since 2004 by thematic area)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Project No</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>Budget (USD)</th>
<th>End Date</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP 1a</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/04/001</td>
<td>MISP I (Thi Qar)</td>
<td>Jenane</td>
<td>2,422,983</td>
<td>Feb 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISP 2</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/06/002</td>
<td>MISP II (Northern Iraq)</td>
<td>Jenane</td>
<td>2,496,685</td>
<td>Sep 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISP 3</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/001</td>
<td>MISP III (Al-Qadessiya)</td>
<td>Jenane</td>
<td>2,783,066</td>
<td>Sep 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISP 4</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/005</td>
<td>MISP IV (Anbar)</td>
<td>Samarakoon</td>
<td>1,995,195</td>
<td>Mar 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISP 1b</td>
<td>TE/IRQ/08/004</td>
<td>IDP Thi Qar (follow-up of MISP I)</td>
<td>Jenane</td>
<td>1,401,870</td>
<td>Jul 2011</td>
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<td>TE/IRQ/09/A08 (2010)</td>
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<td>2,148,019</td>
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<td>TE/IRQ/09/B08 (2011)</td>
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<td>1,441,239</td>
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<td>TE/IRQ/09/C08 (2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Agro-Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI 1</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/04/003</td>
<td>Pilot Project for the Rehabilitation of the Dairy Sector in Iraq (Dairy Diwaniya)</td>
<td>Schebesta</td>
<td>4,419,514</td>
<td>Oct 2010</td>
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<td>AI 2</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/06/003</td>
<td>Rebuilding Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq (with FAO and WHO)</td>
<td>Schebesta</td>
<td>1,656,637</td>
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<td>AI 3</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/003</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Date Palm Sector in Iraq</td>
<td>Tezera</td>
<td>2,949,721</td>
<td>Feb 2011</td>
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<td>AI 4</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/10/001</td>
<td>Dairy Mosul</td>
<td>Schebesta</td>
<td>2,371,374</td>
<td>July 2012</td>
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<td>FB/IRQ/10/A01 – (FAO comp.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCB 1</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/09/A04</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Specialized Institute for Engineering Services</td>
<td>Niculae</td>
<td>1,549,336</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
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<td>TCB 2</td>
<td>TF/IRQ/11/004</td>
<td>Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection</td>
<td>Badameh</td>
<td>10,000,000 (planned)</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
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## Annex A: Terms of Reference

### Table 1 (cont.)

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<th>PM</th>
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<th>End Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>PSD 1</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/004 (direct continuation: PSD 4)</td>
<td>Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion in the SME Sector in Iraq (EDIP)</td>
<td>Pasini (Kulur)</td>
<td>2,253,980</td>
<td>Dec 2010</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Badameh</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD 2</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/08/007</td>
<td>Private sector development programme for IRAQ</td>
<td>Dhaoui</td>
<td>3,952,941</td>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
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<td>Moll</td>
<td>3,294,118</td>
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<td>PSD 3</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/08/006</td>
<td>Technology acquisition to restart and generate economic transformation (TARGET)</td>
<td>Jenane</td>
<td>2,784,112</td>
<td>Dec 2011</td>
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<td>PSD 4</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/09/007</td>
<td>Enterprise development through information and communication technology (EDICT)</td>
<td>Boye</td>
<td>2,770,941</td>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
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<td>PSD 5</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/09/004</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Specialized Institute for Engineering Services</td>
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<td>2,411,182</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
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<td>PSD 6</td>
<td>TE/IRQ/09/010</td>
<td>Investment Promotion for Iraq (IPI)</td>
<td>Kratzsch (Kulur)</td>
<td>2,604,855</td>
<td>Dec 2012 (ext. to Dec 2013 likely)</td>
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<td>PSD 7</td>
<td>TE/IRQ/10/006</td>
<td>Enhancing investments to Iraq through industrial zone development</td>
<td>Boye</td>
<td>3,684,281</td>
<td>Dec 2012 (ext. to Dec 2013 likely)</td>
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<td>PSD 8</td>
<td>TF/IRQ/11/001</td>
<td>Operations and Industrial Maintenance Training Academy</td>
<td>Jenane</td>
<td>493,359</td>
<td>Dec 2014</td>
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<th>PM</th>
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<th>End Date</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Advice</strong></td>
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<td>POL 1</td>
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<td>Technical Assessment for the Development of Agro-Industries Sector in Iraq</td>
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<td>519,169</td>
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<td>POL 2</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/10/005</td>
<td>Developing Iraqi agricultural and agro-industrial data, information systems and analytical capacities</td>
<td>Samarakoon</td>
<td>470,588</td>
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<td>Project No</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Budget (USD)</td>
<td>End Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP 1</td>
<td>MP/IRQ/08/002</td>
<td>Preparation of a HCFC Phase-Out Management Plan</td>
<td>Ghoneim</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Dec 2009</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MP/IRQ/08/003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nielsen</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP/IRQ/09/009 (additional funding)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>Dec 2010</td>
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<td>MP 2</td>
<td>MP/IRQ/09/001</td>
<td>Conversion from CFC-11 to methylene chloride in the production of flexible slabstock foam at al Hadi Co.</td>
<td>Demko (Ghoneim)</td>
<td>126,457</td>
<td>Dec 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP 3</td>
<td>MP/IRQ/09/002</td>
<td>Replacement of refrigerant CFC-12 with isobutene and foam blowing agent CFC-11 with cyclopentane in the manufacture of domestic refrigerators and chest freezers at light industries companies</td>
<td>Nielsen (Ghoneim)</td>
<td>2,161,581</td>
<td>Mar 2010</td>
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<td>MP/IRQ/09/005</td>
<td>National Phase-Out Plan (first tranche)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MP/IRQ/09/A05</td>
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<td>Demko</td>
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<td>MP/IRQ/11/002 (second tranche)</td>
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<td>303,000</td>
<td>Mar 2012</td>
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<td>MP 5</td>
<td>MP/IRQ/09/006</td>
<td>Project preparation for elimination of controlled uses of methyl bromide in pre- and post-harvest sectors</td>
<td>Savigliano</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Aug 2010</td>
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<td>MP 6</td>
<td>MP/IRQ/10/007</td>
<td>Technical Assistance for alternatives to methyl bromide</td>
<td>Savigliano</td>
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<td>MP 7</td>
<td>MP/IRQ/11/005</td>
<td>HCFC Phase-Out Management Plan (stage 1, first tranche)</td>
<td>Nielsen (Si Ahmed)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Dec 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 The Country Evaluation will also include a review of the portfolio of Montreal Protocol projects with emphasis on results achieved in terms of UNIDO ODS objectives as well as lessons to be learned from implementation practice.
The country evaluation will build upon ten UNIDO evaluations and three UNDP evaluations conducted between 2008 and 2011 (Table 2) and coordinate with seven on-going UNIDO evaluations to be conducted in 2012 (Table 3).

Table 2: Overview of existing evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Project No</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Year of evaluation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISP 1a</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/04/001</td>
<td>MISP I (Thi Qar)</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>MISP 2</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/06/002</td>
<td>MISP II (Northern Iraq)</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>MISP 3</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/001</td>
<td>MISP III (Al-Qadessiya)</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>MISP 4</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/005</td>
<td>MISP IV (Anbar)</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>MISP 1b</td>
<td>TE/IRQ/08/004</td>
<td>IDP Thi Qar (follow-up of MISP I)</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al 1</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/04/003</td>
<td>Pilot Project for the Rehabilitation of the Dairy Sector in Iraq (Dairy Diwaniya)</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>Al 2</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/06/003</td>
<td>Rebuilding Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq (with FAO and WHO)</td>
<td>2010 (by WHO)</td>
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<td>Al 3</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/07/003</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Date Palm Sector in Iraq</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<td>PSD 1</td>
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<td>Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion in the SME Sector in Iraq (EDIP)</td>
<td>2011</td>
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Annex A: Terms of Reference

### Evaluations of UNIDO projects

<table>
<thead>
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<th>No</th>
<th>Project No</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Period of evaluation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MISP 5</td>
<td>TE/IRQ/09/008 (2009)</td>
<td>MISP 5 (Ninewa)</td>
<td>06 to 09/2012</td>
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<td>TE/IRQ/09/A08 (2010)</td>
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<td>TE/IRQ/09/B08 (2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI 4</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/10/001</td>
<td>Dairy Mosul</td>
<td>06 to 09/2012</td>
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<td>TCB 1</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/09/004</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Specialized Institute for Engineering Services (SIEI)</td>
<td>06 to 09/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD 5</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/09/A04</td>
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<td>Enterprise development through information and communication technology (EDICT)</td>
<td>Combined evaluation in 2012/13</td>
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<td>PSD 6</td>
<td>TE/IRQ/09/010</td>
<td>Investment Promotion for Iraq (IPI)</td>
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<td>TE/IRQ/10/006</td>
<td>Enhancing investments to Iraq through industrial zone development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD 2</td>
<td>FB/IRQ/08/007</td>
<td>UN Joint Programme - Private sector development programme for IRAQ</td>
<td>To be evaluated by UNDP</td>
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<td>FB/IRQ/08/A07</td>
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### UNDP evaluations in Iraq

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<th>Year of evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Independent Exrernal Project Evaluation of “Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq” Phase II (Implemented by the IOM)</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Independent External Joint Evaluation of “Local Area Development Programme”</td>
<td>2010</td>
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</table>

Table 3: Overview of evaluations to be conducted in 2012 - 2013

### IV. Purpose of the Independent Country Evaluation

The evaluation pursues the following purposes:

To assess the progress and achievements of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects towards the expected outcomes;
To assess the progress and achievements of UNIDO’s non-TC interventions (“Global Forum”);
To assess the UNIDO portfolio of interventions in Iraq (TC and non-TC) for coherence and synergies;
To assess the integration of the UNIDO portfolio into the activities of the UN system and the UNAMI Fund;
The extend to which UNIDO has made contributions to achieving the MDGs;
To assess the performance of the UNIDO Country Office for Iraq in carrying out its functions and in relation to the delivery of the RBM-based work plan.

The evaluation will cover the full range of UNIDO’s support to Iraq, including Technical Cooperation (TC) and so called “Global Forum” (GF) activities. It should go beyond a mere documentation of results by trying to identify success factors of projects and programmes. The evaluation will also identify how these successes and failures can be used to improve future UNIDO projects in the country.

As far as TC is concerned, the evaluation will consider the portfolio of UNIDO projects, as shown above in Table 1 above.

V. Evaluation methodology

This Independent Country Evaluation will attempt to assess in a systematic and objective manner the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness (achievement of outputs and outcomes), impact and sustainability of the interventions under evaluation. The evaluation will assess the achievements of the interventions against their key objectives, including re-examination of the relevance of the objectives and the appropriateness of the design, specifically in regard to gender equality and empowerment of women. It will identify factors that have facilitated or impeded the achievement of the objectives.

The country evaluation will consider the DAC Criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, impact). In addition, the following specific evaluation criteria and cross-cutting issues will be mainstreamed in the evaluation of the Country Program, individual projects, and the performance of the Country Office:

- Contribution to empowerment of women and gender equality
- Contribution to environmental sustainability
- Fostering of South-South cooperation

The country evaluation will not only address individual projects but apply a portfolio evaluation approach considering synergies and complementarities between projects as well as how individual projects contribute to larger objectives. It will include an assessment of the design and implementation of the country portfolio with regards to:

- strategic objective,
- geographic priority,
- subsector focus,
- collaboration with and role of counterpart institutions and
- programme management and coordination.

The country evaluation will apply an “outcome mapping” approach taking into consideration the following documents:
• UNIDO evaluation policy and standards, as these have been used with previous UNIDO Country Evaluations.\textsuperscript{63}

• Outcome evaluation tools available through United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) members. Particular note is made of the UNDP’s Outcome Evaluation Guidelines (2002) and accompanying Companion Guidelines for Outcome Evaluation (2011) as the most relevant to UNIDO’s portfolio.\textsuperscript{64}

• The OECD-DAC methodology for Outcome Evaluation in fragile and conflict-affected situations, issued by the DAC’s Network on Development Evaluation. Particular note is made of Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities; Towards DAC Guidance (2007).\textsuperscript{65}

The following preliminary work has already been conducted under the preparation phase of this evaluation:

• A draft Iraq Situation Analysis using data and analysis from the United Nations Interagency Analysis Unit (IAU) as its primary source, while also consulting other sources in the public domain. The final version will incorporate relevant analysis gathered during the evaluation process.

• Eleven Project Summaries, based on the findings of previous evaluations. The team used a format similar to other Country Evaluations, noting in particular the Vietnam Country Evaluation (2012). The summaries will be included as an annex to the final report, and new summaries will be written for the evaluations that are on-going or planned in the second half of 2012.

The project summaries serve as an initial synthesis to support methodology design, and to support decision-making on allocation of the Iraq Country Evaluation’s limited resources.

The immediate purpose of the Situation Analysis has been to support methodology design, during the inception phase. The analysis will be used during the evaluation itself as a baseline against which to assess UNIDO’s own understanding of the project/programme context. The situation analysis will be a “living document”, to be revised and developed over the full course of the evaluation. A summary version will be included in the main text of the final evaluation report, with the full length version available as an Annex.

The Independent Country Evaluation will build on this preliminary work and be structured along the following steps and deliverables:

\textsuperscript{64}http://web.undp.org/evaluation/methodologies.htm
\textsuperscript{65}http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/dcdndep/39660852.pdf
Step One: Iraq Country Evaluation Inception Report

The deliverable for Step One shall be an approved Inception Report, based on a review of documentation and the two deliverables from the pre-evaluation phase (Situation Analysis and Project Summaries). Requirements of the Inception Report shall include:

a. The review of relevant Iraq Country Programme and project documentation, in addition to UNIDO relevant policies and procedures (for example, the 2011 evaluation of UNIDO’s role in fragile states and conflict-affected situations and its gender policy).

b. The review of documentation and identification of initial findings will include (i) a summary of UNIDO’s country analysis and strategy, as it evolved over the evaluation period; (ii) a synthesis statement of expected UNIDO Outcomes in Iraq; (iii) description of UNIDO’s Iraq portfolio, including relevance trends in resource allocation, and for other relevant issues; (iii) a summary of output-level initial findings, on the key evaluation criteria.

c. The evaluation will also include a preliminary assessment of the Montreal Protocol projects MP1 to MP7 shown in Table 1. However, this assessment will be based on desk studies and interviews only. No fieldwork is foreseen in this connection.

d. Finalisation of the evaluation methodology, including the list of stakeholders to be interviewed. The list will include key UNIDO staff, Donors, officials in counter-part Government of Iraq Ministries, counter-part United Nations agencies and others, as relevant.

e. Preparation of field study tools, including guides for Stakeholder interviews and site visits.

The synthesis of this information will be used to create the “Outcome Map” depicting the causal chains of the UNIDO country programme. Focus shall be on the results chains and on assessing assumptions on the overall environment and identifying the specific UNIDO contribution through the outputs provided.

Step Two: Interviews

The Team Leader and the International Evaluation Specialist will conduct face-to-face interviews with

a) UNIDO international and national staff, at the UNIDO offices in Vienna and Amman and other relevant locations;

b) Iraq programme donors and UNIDO’s counterparts within UN agencies, including in UN Joint Programmes and the UNDG ITF in Amman.

The Team Leader and the International Evaluation Specialist will also conduct telephone interviews with UNIDO’s main counterparts in the Government of Iraq, primarily at the central Ministry Headquarters in Baghdad but also at the Governorate level, where proven essential to the evaluation.
Whenever possible, the evaluators will schedule their missions to Vienna and Amman in a way to use upcoming steering group meetings and other opportunities for face-to-face meetings with UNIDO counterparts and stakeholders. The combined evaluation of the projects PSD 4, PSD 6 and PSD 7 (Table 3) to be conducted in parallel to the country evaluation is expected to provide several opportunities of this kind.

**Step Three: Collation of Field Study Result and Document Review Data**

The evaluation team will meet for three days in Amman, at an agreed location in the Middle East; likely Amman for proximity to the UNIDO Iraq office. The purpose of the meeting shall be to debrief the results of the field study, and synthesize the initial findings resulting from the Document Review and the field study.

**Step Four: Debriefing at UNIDO HQ, Drafting and Finalisation of the Report**

The Team Leader and International Evaluation Specialist shall debrief the evaluation in Vienna for a period of two days, during the week of 19 November 2012. The debriefing will also be an opportunity to gather any additional information and analysis, where gaps have been identified, and to conduct any final interviews.

**VI. Time schedule**

The Iraq country evaluation is scheduled to take place as shown in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Time scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of inception report and interviews at UNIDO HQ</td>
<td>Week 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews at UNIDO Office in Amman</td>
<td>Weeks 40 to 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing at UNIDO Office in Amman</td>
<td>Week 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing at UNIDO HQ</td>
<td>Week 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft report</td>
<td>07/12/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO feed back</td>
<td>20/12/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final draft</td>
<td>31/12/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart feed back</td>
<td>15/01/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final draft</td>
<td>31/1/2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VII. Evaluation team**

The evaluation team of the Country Evaluation will include:

1) One Senior International Evaluation Consultant and Team Leader with extensive experience in conducting evaluations in Iraq (Mr. David Gairdner);
2) One Senior International Evaluation Consultant with extensive experience in conducting evaluations in Iraq (Ms. Ginger Cruz);

3) One Evaluation Consultant familiar with UNIDO and with UNIDO’s project portfolio in Iraq (Ms. Michaela Fleischer).

All consultants will be contracted by UNIDO. The tasks of the consultants are specified in their respective job descriptions, attached to this ToR as Annex A.

All members of the evaluation team must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of any intervention to be assessed by the evaluation and/or have benefited from the programmes/projects under evaluation. The Senior Evaluation Officer will manage the evaluation and act as a focal point for the evaluation consultants.

VIII. QUALITY ASSURANCE

All UNIDO evaluations are subject to quality assessments by the UNIDO Evaluation Group. Quality control is exercised in different ways throughout the evaluation process (briefing of consultants on EVA methodology and process, review of deliverables).
Annex A: Terms of Reference

ANNEX A of Terms of Reference: Job Descriptions

Job Description

INDEPENDENT COUNTRY EVALUATION IRAQ

XP/IRQ/12/001 (SAP 120150)

Post title
International Evaluation Consultant (Team Leader)

Estimated duration
30 days (over period 20/9 to 31/12 2012)

Starting date required
20 September 2012

Duty station
Home based with travels to Vienna and Amman

Description
The international evaluation consultant and team leader will be responsible to conduct the Iraq country evaluation as described in the TORs, which are an integral part of this Job Description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft inception report</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Weeks 38 to 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present inception report and conduct interviews</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Week 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field mission to Amman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Week 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct telephone interviews and analytical work</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Weeks 41 to 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present preliminary evaluation results</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Week 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft and finalize evaluation report</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Weeks 46 to 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub total: 30 days

Qualifications:
The qualifications and skill areas required include:

- Designing and managing complex evaluations;
- Leading multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural teams of evaluators;
- In-depth experience with evaluation of development projects in Iraq;
- Designing and supervising qualitative and quantitative field surveys;
- Drafting reports in English (excellent drafting skills to be demonstrated).

Language:
- English

Absence of Conflict of Interest:
According to UNIDO rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.
Annex A: Terms of Reference

Job Description
INDEPENDENT COUNTRY EVALUATION IRAQ
XP/IRQ/12/001 (SAP 120150)

Post title
International Evaluation Consultant

Estimated duration
22 days (over period 20/9 to 31/12 2012)

Starting date required
20 September 2012

Duty station
Home based

Description
Under the guidance of the evaluation team leader, the international evaluation consultant (home base in Beirut/Lebanon) will conduct the Iraq country evaluation as described in the TORs, which are an integral part of this Job Description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft inception report</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Weeks 38 to 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present inception report and conduct</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Week 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interviews with UNIDO staff at UNIDO HQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct telephone interviews and analytical</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Weeks 41 to 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft and finalize evaluation report</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Home base</td>
<td>Weeks 46 to 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualifications:
The qualifications and skill areas required include:

- Designing and managing complex evaluations;
- In-depth experience with evaluation of development projects in Iraq;
- Drafting reports in English (excellent drafting skills to be demonstrated).

Language:

- English

Absence of Conflict of Interest:

According to UNIDO rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.
Annex A: Terms of Reference

Job Description
INDEPENDENT COUNTRY EVALUATION IRAQ
XP/IRQ/12/001 (SAP 120150)

Post title  Evaluation Consultant
Estimated duration  1 w/m, 2 workdays (over period 28/11 to 31/12 2012)
Starting date required  26 November 2012
Duty station  UNIDO HQ

Description
Under the guidance of the evaluation team leader, the evaluation consultant (home base in Vienna) will conduct the Iraq country evaluation as described in the TORs, which are an integral part of this Job Description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Duration (work days)</th>
<th>Deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate in the analysis of UNIDO’s Iraq portfolio, including relevance trends in resource allocation; editing of the data in graphs and tables</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Contributions to evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation and editing of an ‘Iraq situation analysis’ and an analysis of the Iraqi economy</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>A coherent analysis of Iraq’s political and economic situation for use in the evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing and finalization of summaries on all projects of the portfolio</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Project summaries are finalized and edited for use in the evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualifications:
University degree in development studies

Languages:
- English
ANNEX B of Terms of Reference: Tentative evaluation report structure

Acronyms and Abbreviations
Glossary of Terms
Executive Summary

I. BACKGROUND

1. Background and introduction
   - evaluation objectives
   - methodology
   - evaluation process
   - limitations of evaluation

2. Country context
   - historical context
   - brief overview of recent economic development
   - industrial situation and relevant sector specific information
   - development challenges facing the country
   - relevant Government policies, strategies and initiatives
   - initiatives of international cooperation partners

3. Description of UNIDO activities in the country
   - major TC components, main objectives and problems they address
   - brief overview of other important activities (Global Forum)

II. ASSESSMENT

4. Performance of TC activities
   - Private sector development
   - Trade capacity building
   - Energy and Environment

5. Global Forum activities

6. Performance in cross-cutting issues
   - gender
   - environment
   - South-South cooperation

III. MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

   - Main conclusions from section II will be used as a basis for recommendations.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED

V. ANNEXES
   - Annex A: Terms of Reference
   - Annex B: List of persons met
   - Annex C: Bibliography
   - Annex D: Project Assessments and reviews
   - Annex E: Country Map and project sites
# Annex B: List of projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget (USD)</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) MISP I (Thi Qar) – FB/IRQ/04/001</td>
<td>2,422,983</td>
<td>16) Private sector development programme for IRAQ – Policy component - FB/IRQ/08/007</td>
<td>3,952,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) MISP II (Northern Iraq) - FB/IRQ/06/002</td>
<td>2,496,685</td>
<td>17) Enhancing investments to Iraq through industrial zone development - TE/IRQ/10/006</td>
<td>3,504,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) MISP III (Al-Qadessiya) - FB/IRQ/07/001</td>
<td>2,813,212</td>
<td>18) Technical Assessment for the Development of Agro-Industries Sector in Iraq - FB/IRQ/07/002</td>
<td>519,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) MISP IV (Anbar) - FB/IRQ/07/005</td>
<td>1,995,195</td>
<td>19) Developing Iraqi agricultural and agro-industrial data, information systems and analytical capacities - FB/IRQ/10/005</td>
<td>470,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) IDP Thi Qar - TE/IRQ/08/004</td>
<td>1,401,870</td>
<td>Private Sector Development (PSD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) MISP V (Ninewa) - TE/IRQ/09/008 - TE/IRQ/09/C08</td>
<td>4,089,656</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Capacity Building (TCB)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20) Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion in the SME Sector in Iraq (EDIP) - FB/IRQ/07/004</td>
<td>2,862,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Budget (USD)</td>
<td>21) Technology acquisition to restart and generate economic transformation (TARGET) - FB/IRQ/08/006</td>
<td>2,784,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Rehabilitation of the Specialized Institute for Engineering Services - FBIRQ/09/004-A04 and FB/IRQ/09/004</td>
<td>3,960,518</td>
<td>22) Enterprise development through information and communication technology (EDICT) - FB/IRQ/09/007</td>
<td>2,770,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Strengthening the National Quality Infrastructure to facilitate trade and enhance consumer protection (10000000 planned budget) - TF/IRQ/11/004</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>23) Investment Promotion for Iraq (IPI) - TE/IRQ/09/010</td>
<td>3,193,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24) Operations and Industrial Maintenance Training Academy (with SIDA) - TF/IRQ/11/001; TE/IRQ/11/001</td>
<td>2,492,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex B: List of projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget (USD)</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10) Conversion from CFC-11 to methylene chloride in the production of flexible slabstock foam at al Hadi Co. - MP/IRQ/09/001</td>
<td>126,457</td>
<td>26) Rebuilding Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq (with FAO and WHO) - FB/IRQ/06/003</td>
<td>1,619,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Replacement of refrigerant CFC-12 with isobutene and foam blowing agent CFC-11 with cyclopentane in the manufacture of domestic refrigerators and chest freezers at light industries companies - MP/IRQ/09/002</td>
<td>2,161,581</td>
<td>27) Private sector development programme for IRAQ – Agro-industry component - FB/IRQ/08/A07</td>
<td>3,294,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Project preparation for elimination of controlled uses of methyl bromide in pre- and post-harvest sectors - MP/IRQ/09/006</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>29) Dairy Mosul - FB/IRQ/07/003</td>
<td>2,371,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Technical Assistance for alternatives to methyl bromide MP/IRQ/10/007</td>
<td>211,970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) HCFC Phase-Out Management Plan (stage 1, first tranche) - MP/IRQ/11/005</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Totale portfolio amount</td>
<td>2,371,374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex C: List of Persons interviewed

### Government of Iraq Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khalid Aljuboorry</td>
<td>Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Vienna, Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sami al-Araji</td>
<td>Chairman, Iraq National Investment Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shwan Azabani</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Office of Deputy Prime Minister Roysch Shaways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munkith al-Baker</td>
<td>Minister-Counselor, Ministry of Industry and Minerals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suar Aziz Ali Al Bajalan</td>
<td>Director-General, KRG Ministry of Trade and Industry, (steering committee member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thamer Ghabdan</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saad Khassaf Ali Al Khafaji</td>
<td>Head of EDU, Member of Nassariyah Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyar M. Murad</td>
<td>Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Vienna, Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alee Saleem Omer Alee</td>
<td>Director General, Department of Development and Industrial Regulations, Ministry of Industry and Minerals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabah Salih Mahdi Al Qaysi</td>
<td>Director General for Iraqi Free Zone Commission, Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoger Shalli</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Deputy Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swar Aziz Ali</td>
<td>General Director, Planning, Kurdish Ministry of Trade &amp; Industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UNIDO Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yasmin Khaled Aly</td>
<td>Associate Industrial Development Expert, UNIDO, Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Badarneh</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tidiane E. Boye</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer, Investment and Technology Unit, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan Demko</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer, Montreal Protocol Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saman Khalid Ismael Dizaye</td>
<td>UNIDO Local Program Coordinator, Erbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonothan Eischen</td>
<td>International Project Coordinator, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renato Fornacaldo</td>
<td>UNIDO Special Representative to Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishteyq Haddadin</td>
<td>Assistant to Country Programme Coordinator &amp; Security Warden, UNIDO, Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Hadi Rashaq al Rikabi</td>
<td>UNIDO Local Program Coordinator, Thi Qar Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nidal Hamza</td>
<td>Head of EDU, Baghdad, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashim Hussein</td>
<td>Director, Arab Regional Centre for Entrepreneurship and Investment Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakib Jenane</td>
<td>Chief, Agro-Industries Technology Unit and Deputy to the Director Agri-Business Development Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dina Kattan</td>
<td>Programme Assistant, UNIDO, Amman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex C: List of Persons interviewed

#### UNIDO Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arda Saygin Kostem</td>
<td>SPX Programme Coordinator – Iraq, UNIDO, Amman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefan Kratzsch</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erik Ladefoged</td>
<td>General Manager, Swedish Academy for Training, UNIDO, Erbil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Lamine Dhaoui</td>
<td>Director, Business, Investment &amp; Technology Services Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrey V. Lazykin</td>
<td>Senior Security Coordinator, Regional &amp; Field Operations Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Moll De Alba Cabot</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer, Agri-Business Development Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristiano Pasini</td>
<td>Country Programme Coordinator for Iraq, UNIDO, Amman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximilien Pierotti</td>
<td>International Project Coordinator, IZ Project, UNIDO, Amman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wigdan Al Qassy</td>
<td>Senior Technical Advisor, UNIDO, Amman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Menad Si Ahmed</td>
<td>Director, Montreal Protocol Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ole Reinholdt Nielsen</td>
<td>Unit Chief, Refrigeration &amp; Aerosols Unit, Montreal Protocol Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namal Samarakoon</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer, Agri-Business Development Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ygor Scarcia</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Expert, UNIDO, Amman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdullah Al Taharwek</td>
<td>Finance Assistant, UNIDO, Amman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dejene Tezera</td>
<td>Industrial Development Officer, Agri-Business Development Branch, UNIDO, Vienna</td>
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</table>

#### Other United Nations Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bashar Al-Ali</td>
<td>Programme Specialist, ITF Steering Committee Support Office, UNAMI, Amman</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bana Kaloti</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UNDG-Iraq Trust Fund Support Office, Amman</td>
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#### Donors and Related International Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maria Amata Garito</td>
<td>President/Rector, International Telematic University Uninettuno</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enrico Altieri</td>
<td>Owner, Galya (International firm participating in matchmaking)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alessandro Gaiazzo</td>
<td>Opere Pubbliche</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guglielmo Giordano</td>
<td>Senior Officer, Italian Cooperation for Development, (donor representative)</td>
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<td>Raimondo Sepe</td>
<td>ICT Director, Uninettuno</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ernesto Massimino Bellelli</td>
<td>Head of Task Force Iraq, Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Annex D: List of documents consulted


